McDermott v. Ige ( 2015 )

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCAP-14-0000843
27-MAY-2015
08:32 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
---o0o—
REPRESENTATIVE BOB McDERMOTT, GARRET HASHIMOTO,
WILLIAM E.K. KUMIA, and DAVID LANGDON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
GOVERNOR DAVID IGE and VIRGINIA PRESSLER,
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, STATE OF HAWAI#I,
Defendants-Appellees.
SCAP-14-0000843
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CAAP-14-0000843; CIV. NO. 13-1-2899)
MAY 27, 2015
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ., AND
CIRCUIT JUDGE CASTAGNETTI, IN PLACE OF McKENNA, J., RECUSED
OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, C.J.
This case requires us to determine whether Appellants
have standing to challenge the Hawai#i Marriage Equality Act of
2013. The 2013 Act changed Hawaii’s definition of marriage so
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that same-sex couples could marry. Appellants--State
Representative Bob McDermott, Garret Hashimoto, William E.K.
Kumia, and David Langdon--filed suit in the Circuit Court of the
First Circuit1 to invalidate the 2013 Act. The circuit court
upheld the Act’s validity.
On appeal, Appellants claim that the 2013 Act is
unconstitutional under article I, section 23 of the Hawai#i
Constitution (also referred to as the “1998 marriage amendment”),
which provides: “The legislature shall have the power to reserve
marriage to opposite-sex couples.” Haw. Const. art. I, § 23.
Specifically, Appellants argue that the 1998 marriage amendment
was adopted by the voters to constitutionally require the
legislature to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.
Before we consider the merits of Appellants’ claims, we
must first determine whether they have standing to bring this
lawsuit. Legal standing requirements promote the separation of
powers between the three branches of government by limiting the
availability of judicial review to cases involving an “injury in
fact.” Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 115 Hawai#i 299, 319,
321, 167 P.3d 292, 312, 314 (2007); Sierra Club v. Hawai#i
Tourism Auth. Ex rel. Bd. of Dirs., 100 Hawai#i 242, 250-51, 59
P.3d 877, 885-86 (2002) (plurality opinion). To have standing, a
1
The Honorable Karl K. Sakamoto presided.
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plaintiff must show that he or she has suffered an actual or
threatened injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s
actions, and that a favorable decision would likely provide
relief for that injury. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Dep’t of
Transp., 115 Hawai#i at 314, 167 P.3d at 321.
We hold that Appellants have failed to establish
standing to bring this lawsuit. The legislature’s decision to
extend the right to marry to same-sex couples does not, in any
way, diminish the right to marry that Appellants remain free to
exercise. Although it appears Appellants have deeply-held
objections to same-sex marriage, such moral or ideological
disapproval does not constitute a legally cognizable injury
sufficient to establish standing.
Because Appellants do not have standing to challenge
the constitutionality of the Marriage Equality Act, we vacate the
circuit court’s order granting summary judgment and remand the
case to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss the case
for lack of jurisdiction.
I. Background
A. Background to article I, section 23 of the Hawai#i
Constitution and the Marriage Equality Act
In 1991, three same-sex couples filed a lawsuit in the
circuit court against John C. Lewin, then-Director of the Hawai#i
Department of Health (DOH), challenging the DOH’s practice of
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restricting marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples. Baehr v.
Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 535-37, 852 P.2d 44, 48-49 (1993) (Baehr I).
The plaintiffs in Baehr I alleged that Hawai#i Revised Statutes
(HRS) § 572-1 was unconstitutional as construed by the DOH.2 Id.
On appeal, this court held that both on its face and as applied
by the DOH, HRS § 572-1 established a sex-based classification,
which would violate the equal protection clause of the Hawai#i
Constitution unless the strict scrutiny test was met, and
remanded the case to the circuit court to determine whether the
State could meet its burden of showing that the statute “furthers
compelling state interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights.” Id. at 580,
582, 852 P.2d at 67, 68.
2
At the time this court decided Baehr I, HRS § 572-1 provided, in
relevant part:
In order to make valid the marriage contract, it shall
be necessary that:
. . .
(3) The man does not at the time have any lawful
wife living and that the woman does not at the
time have any lawful husband living;
. . .
(7) The marriage ceremony be performed in the
State by a person or society with a valid
license to solemnize marriages and the man and
woman to be married and the person performing
the marriage ceremony be all physically present
at the same place and time for the marriage
ceremony.
HRS § 572-1 (1985) (emphases added).
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In 1994, while the remanded Baehr case was again before
the circuit court, the legislature amended Hawaii’s definition of
marriage in HRS § 572-1 to specify that Hawaii’s marriage
licensing laws only allowed marriage between opposite-sex
couples. 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 217 at 526. The amended HRS
§ 572-1 stated that the marriage contract “shall be only between
a man and a woman . . . .” HRS § 572-1 (2006).
Meanwhile, on remand, the circuit court held that the
State’s traditional definition of marriage did not meet strict
scrutiny, and the State appealed. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394,
1996 WL 694235, at *21-22 (Dec. 3, 1996).
In 1997, while the appeal was pending, the legislature
proposed an amendment to the Hawai#i Constitution. See 1997 Haw.
Sess. Laws HB 117 at 1246-47. Representative McDermott voted in
support of the amendment when it came before the House. The
proposed amendment was submitted to the general public as a
ballot question in the November 3, 1998 general election. The
question on the ballot asked: “Shall the Constitution of the
State of Hawaii be amended to specify that the legislature shall
have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples?”
Before the election, the State of Hawai#i Office of
Elections released a fact sheet, which included explanations of
the consequences of a “yes” vote and a “no” vote. The fact sheet
stated that “[t]he proposed amendment is intended to make it
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absolutely clear that the State Constitution gives the
Legislature the power and authority to reserve marriage to
opposite-sex couples.” The fact sheet went on to explain that a
“yes” vote would “add a new provision to the Constitution that
would give the Legislature the power to reserve marriage to
opposite-sex couples only. The legislature could then pass a law
that would limit marriage to a man and a woman, overruling the
recent Supreme Court decision regarding same-sex couples.” The
fact sheet also explained that a “no” vote “will make no change
to the Constitution of the State of Hawai#i, and allow the court
to resolve the lawsuit that has been brought against the State.”
Over two-thirds of the voters voted in favor of the
amendment, and article I, section 23 of the constitution was
added to read: “The legislature shall have the power to reserve
marriage to opposite-sex couples.” Haw. Const. art. I, § 23.
After the 1998 marriage amendment was ratified, the legislature
did not re-enact legislation defining marriage as between a man
and a woman, presumably because the then-existing version of HRS
§ 572-1 already limited marriage to opposite-sex couples. See
HRS § 572-1 (1993) (amended 1994, 1997, 2012, 2013).3
3
The 1997 and 2012 amendments to HRS § 572-1 are not relevant to
the present appeal. In 1997, the legislature amended the statute by replacing
the phrase “legitimate or illegitimate” with “the result of the issue of
parents married or not married to each other.” 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 52,
§ 5 at 97. In 2012, the legislature added language to HRS § 572-1 to ensure
consistency with Hawaii’s 2011 law recognizing civil unions. 2012 Haw. Sess.
Laws Act 267, § 4 at 945-46.
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On December 9, 1999, this court issued a summary
disposition order stating that the 1998 marriage amendment had
“tak[en] the [marriage] statute out of the ambit of the equal
protection clause of the Hawai#i Constitution,” and therefore
“HRS § 572-1 must be given full force and effect.” Baehr v.
Miike, No. 20371, 1999 WL 35643448, at *1 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999)
(SDO) (Baehr II).
The 1994 statutory definition of marriage in HRS § 572-
1 remained unchanged in pertinent part until November 2013. On
October 28, 2013, the legislature began a special session to
consider Senate Bill 1 (SB 1). SB 1 was signed into law on
November 13, 2013, as the Hawai#i Marriage Equality Act of 2013.
The Marriage Equality Act changed the definition of marriage so
that “the marriage contract . . . shall be permitted between two
individuals without regard to gender,” thereby permitting same-
sex marriage. HRS § 572-1 (Supp. 2014).
B. Prior Proceedings in the Present Case
On October 30, 2013, while the legislature was
considering SB 1, Representative McDermott filed a complaint in
the circuit court. On November 1, 2013, a first amended
complaint joined as plaintiffs Hashimoto, Kumia, and Langdon.
Appellants originally named as defendants the Governor and four
legislators. After the Marriage Equality Act was signed into
law, the legislators were removed as parties and the Director of
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the DOH was added, and the case proceeded against the Governor
and the Director of the DOH (Appellees).
On November 4, 2013, Appellants moved for a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) to enjoin the State from issuing any
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Appellants first argued
that they were likely to succeed on the merits. Appellants
acknowledged that based on the 1998 marriage amendment, the
legislature only possessed the authority to limit marriage to
opposite-sex couples by statute if it chose to do so, but argued
that at the time the public voted, the legislature had already
chosen to do so in HRS § 572-1. According to Appellants, this
indicates that the intent of the voters in 1998 was to validate
the existing statute, and reserve marriage to opposite-sex
couples only. Thus, according to Appellants, before amending the
statute to allow same-sex marriage, the legislature would have to
again ask the public to amend the constitution.
Appellants next argued that, based on experiences in
other states, they would suffer irreparable injury if SB 1 became
law:
Once same-sex marriages were approved in
Massachusetts, parents there were faced with rulings
that the schools had a duty to portray homosexual
relationships as normal, and the complaints of parents
were ignored. Further, businesses in Massachusetts
were faced with equally serious situations involving,
for example, disruptions and expenses caused by
“testing for tolerance” by homosexual activists.
Finally, Appellants argued that the public interest
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favored granting the injunction because:
[t]he public has a strong vested interest in knowing
that the very basis of Hawaii’s cultural norms, the
family, which consists of a mother, father and
children (and perhaps includes several generations),
will be forever changed. To see the depth of that
vested interest, one needs to go no further than to
consider the thousands and thousands of citizens that
met and rallied at the Capitol Building on October 28,
2013 to oppose any change to Section 572-1 that would
validate same-sex marriages. These citizens were from
every walk of life. They were Hawaiians, Polynesians,
Asians, African Americans and Caucasians. They were
young and old, and all they wanted was to tell the
legislators: “Let the people vote.” There is a
cultural norm involved, and a change in that historic
cultural norm should not be changed and mandated by a
law that is opposed by the vast majority of Hawaii’s
citizens. The adverse societal impacts and the great
public interest should be obvious to the Court.
On November 5, 2013, Appellees responded by arguing
that the court lacked the authority to grant Appellants’ motion
because enjoining the legislature from enacting a bill or the
governor from signing it would violate the separation of powers
doctrine and the political question doctrine, and that
Appellants’ action against a bill rather than a law was not ripe.
Appellees also argued that Appellants lacked standing.
According to Appellees, Representative McDermott lacked standing
as a legislator suing in his official capacity because an
individual legislator does not have standing based solely on his
or her status as a legislator, and is required to show a personal
stake and a concrete injury to establish standing. Appellees
argued that the only exception to this rule--where legislators
whose votes would have been sufficient to pass or defeat a
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specific bill sue because their votes were “nullified”--does not
apply here because Representative McDermott has not shown that
there were enough votes to defeat the bill or that his vote had
been nullified. Appellees also argued that Hashimoto, Kumia, and
Langdon (the “Individual Plaintiffs”) lacked standing because
they were attempting to assert a “value preference” which was
insufficient to show a concrete injury-in-fact.
Appellees also argued that even if the case was
properly before the court, Appellants could not show a likelihood
of success on the merits. Appellees argued that the language of
article I, section 23 clearly and unambiguously permits, but does
not require, the legislature to limit marriage to opposite-sex
couples. Thus, according to Appellees, article I, section 23 did
not limit the legislature’s authority to enact the Marriage
Equality Act.
Appellees also contended that even if the language of
article I, section 23 is ambiguous, the legislative history and
the factual circumstances surrounding the 1998 marriage amendment
supported Appellees’ interpretation of the provision.
Specifically, Appellees argued that a reasonable voter would have
understood that the 1998 marriage amendment did not require the
legislature to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples, but merely
gave the legislature the authority to act if it chose to do so.
In response to Appellees’ claim that Appellants lacked
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standing, Appellants argued that because they were bringing a
declaratory action in a matter of great public importance, the
traditional standing requirements were not applicable.
Appellants also argued that Representative McDermott had standing
as a legislator because prior to the 1998 marriage amendment, he
had represented publicly that “a ‘Yes’ vote would allow the
Constitution to be amended, so that the prior law . . . (that
reserved marriage to heterosexual couples only) would be
Constitutionally established and would be valid.” Therefore,
according to Appellants, absent an injunction, Representative
McDermott would “suffer irreparable damages to his reputation and
to his electability as a legislator, which is his livelihood,
because his actions and speeches prior to the 1998 vote will have
been and will be deemed by the electorate to be misleading and
untruthful.”
On November 7, 2013, the circuit court denied
Appellants’ motion on the grounds that enjoining the signing of
the bill would be a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine, was a political question, and was not ripe, but also
stated that it would hear further arguments on the impact of SB 1
if the Governor signed the bill into law.
In a supplemental memorandum, Appellants argued that
Appellees should be estopped from arguing that article I, section
23 merely gave the legislature the power to limit marriage to
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opposite-sex couples if it chose to do so because according to
Appellants, Appellees’ interpretation is contrary to the
information the State had given in its Ballot Information Flyer
before the general election vote on the 1998 marriage amendment.
The Ballot Information Flyer stated, in relevant parts:
The proposed amendment is intended to make it
absolutely clear that the State Constitution gives the
Legislature the power and authority to reserve
marriage to opposite-sex couples.
. . . .
A “Yes” vote would add a new provision to the
Constitution that would give the legislature the power
to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples only. The
legislature could then pass a law that would limit
marriage to a man and a woman, overruling the recent
Supreme Court decision regarding same-sex couples.
. . . .
A “No” vote will make no change to the Constitution of
the State of Hawai#i and allow the court resolve the
lawsuit that has been brought against the State.
On November 14, 2013, the day after the Marriage
Equality Act was signed into law, the circuit court held another
hearing on Appellants’ motion for a TRO and preliminary
injunction.4
Appellants clarified that their argument was not that
article I, section 23 required the legislature to define marriage
as between opposite-sex couples, but that once the legislature
exercised its power conferred by article I, section 23, the
4
Although Appellants’ motion was entitled a motion for TRO, the
circuit court held a hearing on “Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order & Preliminary Injunction.”
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legislature no longer had other powers to define marriage without
amending the constitution.
Appellees argued that regardless of article I, section
23, the legislature has the power under article 3, section 15 to
enact the Marriage Equality Act.
The circuit court found that Appellants had standing,
and concluded verbally as follows:
The court believes that the plaintiffs, both as
citizens and voters in matters of great public
importance, have a personal stake in the outcome of
this controversy and thereby have standing arising
from what the court believed was an attempt to expand
Article I, section 23 to include same sex marriage.
The circuit court then went on to conclude that article
I, section 23 empowered the legislature to limit marriage to
opposite-sex couples, but that the legislature could choose not
to exercise that power, and that, separate from article I,
section 23, the legislature had the power to define marriage
pursuant to article III, section 1. Thus, the circuit court
concluded that the Marriage Equality Act did not violate article
I, section 23, and that “same sex marriage in Hawai#i is legal.”
On December 20, 2013, the circuit court entered an
order granting in part and denying in part Appellants’ motion for
5
Article 3, section 1 of the Hawai#i Constitution provides that
“[t]he legislative power of the State shall be vested in a legislature, which
shall consist of two houses, a senate and a house of representatives. Such
power shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent
with this constitution or the Constitution of the United States.”
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a TRO and preliminary injunction.6
On December 23, 2013, Appellees filed a motion for
summary judgment (MSJ). Appellees again argued that
Representative McDermott lacked standing in his official capacity
as a legislator, and the Individual Plaintiffs all lacked
standing because they had suffered no injury-in-fact as a result
of the passage of the law.
In response, Appellants argued that Representative
McDermott has standing in his official capacity as a legislator,
and that summary judgment should be denied because “[a]s a
minimum, there is a serious issue of material fact whether the
individual Plaintiffs’ constitutional due process voting rights
have been abridged by the State’s ‘bait and switch’ tactic.”
This “bait and switch” referred to Appellants’ argument that the
State’s interpretation of the 1998 marriage amendment in the
present case is contrary to the position it presented in the
Ballot Information Flyer for the 1998 ballot question.
Appellants argued that the “bait and switch” should estop
Appellees from asserting their arguments and that it conferred
6
Appellants’ motion was
GRANTED to the extent of Plaintiffs’ declaratory
relief, as Article I, Section 23 empowers the
legislature to reserve marriage to opposite-sex
couples, but does not give the legislature the power
to constitutionally recognize marriage to same-sex
couples under Article I, Section 23; and DENIED to the
extent Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief.
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standing on the Individual Plaintiffs. Appellants also argued
that they have standing as private citizens because the lawsuit
they brought was a matter of great public importance.
On January 29, 2014, the circuit court ruled that the
Marriage Equality Act was constitutional, and on April 21, 2014,
entered an order granting Appellees’ MSJ. The circuit court
concluded that the language of article I, section 23 is clear and
unambiguous, and gives the legislature the power to reserve
marriage to opposite-sex couples, but does not demand it. The
circuit court also concluded that the legislative history and
factual circumstances surrounding the 1998 marriage amendment
supported its interpretation of the amendment’s plain language.
On May 21, 2014, Appellants appealed, and on July 16,
2014, this court granted Appellees’ transfer application. On
appeal, Appellants challenge the circuit court’s denial of
Appellants’ motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction, and
granting of Appellees’ MSJ.
II. Standard of Review
Whether the plaintiff had standing to bring his or her
claim presents a question of law, reviewable de novo. Haw. Med.
Ass’n v. Haw. Med. Serv. Ass’n, Inc., 113 Hawai#i 77, 90, 148
P.3d 1179, 1192 (2006); see also Keahole Def. Coal., Inc. v. Bd.
of Land & Natural Res., 110 Hawai#i 419, 427-28, 134 P.3d 585,
593-94 (2006). Further, standing must be addressed before we
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reach the merits, and “may be addressed at any stage of a case.”
Keahole Def. Coal., Inc., 110 Hawai#i at 427, 134 P.3d at 593.
III. Discussion
A. Legal Standing is a Requirement that Cannot be Waived
At every stage of the proceedings before the circuit
court, Appellees argued that Appellants lacked standing. The
circuit court concluded that Appellants did have standing upon
finding that this case presents a matter of great public
importance and that by passing the Marriage Equality Act of 2013,
the legislature was attempting to expand the scope of article I,
section 23. Appellees have not cross-appealed the circuit
court’s finding that Appellants had standing, because Appellees
prevailed on the merits and, according to Appellees, “‘only a
party aggrieved by a judgment can appeal from it.’” (Citing In
re Campbell’s Estate, 46 Haw. 475, 498, 382 P.2d 920, 941
(1963)).
Appellants argue that because Appellees did not cross-
appeal the circuit court’s ruling on standing, Appellees have
waived any argument on this issue. However, this court has the
independent obligation to address whether Appellants have
standing to bring these claims. See Keahole Def. Coal., Inc.,
110 Hawai#i at 427, 134 P.3d at 593 (“The issue of standing
implicates this court’s jurisdiction, and, therefore, must be
addressed first.”). If this court concludes that Appellants
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lacked standing, this court must dismiss the appeal without
reaching the merits of the case. See, e.g., Sierra Club v.
Hawai#i Tourism Auth. ex rel. Bd. of Dirs., 100 Hawai#i 242, 265 &
n.35, 59 P.3d 877, 900 & n.35 (2002) (plurality opinion) (holding
that “[i]n light of the fact that we have decided that Petitioner
lacks standing, we do not reach the merits of the case” and that
“having held that Petitioner lacks standing to bring its suit, we
dismiss Petitioner’s . . . Petition”).
Indeed, we must address standing as a threshold matter,
even if it is not raised by the parties. See Akinaka v.
Disciplinary Bd. of Hawai#i Supreme Court, 91 Hawai#i 51, 55, 979
P.2d 1077, 1081 (1999) (“Although neither the parties nor the
trial court considered the question of standing, this court has a
duty, sua sponte, to determine whether [the plaintiff] had
standing to prosecute his complaint against appellees.”).
The requirements that a party must have legal standing
to litigate a claim, and that a lack of standing is a defect that
must be addressed by the court at any point in the case, serve
several purposes that are fundamental in ensuring the effective
role of the courts in our society. Legal standing requirements
promote the separation of powers between the three branches of
government by limiting the availability of judicial review to
cases in which there is an actual dispute between adverse
parties, which “focuses attention directly on the question of
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what is the proper place of the judiciary in the American system
of government.” Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 57-58
(4th ed. 2003).
This is particularly important where, as in this case,
one party claims that action taken by another branch of
government was unconstitutional. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,
819-20 (1997). For example, this court noted in Life of the Land
v. Land Use Comm’n of State of Haw., that “even in the absence of
constitutional restrictions [on justiciability],[7] courts still
carefully weigh the wisdom, efficacy, and timeliness of an
exercise of their power before acting, especially where there may
be an intrusion into areas committed to other branches of
government.” 63 Haw. 166, 172, 623 P.2d 431, 438 (1981). In
Trustees of Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, this court
further explained that we must be wary of the “inappropriateness
of judicial intrusion into matters which concern the political
branch of government,” and that “too often, courts in their zeal
to safeguard their prerogatives overlook the pitfalls of their
7
Unlike the federal courts, the courts of Hawai#i are not subject
to the “cases or controversies” limitation imposed by Article III, Section 2
of the U.S. Constitution. Nevertheless, because the Hawai#i government, like
the federal government, is “divided and allocated among three co-equal
branches,” Trustees of Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki 69 Haw. 154,
170-71, 737 P.2d 446, 456 (1987), this court has established a set of
“‘prudential rules’ of judicial self governance” to properly limit the role of
the courts in our society, and has looked to decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court for guidance on these rules, Life of the Land, 63 Haw. at 171-73, 623
P.2d at 438-39; see also Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd. v. Cole, 59 Haw.
503, 510-11, 584 P.2d 107, 111 (1978).
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own trespass on legislative functions.” 69 Haw. 154, 172, 737
P.2d 446, 456-57 (1987) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets
omitted). Thus, a judicial determination of the
constitutionality of a statute without an actual dispute between
genuinely adverse parties could constitute an unwarranted
encroachment into the authority of the legislative branch of
government.
In addition, legal standing requirements improve
judicial decision-making by ensuring that the parties before the
court have a sufficient personal stake in the outcome to
effectively and zealously argue the merits. See Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (stating that the “gist of the question
of standing” is whether “the appellants [have] alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions”).
We note that, although standing requirements are
important to serve the policies described above, this court has
also indicated that the standing doctrine should not create a
barrier to justice where one’s legitimate interests have, in
fact, been injured. See East Diamond Head Ass’n v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals of City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 52 Haw. 518, 523 n.5, 479
P.2d 796, 799 n.5 (1971) (quoting Kenneth Davis, The Liberalized
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Law of Standing, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450, 473 (1970))
(“Complexities about standing are barriers to justice; in
removing the barriers the emphasis should be on the needs of
justice. One whose legitimate interest is in fact injured by
illegal action of an agency or officer should have standing
because justice requires that such a party should have a chance
to show that the action that hurts his interest is illegal.”).
However, the application of our standing doctrine in
this case does not create a barrier to justice. Appellants have
not been deprived of any right and have not, as discussed below,
pointed to any legally-recognized interest that has been injured.
Indeed, Appellants are seeking standing to challenge the
legislature’s extension of the right to marriage to people who,
previously, could not exercise that right. Therefore, this is
not a case in which justice requires us to relax our standing
requirements.
Accordingly, this court must, and will, address the
issue of Appellants’ standing before considering the merits of
Appellants’ constitutional argument.
B. Appellants Lack Standing to Challenge the Constitutionality
of the Marriage Equality Act
The critical inquiry in determining standing is
“‘whether the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his [or her] invocation
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of . . . [the court’s] jurisdiction and to justify exercise of
the court’s remedial powers on his [or her] behalf.’” Life of
the Land, 63 Haw. at 172, 623 P.2d at 438 (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975)). Generally, whether a
plaintiff has the requisite “personal stake” is evaluated using
the three-part injury-in-fact test. Sierra Club v. Hawai#i
Tourism Auth., 100 Hawai#i at 250-51, 59 P.3d at 885-86. Under
this test, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he or she has
suffered an actual or threatened injury as a result of the
defendant’s wrongful conduct; (2) the injury is fairly traceable
to the defendant’s actions; and (3) a favorable decision would
likely provide relief for the plaintiff’s injury. Id.
Once the standing of one plaintiff is established, the
court can proceed to a decision on the merits of the case and
need not determine whether the other Appellants also have
standing. See Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376
F.3d 908, 918 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Where the legal issues on appeal
are fairly raised by one plaintiff who had standing to bring the
suit, the court need not consider the standing of the other
plaintiffs.”) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).
Thus, we look to see if any of the Appellants have
established standing. We will first address the Appellants’
argument that they have standing based on the fact that this is a
matter of great public importance, and will then examine whether
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the Appellants have otherwise satisfied the requirements of the
injury-in-fact test.
1. Appellants Cannot Establish Standing Solely on the
Grounds That This is a Matter of Great Public
Importance
Appellants argued before the circuit court that
standing requirements should be relaxed or completely eliminated
in this case because it is a matter of great public importance.
Specifically, Appellants argued that:
The complexities of standing and ripeness standards
are considered to be barriers to justice, and when a
court considers removing those barriers, the emphasis
is placed on the needs of justice. More specifically,
those justiciability standards are simply not
applicable in declaratory judgment actions involving
matters of great importance. Thus, those standards
are not applicable and are not barriers in this case.
(Internal citations omitted).
The circuit court generally agreed with Appellants and
concluded that:
The court believes that the Plaintiffs, both as
citizens and voters in matters of great public
importance, have a personal stake in the outcome of
this controversy and thereby have standing arising
from what the court believed was an attempt to expand
Article I, section 23 to include same sex marriage.
(Emphasis added).
Before this court, Appellants do not elaborate further
on their argument that they have standing because this is a
matter of great public importance. However, because this was at
least a partial basis for the circuit court’s conclusion, we
address it as a possible basis for Appellants’ standing.
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This court has never based standing solely on the
grounds that a matter was of great public importance. Instead,
in two narrow types of cases--those involving native Hawaiian
rights and environmental concerns--this court has expanded the
requisite “injury” to include harms to aesthetic and
environmental well-being and where a plaintiff’s harm is shared
by a large portion of the population generally. Critically
though, this court has always required the plaintiff to show some
injury-in-fact.
This court’s expansion of standing in certain cases can
be traced back to East Diamond Head Ass’n, 52 Haw. at 518, 479
P.2d at 796. In East Diamond Head Ass’n, this court held that
the plaintiffs, landowners of a lot adjacent to which a variance
for industrial use had been granted in a residentially-zoned
area, had standing as “aggrieved persons” under HRS § 91-14(a)8
to challenge the variance. Id. at 522, 479 P.2d at 798. In so
holding, this court stated that:
In this case we subscribe to Professor Davis’ common
sense position on standing requirements:
“Complexities about standing are barriers to justice;
in removing the barriers the emphasis should be on the
needs of justice. One whose legitimate interest is in
fact injured by illegal action of an agency or officer
should have standing because justice requires that
such a party should have a chance to show that the
8
HRS § 91-14(a) (Supp. 2014) provides, in relevant part: “Any
person aggrieved by a final decision and order in a contested case or by a
preliminary ruling of the nature that deferral of review pending entry of a
subsequent final decision would deprive appellant of adequate relief is
entitled to judicial review thereof under this chapter . . . .”
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action that hurts his interest is illegal.”
Id. at 523 n.5, 479 P.2d at 799 n.5 (quoting Kenneth Davis, The
Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450, 473 (1970))
(emphasis added).
Even at the genesis of this expansion of standing, it
was thus clear from the language quoted by this court that we
would still require the plaintiff to show an injury-in-fact to a
legitimate interest to establish standing, while also not
allowing procedural standing complexities to create a barrier to
justice.
Since East Diamond Head Ass’n, this court has expanded
what constitutes an injury-in-fact to include not just economic
harms, but also harm to “aesthetic and environmental well being”
and cases where the plaintiff’s injury “is not different in kind
from the public’s generally, if he or she can show that he or she
has suffered an injury-in-fact.” Sierra Club v. Hawai#i Tourism
Auth. ex rel. Bd. of Dirs., 100 Hawai#i 242, 251, 59 P.3d 877,
886 (2002) (internal brackets omitted); see also Sierra Club v.
Dep’t of Transp., 115 Hawai#i 299, 313, 167 P.3d 292, 320 (2007)
(“environmental plaintiffs must meet the three-part standing test
. . . although there will be no requirement that their asserted
injury be particular to the plaintiffs, and the court will
recognize harms to plaintiffs [sic] environmental interests as
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injuries that may provide the basis for standing”).9 This
court’s expansion of standing in such cases is based, at least in
part, on article XI, section 9 of the Hawai#i Constitution, which
creates a right in “each person” to a “clean and healthful
environment.”10 Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 115 Hawai#i at
320, 167 P.3d at 313 (“The less rigorous standing requirement
this court applies in environmental cases draws support from the
Hawai#i Constitution, article XI, section 9.”). However, as this
court noted in Sierra Club v. Hawai#i Tourism Auth., “while the
basis for standing has expanded in cases implicating
environmental concerns and native Hawai[]ian rights, plaintiffs
9
See also Ka Pa#akai O Ka#aina v. Land Use Comm’n, State of Hawai#i,
94 Hawai#i 31, 42–44, 7 P.3d, 1068, 1079–81 (2000) (plaintiff organization
which sued to prevent development of a parcel of land had standing to
challenge the Land Use Commission’s decision because members of the
organization alleged the development would impair their use and enjoyment of
pristine nature, scenic views, and open coastline of the area); Citizens for
Protection of North Kohala Coastline v. Cnty. of Hawai#i, 91 Hawai#i 94,
100–02, 979 P.2d 1120, 1126–28 (1999) (plaintiff group established standing to
challenge the construction of a coastline resort by contending that they used
the area for picnics, swimming, boating, fishing, and spiritual activities,
and that the proposed resort threatened the plaintiffs’ quality of life
through irreversible degradation of the coastline and marine environment);
Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai#i 64, 70, 881 P.2d
1210, 1216 (1994) (organizations and individuals that sued challenging an
agency’s decision to grant a permit for geothermal wells established standing
by alleging the permits would diminish their property values, cause an odor
nuisance, and reduce air quality).
10
Article XI, section 9 of the Hawai#i Constitution provides in
full:
Each person has the right to a clean and healthful
environment, as defined by laws relating to
environmental quality, including control of pollution
and conservation, protection and enhancement of
natural resources. Any person may enforce this right
against any party, public or private, through
appropriate legal proceedings, subject to reasonable
limitations and regulation as provided by law.
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must still satisfy the injury-in-fact test.” 100 Hawai#i at 251,
59 P.3d at 886 (emphasis added).
Therefore, even acknowledging that marriage equality is
a matter of great public importance, Appellants cannot establish
standing based solely on this basis. Rather, they must establish
that they otherwise satisfy the injury-in-fact test, and in
particular, whether they have suffered an actual or threatened
injury.
2. Representative McDermott’s Status as a State Legislator
Who Voted for HB 117 in 1997 Does Not Establish an
Injury-in-Fact
Appellees argue that an individual’s status as a
legislator does not, on its own, confer standing to challenge a
law, and that a legislator establishes standing only by showing:
(1) a sufficient “personal stake” and “concrete injury” in the
outcome of the litigation (just like any other plaintiff); or (2)
a deprivation of his or her right to vote in the legislature, or
that his or her legislative vote has been “nullified” by the
defendants. According to Appellees, for Representative McDermott
to demonstrate legislative standing on this second basis, he
would have to demonstrate that he voted against SB 1, there were
sufficient votes to defeat SB 1, and that due to some
nullification of his vote, SB 1 nonetheless was deemed passed.
In response, Appellants argue that it is not
Representative McDermott’s vote against SB 1 that is at issue,
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but instead his vote in 1997 for HB 117, which was the bill that
proposed the ballot question for the 1998 marriage amendment.
Appellants argue that Representative McDermott voted for HB 117
with the “firm conviction that the [1998] Marriage Amendment
. . . would allow only opposite sex couples to marry in the State
of Hawai#i.” According to Appellants, the legislature’s
enactment of the Marriage Equality Act abrogated the 1998
marriage amendment, and in doing so the legislature nullified
Representative McDermott’s legislative vote in favor of HB 117.
Cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court and this court
do not support Appellants’ argument that Representative McDermott
has established legislative standing. Instead, these cases show
that, although a legislator may indeed have standing to challenge
a law if his or her vote was nullified or if he or she was
unlawfully deprived of the right to vote, Representative
McDermott simply has not shown the requisite deprivation or
nullification that is required to establish such standing.
In Coleman v. Miller, twenty Kansas state legislators
voted to ratify a constitutional amendment, and twenty voted
against ratification. 307 U.S. 433, 435-36 (1939). The Kansas
Lieutenant Governor cast the deciding twenty-first vote in favor
of ratification and the legislators who lost the vote then sued
to compel state officials to recognize that the amendment had not
been properly ratified. Id. at 436. The U.S. Supreme Court held
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that the legislators had standing because
[h]ere, the plaintiffs include twenty senators, whose
votes against ratification have been overridden and
virtually held for naught although if they are right
in their contentions their votes would have been
sufficient to defeat ratification. We think that
these senators have a plain, direct and adequate
interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their
votes.
Id. at 438.
In Raines v. Byrd, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether four Senators and two Congressmen who all voted
“nay” in 1996 on the Line Item Veto Act had standing to file a
lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the act after it was
passed. 521 U.S. 811, 813-14 (1997). The Line Item Veto Act
gave the President the authority to cancel certain spending and
tax measures after signing them into law. Id. at 814. The
Senate passed the bill for the act by 69 votes to 31, and the
House passed the identical bill by a vote of 232 to 177. Id.
The Court first reiterated that a plaintiff must suffer a
“particularized” injury which affects the plaintiff in a personal
and individual way. Id. at 819 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). The Court then held that
the legislator-plaintiffs did not have a sufficient “personal
stake” in the dispute and had not alleged a sufficiently
“concrete injury” to establish standing. Id. at 830. In so
holding, the Court examined its previous decision in Coleman.
The Raines Court explained:
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[O]ur holding in Coleman stands . . . for the
proposition that legislators whose votes would have
been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific
legislative Act have standing to sue if that
legislative action goes into effect (or does not go
into effect), on the ground that their votes have been
completely nullified.
It should be equally obvious that appellees’ claim [in
Raines] does not fall within our holding in Coleman,
as thus understood. They have not alleged that they
voted for a specific bill, that there were sufficient
votes to pass the bill, and that the bill was
nonetheless deemed defeated.
Id. at 823-24.
The Raines Court also addressed the legislator-
plaintiffs’ argument that, under Coleman, they had standing
because their future votes on appropriations bills would be less
effective because the President now had the power to veto certain
measures. Id. at 825. The Court refused to expand Coleman this
far because
[a]ppellees’ use of the word “effectiveness” to link
their argument to Coleman stretches the word far
beyond the sense in which the Coleman opinion used it.
There is a vast difference between the level of vote
nullification at issue in Coleman and the abstract
dilution of institutional legislative power that is
alleged here.
Id. at 825-26.
Appellees in the case at bar contend that the
principles set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Raines and
Coleman are also followed in Hawai#i.
In Mottl v. Miyahira, two of the plaintiffs challenging
a reduction in the University of Hawaii’s allotted funds were
legislators who argued that they had standing because they “have
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not only the interest of a general member of the public in seeing
that the laws of the state are complied with, but the interest of
persons who have spent their own official time on behalf of their
constituents, reviewing, voting on, and enacting budgets that
become law.” 95 Hawai#i 381, 392, 23 P.3d 716, 727 (2001). This
court held that the legislator-plaintiffs did not have standing
because “[t]hey have not alleged any ‘personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy,’ inasmuch as they have not alleged
that they had personally suffered any ‘distinct and palpable
injury.’” Id.
In Hanabusa v. Lingle, two state senators who had voted
in favor of an act that modified the appointment process for
members of the University of Hawai#i Board of Regents (BOR)
brought an action to compel the governor to nominate six
candidates to replace holdover members of the BOR. 119 Hawai#i
341, 346, 198 P.3d 604, 609 (2008). The senators contended that
by refusing to nominate six new names, the governor was denying
the senators their constitutional power and duty to advise and
consent regarding the nominees. Id. The governor argued that,
under Mottl, the senators lacked standing. Id. at 348, 198 P.3d
at 611. However, this court distinguished Mottl and held that
the senators had standing on the grounds that the “allegation
that [the senators’] right to advise and consent on BOR
appointments has been usurped by [the governor] . . . is
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sufficiently personal to constitute an injury in fact.” Id.
Several principles can be drawn from these cases of the
U.S. Supreme Court and Hawai#i Supreme Court. First, a
legislator does not, merely by virtue of voting on an act, have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the act. Second,
to have standing, a legislator must establish that he or she has
suffered a distinct and palpable injury resulting from the
passing of (or failure to pass) the law being challenged. Third,
this requisite injury for legislators may arise if the
legislator’s right to vote on a bill has somehow been nullified,
usurped, or the legislator’s vote has subsequently been rendered
ineffective. These cases do not, however, support standing for a
legislator who simply does not prevail in the vote count.
In the present case, Appellants argue that
Representative McDermott’s vote in 1997 in favor of HB 117 was
nullified by the legislature enacting the Marriage Equality Act
in 2013. In essence, Appellants’ argument is that Representative
McDermott voted for HB 117 under the belief that the proposed
constitutional amendment would limit marriage to opposite-sex
couples in a way that could not be undone by the legislature
through its customary and ordinary powers, but that the
legislature’s determination in 2013 that the 1998 marriage
amendment did not inhibit its customary and ordinary power to
enact the Marriage Equality Act nullified Representative
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McDermott’s 1997 vote in favor of HB 117. This is unpersuasive.
Representative McDermott voted in favor of HB 117,
which provided, in relevant part:
SECTION 1. The purpose of this Act is to propose an
amendment to article I of the Constitution of the
State of Hawaii, to clarify that the legislature has
the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.
The legislature finds that the unique social
institution of marriage involving the legal
relationship of matrimony between a man and a woman is
a protected relationship of fundamental and unequaled
importance to the State, the nation, and society. The
legislature further finds that the question of whether
or not the state should issue marriage licenses to
couples of the same sex is a fundamental policy issue
to be decided by the elected representatives of the
people. This constitutional measure is thus designed
to confirm that the legislature has the power to
reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples and to ensure
that the legislature will remain open to the petitions
of those who seek a change in the marriage laws, and
that such petitioners can be considered on an equal
basis with those who oppose a change in our current
marriage statutes.
SECTION 2. Article I of the Constitution of the State
of Hawaii is amended by adding a new section to be
designated and to read as follows:
. . . .
[“]Section 23. The legislature shall have the power
to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.”
SECTION 3. The question to be printed on the ballot
shall be as follows:
“Shall the Constitution of the State of Hawaii be
amended to specify that the legislature shall have the
power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples?”
1997 Haw. Sess. Laws H.B. No. 117 at 1246 (emphases added).
The question that appeared on the ballot at the 1998
election pursuant to HB 117 was identical to that proposed in the
bill: “Shall the Constitution of the State of Hawai#i be amended
to specify that the legislature shall have the power to reserve
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marriage to opposite-sex couples?” The language that was added
to the Hawai#i Constitution as article I, section 23 was also
identical to that proposed in the bill: “The legislature shall
have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.”
Haw. Const. art. I, § 23. Therefore, Representative McDermott’s
vote was not nullified: HB 117 was passed, the Hawai#i public
voted in favor of the amendment, the constitution was amended as
HB 117 provided, and the definition of marriage excluding same-
sex couples in HRS § 572-1 was given full force and effect by
this court in Baehr II.
Because Representative McDermott was able to exercise
his right to vote for HB 117, his vote was counted in full, and
he was on the winning side of the vote, Appellants cannot rely on
any of the cases discussed above to support Representative
McDermott’s legislative standing.
Appellants’ argument essentially boils down to the view
that because the legislature in 2013 interpreted the language of
HB 117 to allow it to enact the Marriage Equality Act–-although
Representative McDermott did not interpret it the same way when
he cast his legislative vote for HB 117--Representative McDermott
now has standing to challenge the Marriage Equality Act.
Even if we assume as true Appellants’ allegation that
in 1997 Representative McDermott believed he was voting for a
measure that would prevent the legislature from redefining
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marriage to include same-sex couples, Appellants’ argument is
misplaced. A legislator’s challenge to the subsequent
interpretation of a law he or she voted for, as Representative
McDermott does here, is a far cry from a legislator’s vote being
“nullified” as explained by the cases discussed above.
Representative McDermott’s challenge to the Marriage Equality Act
is even more attenuated than the “abstract dilution” of
legislative power that was deemed an inadequate injury in Raines,
and is clearly distinguishable from the direct nullification of
votes that were deemed adequate injuries in Coleman, or the
denial of the constitutionally recognized power of advise and
consent that was at issue in Hanabusa.
Representative McDermott also contends that a New York
case, Silver v. Pataki, 755 N.E.2d 842 (N.Y. 2001), supports his
standing argument. Silver states that a legislator’s
“responsibility necessarily includes continuing concern for
protecting the integrity of one’s votes and implies the power to
challenge in court the effectiveness of a vote that has allegedly
been unconstitutionally nullified.” Id. at 846. In Silver, the
plaintiff, a member and speaker of the New York State Assembly,
brought an action against the Governor of New York alleging that
the governor had unconstitutionally vetoed line items in a non-
appropriations bill that the plaintiff had voted on. Id. at 844-
45. The court held that the situation was analogous to that in
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Coleman, and that “[a]s a Member of the Assembly who voted with
the majority in favor of the budget legislation, [the] plaintiff
undoubtedly has suffered an injury in fact with respect to the
alleged unconstitutional nullification of his vote sufficient to
confer standing.” Id. at 847-48.
In contrast to cases like Raines and Mottl, where the
plaintiffs had no standing, the plaintiff in Silver “won the
legislative battle and . . . [sought] to uphold that legislative
victory against a claimed unconditional use of the veto power
nullifying his vote.” Id. at 848. In other words, absent the
allegedly unconstitutional veto in Silver, the bill the plaintiff
voted for would have become law, whereas in Raines and Mottl, the
plaintiffs were simply attempting to challenge bills on the basis
that they had voted no, but had lost in the vote count. Silver
is thus distinguishable from the present case. Like the
plaintiff in Silver, Representative McDermott was on the winning
side of the legislative vote for HB 117 in 1997, but unlike the
plaintiff in Silver, Representative McDermott’s vote was never
vetoed or nullified in any way because the proposed question in
HB 117 appeared on the 1998 ballot in the exact form
Representative McDermott had voted for.11
11
In addition, if we were to hold that Representative McDermott has
standing to challenge the interpretation of a law that he voted for sixteen
years ago, solely on the basis that he voted for it and without any other
individualized injury, we would open the door to legislator suits against both
judicial and agency interpretations of any laws that a legislator has voted
(continued...)
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Appellants also rely on the recent U.S. Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
Appellants argue that Windsor is supportive because in Windsor
the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the Bipartisan Legal Advisory
Group (BLAG), a group consisting solely of members of Congress,
to intervene to defend the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), but did not require BLAG’s members to show that they had
voted for DOMA or that their votes were “nullified.” Contrary to
Appellants’ assertion, Windsor does not support their standing
arguments.
In Windsor, the plaintiff, a private individual,
challenged DOMA, claiming that DOMA’s definition of marriage
unconstitutionally denied tax benefits to same-sex couples. Id.
at 2682-83. The executive branch agreed with Windsor that DOMA
was unconstitutional and thus refused to defend the
constitutionality of the law. Id. at 2683. BLAG then intervened
in the lawsuit to defend DOMA. Id. at 2684. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, amicus curiae challenged BLAG’s standing to appeal
the case. Id. at 2685. Although the Supreme Court recognized
that the arguments raised against BLAG’s standing raised a
substantial question, the court found that BLAG had standing
11
(...continued)
on. Under such a precedent, a legislator would be able to establish standing
no matter how long ago the vote occurred, simply by alleging that he or she
“believed” he or she had voted for a different interpretation.
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based on the “unusual and urgent” circumstances of the case. Id.
at 2688. In particular, the Court noted that if it were to
dismiss the case, extensive litigation would ensue, district
courts in ninety-four districts would be without guidance, and
the “[r]ights and privileges of hundreds of thousands of persons
would be adversely affected, pending a case in which all
prudential concerns about justiciability are absent.” Id.
Appellants’ reliance on Windsor is misplaced. The
standing issue in Windsor did not involve whether a legislator
who voted for a bill had standing to challenge (or defend) a law
because the legislator’s vote was allegedly nullified, as
Representative McDermott is arguing here. BLAG was not seeking
standing on the basis that its members voted for DOMA and were
defending the law to preserve the validity of their votes.
Instead, the standing issue in Windsor was whether the parties
were still adverse given the executive branch’s agreement with
Windsor’s legal position and decision not to defend DOMA, and
BLAG’s intervention on behalf of the executive branch. Id. at
2685. According to the amicus curiae, the case should have ended
once the district court found DOMA to be unconstitutional and
ordered the United States to pay the tax refund to Windsor,
because the parties were no longer adverse and were both, in
effect, prevailing parties. Id. The amicus curiae thus asserted
that BLAG did not have standing to intervene and appeal from the
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district court’s judgment because there was no party aggrieved by
the judgment. Id. Windsor is thus inapposite to the case at bar.
Representative McDermott is not seeking to intervene to defend a
law because the State of Hawai#i is refusing to do so, or appeal
from a judgment where there are no aggrieved parties, but is
simply challenging the validity of a law on his own behalf.
Appellants’ reliance on Windsor to establish Representative
McDermott’s standing is therefore unpersuasive.
Thus, Representative McDermott has alleged no injury-
in-fact based on his status as a legislator who voted for HB 117.
Appellants’ argument for legislative standing fails at part one
of the three-part test because Representative McDermott has not
suffered any actual or threatened individual injury as a result
of Appellees’ wrongful conduct. See Sierra Club v. Dep’t of
Transp., 115 Hawai#i at 319, 167 P.3d 292 at 312.
3. Appellants Have not Shown an Injury-in-Fact Based on
Their Allegation That They Were Misled as to the
Meaning of the 1998 Marriage Amendment
The Individual Plaintiffs argue that the Marriage
Equality Act nullified their votes on the 1998 ballot, so they
suffered an “actual and personal injury” that supports standing.
Appellants contend that the State engaged in a “bait and switch”
tactic, and that this is the basis upon which the circuit court
found standing.
Appellants’ argument is that the voters were misled
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into believing that they were voting for a constitutional
amendment that would prevent the legislature from later enacting
a law to recognize same-sex marriage without another
constitutional amendment, because one part of the Ballot
Information Flyer and the fact sheet was different from the
actual ballot question. The Ballot Information Flyer and the
fact sheet that the State circulated prior to the 1998 election
stated: “A ‘Yes’ vote would add a new provision to the
Constitution that would give the legislature the power to reserve
marriage to opposite-sex couples only,” (emphasis added), while
the question on the actual ballot was: “Shall the Constitution
of the State of Hawai#i be amended to specify that the
legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-
sex couples?” Notably, however, both the fact sheet and the
flyer also included the actual verbatim text of the ballot
question, which did not include the word “only.”
To recap, the first part of the three-part standing
test requires the plaintiff to show that he or she has suffered
an actual or threatened injury as a result of the defendant’s
wrongful conduct. Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 115 Hawai#i
at 319, 167 P.3d 292 at 312. Appellants have not satisfied this
requirement. Appellants’ bare factual allegations may allege an
“injury,” but Appellants have not provided sufficient evidence to
support their allegations. Moreover, even if we were to assume
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that Appellants’ allegations are true, any such injury is not a
result of the Appellees’ conduct.
Hawai#i voters have a legitimate interest in protecting
the validity of their votes on constitutional amendment ballot
questions. While this court has not specifically addressed the
standing of voters to challenge defects in constitutional
amendment ballots, it has decided such cases on the merits. For
example, in Watland v. Lingle, this court exercised jurisdiction
and ruled on the merits of a challenge to the validity of a
constitutional amendment where registered voters alleged that the
State had not complied with requirements regarding publication
and disclosure of the amendment text and had provided voters with
misinformation regarding the amendment. 104 Hawai#i 128, 130,
135-36, 85 P.3d 1079, 1081, 1086-87 (2004).
Similarly, in Kahalekai v. Doi, this court decided on
the merits a case in which voters challenged constitutional
amendments on two grounds. First, the plaintiffs alleged that
the ballot questions were in a form that “contained an inherent
bias towards a ‘yes’ vote.” 60 Haw. 324, 332, 590 P.2d 543, 549,
(1979). Second, the plaintiffs alleged that, although the
Constitutional Convention’s informational supplement stated that
“the complete text of the constitutional amendments is contained
in this supplement,” the supplement did not in fact contain the
exact text of the amendments because the Constitutional
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Convention altered the language of the amendments before they
appeared on the ballots. Id. at 340-41, 590 P.2d at 554.
Here, although part of the explanations on the fact
sheet and the Ballot Information Flyer did include the word
“only,” the fact sheet and the flyer both also included the
verbatim text that appeared on the ballot sheet (without the word
“only”), and this was the same language that was ultimately added
as article I, section 23. Further, the addition of the word
“only” in the explanations does not appear to change the meaning
of the text in the amendment.
Moreover, even if Appellants’ allegations could, under
Watland and Kahalekai, amount to a legally cognizable injury
based on their interest in their votes on the 1998 ballot,
Appellants’ bare factual allegations are insufficient. This case
was decided at the summary judgment stage, so Appellants were
required to set forth facts demonstrating their standing.12
12
Although, at the pleading stage, general factual allegations may
be sufficient to establish standing, Appellants bear the burden of proof for
each of the injury-in-fact elements, commensurate with the degree of evidence
required at each successive stage of litigation. Sierra Club v. Hawai#i
Tourism Auth., 100 Hawai#i at 250-51, 59 P.3d at 885-86 (citing Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). This case proceeded to the
summary judgment stage, so Appellants, as the party responding, were required
to demonstrate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” HRCP Rule 56(e). At the summary judgment stage, we may consider
affidavits submitted opposing the motion for summary judgment. Sierra Club v.
Hawai#i Tourism Auth., 100 Hawai#i at 251, 59 P.3d at 886.
Attached to Appellants’ response to the MSJ in this case were
declarations by Hashimoto, which stated: “I voted in 1998 to amend the
Hawai#i Constitution which gave the Legislature only power to reserve marriage
for opposite-sex couples,” Langdon, which stated: “In 1998, I voted for our
Hawai#i Constitution being amended with the understanding that this would make
(continued...)
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However, Appellants have not provided evidence that the
Individual Plaintiffs were misled. Although the declarations of
the Individual Plaintiffs show that Hashimoto, Langdon, and Kumia
all voted on the 1998 ballot under the belief that a “yes” vote
would only allow marriage in Hawai#i to be between opposite-sex
couples, none of the declarations state that any of the three
Individual Plaintiffs relied upon or even read the Ballot
Information Flyer or the Office of Elections’ fact sheet that
Appellants claim misled the voters. Thus, Appellants presented
no evidence at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings to
show that any of the Individual Plaintiffs were actually misled.
Furthermore, even if Appellants had provided enough
evidence to establish an injury under the first prong, they could
not rely on this alleged injury to challenge the Marriage
Equality Act because such injury is not a result of Appellees’
conduct. There is a disconnect between the allegedly wrongful
conduct--the alleged “bait and switch” in 1998--and the identity
and conduct of Appellees in this case. The parties that
Appellants have sued as defendants in this case--the Governor and
Director of Health--are responsible for signing the Marriage
Equality Act into law in 2013 and issuing marriage licenses,
12
(...continued)
same-sex marriages illegal under our Constitution,” and Kumia, which stated:
“I voted in 1998 to amend the Hawai#i Constitution by adding in new section to
only allow marriage in Hawai#i to be between one man and one woman.”
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respectively, but they are not the parties responsible for the
alleged misleading of voters on the 1998 ballot. To seek a
remedy for this injury that occurred in 1998, Appellants would
have needed to sue the State of Hawai#i Office of Elections.
This flaw in Appellants’ allegation also causes the
alleged injury to fail at the second part of the three-part test.
Appellants have not demonstrated sufficient causation because the
Individual Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is not “fairly traceable”
to Appellees’ actions.
As noted above, the Appellees in this case are not the
parties responsible for the alleged “bait and switch” upon which
Appellants’ “injury” is based. If Appellants had sued the
parties responsible for allegedly misleading Appellants on the
1998 ballot, we would be required to determine whether there was
a sufficient “logical nexus” between the Appellees’ conduct
(misleading voters in 1998) and Appellants’ alleged injury (the
enactment of the Marriage Equality Act). See Sierra Club v.
Hawai#i Tourism Auth., 100 Hawai#i at 253, 59 P.3d at 888
(requiring members of the Sierra Club to show a “logical nexus”
between the defendant’s expenditure of funds and the injuries the
members alleged). Although the link between the alleged “bait
and switch” and the enactment of the Marriage Equality Act seems
somewhat speculative, we need not determine whether there is
sufficient causation to be “fairly traceable” because here, it is
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clear that Appellees are not the parties responsible for
allegedly misleading Appellants on the 1998 ballot.
Moreover, even if Appellants had met the first two
prongs of the test, in regard to the third prong, Appellants have
not established that “‘a favorable decision would likely provide
relief for the [their] injur[ies].’” Sierra Club v. Dep’t of
Transp., 115 Hawai#i at 319, 167 P.3d 292 at 312 (quoting Mottl,
95 Hawai#i at 389, 23 P.3d at 724). The Individual Plaintiffs,
as voters on the 1998 ballot, are seeking a remedy that is not
available to them. Appellants allege that “because the State
engaged in a ‘bait and switch’ tactic, to the detriment of the
Individual Plaintiffs, they have certainly demonstrated an injury
in fact.” Even if Appellants suffered an injury, this is only
true as to the 1998 ballot question. Accordingly, as in Watland
and Kahalekai, Appellants would arguably have standing to
challenge the validity of the amendment they voted on, i.e. the
1998 marriage amendment. However, that is not the law that they
are challenging here. Rather, they are challenging the Marriage
Equality Act, which was adopted sixteen years later.
Accordingly, Appellants have not shown an injury that a
favorable decision in this case would address, and therefore fail
the third part of the standing test.
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4. Appellants Do Not Have Standing Based on Their
Allegation That the Marriage Equality Act
Unconstitutionally Expanded the Meaning of Article I,
Section 23
Appellants argue that the Marriage Equality Act
unconstitutionally expands the meaning of article I, section 23
in a way contrary to what they voted for, thereby nullifying
their votes and injuring them, and that this was the grounds on
which the circuit court found that Appellants had standing.
Effectively, Appellants allege that the Marriage Equality Act is
facially unconstitutional because it violates their understanding
of article I, section 23.
To have standing to challenge the constitutionality of
a statute, “[t]he general rule is that ‘[w]here restraints
imposed act directly on an individual or entity and a claim of
specific present objective harm is presented, standing to
challenge the constitutionality of an ordinance or statute
exists.’” State v. Armitage, 132 Hawai#i 36, 55, 319 P.3d 1044,
1063 (2014) (quoting State v. Bloss, 64 Haw. 148, 151, 637 P.2d
1117, 1121 (1981)). Further, to have standing, “[o]ne must show
that as applied to him [or her] the statute is constitutionality
invalid.” Id.; City & Cnty. of Honolulu v. Ariyoshi, 67 Haw.
412, 419, 689 P.2d 757, 763 (1984).
Appellants’ argument for standing on this basis is
without merit. In the same way that Representative McDermott’s
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vote for HB 117 was not nullified by the enactment of the
Marriage Equality Act, neither have the Individual Plaintiffs’
votes in 1998 been nullified. There is no allegation that
Appellants’ votes were not given full effect, or that the 1998
marriage amendment that the Individual Plaintiffs voted for was
not enacted into law. The legislature’s enactment of a statute
cannot constitute an injury-in-fact to grant standing to general
election voters who voted on a related proposed constitutional
amendment years earlier.
Thus, Appellants do not have standing based on their
contention that the Marriage Equality Act unconstitutionally
expanded the meaning of article I, section 23.
Finally, we note that, in addition to their argument
for standing based on their status as voters on the 1998 marriage
amendment, before the circuit court, Appellants argued that the
Individual Plaintiffs had standing based on alleged injuries
resulting directly from the enactment of the Marriage Equality
Act, as articulated in their declarations. Appellants have not
pursued this argument in their submissions to this court, and
counsel for Appellants explicitly stated at oral argument that
Appellants were not relying on these alleged injuries to
establish standing. See Oral Argument at 21:28-22:25; 23:00-
23:33, McDermott v. Ige, No. SCWC–XX-XXXXXXX, available at
http://state.hi.us/jud/oa/14/SCOA_121814_14_843.mp3. We
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therefore do not address this argument here.13
Because the Marriage Equality Act has not nullified
Appellants’ votes, and Appellants have not alleged any way in
which the Marriage Equality Act is constitutionally invalid as
applied to them, we hold that the circuit court erred in finding
that Appellants had standing to pursue this claim.
IV. Conclusion
Because Appellants lacked standing to pursue the
present action, we vacate the circuit court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of Appellees and against Appellants,
and remand the case to the circuit court with instructions to
enter an order dismissing the first amended complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
Robert K. Matsumoto /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
and Shawn A. Luiz
for appellants /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Deirdre Marie-Iha /s/ Richard W. Pollack
and Donna H. Kalama
for appellees /s/ Michael D. Wilson
/s/ Jeannette H. Castagnetti
13
We note, however, that courts in other jurisdictions, when
addressing the merits of challenges to bans on same-sex marriage, have
rejected the notion that allowing same-sex couples to marry might harm other
members of the public. For example, the Seventh Circuit held that “while many
heterosexuals . . . disapprove of same-sex marriage, there is no way they are
going to be hurt by it in a way that the law would take cognizance of.”
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 669 (7th Cir. 2014). Further, the District
Court for the Northern District of Florida held that “[t]hose who enter
opposite-sex marriages are harmed not at all when others . . . are given the
liberty to choose their own life partners and are shown the respect that comes
with formal marriage.” Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1291 (N.D. Fl.
2014).
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