Oahu Publications, Inc. v. Abercrombie. , 134 Haw. 16 ( 2014 )

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-13-0000127
31-JUL-2014
07:54 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
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OAHU PUBLICATIONS, INC., dba The Honolulu Star-Advertiser,
Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, in his official capacity
as Governor of the State of Hawai#i,
Respondent/Defendant-Appellant.
SCWC-13-0000127
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(ICA NO. CAAP-13-0000127; CIV. NO. 11-1-1871)
JULY 31, 2014
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, J., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE
BROWNING, IN PLACE OF McKENNA, J., RECUSED, CIRCUIT JUDGE
CASTAGNETTI, IN PLACE OF POLLACK, J., RECUSED, AND
CIRCUIT JUDGE CHANG, IN PLACE OF WILSON, J., RECUSED
OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, C.J.
We consider whether the Intermediate Court of Appeals
(ICA) erred in denying Oahu Publications’ request for appellate
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attorneys’ fees and costs. In brief summary, Oahu Publications
filed the underlying suit against The Honorable Neil Abercrombie,
in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Hawai#i,
under the Uniform Information Practices Act (UIPA), Hawai#i
Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 92F, seeking to obtain the list of
nominees considered for a vacancy on the Hawai#i Supreme Court.
After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the
circuit court1 entered summary judgment in favor of Oahu
Publications, ordering disclosure of the nominees’ names. The
circuit court also awarded Oahu Publications attorneys’ fees and
costs pursuant to HRS § 92F-15(d) (1993).
The Governor appealed to the ICA only with regard to
the circuit court’s award of attorneys’ fees and costs. After
the parties had briefed the case, the ICA dismissed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction because of an error in the circuit
court’s judgment. After the circuit court corrected the
judgment, the Governor filed a second appeal. In the second
appeal, the parties agreed to re-submit the briefs filed in the
first appeal, with updated citations to the record on appeal. In
a summary disposition order, a majority of the ICA affirmed the
circuit court’s award of $69,027.06 in fees and costs to Oahu
Publications, except for $564.60 of photocopying costs.
Oahu Publications then filed a request for appellate
1
The Honorable Karl K. Sakamoto presided.
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fees and costs in the ICA, which included fees accrued during
both the first and second appeals. The ICA denied Oahu
Publications’ request for fees incurred during the first appeal,
concluding that the request was untimely under Hawai#i Rules of
Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 39(d)(2) (2007). The ICA granted
Oahu Publications’ request with respect to the second appeal in
its entirety.
In its application, Oahu Publications presents a single
question:
Are attorneys’ fees incurred in an earlier phase of
appellate litigation — which the ICA dismissed for
lack of a final circuit court judgment, but which did
not resolve the action — recoverable by the prevailing
complainant under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 92F-15(d) after
the ICA rules in its favor on the merits?
We hold that the ICA erred in not considering Oahu
Publications’ request for fees and costs incurred during the
first appeal. Oahu Publications was not a prevailing party for
purposes of HRS § 92F-15(d) until after the second appeal was
decided. Section 92F-15(d) provides that if the complainant
prevails, the court shall assess reasonable attorneys’ fees and
all other expenses. Although Oahu Publications prevailed in the
circuit court and ultimately prevailed in the ICA, it was not a
prevailing party for purposes of HRS § 92F-15(d) when the ICA
dismissed the first appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Oahu
Publications prevailed in the ICA only after the second appeal
was decided.
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Moreover, even assuming Oahu Publications could have
filed a request for fees and costs pursuant to HRS § 92F-15(d)
upon dismissal of the first appeal, the ICA erred in denying Oahu
Publications’ request following resolution of the second appeal.
Although HRAP Rule 39(d)(2) generally provides that “[a] request
for fees and costs or necessary expenses must be filed . . . no
later than 14 days” after the time for filing a motion for
reconsideration has expired or such motion has been decided, it
further provides that the appellate court “may” nevertheless
consider such a request. Thus, the ICA had the discretion to
consider an untimely request for fees and costs. Tortorello v.
Tortorello, 113 Hawai#i 432, 153 P.3d 1117 (2007). Given the
express language of HRS § 92F-15(d), which provides that the
court “shall assess against the agency reasonable attorney’s fees
and all other expenses reasonably incurred in the litigation,”
the ICA should have considered Oahu Publications’ request for
fees incurred in the first appeal even if it was untimely. HRS
§ 92F-15(d) (emphases added).
We therefore vacate in part the ICA’s January 6, 2014,
and January 24, 2014 orders, and vacate the ICA’s March 3, 2014
judgment on appeal.
II. Background
Oahu Publications filed a four-count complaint pursuant
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to the UIPA, HRS Chapter 92F, seeking to compel the Governor “to
honor Hawai#i’s strong public policy of open, transparent, and
accountable government” by publicly disclosing “the list of the
nominees presented to him in January 2011 by the Judicial
Selection Commission (JSC) from which he appointed Associate
Justice Sabrina McKenna” to the Hawai#i Supreme Court. Oahu
Publications alleged that the Governor rejected multiple requests
to release the list of judicial nominees, and that the Governor
stated he would not disclose the list unless a court ordered him
to do so.
Oahu Publications’ complaint included the following
counts: (1) failure to grant access to requested records, in
violation of HRS § 92F-11 (1993 & Supp. 2011); (2) failure to
respond to the request in a timely manner, in violation of
Hawai#i Administrative Rules (HAR) § 2-71-13 (1999); (3)
reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses, pursuant to HRS § 92F-
15(d) (1993);2 and (4) a request for declaratory relief. Oahu
Publications’ prayer for relief included a request for “an order
and judgment compelling Governor Abercrombie to disclose the list
presented to him by the JSC of the nominees to fill the vacancy
in the office of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
Hawai#i created by Governor Lingle’s appointment of then-
2
Section 92F-15(d) provided then, as it does now, that, “If the
complainant prevails in an action brought under this section, the court shall
assess against the agency reasonable attorney’s fees and all other expenses
reasonably incurred in the litigation.” HRS § 92F-15(d).
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Associate Justice Mark Recktenwald as Chief Justice”; a
declaratory judgment that after the Senate has consented to a
judicial appointment, a governor must disclose the list of
judicial nominees; and an order assessing reasonable attorneys’
fees and expenses pursuant to HRS § 92F-15(d).
Oahu Publications filed a motion for summary judgment,
and the Governor subsequently filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment. Following a hearing on November 14, 2011, the circuit
court granted Oahu Publications’ motion for summary judgment.
The circuit court concluded that the Governor was required to
disclose the list of judicial nominees pursuant to HRS § 92F-11,
and that the Governor had failed to demonstrate that one of the
enumerated exceptions set forth in HRS § 92F-13 (1993) applied.
The circuit court further concluded that the limitations on
disclosures of government records to other agencies, set forth in
HRS § 92F-19 (1993 & Supp. 2011), did not apply. The circuit
court filed its written order on December 13, 2011.
In the meantime, on November 28, 2011, Oahu
Publications filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs,
pursuant to HRS § 92F-15(d), HRS § 607-9 (1993), and Hawai#i
Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 54(d) (2000). Oahu
Publications sought $66,822.29 in attorneys’ fees incurred in the
circuit court, $5,000 in attorneys’ fees accrued in seeking to
collect fees and costs, and $1,177.87 in costs and expenses. The
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Governor opposed Oahu Publications’ motion, and Oahu Publications
filed a reply.
On June 8, 2012, the circuit court issued an order
granting Oahu Publications’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.
The circuit court concluded that “the fees and costs requested by
[Oahu Publications] are reasonable and that, pursuant to Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 92F-15, [Oahu Publications], as the complainant
prevailed in an action brought under the Uniform Information
Practices Act, and this court ‘shall assess against the agency
reasonable attorney’s fees and all other expenses reasonably
incurred in the litigation.’” The circuit court further
concluded that “given the novel and complex issues presented by
this case and the extensive research it entailed, the time
expended by the attorneys for [Oahu Publications] was reasonable,
as demonstrated by the exhibits attached to [Oahu Publications’]
motion and supporting papers.” The circuit court awarded Oahu
Publications $61,566.47 in attorneys’ fees for work performed
through the summary judgment hearing, $6,282.72 in attorneys’
fees to litigate the fees motion, and $1,777.87 in costs and
expenses. The circuit court entered judgment on June 29, 2012,
awarding Oahu Publications $69,627.06.
On July 6, 2012, the Governor timely filed a notice of
appeal, and the case was docketed in the ICA as CAAP-12-0000625.
In his appeal, the Governor did not challenge the circuit court’s
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conclusions on the underlying disclosure issue. He only
challenged the order granting Oahu Publications’ motion for
attorneys’ fees and costs, and the resulting judgment.
The Governor filed his opening brief on October 9,
2012, Oahu Publications filed its answering brief on November 16,
2012, and the Governor filed his reply brief on December 1,
2012.3 Briefly stated, the Governor argued that the circuit
court lacked sufficient information to determine the
reasonableness of the hours spent by Oahu Publications on this
case; the circuit court’s fees and costs award was unreasonable;
and Oahu Publications should not have been reimbursed for
photocopying costs.
On December 27, 2012, the ICA dismissed the appeal sua
sponte for lack of jurisdiction. The ICA explained that the
June 29, 2012 judgment “does not satisfy the requirements for an
appealable final judgment under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS)
3
Although not all of the documents from appeal CAAP-12-0000625 are
included in the record on appeal in this case, the Governor requested that the
ICA take judicial notice of those filings pursuant to Hawai#i Rules of
Evidence (HRE) Rule 201 (1993). Rule 201(d) provides that “[a] court shall
take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary
information.” HRE Rule 201(d). In the past, “[t]his court has validated the
practice of taking judicial notice of a court’s own records in an interrelated
proceeding where the parties are the same.” State v. Akana, 68 Haw. 164, 165,
706 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1985) (citing State v. Wong, 50 Haw. 42, 43, 430 P.2d
330, 332 (1967)). Here, the filings from appeal CAAP-12-0000625 are included
in the ICA’s electronic records through the Judiciary Information Management
System (JIMS), and the parties in the two appeals are the same. Although the
ICA did not explicitly address the Governor’s request, it appears that the ICA
was required to take judicial notice of filings made in appeal CAAP-12-
0000625, pursuant to HRE Rule 201(d). Akana, 68 Haw. at 165-66, 706 P.2d at
1302 (“Under Hawaii Rules of Evidence (HRE) 201(d), a court is mandated to
take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary
information.” (emphasis added)).
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641-1(a) (1993 & Supp. 2011), Rule 58 of the Hawai#i Rules of
Civil Procedure (HRCP) and the holding in Jenkins v. Cades
Schutte Fleming & Wright, 76 Hawai#i 115, 119, 869 P.2d 1334,
1338 (1994).” The ICA explained that, although the complaint
alleged “four separate and distinct counts against Appellant
Abercrombie, the June 29, 2012 judgment does not specifically
identify whether the circuit court intends to enter judgment on
all four counts in the . . . complaint or merely some of the four
counts in the . . . complaint.”
The Governor filed a motion for reconsideration, which
Oahu Publications joined. On January 10, 2013, the ICA entered
an order denying the Governor’s motion for reconsideration. Oahu
Publications did not file a motion to recover attorneys’ fees and
costs associated with this first appeal within fourteen days of
the ICA’s denial of the motion for reconsideration.
After the ICA dismissed the first appeal, the circuit
court entered a second amended final judgment on February 8,
2013.4 On March 1, 2013, the Governor timely filed a second
notice of appeal. On March 14, 2013, the Governor filed a
stipulation informing the court that the parties had agreed to
file their briefs from the first appeal, with updated references
4
In the meantime, the circuit court had granted Oahu Publications’
motion to correct a clerical error in the judgment. The circuit court entered
an amended judgment on December 12, 2012, reflecting a $600 reduction in the
amount awarded to Oahu Publications, from $69,627.06 to $69,027.06.
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to the record on appeal. The parties also agreed on an
accelerated briefing schedule. Specifically, the parties agreed
that the Governor’s opening brief would be filed no later than
seven days after the filing of the record on appeal, Oahu
Publications’ answering brief no more than five days after the
opening brief, and the Governor’s reply brief no more than three
days after the answering brief. The ICA entered a corresponding
order.
On October 18, 2013, the ICA entered a summary
disposition order affirming in part and vacating in part the
circuit court’s February 8, 2013 second amended final judgment.
A majority of the court concluded that the Governor had failed to
demonstrate that the circuit court clearly exceeded the bounds of
reason in its award of attorneys’ fees, but that photocopying
costs totaling $564.60 were not adequately substantiated. The
ICA therefore affirmed the second amended judgment as to
attorneys’ fees, vacated the judgment as to photocopying costs,
and remanded the case for further proceedings on the latter
issue.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Ginoza concluded that
the record was inadequate for the circuit court to properly
exercise its discretion on the issue of attorneys’ fees. Judge
Ginoza would have therefore also vacated the attorneys’ fees
award.
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On November 10, 2013, Oahu Publications filed a request
to recover attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in the ICA. Oahu
Publications’ request totaled $26,838.02, which included
attorneys fees of $25,300.87 and the associated general excise
tax of $1,162.13, anticipated fees of $325 and the associated
general excise tax of $15.31, and costs of $34.71. The request
included fees and costs associated with both the first and second
appeals. Thus, the invoices submitted by Oahu Publications
spanned from July 6, 2012, the day the Governor filed a notice of
appeal in the first appeal, through October 2013, after the ICA
issued its SDO in the second appeal.
The Governor made four arguments in opposition to Oahu
Publications’ request. First, the Governor argued that any
requested fees for work done in the first appeal were untimely.
The Governor argued that pursuant to HRAP Rule 39(d)(2), any
request for fees accrued in connection with the first appeal
“needed to be filed on or before January 24, 201[3],” i.e., no
later than 14 days after the ICA issued its order denying the
Governor’s motion for reconsideration. The Governor argued,
therefore, that Oahu Publications could only recover fees accrued
after March 1, 2013, when the Governor filed the notice of appeal
in the second appeal.
Second, the Governor argued that Oahu Publications
could not recover fees for work performed in the circuit court.
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Third, the Governor argued that Oahu Publications’ request did
not satisfy the requirements of HRAP Rule 39. Finally, the
Governor argued that Oahu Publications had not demonstrated that
the requested hourly rates were reasonable, and many of the hours
reported were “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.”
In its reply, Oahu Publications argued that it was
entitled to recover fees and costs associated with both appeals
because HRS § 92F-15(d) “requires assessment of fees and expenses
incurred ‘in the litigation,’ and ‘the litigation’ here includes
both [the Governor’s] failed first attempt to appeal . . . and
the second[.]” In response to the Governor’s argument that Oahu
Publications could not recover fees associated with work done in
the circuit court, Oahu Publications argued that this work was a
“miniscule portion” of its request, and that judicial economy
would not be served by mandating “piecemeal requests.” Oahu
Publications further argued that its request complied with HRAP
Rule 39(d)(1). Finally, Oahu Publications argued that its
requested hourly rates were reasonable, as were the hours
expended.
On January 6, 2014, the ICA entered an order denying
Oahu Publications’ request for fees. The ICA first stated that
“[a]ttorneys’ fees and costs related to [the first appeal] are
denied with prejudice.” The ICA denied without prejudice Oahu
Publications’ request for fees and costs related to the second
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appeal, explaining that the request was “incorrectly calculated
in that it requests two different amounts for attorneys’ fees,”
and that it appeared “that some entries are block billed which is
prohibited under Hawaii Adventures v. Otaka, 116 Hawai#i 465, 173
P.3d 1122 (2007).” Finally, the ICA noted that the “request for
costs for photocopying and extra postage failed to specify the
purpose for incurring the costs and the date the costs were
incurred.” The ICA explained that Oahu Publications could file
an amended request for attorneys’ fees and costs associated with
the second appeal within ten days of the filing of the order.
Oahu Publications then filed a motion for
reconsideration or clarification. Oahu Publications argued that
the ICA misapprehended the requirements of HRS Chapter 92F,
“which mandates the assessment of fees and costs reasonably
incurred ‘in the litigation’ which includes both [appeals].”
Oahu Publications also asked the ICA for clarification, noting
that the ICA did not “provide the reason for denying the request,
or the reason it was denied with prejudice[.]”
On January 24, 2014, the ICA entered an order granting
Oahu Publications’ motion for clarification, but denying its
motion for reconsideration. The ICA stated that it denied the
request for fees and costs associated with the first appeal
because the request was untimely. The ICA noted that under HRAP
Rule 39(a), if an appeal is dismissed, “costs shall be taxed
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against the appellant or petitioner upon proper application,” and
that, pursuant to HRAP Rule 39(d)(2), a request for fees and
costs must be filed no later than fourteen days after the time
for filing a motion for reconsideration has expired. The ICA
also denied Oahu Publications’ request to reconsider its denial
of fees and costs associated with the second appeal.
Before the ICA ruled on Oahu Publications’ motion for
reconsideration or clarification, Oahu Publications filed an
amended request for fees. The amended request included only
those fees associated with the second appeal. Specifically, Oahu
Publications sought fees of $1,728.75, for 10.2 hours of work,
and general excise tax of $81.45, for a total of $1,810.20. Oahu
Publications submitted its amended request “without prejudice to
its arguments, as set forth in the [motion for reconsideration],
that [the Governor] must be assessed under [HRS § 92F-15(d)] for
all fees and costs incurred ‘in the litigation,’ which includes
both [appeals][.]”
The Governor opposed the amended request, arguing that
the number of hours spent preparing the answering brief was
overstated, fees associated with requesting an expedited appeal
should not be awarded, and the requested hourly rates were not
fair reflections of prevailing rates in Honolulu. In its reply,
Oahu Publications argued that the fees award proposed by the
Governor was unreasonable, the hours it spent on the appeal were
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reasonable, it was not prohibited from requesting that the case
be expedited, and the Governor failed to offer evidence that the
requested hourly rates were unreasonable.
On February 24, 2014, the ICA entered an order granting
Oahu Publications’ amended request for attorneys’ fees in its
entirety, thereby awarding Oahu Publications $1,810.20 in fees,
based on work done during the second appeal. After the ICA
entered the judgment on appeal, Oahu Publications timely filed an
application for writ of certiorari.
In its application, Oahu Publications presents a single
question:
Are attorneys’ fees incurred in an earlier phase of
appellate litigation — which the ICA dismissed for
lack of a final circuit court judgment, but which did
not resolve the action — recoverable by the prevailing
complainant under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 92F-15(d) after
the ICA rules in its favor on the merits?
III. Standard of Review
“This court reviews the . . . denial and granting of
attorney’s fees under the abuse of discretion standard.” Ranger
Ins. Co. v. Hinshaw, 103 Hawai#i 26, 30, 79 P.3d 119, 123 (2003).
“[A]n abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court has
clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or
principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a
party litigant.” Id.IV. Discussion
Oahu Publications argues that the ICA “ignored the
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plain language” of HRS § 92F-15(d) and “seriously undermined the
UIPA’s core purpose of encouraging public challenges to
government secrecy” in denying Oahu Publications’ request for
fees incurred during the first appeal. Specifically, Oahu
Publications asks this court to hold that “a request by the
complainant for appellate fees and costs incurred in a UIPA case
is timely under [HRAP Rule 39] if it is timely filed pursuant to
[HRAP Rule 39(d)(2)] after the appellate court has finally
determined the merits in the complainant’s favor, even if an
earlier appeal was dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.”
Section 92F-15(d) provides that “if the claimant
prevails” in an action brought under the UIPA, the court “shall
assess against the agency reasonable attorney’s fees and all
other expenses reasonably incurred in the litigation.” (Emphasis
added). The fees and costs at issue here relate to one specific
part of the litigation, i.e., the Governor’s appeal of the
circuit court’s award of attorneys’ fees and costs. Oahu
Publications could not have requested attorneys’ fees and costs
upon dismissal of the first appeal pursuant to HRS § 92F-15(d)
because it was not yet a prevailing party on appeal. The ICA
therefore erred in determining that Oahu Publications’ request
for fees and costs, which it filed after prevailing in the second
appeal, was untimely.
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Moreover, although HRAP Rule 39(d)(2) provides that a
request for fees and costs “must be filed . . . no later than 14
days after the time for filing a motion for reconsideration has
expired or the motion for reconsideration has been decided,” the
rule further provides that “[a]n untimely request for fees and
costs or necessary expenses may be denied.” (Emphasis added).
Thus, even assuming arguendo that Oahu Publications could have
filed a request for fees and costs after the first appeal was
dismissed, the ICA had the discretion to award fees and costs
following resolution of the second appeal. Failing to do so in
the circumstances presented here was an abuse of discretion.
In this regard, the vast majority of the work done in
the ICA was performed during the first appeal. The parties re-
submitted the briefs filed in first appeal in the second appeal,
with only minor changes. By not considering the work done during
the first appeal, even though it had the discretion to do so, the
ICA failed to award Oahu Publications the fees “incurred in the
litigation,” as it was required to do under HRS § 92F-15(d).
A. The ICA erred in determining that Oahu Publications’ request
for attorneys’ fees and costs was untimely
“Pursuant to the ‘American Rule,’ each party usually
pays its own litigation expenses.” Kemp v. State of Haw. Child
Support Enforcement Agency, 111 Hawai#i 367, 388, 141 P.3d 1014,
1035 (2006). As this court has noted, however, “there are
several exceptions to this general rule which allow fee-shifting
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such that the losing party pays the fees for the prevailing
party, ‘when so authorized by statute, rule of court, agreement,
stipulation, or precedent.’” Id. (quoting Schefke v. Reliable
Collection Agency, Ltd., 96 Hawai#i 408, 444, 32 P.3d 52, 88
(2001)). In this case, fees and costs are expressly authorized
under the UIPA.
The purposes of the UIPA, HRS Chapter 92F, include
promoting the public interest in disclosure; providing accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete government records; enhancing
governmental accountability through a general policy of access to
government records; making government accountable to individuals
in the collection, use, and dissemination of information relating
to them; and balancing the individual privacy interest and the
public access interest, allowing access unless it would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
HRS § 92F-2 (1993). The Legislature explained that “it is the
policy of this State that the formation and conduct of public
policy — the discussions, deliberations, decisions, and action of
government agencies — shall be conducted as openly as possible.”
Id.
In furtherance of these policies, HRS § 92F-15(a)
provides that “[a] person aggrieved by a denial of access to a
government record may bring an action against the agency at any
time within two years after the agency denial to compel
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disclosure.” HRS § 92F-15(a). And HRS § 92F-15(d) expressly
provides that “[i]f the complainant prevails in an action brought
under this section, the court shall assess against the agency
reasonable attorney’s fees and all other expenses reasonably
incurred in the litigation.” HRS § 92F-15(d) (emphases added).
Thus, pursuant to HRS § 92F-15(d), the court is required to award
fees and costs “incurred in the litigation” if the complainant
prevails.
Here, it is undisputed that Oahu Publications
ultimately prevailed on appeal. Thus, there is no dispute that,
pursuant to HRS § 92F-15(d), Oahu Publications was entitled to
recover fees and costs incurred on appeal. This case therefore
turns on whether the ICA erred in denying Oahu Publications’
request for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred during the first
appeal, even though those fees and costs were incurred “in the
litigation.” For the reasons set forth below, the ICA erred in
denying Oahu Publications request for attorneys’ fees and costs
incurred during the first appeal.
Although the authority to recover fees and costs in
this case arose under HRS § 92F-15(d), the procedure for
requesting those fees and costs is generally set forth in HRAP
Rule 39. Rule 39(a) provides:
Except in criminal cases or as otherwise provided by
law, if an appeal or petition is dismissed, costs
shall be taxed against the appellant or petitioner
upon proper application unless otherwise agreed by the
parties or ordered by the appellate court; if a
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judgment is affirmed or a petition denied, costs shall
be taxed against the appellant or petitioner unless
otherwise ordered; if a judgment is reversed or a
petition granted, costs shall be taxed against the
appellee or the respondent unless otherwise ordered;
if a judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in
part, or is vacated, or a petition granted in part and
denied in part, the costs shall be allowed only as
ordered by the appellate court. . . .
HRAP Rule 39(a).5
Rule 39(d)(1) provides:
A party who desires an award of attorney’s fees and
costs shall request them by submitting an itemized and
verified bill of fees and costs, together with a
statement of authority for each category of items and,
where appropriate, copies of invoices, bills,
vouchers, and receipts. . . . Requests for non-
indigent attorney’s fees and costs allowed by statute
or contract shall be submitted in a form that
substantially complies with Form 8 in the Appendix of
Forms. A failure to provide authority for the award
of attorney’s fees and costs or necessary expenses
will result in denial of that request.
HRAP Rule 39(d)(1).
Subsection (2) further provides:
A request for fees and costs or necessary expenses
must be filed with the appellate clerk, with proof of
service, no later than 14 days after the time for
filing a motion for reconsideration has expired or the
motion for reconsideration has been decided. An
untimely request for fees and costs or necessary
expenses may be denied.
HRAP Rule 39(d)(2).
In the instant case, the relevant portion of the
litigation is the Governor’s appeal with respect to the circuit
court’s award of fees and costs. The ICA concluded that Oahu
5
Rule 39(b) addresses costs against the State of Hawai#i, and
provides that “if an award of costs against the State is authorized by law,
costs shall be awarded in accordance with the provisions of this rule.” HRAP
Rule 39(b). Here, because HRS § 92F-15(d) authorizes the recovery of
“reasonable attorney’s fees and all other expenses,” HRAP Rule 39(a) applies.
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Publications’ request for fees and costs incurred during the
first appeal was untimely because it was filed more than fourteen
days after the Governor’s motion for reconsideration in the first
appeal was denied. The Governor argues that “nothing would have
prevented [Oahu Publications] from filing a request for fees and
costs on appeal after the [first appeal] was dismissed[.]” This
argument is incorrect. Although Oahu Publications prevailed in
the circuit court on the disclosure issue and on its request for
fees and costs incurred in the trial court, it was not a
prevailing party in the ICA when the court dismissed the first
appeal. Thus, Oahu Publications could not have requested either
attorneys’ fees or costs upon dismissal of the first appeal
because it had not yet prevailed in the ICA.
In general, “‘the litigant in whose favor judgment is
rendered is the prevailing party.’” Wong v. Takeuchi, 88 Hawai#i
46, 49, 961 P.2d 611, 614 (1998) (citing Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d § 2667 (1983)). “Thus, a
dismissal of the action, whether on the merits or not, generally
means that [the] defendant is the prevailing party.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]here is no
requirement that the judgment in favor of the prevailing party be
a ruling on the merits.” Id.
In Wong, for example, the plaintiff filed a complaint
against three defendants for dissolution of a partnership,
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partnership accounting, and for contribution. Id. at 48, 961
P.2d at 613. The circuit court granted the defendants summary
judgment on the defense of laches and the applicable statute of
limitations. Id. The circuit court awarded attorneys’ fees and
costs to each of the defendants. Id. at 48-49, 961 P.2d at 613-
14. On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the fees and costs
awarded to one of the defendants, arguing that the defendant was
not a prevailing party. Id. at 49, 961 P.2d at 614.
Specifically, the plaintiff argued that because the circuit court
concluded that the claims were untimely, the defendant did not
prevail on the merits of her claim, and that she was therefore
not a prevailing party for purposes of awarding fees and costs.
Id. This court rejected the plaintiff’s argument, concluding
that there is “no requirement that the judgment in favor of the
prevailing party be a ruling on the merits of the claim.” Id.This rule was reaffirmed in Blair v. Ing, 96 Hawai#i
327, 31 P.3d 184 (2001). In Blair, the plaintiffs sued for
professional negligence and breach of implied contract. Id. at
328, 31 P.3d at 185. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss,
which the trial court granted. Id. The defendant then filed a
motion for fees and costs. Id. at 329, 31 P.3d at 186. The
plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing, among other things, that
the judgment was not on the merits. Id. This court reaffirmed
the rule set forth in Wong, holding that “a defendant who
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succeeds in obtaining a judgment of dismissal is a prevailing
party for the purpose of fees[.]” Id. at 331, 31 P.3d at 188.
In reaching this conclusion, the Blair court explained that
“requiring a defendant who would otherwise prevail on a motion to
dismiss, to litigate a claim through trial in order to prevail
‘on the merits’ would frustrate the modern goals of judicial
economy and the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action.” Id.This court has applied the same rule to a situation
where a plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed an action. See
Ranger Ins. Co. v. Hinshaw, 103 Hawai#i 26, 79 P.3d 119 (2003).
In Ranger, an insurance company filed a complaint seeking, among
other things, a declaration that it had no duty to indemnify a
skydiving business, following an accident involving one of the
business’s patrons. Id. at 30, 79 P.3d at 123. The parties
eventually entered into a settlement agreement, and Ranger moved
for leave to dismiss its declaratory judgment action. Id. The
circuit court dismissed the complaint for declaratory relief with
prejudice, and the business filed a motion of attorneys’ fees and
costs. Id.On appeal, Ranger argued that there was no prevailing
party because there was no judgment on the merits. Id. at 31, 79
P.3d at 124. Citing Wong and Blair, this court held that
“dismissal of Ranger’s action, albeit voluntary, is sufficient to
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deem a defendant to be the prevailing party[.]” Id.Here, the ICA dismissed the first appeal sua sponte,
solely because of a flaw in the circuit court’s judgment.
Specifically, the ICA explained that, although the complaint
alleged four counts against the Governor, the June 29, 2012
judgment did not specifically identify whether the circuit court
intended to enter judgment as to all four counts. The Governor
filed a motion for reconsideration, which Oahu Publications
joined. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that Oahu
Publications prevailed following the first appeal.
Unlike in Wong, where the case was decided on the
defense of laches and the applicable statute of limitations, the
ICA’s dismissal of the first appeal did not finally resolve the
instant case. The Governor was free to file a second appeal once
the circuit court corrected the judgment, so that he could
challenge the circuit court’s award of fees and costs to Oahu
Publications. Indeed, this is exactly what happened. Unlike in
Blair, where the defendant affirmatively moved to dismiss the
complaint, Oahu Publications did not seek dismissal of the first
appeal. In fact, as noted above, Oahu Publications joined the
Governor’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal. Finally,
unlike in Ranger, where the plaintiff moved for leave to dismiss
its complaint and the circuit court dismissed the complaint with
prejudice, the Governor did not move to dismiss the first appeal,
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nor did the ICA dismiss the first appeal with prejudice. In
other words, the Governor was free to file another appeal upon
entry of an amended judgment and that is exactly what he did.
Oahu Publications was therefore not a prevailing party and could
not have requested fees under HRS § 92F-15(d) following the
dismissal of the first appeal.
Our conclusion in this regard is consistent with a line
of cases concluding that a “material alteration of the legal
relationship of the parties [is] necessary to permit an award of
attorney’s fees.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t
Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001); see also Cadkin v.
Loose, 569 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The key inquiry is
whether some court action has created a material alteration of
the legal relationship of the parties.”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). In Buckhannon, the United States
Supreme Court observed that a “‘prevailing party’ is one who has
been awarded some relief by the court[.]” 532 U.S. at 603.
Courts have therefore concluded that a dismissal without
prejudice does not alter the legal relationship of the parties
“because the defendant remains subject to risk of re-filing.”
Oscar v. Alaska Dept. of Educ. & Early Dev., 541 F.3d 978, 981
(9th Cir. 2008). These cases therefore also support our
conclusion that Oahu Publications had not prevailed upon
dismissal of the first appeal because there was no “material
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alteration of the legal relationship of the parties,” and it
remained at risk that the Governor would file another appeal upon
entry of an amended judgment.
Even assuming Oahu Publications had filed such a
request upon dismissal of the first appeal, the ICA could not
have awarded Oahu Publications the substantial fees incurred in
reviewing the Governor’s briefs and preparing its own brief
because there had been no determination that Oahu Publications
would ultimately prevail on appeal. Put another way, the ICA
could not have awarded Oahu Publications the $19,000 in fees
generated during the first appeal unless and until Oahu
Publications prevailed in that court. Because Oahu Publications
could not have obtained an award of attorneys’ fees upon
dismissal of the first appeal, the ICA erred in concluding that
it was required to seek them at that time.
With respect to costs, as noted above, HRAP Rule 39(a)
provides that “[e]xcept in criminal cases or as otherwise
provided by law, if an appeal or petition is dismissed, costs
shall be taxed against the appellant or petitioner upon proper
application unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by
the appellate court[.]” HRAP Rule 39(a) (emphasis added).
Costs, in this case, are “otherwise provided by law,” because HRS
§ 92F-15(d) expressly provides that if the complainant prevails,
the court shall assess “reasonable attorney’s fees and all other
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expenses reasonably incurred in the litigation.” (Emphasis
added). Thus, like with attorneys’ fees, Oahu Publications was
entitled to recover costs pursuant to HRS § 92F-15(d) once it
prevailed in the ICA. As noted above, because Oahu Publications
was not a prevailing party upon dismissal of the first appeal, it
was not required to request costs until after the second appeal
was decided.
In sum, when the ICA dismissed the first appeal, it did
so sua sponte, without prejudice to the Governor filing a second
appeal after the circuit court filed an amended judgment. Thus,
it was not possible to determine then who the prevailing party
would be on appeal, and it would have been futile for Oahu
Publications to file a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs at
that time. It was not until the second appeal was decided that
such a determination could be made. While HRAP Rule 39(d)(2)
properly requires parties to act in a timely manner, its purposes
are not served by requiring parties to take actions that are
futile. Yet that is effectively what the ICA’s ruling required
here.
B. Even assuming arguendo that Oahu Publications could have
filed a request for fees and costs following the first
appeal, the ICA should have exercised its discretion to
consider the request filed after the second appeal was
decided
As noted above, the ICA concluded that Oahu
Publications was required to request fees incurred during the
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first appeal within fourteen days after the ICA denied the
Governor’s motion for reconsideration. Even assuming that Oahu
Publications could have filed a request for fees following the
dismissal of the first appeal, the ICA had discretion to consider
the request filed after the second appeal was decided.
Although the first sentence of HRAP Rule 39(d)(2)
provides that a request for fees and costs “must be filed” no
later than fourteen days after the time for filing a motion for
reconsideration expires or the motion is decided, the rule goes
on to provide that the appellate court “may” nevertheless
consider an untimely request. Thus, this court has observed that
the ICA is not required to deny an untimely request. Tortorello
v. Tortorello, 113 Hawai#i 432, 442, 153 P.3d 1117, 1127 (2007).
In Tortorello, the ICA granted a husband’s request for
costs in a protective order case, even though the request was
filed four days after the deadline for submission under HRAP Rule
39(d)(2). Id. The wife argued that the ICA erred in awarding
costs because the request was untimely. Id. This court
concluded that the “ICA was not required to deny Husband’s
request for costs due to untimeliness,” because “HRAP Rule
39(d)(2) expressly indicates that an untimely request for costs
‘may be denied.’” Id. (emphasis in original).6 Thus, the ICA
6
In reaching this conclusion, this court also noted that
“[a]lthough the appellate courts are not required to deny a request due to
untimeliness, the appellate courts have exercised that discretion in denying
(continued...)
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has discretion to consider an untimely request under HRAP Rule
39(d)(2). Id.In the circumstances of this case, the ICA abused its
discretion in refusing to consider Oahu Publications’ request for
attorneys’ fees and costs following the resolution of the second
appeal. Specifically, the parties had completely briefed the
case during the first appeal, before the ICA dismissed that
appeal because of an error in the circuit court’s judgment. By
the time the ICA dismissed the appeal, Oahu Publications had
spent significant time reviewing the Governor’s opening and reply
briefs, and preparing its answering brief. Specifically, the
record indicates that Oahu Publications spent more than sixty-
eight hours directly related to the briefing of the first appeal,
resulting in fees in excess of $19,000.7
Moreover, the time spent by Oahu Publications on the
second appeal did not accurately reflect the work it had
performed in the ICA. After the Governor filed the second
6
(...continued)
outright an untimely request for fees and/or costs.” Id. n.9. This court
therefore cautioned “counsel to comply with HRAP Rule 39(d)(2)’s mandate that
such requests for fees and/or costs be filed no later than fourteen days after
the time for filing a motion for reconsideration has expired or the motion for
reconsideration has been decided.” Id.
7
On the invoices associated with the work performed during the
first appeal, it appears that counsel gave Oahu Publications a ten percent
“courtesy discount” on the resulting fees. Even taking such a discount into
account, however, Oahu Publications’ fees exceeded $17,000. In its memorandum
in support of its request for fees, Oahu Publications stated that it “provided
a total of $5,583.88 in courtesy discounts,” “primarily related to work
undertaken as a result of Governor Abercrombie’s failed first appeal[.]”
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appeal, the parties agreed that they would each re-file the
briefs from the first appeal, with updated references to the
record on appeal. As a result, the vast majority of Oahu
Publications’ work done in the ICA was undertaken during the
course of the first appeal, rather than the second. Indeed, Oahu
Publications requested fees totaling only $1,728.75 for 10.2
hours of work performed during the second appeal.8
By denying Oahu Publications’ request for fees
associated with the first appeal, the ICA essentially ignored
more than sixty hours of work and fees in excess of $19,000
incurred during the first appeal, all of which was used by Oahu
Publications to prevail on the merits during the second appeal.
The ICA offered no explanation why it refused to exercise its
discretion to consider Oahu Publications’ request for fees for
services that were performed during the first appeal and used to
obtain the ultimately successful outcome on the merits. The
ICA’s denial of any fees incurred during the first appeal is at
odds with the express language of HRS § 92F-15(d), which provides
that “the court shall assess against the agency reasonable
attorney’s fees and all other expenses reasonably incurred in the
8
This total reflects a fifty percent “courtesy discount.” The
ICA’s final award of fees for the second appeal, $1,810.20, also included a
general excise tax of $81.45.
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litigation.”9 (Emphases added). In these circumstances, the ICA
abused its discretion in denying Oahu Publications’ request for
fees and costs incurred during the first appeal.10
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the ICA’s January 6, 2014,
and January 24, 2014 orders are vacated in part, and the ICA’s
March 3, 2014 judgment on appeal is vacated to the extent it
reflects a denial of Oahu Publications’ request for appellate
9
Oahu Publications argues that to the extent there is a conflict
between HRAP Rule 39 and HRS § 92F-15(d), the statute controls. This court
has explained that “where a statute and a rule merely overlap, but do not
irreconcilably conflict, effect should be given to both if possible.” Cnty.
of Haw. v. C & J Coupe Family Ltd. P’ship, 120 Hawai#i 400, 405, 208 P.3d 713,
718 (2009). Here, there is no irreconcilable conflict between HRAP Rule 39
and HRS § 92F-15(d). Section 92F-15(d) provided Oahu Publications with the
authority to seek fees and costs in the ICA, and HRAP Rule 39 set forth the
procedure for requesting those fees and costs. There is nothing inherently
inconsistent in those two provisions, provided the court reasonably exercises
its discretion under the rule. In the circumstances of the instant case, the
ICA abused its discretion under the rule in denying Oahu Publications its fees
and costs for services performed in connection with the first appeal. There
may be circumstances where a denial of fees and costs as untimely in a HRS §
92F-15(d) case would be appropriate, but this case does not present such
circumstances. For example, if Oahu Publications had filed a request for fees
and costs more than 14 days after the second appeal had become final, the ICA
could have properly denied such a request as untimely.
10
Of course, this is not to say that Oahu Publications should
receive the fees and costs requested in connection with the first appeal in
their entirety. The reasonableness of the request in connection with the
first appeal should be decided by the ICA in the first instance on remand.
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fees and costs. The matter is remanded to the ICA for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Diane D. Hastert, /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
Robert H. Thomas,
Mark M. Murakami, and /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Christopher J.I. Leong
for petitioner /s/ R. Mark Browning
Charleen M. Aina /s/ Gary W.B. Chang
for respondent
/s/ Jeannette H. Castagnetti
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