In re Ishida-Waiakamilo Legacy Trust Dated June 27, 2006. , 140 Haw. 69 ( 2017 )


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  •    *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
    Electronically Filed
    Supreme Court
    SCWC-13-0000449
    15-JUN-2017
    08:28 AM
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    ---o0o---
    IN THE MATTER OF THE ISHIDA-WAIAKAMILO
    LEGACY TRUST DATED JUNE 27, 2006
    AND
    IN THE MATTER OF THE ISHIDA-WINANT
    LEGACY TRUST DATED JUNE 27, 2006
    SCWC-13-0000449
    CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    (CAAP-13-0000449, CAAP-13-0000450;
    T. NOS. 12-1-0080 and 12-1-0081)
    JUNE 15, 2017
    RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.
    OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, C.J.
    This case arises from the administration of two
    irrevocable trusts established by Richard and Rachel Ishida:                the
    Ishida-Waiakamilo Legacy Trust (Waiakamilo Trust), and the
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    Ishida-Winant Legacy Trust (Winant Trust) (collectively, “the
    Trusts”).    The Trusts name as beneficiaries the Ishidas’
    daughters Jeri S. Wilson (Jeri) and Juney M. Ishida (Juney), and
    their granddaughter Kauialohaokalani R. Wilson (Kaui), but they
    expressly exclude the Ishidas’ third daughter, Richardeen Kimura
    (Deenie).    Six years after the creation of the Trusts, the
    Ishidas filed petitions in Probate Court of the First Circuit
    (probate court) requesting rescission of both Trusts.            The
    Ishidas alleged that they never intended to make the Trusts
    irrevocable, and that Jeri had wrongfully transferred ownership
    of property from the Waiakamilo Trust to herself.           Jeri and Juney
    opposed the petitions.
    The probate court found that the transfer of property
    to Jeri had violated the terms of the Waiakamilo Trust, ordering
    the property returned to the Trust; it declined to rescind or
    reform the Trusts.    The Ishidas appealed to the Intermediate
    Court of Appeals (ICA), which affirmed the probate court’s denial
    of their petitions.
    The Ishidas’ Application for Writ of Certiorari
    presents two issues to this court:        1) whether that the probate
    court’s failure to return the Waiakamilo Trust property to the
    Ishidas was an abuse of discretion in light of alleged wrongdoing
    by Jeri, and 2) whether the ICA improperly discounted the
    evidentiary value of the Ishidas’ petitions, which were verified
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    pursuant to Hawai#i Probate Rules (HPR) Rule 5(a).
    First, we hold that the probate court did not err in
    denying the Ishidas’ requested relief, as the matter was within
    the court’s equitable discretion.        Second, we affirm the ICA’s
    holding that the probate court was not required to accept the
    Ishidas’ petitions at face value, and in doing so we clarify the
    status of HPR Rule 5(a) statements in relation to other types of
    testimonial evidence.
    I. Background
    The Ishidas hired an attorney to draft documents
    creating the Trusts, which they executed on June 27, 2006.             The
    Ishidas settled each Trust with a single residential and/or
    commercial property.     Jeri and Juney were named as trustee for
    the Waiakamilo Trust and Winant Trust, respectively.            The
    Waiakamilo Trust designates Jeri as beneficiary, with full
    ownership of the Trust’s property passing to Jeri’s daughter Kaui
    upon Jeri’s death.    The Winant Trust provides that its property
    will be distributed to Juney as beneficiary upon the death of the
    Ishidas, with full ownership passing to Kaui upon Juney’s death.
    The Trusts are irrevocable, with both including the following
    provision:
    Section 3. Irrevocable Trust
    Our Trust is irrevocable. Except as expressly herein
    provided to the contrary, no Trustor or any other
    person shall have any right or power to alter, amend,
    or in any manner whatsoever modify any of the
    provisions hereof.
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    Additionally, both the Waiakamilo Trust and the Winant
    Trust specifically exclude the Ishidas’ third daughter, Deenie,
    with both Trusts including the following provision:
    c. Exclusions
    We hereby exclude RICHARDEEN R. KIMURA and such
    person’s descendants as beneficiaries under our Trust
    Agreement, including without limitation for the
    purposes of intestate succession. For the purposes of
    our Trust Agreement, all excluded persons shall be
    treated as having died prior to the execution of our
    Trust Agreement.
    On March 28, 2007, Jeri and the Ishidas executed a
    series of deeds, transferring ownership of the Waiakamilo Trust
    property (Waiakamilo Property) from the trust to Jeri personally.
    On May 4, 2012, the Ishidas filed in probate court a
    Petition for Rescission of Warranty Deed, Imposition of
    Constructive Trust and an Order for Disgorgement related to the
    Waiakamilo Trust (Waiakamilo Petition), and a Petition for
    Reformation of Trust and/or Order Setting Aside the Ishida-Winant
    Trust (Winant Petition).      The Ishidas alleged that, although they
    had asked their attorney to make simple wills and revocable
    trusts as part of their estate planning, their attorney went
    against their wishes and designed the Waiakamilo and Winant
    Trusts to be irrevocable.      The Ishidas further claimed that Jeri
    had schemed with their attorney to transfer the Waiakamilo
    Property to Jeri personally in the March 28, 2007 deeds.
    Accordingly, the Ishidas asked the probate court to rescind the
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    deed transferring the Waiakamilo Property to Jeri, and to set
    aside both Trusts and restore ownership of Trust properties to
    the Ishidas.   In apparent compliance with HPR Rule 5(a),1 both
    petitions included the following text above the Ishidas’
    signatures:
    THE UNDERSIGNED UNDERSTANDS THAT THIS DOCUMENT IS
    DEEMED TO INCLUDE AN OATH, AFFIRMATION, OR STATEMENT
    TO THE EFFECT THAT ITS REPRESENTATIONS ARE TRUE AS FAR
    AS THE UNDERSIGNED KNOWS OR IS INFORMED, AND PENALTIES
    FOR PERJURY MAY FOLLOW DELIBERATE FALSIFICATION.
    Jeri and Juney (Respondents) disputed the Ishidas’
    account of the Trusts’ creation, claiming that the Ishidas
    intentionally made the trusts irrevocable because they had
    disinherited Deenie.     Respondents further contended that Deenie
    1
    HPR Rule 5 (1999) provided:
    Rule 5. SIGNING OF PLEADINGS.
    (a) Verification of Pleadings; Affidavits. All
    pleadings (other than those signed by a party’s
    attorney) shall include a statement at the end and
    before the signature of the person presenting the
    pleading to the effect that the person understands
    that the document is deemed to include an oath,
    affirmation, or statement to the effect that its
    representations are true as far as the person
    executing or filing it knows or is informed, and that
    penalties for perjury may follow deliberate
    falsification. Such a statement shall be accepted in
    lieu of an affidavit as to the facts stated in the
    pleading. The signature of an applicant in informal
    proceedings shall be notarized.
    If a pleading requires consideration of facts
    not appearing of record or verified as provided above,
    it shall be supported by affidavit, signed by the
    person having knowledge of the facts and competent to
    testify. An attorney may submit a declaration in lieu
    of an affidavit to support facts outside of the
    record.
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    had recently reconciled with their parents, and that she was
    behind the petitions.      Respondents also alleged that the transfer
    of property from the Waiakamilo Trust to Jeri personally had been
    done with the Ishidas’ knowledge in order to avoid “issues”
    raised by the Ishidas’ accountant.            Respondents concluded that
    “further discovery into the Ishidas’ allegations is required as
    they raise issues of material fact,” asking that both petitions
    be assigned to the civil trials calendar pursuant to HPR Rule
    20(a).2
    The Ishidas replied to Respondents’ objections,
    asserting, “[w]hile the allegations against Deenie are absolutely
    untrue, they are irrelevant and the Ishidas will not address
    them.”    The Ishidas urged the probate court to grant their
    petitions forthwith, arguing that “the equities of the case, as
    well as public policy” required immediate relief.           The Ishidas
    opposed discovery or otherwise prolonging the proceedings in
    court, asserting that “the Court has all the information it needs
    to declare the transfer void and return the [Trust properties] to
    [their] rightful owners, the Ishidas.”
    After a hearing, the probate court issued an order
    rescinding the March 28, 2007 deeds and restoring the Waiakamilo
    2
    HPR Rule 20(a) (1995) provides:
    (a) Assignment. The court by written order may retain
    a contested matter on the regular probate calendar or
    may assign the contested matter to the civil trials
    calendar of the circuit court.
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    Property to the Waiakamilo Trust, finding that the transfer had
    violated the terms of the Waiakamilo Trust.          However, the probate
    court denied all other relief requested.         The Ishidas filed
    petitions for reconsideration of the orders, which the probate
    court denied, and final judgment was entered for both petitions
    on May 2, 2013.
    The Ishidas appealed to the ICA, arguing that the
    probate court erred in 1) failing to “right the injustice done to
    the Ishidas” by refusing to set aside the Trusts and restore the
    Properties to the Ishidas, and 2) failing to reform the Trusts
    because they “were a mistake.”       Accordingly, the Ishidas urged
    the ICA to reform or set aside the Waiakamilo and Winant Trusts,
    or in the alternative, to impose constructive trusts on the
    Waiakamilo and Winant Trust properties.
    In a published opinion, the ICA examined each of the
    Ishidas’ arguments in turn, finding that the Ishidas had failed
    to show by clear and convincing evidence circumstances warranting
    the reformation of the Trusts or other equitable relief.            In re
    Ishida Waiakamilo Legacy Trust, 138 Hawai#i 98, 103–09, 
    377 P.3d 39
    , 44–50 (App. 2016).     Regarding the evidence presented by the
    Ishidas, ICA stated:
    On appeal, the Ishidas refer to “compelling evidence”
    and “the clear testimony of the Settlors regarding
    their own intent and the mistake that was made,” in
    apparent reference to the Ishidas’ signatures on the
    Waiakamilo Petition following a statement that:
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    THE UNDERSIGNED UNDERSTANDS THAT THIS DOCUMENT
    IS DEEMED TO INCLUDE AN OATH, AFFIRMATION, OR
    STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT REPRESENTATIONS ARE
    TRUE AS FAR AS THE UNDERSIGNED KNOWS OR IS
    INFORMED, AND PENALTIES FOR PERJURY MAY FOLLOW
    DELIBERATED FALSIFICATION.
    . . . .
    As set forth in HPR Rule 5(a), this attestation is
    accepted in lieu of a sworn affidavit to the same
    effect, i.e., that the information contained therein
    is true as far as the affiant knows or is informed,
    and thus satisfied the requirements of the rule. It is
    not, however, identical in every way to testimony that
    has been subject to cross-examination, or a sworn
    affidavit, or a declaration made under penalty of law,
    that specified factual statements are true and
    correct. It is within the province of the trial court
    to determine the credibility of a witness and the
    weight to be given to a witness’s testimony.
    See, e.g., Tamashiro v. Control Specialist, Inc., 97
    Hawai#i 86, 92, 
    34 P.3d 16
    , 22 (2001). Written
    testimony that could be based upon limited memory or
    knowledge, or information and belief, rather than
    personal knowledge, particularly testimony that
    purports to reflect the joint recollection and intent
    of two people, without distinction, might reasonably
    be viewed as less reliable or less convincing than
    other forms of evidence.
    
    Id. at 106–07,
    377 P.3d at 47–48.
    The ICA also determined that the creation of the
    irrevocable trusts was not “so inherently improvident and
    unreasonable” that the probate court was required to infer that
    it was the product of delusion or mental infirmity.           
    Id. at 109,
    377 P.3d at 50 (citing Love v. Love, 
    17 Haw. 206
    , 215 (1905)).
    Accordingly, the ICA concluded that the probate court did not
    abuse its discretion when it declined to impose a constructive
    trust on the Trust properties or otherwise return them to the
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    Ishidas.    
    Id. The ICA
    thus affirmed the probate court’s
    judgments.     
    Id. II. Standards
    of Review
    A.    Equitable Relief
    “The relief granted by a court in equity is
    discretionary and will not be overturned on review unless the
    circuit court abused its discretion by issuing a decision that
    clearly exceeds the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or
    principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of the
    appellant.”     Aickin v. Ocean View Invs. Co., Inc., 84 Hawai#i
    447, 453, 
    935 P.2d 992
    , 998 (1997) (internal quotation marks,
    citation, and brackets omitted).
    B.    Interpretation of Court Rules
    The interpretation of a court rule is reviewed de novo.
    Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 120 Hawai#i 181, 197, 
    202 P.3d 1226
    , 1242 (2009).
    III.   Discussion
    In their Application for Writ of Certiorari, the
    Ishidas argue that the ICA erred in 1) holding that the probate
    court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to impose a
    constructive trust on the Waiakamilo Property or otherwise return
    it to the Ishidas; and 2) concluding that the Ishidas’ statements
    in their petitions were “less reliable and less convincing,” even
    though those statements were verified pursuant to HPR Rule 5(a).
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    A.    Denial of Equitable Relief
    The ICA did not err in finding that the Ishidas failed
    to produce clear and convincing evidence that the Trusts were the
    result of mistake or other grounds justifying equitable relief.
    “A constructive trust arises where a person holding
    title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to
    another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he
    were permitted to retain it.”         Kam Oi Lee v. Fong Wong, 
    57 Haw. 137
    , 139, 
    552 P.2d 635
    , 637 (1976) (citation omitted).               Hawai#i
    courts will impose a constructive trust “where the evidence is
    clear and convincing” that the grantee will be unjustly enriched
    if allowed to retain the entire property.           Maria v. Freitas, 
    73 Haw. 266
    , 274, 
    832 P.2d 259
    , 264 (citation omitted).               The
    Restatement (Third) of Property explains the rationale for this
    high standard:
    When a donative document is unambiguous, evidence
    suggesting that the terms of the document vary from
    intention is inherently suspect but possibly
    correct. . . . Only high-safeguard allowance of
    extrinsic evidence achieves the primary objective of
    giving effect to the donor’s intention.
    Restatement (Third) of Property § 12.1 cmt. b (Am. Law Inst.
    2003) (emphasis added).
    Here, the Waiakamilo Trust is unambiguous, stating in
    bold type that it is an irrevocable trust.           The Ishidas thus had
    to offer clear and convincing evidence that Jeri would be
    unjustly enriched if the Waiakamilo Trust remained unaltered.
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    They failed to do so.       The Waiakamilo Petition made a colorable
    argument that the Ishidas did not intend to make the Waiakamilo
    Trust irrevocable, but Respondents made an equally plausible
    argument that the Ishidas simply changed their minds regarding
    the Trusts as a result of their alleged reconciliation with
    Deenie.    Moreover, the Ishidas provided little evidence to
    support their arguments beyond the bare assertions in the
    Waiakamilo Petition, and they opposed discovery or assignment of
    their case to the civil trials calendar–-steps which might have
    allowed them to adduce additional evidence in support of their
    position.     Faced with two competing stories and scant evidence,
    it was well within the probate court’s discretion to deny
    equitable relief.      See, e.g., Aickin 84 Hawai#i at 449 
    n.1, 935 P.2d at 994
    n.1 (“Equity is a discretionary remedy; the trial
    court was not obligated to grant it.”).           Thus, the ICA did not
    err in affirming the probate court’s denial of the Ishidas’
    request to impose a constructive trust upon the Waiakamilo
    Property.
    B.    Verification
    The Ishidas argue that the ICA erred “because it should
    have treated the Ishidas’ account of their intent and experiences
    as personal, and thus constituted personal knowledge.”              In
    support of this contention, the Ishidas cite HPR Rule 5(a),
    arguing that pursuant to this rule their petitions “had the
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    effect of an affidavit.”       The Ishidas also assert that the ICA
    displayed “uncritical reliance” on similarly verified statements
    from Respondents’ briefs, arguing that there is “no principled
    reason to treat the Ishidas’ and Jeri/Juney’s Rule 5(a)
    statements differently, as the ICA did.”3          Lastly, the Ishidas
    argue that the ICA’s position “will undermine the Rule 5(a)
    verification” routinely relied upon in probate filings.
    We agree with the Ishidas’ argument to the extent that
    a portion of the ICA’s opinion does have the potential to
    “undermine Rule 5(a) verification.”         Referring to the
    verification language in the Ishidas’ petitions,4 the ICA stated:
    It is not, however, identical in every way to
    testimony that has been subject to cross-examination,
    or a sworn affidavit, or a declaration made under
    penalty of law, that specified factual statements are
    true and correct.
    In re Ishida Waiakamilo Legacy Trust, 138 Hawai#i at 
    107, 377 P.3d at 48
    (emphasis in original).
    To the extent that this sentence suggests that a
    statement verified pursuant to HPR Rule 5(a) has less evidentiary
    3
    Although the ICA refers to claims made in Respondents’ verified
    statements, it does not make findings regarding the veracity of these claims.
    See, e.g., In re Ishida Waiakamilo Legacy Trust, 138 Hawai#i at 
    108, 377 P.3d at 49
    (“in her objection, Jeri averred that . . . .”)
    4
    As noted above, the following text based on HPR Rule 5(a) is
    printed above the signature block on the Waiakamilo and Winant Petitions:
    THE UNDERSIGNED UNDERSTANDS THAT THIS DOCUMENT IS
    DEEMED TO INCLUDE AN OATH, AFFIRMATION, OR STATEMENT
    TO THE EFFECT THAT ITS REPRESENTATIONS ARE TRUE AS FAR
    AS THE UNDERSIGNED KNOWS OR IS INFORMED, AND PENALTIES
    FOR PERJURY MAY FOLLOW DELIBERATE FALSIFICATION.
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    weight than a sworn affidavit, it is in error.          HPR Rule 5(a)
    provides that a verified statement “shall be accepted in lieu of
    an affidavit as to the facts stated in the document.”5              A court
    must thus accord a statement verified pursuant to HPR 5(a) the
    same evidentiary weight it would a sworn affidavit of identical
    content.
    However, on the whole the ICA’s analysis is correct in
    its affirmance of the probate court’s judgments.           The ICA did not
    display “uncritical reliance” on Jeri and Juney’s verified
    petitions, but rather reviewed the record in accordance with the
    relevant standard.     As stated in the ICA’s opinion:
    We consider the Ishidas’ verification in the context
    of the clear and convincing evidence standard
    applicable to their request for equitable relief from
    the unambiguous terms of the Waiakamilo Trust.
    In re Ishida Waiakamilo Legacy Trust, 138 Hawai#i at 
    107, 377 P.3d at 48
    .
    The ICA correctly noted that “it is within the province
    of the trial court to determine the credibility of a witness and
    the weight to be given to a witness’s testimony.”           
    Id. Whether or
    not the Ishidas’ statements in their petitions constituted
    5
    As noted by the commentary to HPR Rule 5:
    Because the Registrar processes a large number of
    informal applications filed by pro se applicants, it
    is important to provide an easy mechanism for the
    Registrar to determine that the applicant is who he or
    she claims to be. A notarized signature gives the
    Registrar this proof without adding any significant
    cost to the probate process.
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    clear and convincing evidence was a question clearly within the
    probate court’s discretion.       The ICA carefully considered the
    record, and it correctly concluded that the probate court did not
    abuse its discretion in declining to impose a constructive trust
    or other otherwise modify the Trusts in light of the evidentiary
    burden the Ishidas were required to satisfy.
    IV.    Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, the ICA did not err in
    affirming the probate court’s judgment.         Thus, the ICA’s
    September 6, 2016 judgment on appeal is affirmed.
    Margery S. Bronster,                     /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
    Rex Y. Fujichaku, and
    Angela K.H. Jacso                        /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
    for petitioners
    /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
    Michael A. Lilly and
    Valerie M. Kato                          /s/ Richard W. Pollack
    for respondents
    /s/ Michael D. Wilson
    14
    

Document Info

Docket Number: SCWC-13-0000449

Citation Numbers: 140 Haw. 69, 398 P.3d 658, 2017 WL 2590870, 2017 Haw. LEXIS 117

Judges: Recktenwald, Nakayama, McKenna, Pollack, Wilson

Filed Date: 6/15/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/8/2024