State v. Godines. , 138 Haw. 243 ( 2016 )

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-14-0000384
05-AUG-2016
07:50 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
---o0o---
STATE OF HAWAI#I,
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DANNETTE H. GODINES,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
SCWC-14-0000384
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-14-0000384; CASE NO. 3DTC-13-000064)
AUGUST 5, 2016
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, C.J.
Dannette H. Godines received a citation for operating a
vehicle without motor vehicle insurance in violation of Hawai#i
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 431:10C-104 (2005).1 The District Court
1
HRS § 431:10C-104 (Conditions of operation and registration of
motor vehicles) provides in relevant part:
(continued...)
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of the Third Circuit2 found Godines guilty and sentenced her to a
$500 fine. Upon appeal to the Intermediate Court of Appeals
(ICA), Godines requested waiver of her transcript costs under HRS
§ 802-7 (1979).3 The ICA denied her request for waiver,
reasoning that Godines was not a “criminal defendant” as required
by the statute. After several more attempts to get her
transcript costs waived, Godines proceeded with her appeal
without filing any of the district court transcripts. She argued
that the district court committed reversible error by failing to
adjudicate her case pursuant to HRS Chapter 291D4 and the Hawai#i
Civil Traffic Rules (HCTR). The ICA affirmed the district court,
1
(...continued)
(a) Except as provided in section 431:10C-105, no
person shall operate or use a motor vehicle upon any
public street, road, or highway of this State at any
time unless such motor vehicle is insured at all times
under a motor vehicle insurance policy.
(b) Every owner of a motor vehicle used or operated at
any time upon any public street, road, or highway of
this State shall obtain a motor vehicle insurance
policy upon such vehicle which provides the coverage
required by this article and shall maintain the motor
vehicle insurance policy at all times for the entire
motor vehicle registration period.
. . . .
2
The Honorable Barbara T. Takase presided.
3
HRS § 802-7 (Litigation expenses) provides in relevant part:
The court may, upon a satisfactory showing that a
criminal defendant is unable to pay for transcripts or
witness fees and transportation, or for investigatory,
expert or other services, and upon a finding that the
same are necessary for an adequate defense, direct
that such expenses be paid from available court funds
or waived, as the case may be . . . .
4
HRS Chapter 291D is titled “Adjudication of Traffic Infractions.”
2
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concluding that HRS Chapter 291D does not apply to violations of
HRS § 431:10C-104 and that the district court used the proper
procedure.
In her application, Godines presents three questions:
A. Whether the [ICA] gravely erred when it
misinterpreted HRS §431:10C-117(a)(6), then misapplied
it to the ruling in this matter in its Summary
Disposition Order of December 21, 2015.
B. Whether the [ICA] gravely erred under HRS §602-59
when it denied Petitioner the required waiver to
facilitate the procurement of vital written
transcripts based upon the finding that the violation
of offense “constitutes a traffic infraction” as
defined by HRS §291D and supporting case law, then
turned and ruled in favor of Respondent based upon the
complete opposite finding that the violation or
offense “not be deemed . . . a traffic infraction as
defined by chapter 291D.”
C. Whether the ICA gravely erred when it failed to
surmise that the lower court should have disposed of
this case on May 14, 2013 had it complied with [HRS]
§805-13, the proper procedure for violations under
[HRS §] 431:10C-104, and that other contributing
factors, including the requirement of actual operation
of a motor vehicle prior to being cited for said
moving violation, would deem [HRS] §291D the proper
application in this matter.
In short, Godines argues that the ICA (1) incorrectly
concluded that HRS Chapter 291D did not apply to her case and (2)
improperly denied her requests to waive transcript costs.
We conclude that the ICA correctly determined that HRS
Chapter 291D did not apply to Godines’ case, since HRS
§ 431:10C-117 (2006) clearly states that first time violations of
HRS § 431:10C–104 “shall not be deemed to be a traffic infraction
as defined by chapter 291D.” HRS § 431:10C-117(a)(6).
3
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However, the ICA did err in denying Godines’ request
for transcript costs on the basis that she was not a “criminal
defendant” under HRS § 802-7. Although the punishment of a first
time violation of HRS § 431:10C-104 does not include
imprisonment, HRS § 431:10C-104 cases are adjudicated pursuant to
criminal procedure in a criminal proceeding. Further, the
legislature sought to impose harsher penalties for HRS § 431:10C-
104, as evidenced by the fact that multiple convictions under HRS
§ 431:10C-104 authorize imprisonment. HRS § 431:10C-117(a)(5).
Thus, Godines should be considered a “criminal defendant” for the
purposes of HRS § 802-7.
We therefore vacate the ICA’s judgment on appeal and
remand with instructions to consider Godines’ request under HRS
§ 802-7 and determine whether she is entitled to payment of
transcripts from available court funds. If Godines is so
entitled, the transcripts shall be included in the record on
appeal, and the ICA should allow for supplemental briefing on
issues other than those related to HRS Chapter 291D.
I. Background
A. District Court Proceedings
Godines received a citation for “No Motor Vehicle
Insurance Policy,” in violation of HRS § 431:10C-104. After a
bench trial, the court found Godines guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt and sentenced her to the following: “[Fine] $500, of which
$450 suspended for a period of 6 months provided no further
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similar violations; [Driver Education Assessment Fee] $7;
[Administrative Fee] $40.”
B. ICA Proceedings
Godines filed her notice of appeal and a “Motion for
Leave to Proceed on Appeal In Forma Pauperis,” stating that she
was unable to pay the costs of her appeal. The motion also
expressed her intent to appeal the following issues:
1. Lack of probable cause prior to police involvement
preempting violation of civil rights;
2. Criteria not met prior to issuance of citation;
3. Lack of equity during trial court proceeding,
plain and grave error, abuse of discretion;
4. Existence of ample reasonable doubt; and,
5. Questionable, even contemptuous behavior on the
part of certain police officers, prosecuting attorneys
and trial court.
The ICA granted Godines’ motion to proceed in forma
pauperis and ordered the clerk to “file the record on appeal
without payment of the filing fee.”5 Godines subsequently filed
a “Request for Waiver of Prepayment of Court Costs,” requesting
“pursuant to HRS § 802-7 and any other applicable statute, that
prepayment of . . . costs be paid from available court funds or
waived, . . . includ[ing] transcripts or witness fees and
transportation, investigatory, expert or other services[.]”
The ICA denied Godines’ request, reasoning that Godines
was not entitled to a waiver of appellate fees because HRS § 802-
7 only applies to “criminal defendants.” The ICA noted that a
single conviction under HRS § 431:10C-104 is not punishable by
5
The record on appeal consisting of the district court docket
entries was filed.
5
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imprisonment, and thus, Godines’ citation constituted a traffic
infraction. Because HRS § 291D-3(a) (2007) states that “[n]o
traffic infraction shall be classified as a criminal offense[,]”
the ICA determined that Godines had not been charged with a
crime.
The ICA further reasoned that, pursuant to HRS Chapter
291D, “contested traffic citations are adjudicated at a hearing
before a district court” and that “[a]n adjudication in favor of
the State may be followed by a trial de novo.” The ICA stated
Godines’ case was adjudicated with a trial de novo “consistent
with the procedure for a traffic infraction rather than a
criminal offense[.]”
Therefore, the ICA concluded that Godines was not
entitled to a waiver of costs under HRS § 802-7. Godines did not
pay the transcript costs requested by the court reporter, and no
transcripts were filed in the record on appeal.
Godines filed––and the ICA denied––several motions
repeatedly arguing that the court’s grant of her motion to
proceed in forma pauperis established her indigent status and
that the transcripts were necessary to present her issues on
appeal.
Her opening brief again stated that Godines was
“severely crippled” by the ICA’s denial of her waiver request and
presented the following question on appeal:
The question in this instant case is whether the trial
[c]ourt committed reversible error by adjudicating a
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traffic infraction as a traffic crime under the HRPP
and HRE, sending Appellant directly to trial as a
criminal defendant, yet without the provision of
counsel, while the prosecutor maintained a presence
all throughout the proceedings, as opposed to
adjudicating the infraction in accordance with HRS
§291D-8 and the HCTR [Hawai#i Civil Traffic Rules].
She stated that, pursuant to HCTR Rule 2,6 District Court Rules
of Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 1,7 HRS § 291D-8,8 and HRS
6
HCTR Rule 2 (1994) provides:
(a) Scope of Rules. These rules govern the practice
and procedure in the District Courts of the State of
Hawai#i for all cases involving civil infractions
except as otherwise provided by HRS Chapter 291D.
(b) Purpose. These rules shall be construed to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every charged infraction.
7
DCRCP Rule 1 (1996) provides:
These rules govern the procedure in the district
courts of the State in all suits of a civil nature
except as otherwise provided in Rule 81. They shall
be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.
8
HRS § 291D-8 (2007) provides in relevant part:
(a) In proceedings to contest a notice of traffic
infraction where the person to whom the notice was
issued has timely requested a hearing and appears at
such hearing:
(1) In lieu of the personal appearance by the
officer who issued the notice of traffic infraction,
the court shall consider the notice of traffic
infraction and any other written report made by the
officer, if provided to the court by the officer,
together with any oral or written statement by the
person to whom the notice of infraction was issued, or
in the case of traffic infractions involving parking
or equipment, the operator or registered owner of the
motor vehicle;
(2) The court may compel by subpoena the
attendance of the officer who issued the notice of
traffic infraction and other witnesses from whom it
may wish to hear;
(3) The standard of proof to be applied by the
court shall be whether, by a preponderance of the
evidence, the court finds that the traffic infraction
(continued...)
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§ 291D-14(b) and (d),9 she “expected an informal hearing . . .
which would have consisted of one hearing . . . and a decision,
without the presence of Prosecution.” Godines argued that, in
contrast, the district court “adjudicated this instant case in
accordance with Hawai#i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) and
Hawai#i Rules of Evidence (HRE).”
The ICA’s Summary Disposition Order (SDO) determined
that “Godines’s argument that her alleged offense should have
been handled pursuant to HRS Chapter 291D is incorrect.” It
reasoned that HRS § 431:10C-117(a)(6) provides that Godines’
violation––a first time offense under HRS § 431:10C-104––“shall
not be deemed to be a traffic infraction as defined by chapter
291D.” Further, the ICA stated that failure to comply with HRS
§ 431:10C-104 is a violation, which constitutes a penal offense
8
(...continued)
was committed; and
(4) After due consideration of the evidence and
arguments, if any, the court shall determine whether
commission of the traffic infraction has been
established. . . .
9
HRS § 291D-14 (2007) provides in relevant part:
(b) Chapter 626 shall not apply in proceedings
conducted pursuant to this chapter, except for the
rules governing privileged communications, and
proceedings conducted under section 291D-13.
. . . .
(d) The prosecuting attorney shall not participate in
traffic infraction proceedings conducted pursuant to
this chapter, except proceedings pursuant to section
291D-13 and proceedings in which a related criminal
offense is scheduled for arraignment, hearing, or
concurrent trial.
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under HRS § 701-107(5).10 Thus, the ICA concluded that “[t]he
district court did not err in the procedure it utilized.”
The ICA further noted that “Godines also appears to
contend that, if the trial court properly addressed her case
outside of Chapter 291D, she was entitled to appointed counsel
during her trial.” However, the ICA determined that she was not
entitled to appointed counsel because “Godines was not subject to
imprisonment for her first violation of HRS § 431:10C-104.”
Accordingly, the ICA affirmed the district court’s judgment.
II. Standards of Review
A. Conclusions of Law
This court reviews the trial court’s conclusions of law
(COLs) de novo. Bhakta v. Cnty. of Maui, 109 Hawai#i 198, 208,
124 P.3d 943, 953 (2005). “A COL is not binding upon an
appellate court and is freely reviewable for its correctness.”
Id. “Moreover, a COL that is supported by the trial court’s
Finding of Facts and that reflects an application of the correct
rule of law will not be overturned.” Id. (internal quotation
marks, citations, and brackets in original omitted).
10
HRS § 701-107(5) (2005) provides:
An offense defined by this Code or by any other
statute of this State constitutes a violation if it is
so designated in this Code or in the law defining the
offense or if no other sentence than a fine, or fine
and forfeiture or other civil penalty, is authorized
upon conviction or if it is defined by a statute other
than this Code which provides that the offense shall
not constitute a crime. A violation does not
constitute a crime, and conviction of a violation
shall not give rise to any civil disability based on
conviction of a criminal offense.
9
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B. Statutory Interpretation
“Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of
law reviewable de novo.”• Gump v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 93
Hawai#i 417, 420, 5 P.3d 407, 410 (2000). In our review of
questions of statutory interpretation, this court is guided by
the following principles:
First, the fundamental starting point for statutory
interpretation is the language of the statute itself.
Second, where the statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its
plain and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the
task of statutory construction is our foremost
obligation to ascertain and give effect to the
intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained
primarily from the language contained in the statute
itself. Fourth, when there is doubt, doubleness of
meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an
expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists.
And fifth, in construing an ambiguous statute, the
meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by
examining the context, with which the ambiguous words,
phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to
ascertain their true meaning.
Awakuni v. Awana, 115 Hawai#i 126, 133, 165 P.3d 1027, 1034
(2007) (citation omitted).
III. Discussion
Godines believes that her HRS § 431:10C-104 conviction
should be overturned based on several errors made during her
trial in the district court.
She argued to the ICA that she could not effectively
raise all of her arguments on appeal without waiver of her
transcript costs due to her indigent status. The ICA denied her
request for waiver of transcript costs under HRS § 802-7, on the
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basis that Godines was not a “criminal defendant” and therefore
the statute did not apply to her.
Based on the record of district court docket entries,
Godines argued that her case should have been adjudicated as a
decriminalized traffic infraction under HRS Chapter 291D, and not
as a criminal offense. In the alternative, she appeared to argue
that, since the district court treated her like a criminal
defendant at trial, she should also be considered a criminal
defendant for the purposes of HRS § 802-7. The ICA’s SDO did not
address HRS § 802-7 and rejected her HRS Chapter 291D arguments.
Thus, Godines’ application raises two issues. First,
we must determine whether the ICA correctly concluded that HRS
Chapter 291D does not apply to Godines’ HRS § 431:10C-104
offense. We conclude that the applicable statutes clearly
provide that the decriminalized framework of HRS Chapter 291D
does not apply here. Second, we must determine whether she
should be treated as a “criminal defendant” under HRS § 802-7.
Even though a first violation of HRS § 431:10C-104 does not meet
the Hawai#i Penal Code definition of “crime,” we hold that
Godines is a “criminal defendant” for purposes of HRS § 802-7
because (1) multiple convictions under HRS § 431:10C-104
authorize imprisonment, and (2) the legislature specifically
intended to give district courts the ability to consider first
time HRS § 431:10C-104 convictions when imposing sentencing
enhancements that require a finding of multiple convictions.
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Thus, we vacate the ICA’s Judgment on Appeal and remand
this case to the ICA to determine whether Godines satisfies the
requirements of HRS § 802-7. If so, then Godines can obtain
transcripts and proceed with her appeal on issues other than
those related to HRS Chapter 291D.
A. The ICA correctly concluded that HRS Chapter 291D does not
apply to HRS § 431:10C-104 violations.
Godines contends that the ICA “wrongfully interpreted
the language of HRS § 431:10C-117(a)(6)” and that her citation
should have been adjudicated as a traffic infraction under HRS
Chapter 291D. Under HRS Chapter 291D, her hearing would have
been informal, the prosecutor would not have been present, and
the standard of proof would have been “preponderance of the
evidence.” See HRS § 291D-1 (1993), HRS § 291D-8 (2007).
Godines also argues that HRS § 291D-9(a) bars “[t]he $500 fine
imposed for first time offenders of HRS 431:10C-104” because it
“would exorbitantly exceed the maximum fine of any traffic
infraction[.]”
The ICA concluded that violations of HRS § 431:10C-104
are not adjudicated under HRS Chapter 291D but rather are subject
to the provisions of HRS § 431:10C-117(a). We agree.
Petitioner was charged with a first-time violation of
HRS § 431:10C-104, which provides that “any person who violates
the provisions of this section shall be subject to the provisions
of section 431:10C-117(a).” HRS § 431:10C-104(c) (1997). HRS
§ 431:10C-117(a) provides the penalties for violations of HRS
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Chapter 431-10C and states in relevant part:
(B) If the person is convicted of not having had a
motor vehicle insurance policy in effect at the time
the citation was issued, the fine shall be $500 for
the first offense and a minimum of $1,500 for each
subsequent offense that occurs within a five-year
period from any prior offense[.]
HRS § 431:10C-117(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). HRS § 431:10C-
117(a) specifically provides that “[a]ny violation as provided in
subsection (a)(2)(B) shall not be deemed to be a traffic
infraction as defined by chapter 291D.” HRS § 431:10C-117(a)(6)
(emphasis added).
Thus, it is clear that HRS Chapter 291D would not apply
to Godines’ HRS § 431:10C offense.
B. The ICA erred in denying Godines’ request for waiver of
transcript costs under HRS § 802-7 on the basis that she was
not a criminal defendant.
Godines also argues that the ICA erred in denying her
request for waiver of transcript costs under HRS § 802-7.
Godines does not clearly explain why HRS § 802-7 applies to
alleged violations of HRS § 431:10C-104. Rather, she points out
a contradiction between the ICA’s order denying her request and
the ICA’s SDO affirming the district court’s judgment. Godines
notes that the ICA’s order states that an HRS § 431:10C-104
offense “constitutes a traffic infraction” under HRS § 291D,
whereas the ICA’s SDO states that an HRS § 431:10C-104 offense is
“not a traffic infraction within HRS Chapter 291D.” (Emphasis
added).
HRS § 802-7 (1979), the statute relating to payment of
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litigation expenses in criminal proceedings, provides:
The court may, upon a satisfactory showing that a
criminal defendant is unable to pay for transcripts or
witness fees and transportation, or for investigatory,
expert or other services, and upon a finding that the
same are necessary for an adequate defense, direct
that such expenses be paid from available court funds
or waived, as the case may be; provided that where the
defendant is represented by the state public defender
or by other counsel appointed by the court except for
such other counsel appointed by the court for reasons
of conflict of interest on the part of the public
defender, the public defender shall pay for or
authorize payment for the same, if the public defender
determines that the defendant is unable to pay for the
same and that the same are necessary for an adequate
defense, and if there is a dispute as to the financial
ability of the defendant such dispute shall be
resolved by the court. In cases where other counsel
have been appointed by the court for reasons of
conflict of interest, the court may, upon the
requisite showing of inability to pay and a finding
that such expenses are necessary for an adequate
defense as set forth above, direct that such expenses
be paid from available court funds or waived, as the
case may be.
(Emphases added).
The ICA concluded that HRS § 802-7 did not apply to
Godines because she was not a “criminal defendant.” It reasoned
that a single conviction under HRS § 431:10C-104 is not
punishable by imprisonment and, therefore, the conviction
constitutes a traffic infraction under HRS § 291D-2,11 not a
criminal offense.
Godines is correct that the ICA’s order and its SDO
11
HRS § 291D-2 (2007) defines “traffic infraction” as “all
violations of statutes, ordinances, or rules relating to traffic movement and
control, including parking, standing, equipment, and pedestrian offenses, for
which the prescribed penalties do not include imprisonment and that are not
otherwise specifically excluded from coverage of this chapter.”
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were inconsistent with regard to HRS Chapter 291D. As explained
above, HRS Chapter 291D does not apply to HRS § 431:10C-104
offenses, and, therefore, the ICA’s order erred in denying
Godines’ request on this basis.
However, the question remains whether HRS § 802-7
applies to cases involving first time violations of HRS
§ 431:10C-104. The prosecution of HRS § 431:10C-104 violations
and the relevant legislative history show that Godines
constitutes a “criminal defendant” under HRS § 802-7 and was
entitled to appropriate consideration of her request for waiver
of transcript costs.
The penalties for an HRS § 431:10C-104 violation differ
depending on whether it is the first violation. The penalty for
a first time violation of HRS § 431:10C-104 is a fine, see HRS
§ 431:10C-117(a)(2)(B), whereas the authorized penalties for
multiple convictions includes imprisonment:
(5) In the case of multiple convictions for driving
without a valid motor vehicle insurance policy within
a five-year period from any prior offense, the court,
in addition to any other penalty, shall impose the
following penalties:
(A) Imprisonment of not more than thirty days;
(B) Suspension or revocation of the motor
vehicle registration plates of the vehicle involved;
(C) Impoundment, or impoundment and sale, of
the motor vehicle for the costs of storage and other
charges incident to seizure of the vehicle, or any
other cost involved pursuant to section 431:10C-301;
or
(D) Any combination of those penalties[.]
HRS § 431:10C-117(a)(5) (emphases added).
Under the Hawai#i Penal Code, a “crime” is defined as
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“[a]n offense defined by this Code or by any other statute of
this State for which a sentence of imprisonment is authorized[.]”
HRS § 701-107(1). If imprisonment is not authorized upon
conviction of an offense, then the offense constitutes a
“violation,” not a “crime”:
(5) An offense defined by this Code or by any other
statute of this State constitutes a violation if it is
so designated in this Code or in the law defining the
offense or if no other sentence than a fine, or fine
and forfeiture or other civil penalty, is authorized
upon conviction or if it is defined by a statute other
than this Code which provides that the offense shall
not constitute a crime. A violation does not
constitute a crime, and conviction of a violation
shall not give rise to any civil disability based on
conviction of a criminal offense.
HRS § 701-107(5) (emphases added).
Thus, a first time violation of HRS § 431:10C-104
appears to be a violation, not a crime, because imprisonment is
not authorized upon conviction.
However, even though a first time violation of HRS
§ 431:10C-104 does not meet the definition of “crime,” HRS § 802-
7 nonetheless applies to those accused of first time HRS
§ 431:10C-104 violations.
In State v. Riveira, the ICA addressed whether a first
offense under HRS § 431:10C-104 was a criminal offense for
jurisdictional purposes. 92 Hawai#i 546, 549, 993 P.2d 580, 583
(App. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 92 Hawai#i 521, 993 P.2d 555
(2000). Riveira’s counsel filed his notice of appeal late, and
the ICA had to determine whether Riveira was a “criminal
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defendant” because “a criminal defendant is entitled, on his
first appeal, to effective counsel who may not deprive him of his
appeal by failure to comply with procedural rules.” Riveira, 92
Hawai#i at 549, 993 P.2d at 583.
The ICA recognized that Riveira was not subject to
incarceration, but nevertheless concluded that he was a criminal
defendant by focusing on the criminal penalties and criminal
procedure that the legislature intended for HRS § 431:10C-104
violations:
[O]ffenses which do not carry the possibility of
imprisonment can also be considered criminal. For
example, improper mooring of vessel is a criminal
offense, even though no prison sentence can be
imposed. State v. Simeona, 10 Haw.App. 220, 229, 864
P.2d 1109, 1114 (1993), overruled on other grounds,
State v. Ford, 84 Hawai#i 65, 929 P.2d 78 (1996). The
controlling factor is whether the legislature intended
to classify the penalties as criminal or civil.
Simeona, 10 Haw.App. at 229–32, 864 P.2d at 1114–15.
Accordingly, a prosecution for driving without
no-fault insurance is criminal in nature because the
legislature intended the penalties to be criminal.
The purpose of the no-fault insurance penalties is
“[t]o deter persons from driving without motor vehicle
insurance coverage not only through criminal
penalties, but through a limitation on the ability of
the uninsured motorist to recover for injuries in
tort....” (Emphasis added) 1983 Haw. Sess. L. Act
245, § 1 at 510–21, cited in Del Rio v. Crake, 87
Hawai#i 297, 303, 955 P.2d 90, 96 (1998).[12] The Del
Rio Court also noted that the legislature’s several
approaches to enforcing universal no-fault coverage
extend to “[c]riminal penalties including fines,
12
In Del Rio v. Crake, this court discussed the legislative history
of the no-fault motor vehicle insurance system in the context of addressing
the constitutionality of HRS § 431:10C-306, which “abolishes tort liability
. . . with respect for accidental harm arising from motor vehicle accidents
occurring in this State” for insured motorists. Id. at 87 Hawai#i at 300, 955
P.2d at 93; HRS § 431:10C-306(a).
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possible license suspension, jail, and impoundment of
the vehicle[.]” (Emphasis added) Id. at 302, 955 P.2d
at 95.
Finally, the legislature has provided a specific
criminal procedure statute for HRS § 431:10C
violations. HRS § 805–13 (HRS Chapter 805 is entitled
“Criminal Procedure: District Courts.”). See also
State v. Shamp, 86 Hawai#i 331, 334–39, 949 P.2d 171,
174–79 (describing a driving without no-fault
insurance case as “a criminal case,” and applying a
criminal state-of-mind requirement to the material
elements of the offense).
Id. at 550, 993 P.2d at 584 (emphasis added).
This court reversed Riveira on other grounds and did
not address the ICA’s analysis that HRS § 431:10C-104 violations
were criminal offenses. 92 Hawai#i at 521, 993 P.2d at 555. In
the instant case, we agree with the ICA that the legislature
intended, based on the applicable criminal procedure and criminal
penalties, that those prosecuted for the first time under HRS
§ 431:10C-104 violations should be treated as criminal defendants
for purposes of HRS § 802-7.
The fact that the legislature specifically made HRS
Chapter 291D inapplicable to HRS § 431:10C-104 is significant.
HRS Chapter 291D, titled “Adjudication of Traffic Infractions,”
was enacted to “further decriminaliz[e] certain traffic offenses
and “streamlin[e] the handling of those traffic cases [to]
achieve a more expeditious system for the judicial processing of
traffic infractions.”13 HRS § 291D-1. The chapter states, “[n]o
13
HRS Chapter 291D was designed to:
(1) Eliminate the long and tedious arraignment
(continued...)
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penal sanction that includes imprisonment shall apply to a
violation of a state statute or rule, or county ordinance or
rule, that would constitute a traffic infraction under this
chapter.” HRS § 291D-3(a).
In 2006, the legislature amended HRS § 431:10C-117 to
add subsection (a)(6), which specifically states that first time
violations of HRS § 431:10C-104 “shall not be deemed to be a
traffic infraction as defined by chapter 291(D).” 2006 Haw.
Sess. Laws Act 195, § 1 at 838. The accompanying Senate Standing
Committee Report explained the purpose of this amendment:
Your Committee finds that there is a need to deter
persons from driving without motor vehicle insurance.
However, there is a concern regarding criminalizing a
first time traffic violation.
13
(...continued)
proceeding for a majority of traffic matters;
(2) Facilitate and encourage the resolution of many
traffic infractions through the payment of a monetary
assessment;
(3) Speed the disposition of contested cases through a
hearing, similar to small claims proceedings, in which
the rules of evidence will not apply and the court
will consider as evidence the notice of traffic
infraction, applicable police reports, or other
written statements by the police officer who issued
the notice, any other relevant written material, and
any evidence or statements by the person contesting
the notice of traffic infraction;
(4) Dispense in most cases with the need for
witnesses, including law enforcement officers, to be
present and for the participation of the prosecuting
attorney;
(5) Allow judicial, prosecutorial, and law enforcement
resources to be used more efficiently and effectively;
and
(6) Save the taxpayers money and reduce their
frustration with the judicial system by simplifying
the traffic court process.
HRS § 291D-1.
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Your Committee has amended this measure to incorporate
an amendment agreed to by the Judiciary and the Office
of the Public Defender to specify that the violation
of not having a valid motor insurance policy is not a
“traffic infraction” as defined in chapter 291D. This
will allow district court judges to consider a first
offense for the purpose of finding multiple
convictions. Your Committee further amended this
measure to delete the provision that would have
allowed a court to impose a term of imprisonment of
not more than forty-eight hours for a first offense.
S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 2564, in 2006 Senate Journal, at 1274
(emphasis added).
The legislature believed that motor vehicle insurance
law violations were “of a serious nature” and should not be part
of the “further decriminalization” of traffic offenses under HRS
Chapter 291D.14 HRS § 291D-1; see also HRS § 431:10C-102(b)(1)
(“Those uninsured drivers who try to obtain the privilege of
driving a motor vehicle without the concomitant responsibility of
an ability to compensate adequately those who are injured as a
result of a motor vehicle accident are to be dealt with more
severely in the criminal or civil areas than those who obtain the
legally required motor vehicle insurance coverage[.]”) (emphasis
14
In Riveira, the ICA explained the legislative purpose behind the
more serious penalties under HRS § 431:10C:
The legislature was convinced that the system of no-
fault insurance can only be effective if all drivers
participate to the extent required by law, and was
especially concerned about a chronic systemic problem,
the minority of which consistently refuses to obtain
the motor vehicle insurance coverage required by law.
. . . One of the mechanisms the legislature designed
to deter driving without the required coverage is
stiffer penalties for repeat offenders.
92 Hawai#i at 553, 993 P.2d at 587 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and
citations omitted).
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added).
Further, the legislature wanted first time convictions
under HRS § 431:10C-104 to be considered “for the purpose of
finding multiple convictions,” even though the penalty for the
first conviction does not include imprisonment. S. Stand. Comm.
Rep. No. 2564, in 2006 Senate Journal, at 1274.
Thus, whereas HRS § 291D-3(a) precluded imprisonment
for traffic infractions, HRS § 431:10C-117 was amended to give
district courts the ability to consider first time HRS § 431:10C-
104 convictions when imposing sentencing enhancements that
require a finding of multiple convictions. See, e.g., HRS
§ 431:10C-117(a)(5)(A) (authorizing “imprisonment of not more
than thirty days” for multiple convictions of HRS § 431:10C-117).
Given the serious consequences that can follow from even a first
time conviction, it is appropriate to consider such offenders as
“criminal defendants” for the purposes of HRS § 802-7.
Additionally, by specifically removing HRS § 431:10C-
104 from the domain of HRS Chapter 291D, the legislature made
clear that criminal procedure applies to HRS § 431:10C-104
offenses. Under HRS Chapter 291D, a person who requests a
hearing to contest a traffic infraction proceeds with fewer
procedural protections than generally provided in criminal
proceedings. The standard of proof is preponderance of the
evidence, the rules of evidence do not apply, and the court
decides which witnesses, if any, it will call. See HRS § 291D-1,
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-8. After the court enters judgment, the person can specifically
request a trial, in which case the State will be represented by a
prosecuting attorney, and the standard of proof is still
preponderance of the evidence. See HRS § 291D-13 (2007).
In contrast, HRS § 431:10C-104 offenses are adjudicated
pursuant to HRS § 805-13, a criminal statute, and the Hawai#i
Penal Code.15 See HRS § 805-13(a), (b); Lee, 90 Hawai#i at 136,
976 P.2d at 450 (applying HRS §§ 701-114, 701-115, and 702-205 to
support its holding that proof of self-insurance is a defense in
HRS § 431:10C-104 cases). HRS § 805-13 is under the chapter
providing the criminal procedure for district courts (Chapter
805: Criminal Procedure: District Courts). It is also under
Title 38: Procedural and Supplementary Provisions, which is the
same title as HRS § 802-7, which is the statute at issue here.
Instead of the expedited procedure under HRS Chapter 291D, the
State must prove each element of HRS § 431:10C-104 offenses
beyond a reasonable doubt. See HRS §§ 701-114.
This suggests that all HRS § 431:10C-104 cases are
treated as criminal proceedings, even if first time violations of
HRS § 431:10C-104 are not “crimes” as defined by the Hawai#i
Penal Code. If Godines is subject to criminal procedure in a
15
Godines also argues that the district court failed to follow the
proper procedure under HRS § 805-13. Specifically, she alleges, “The court
did not dispose of the citation immediately, nor did it receive evidence that
the required insurance was in force on the date of the citation before
continuing proceedings.” The ICA did not address this issue because Godines
did not raise it in her Opening Brief. Given the lack of transcripts in the
record, we cannot determine whether the district court properly followed
procedures under HRS § 805-13.
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criminal proceeding, she should be considered a “criminal
defendant” under HRS § 802-7, particularly if she can be
subjected to imprisonment for multiple convictions. See Black’s
Law Dictionary (defining “criminal defendant” as “[s]omeone who
is accused in a criminal proceeding”). Indeed, the legislature
specifically intended for first time HRS § 431:10C-104
convictions to be considered for the purpose of imposing
sentencing enhancements. See S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 2564, in
2006 Senate Journal, at 1274.
Thus, the ICA erred in denying Godines’ request for
waiver of transcript costs under HRS § 802-7 on the basis that
she was not a criminal defendant.
Therefore, we vacate the ICA’s SDO and remand with
instructions to consider Godines’ request under HRS § 802-7 and
determine whether she is entitled to waiver of her transcript
costs. The ICA should consider two factors: (1) whether Godines
“is unable to pay for transcripts . . . fees” and (2) whether the
transcripts “are necessary for an adequate defense.” HRS § 802-
7. Pursuant to State v. Scott, to determine whether a particular
transcript is necessary, the ICA should consider “(1) the value
of the transcript to the defendant in connection with the appeal
or trial for which it is sought, and (2) the availability of
alternative devices that would fulfill the same functions as a
transcript.” 131 Hawai#i 333, 340, 319 P.3d 252, 259 (2013). If
the two factors are satisfied, Godines’ transcript costs should
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be waived, and her appeal should proceed accordingly. See id. at
345, 319 P.3d at 264 (“Although the language of HRS § 802–7
suggests that the court has discretion [‘[t]he court may, upon
the requisite showing ....’] to direct that transcript expenses
are paid, the balance of the pertinent statutory language
indicates that once a satisfactory showing of need for the
transcripts and inability to pay has been made, the court should
direct that such expenses be paid, unless alternative means for
timely obtaining the transcripts are available.”).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the ICA correctly determined
that HRS Chapter 291D did not apply to Godines’ case, but it did
err in denying Godines’ request for waiver of transcript costs
under HRS § 802-7 on the basis that she was not a “criminal
defendant.” Thus, we vacate the ICA’s January 22, 2016 judgment
on appeal and remand this case so that the ICA can determine
whether Godines otherwise satisfies the requirements of HRS
§ 802-7. If Godines is entitled to payment of transcripts from
available court funds, the transcripts shall be included in the
record on appeal, and the ICA should allow for supplemental
briefing on issues other than those related to HRS Chapter 291D.
Dannette Godines, /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
petitioner, pro se
/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Ryan K. Caday
for respondent /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
/s/ Richard W. Pollack
/s/ Michael D. Wilson
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