State v. Stone. ( 2020 )


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  •     ***     FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER    ***
    Electronically Filed
    Supreme Court
    SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
    15-JUN-2020
    08:38 AM
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
    ---o0o---
    ________________________________________________________________
    STATE OF HAWAI‘I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    KENTARU KRISTOPHER STONE, also known as KENTARO K. STONE,
    Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant
    SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
    CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; 1PC161000543)
    JUNE 15, 2020
    RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.
    OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.
    I.   Introduction
    This appeal arises from a jury trial in the First Circuit
    of the Circuit Court (“circuit court”)1 in which Kentaru
    Kristopher Stone (“Stone”) was convicted by a jury on the charge
    of promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree.
    1
    The Honorable Jeffrey P. Crabtree presided.
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    At around 3:45 a.m. on April 5, 2016, Stone was approached
    at Ala Moana Beach Park by Honolulu Police Department (“HPD”)
    Officer Douglas Korenic II (“Officer Korenic”).           Stone was
    seated on a picnic table with various items strewn around him,
    including one or more identification cards (“IDs”).            Based on
    discovery provided by the State of Hawaiʻi (“State”), Officer
    Korenic’s testimony was anticipated to be that he approached
    Stone for a park closure or rules violation, that Stone would
    not provide information regarding his identity, and that Stone
    then threw a small “baggie” containing methamphetamine, which
    landed on the picnic table.
    Based on provided discovery, defense counsel’s theory of
    the case during opening statement was that, because the only
    found property report related to an iPhone, the other items on
    the picnic table shown in photographs belonged to Stone and
    included Stone’s ID.      Defense counsel theorized that Officer
    Korenic’s testimony that he had been unable to ascertain Stone’s
    identity would therefore be untruthful.          The defense theory was
    also that Officer Korenic had searched Stone’s bag and had
    strewn Stone’s belongings all over the table, as shown in the
    photographic exhibits; that Officer Korenic must have planted
    the methamphetamine baggie after rifling through Stone’s bag or
    that the methamphetamine baggie was already there but did not
    belong to Stone; and that Officer Korenic did not seek a search
    2
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    warrant for the bag because, based on his search, he already
    knew there was no drug paraphernalia therein.
    During trial, however, Officer Korenic, who was the only
    witness to Stone’s alleged methamphetamine possession, testified
    in cross-examination that in addition to the found property
    report regarding the iPhone, he had generated additional found
    property reports as to the other miscellaneous items on the
    picnic table, including other people’s IDs.              He also testified
    the IDs and other items on the picnic table did not belong to
    Stone.
    The circuit court therefore called a mid-trial recess.            The
    State procured and the defense reviewed additional police
    reports referenced in Officer Korenic’s incident report that had
    not been produced in discovery.              The additional reports
    referenced in the incident report were, however, completely
    unrelated to Stone’s case.          Yet, in his resumed testimony,
    Officer Korenic persisted in his testimony that additional found
    property reports existed pertaining to Stone's case.
    The jury found Stone guilty of promoting a dangerous drug
    in the third degree.
    Stone moved for a new trial pursuant to Hawaiʻi Rules of
    Penal Procedure (“HRPP”) Rule 33 (2012),2 arguing he was deprived
    2
    HRPP Rule 33 states in relevant part: “A motion for a new trial shall
    be made within 10 days after verdict or finding of guilty or within such
    (continued. . .)
    3
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    of a fair trial because he had expected no dispute that the ID
    on the picnic table belonged to him.            This was because discovery
    had not indicated items other than the iPhone belonged to
    others.       On December 27, 2016, the circuit court denied Stone’s
    motion for new trial, sentenced Stone to a five-year term of
    imprisonment, and entered its judgment on January 18, 2017.
    Stone appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals
    (“ICA”), arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his
    motion for new trial.         He asserted he met this court’s four-part
    test for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.                   See
    State v. McNulty, 
    60 Haw. 259
    , 
    588 P.2d 438
     (1978), overruled on
    other grounds by Raines v. State, 79 Hawaiʻi 219, 
    900 P.2d 1286
    (1995).3      He also asserted he met the ICA's four-part test for a
    new trial based on false testimony from a material prosecution
    witness.       See State v. Teves, 
    5 Haw. App. 90
    , 
    679 P.2d 136
    (. . .continued)
    further time as the court may fix during the 10-day period.     The finding of
    guilty may be entered in writing or orally on the record.”
    3
    In McNulty, in relevant part, this court established a four-part test
    for granting motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence:
    A motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence
    will be granted only if all of the following requirements
    have been satisfied: (1) the evidence has been discovered
    after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been
    discovered before or at trial through the exercise of due
    diligence; (3) the evidence is material to the issues and
    not cumulative or offered solely for purposes of
    impeachment; and (4) the evidence is of such a nature as
    would probably change the result of a later trial.
    60 Haw. at 267-68, 
    588 P.2d at 445
    .
    4
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    (1984).4      Stone also argued his right to a fair trial was
    violated.
    In its November 27, 2019 summary disposition order, the ICA
    rejected Stone’s arguments, ruling the circuit court did not
    abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial because
    Stone failed to satisfy the McNulty and Teves tests.               See State
    v. Stone, CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 
    2019 WL 6359162
     (App. Nov. 27, 2019)
    (SDO).       The ICA did not address this court’s opinion in Birano
    v. State, 143 Hawaiʻi 163, 182, 
    426 P.3d 387
    , 406 (2018), which
    was issued after Stone’s 2017 reply brief, but before its SDO.
    We hold the ICA erred in affirming the circuit court’s
    denial of the motion for new trial because Stone satisfied the
    Teves test.       Because the Teves test governs the circumstances of
    this case, we need not and do not address whether Stone
    satisfied the McNulty test.
    We also hold Stone’s right to a fair trial was violated
    because, as the ICA correctly noted, Officer Korenic testified
    4
    In Teves, the ICA set out a four-part test for granting a new trial
    based on a prosecution witness giving false testimony at trial:
    We hold that upon a proper and timely motion under Rule 33,
    HRPP, a new trial must be granted by the trial court when
    it decides that (1) it is reasonably satisfied that the
    testimony at trial of a material prosecution witness is
    false; (2) defendant and his agents did not discover the
    falseness of the testimony until after the trial; (3) the
    late discovery is not due to a lack of due diligence by
    defendant or his agent; and (4) the false testimony is not
    harmless because there is a reasonable possibility that it
    contributed to the conviction.
    5 Haw. App. at 96, 679 P.2d at 141 (footnote omitted).
    5
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    falsely concerning the existence of other found property
    reports.        As there is a reasonable possibility the false
    testimony contributed to Stone’s conviction, however, the ICA
    erred in ruling it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Accordingly, we vacate the ICA’s February 5, 2020 judgment
    on appeal and the circuit court’s January 18, 2017 judgment of
    conviction and sentence, and remand this case to the circuit
    court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    II.   Factual and procedural background
    A.        Circuit court proceedings
    1.    Charge and pretrial
    On April 6, 2016, Stone was charged via felony information
    with promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree in violation
    of HRS § 712-1243 (2014).5
    5
    HRS      § 712-1243 states: “(1) A person commits the offense of promoting a
    dangerous      drug in the third degree if the person knowingly possesses any
    dangerous      drug in any amount. (2) Promoting a dangerous drug in the third
    degree is      a class C felony.”
    HRS § 712-1240 (2014) states in relevant part: “‘Dangerous drugs’ means
    any substance or immediate precursor defined or specified as a ‘Schedule I
    substance’ or a ‘Schedule II substance’ by chapter 329, or a substance
    specified in section 329-18(c)(14), except marijuana or marijuana
    concentrate.”
    HRS § 329-16 (2010) provides in relevant part:
    (a) The controlled substances listed in this section are
    included in schedule II.
    . . . .
    (e) Stimulants. Any material, compound, mixture, or
    preparation which contains any quantity of the following
    (continued. . .)
    6
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    The State provided five HPD reports to the defense in
    discovery.    These reports, identified as Court’s Exhibits A
    through E, were included in the record for appellate purposes
    only.    Court’s Exhibit A is Officer Korenic’s April 5, 2016
    four-page incident report numbered 16-136877, which listed six
    “Related Reports/Comments” numbered 16-121055, 16-121057, 16-
    121058, 16-121059, 16-121060, and 16-121061 (“six related
    reports”) on its face page, and two related reports numbered 16-
    136880 (park closure) and 16-136878 (found property) in the
    narrative of the report.       Court’s Exhibit B is Officer Korenic’s
    follow-up report numbered 16-136877.         Court’s Exhibit C is
    Officer Korenic’s April 5, 2016 two-page incident report
    numbered 16-136880, which listed related reports numbered
    16-136877 (Court’s Exhibit A) and 16-136878 (Court’s Exhibit D).
    Court’s Exhibit D is an April 5, 2016 found property report
    numbered 16-136878 that lists an iPhone.          Court’s Exhibit E is a
    one-page handwritten found property report (or receipt) numbered
    16-136878, listing only an iPhone (Court’s Exhibits D and E are
    collectively referred to as the “iPhone Found Property Report”).
    (. . .continued)
    substances having a danger or probable danger associated
    with a stimulant effect on the central nervous system:
    . . . .
    (2) Any substance which contains any quantity of
    methamphetamine, including its salts, isomers,
    and salts of isomers[.]
    7
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    2.   Jury trial
    The circuit court held a jury trial on October 27 and 28,
    2016.
    a.    Opening statements
    In its opening statement, the State described what the
    evidence would show:
    Knowingly possess. Ladies and gentlemen, what the
    evidence is going to show us through the course of this
    trial is that on April 5th, 2016, the defendant knew that
    he possessed methamphetamine, and that he tried to hide it.
    On April 5th, 2016 at about 3:45 in the morning,
    Officer Douglas Korenic was on patrol, and we're going to
    meet him during this trial and he’s going to tell us about
    how that day he was patrolling the Ala Moana Beach Park
    here in Honolulu, State of Hawaii, and at that time he
    observed this defendant sitting at a park bench. Well, not
    at a park bench, he was on the bench. He was sitting on
    the table, on the picnic table, with his feet on the bench.
    There’s things on the table.
    And Officer Korenic is going to tell us how he
    approached the defendant. He started asking him some
    questions and he’s talking to the defendant, when all of a
    sudden the defendant makes a arm gesture. He uses his arm
    and he flicks away a small baggie, which Officer Korenic
    knows and recognizes from his training and experience as a
    Honolulu Police Department officer, it contains a white
    crystalline substance, and he recognizes this substance to
    possibly be crystal methamphetamine.
    . . . .
    And ladies and gentlemen, what the evidence is going
    to show you is that that substance was, in fact, crystal
    methamphetamine, and even more so, that on April 5th, 2016,
    this defendant knew he had it, and then he tried to hide
    it. Thank you.
    In her opening statement, defense counsel explained the
    defense theory of the case:
    Now, at 3:45 in the morning, at Ala Moana Beach Park,
    I mean, it’s still dark, it’s not the safest place to be at
    that time. You will see a picture, and in that picture it
    will show Mr. Stone’s belongings, including his
    identification, various debit cards, credit cards, store
    cards, strewn all over the table. Use your reason and
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    common sense. Would anybody have all of their property
    thrown all over the table at 3:45 in Ala Moana Beach Park
    all by himself? He’s not the biggest guy. You can see
    him.
    The evidence will show that the very people charged
    with protecting us planted –- well, rifled through his
    belongings, and who knows, the baggie might have been there
    before, but it was not in Kentaru Stone’s possession. He
    did not know it was there.
    I ask you to pay specific attention to those pictures
    because the pictures are neutral; they don’t take any
    sides, they just show what is.
    And the evidence will show that Mr. Stone, he
    probably upset the officers. He has difficulty in hearing
    and in speaking, so when Officer Korenic approached him and
    asked for his identification, he probably didn’t respond.
    But Officer Korenic will testify that he was on bike
    patrol. He came across Mr. Stone at approximately 3:45 in
    the morning. He started asking him for his identification,
    and at approximately 10 minutes later, or 3:55 in the
    morning, that’s when he observes Mr. Stone throwing the
    baggie.
    Now, the baggie is the only evidence in this case,
    but I’d also take you –- I’d also ask you to look closely
    at those pictures, because on that bench table there’s a
    clearly visible Hawaii driver’s license with Mr. Stone’s –-
    identifying Mr. Stone, so if the Officer was questioning
    him on his identification for ten minutes, when his
    identification was clearly in view, because the ID is a lot
    bigger and you can see the scale of it, it’s a lot bigger
    than the little plastic baggie, which is approximately 1
    and a half inches by 1 and 1/4 inches, so, I mean, he
    would’ve surely seen his identification on the table.
    And as you hear the evidence, also consider that
    after recovering the baggie –- I mean, ‘cause there were
    other items, there was a –- the bag. The police officers
    did not request a search warrant to see if there were other
    drug paraphernalia or implementations. They did not
    recover a lighter, they did not recover a scraper, they did
    not recover anything else related to that drug
    paraphernalia.
    And ask yourself why they didn’t get a search
    warrant. Because they had already rifled through his
    stuff, they knew that there wasn’t anything more, and
    Kentaru will testify to that.[6]
    At the end of this case, there will be reasonable
    doubt, and we’ll ask that you find Mr. Stone not guilty.
    Thus, based on the discovery provided, defense counsel’s
    theory of the case during opening statement was that because the
    iPhone Found Property Report was the only found property report
    6
    Stone ultimately decided not to testify.
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    produced in discovery, the other items on the picnic table shown
    in the photographic exhibits, which included an ID, belonged to
    Stone, and that Officer Korenic would therefore not be
    testifying truthfully by testifying he was unable to ascertain
    Stone’s identity, when Stone’s ID was visible right in front of
    him.    The defense theory was also that Officer Korenic had
    searched Stone’s bag and had strewn Stone’s belongings all over
    the table, as shown in the photographic exhibits, that Officer
    Korenic must have planted the methamphetamine baggie after
    rifling through Stone’s bag or that the methamphetamine baggie
    was already there but did not belong to Stone, and that Officer
    Korenic did not seek a search warrant of the bag because he
    already knew there was no drug paraphernalia contained therein
    because he had already searched Stone’s bag.
    b.    Officer Korenic’s testimony
    On October 27, 2016, Officer Korenic testified as follows.
    On April 5, 2016, Officer Korenic was assigned to patrol
    Honolulu parks for park closure and rules violations.             At
    approximately 3:45 a.m., he was walking along the edge of the
    Ala Moana Beach Park when he saw a male, later identified as
    Stone, sitting on top of a picnic table approximately sixty feet
    inside the park boundary.       To address the park closure
    violation, he approached Stone, who was faced towards him.
    While approaching Stone, he saw many items on Stone’s lap and on
    10
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    the picnic table, and Stone was “[j]ust touching them, and I
    imagine he was maybe going through them or looking for
    something[.]”     The area was well lit by lights from the walkway.
    Officer Korenic stopped approximately six feet away from
    Stone.    Because the HPD typically issued citations for park
    closure violations, but because it was also an arrestable
    offense, Officer Korenic asked Stone for his information.                 Stone
    responded that he did not have identification, and when Officer
    Korenic asked “what his information was,” Stone stated he had
    the right to remain silent.        After ten minutes of trying to get
    Stone’s information, Officer Korenic told Stone that he would be
    arrested if he did not provide his identity.            Stone remained
    uncooperative.
    Stone then threw “like a press seal type baggie, maybe an
    inch by an inch, maybe inch and a half at the largest, with his
    right hand,” which landed to Stone’s right on the picnic table.
    Inside the baggie was “a white crystalline substance that, due
    to [his] training and experience,” Officer Korenic “recognize[d]
    to be –- [] a narcotic.”        He clearly saw the baggie because the
    area was well lit by lights from the walkway and his flashlight.
    Officer Korenic placed Stone under arrest, and the baggie stayed
    on the table throughout the entire investigation.
    Officer Korenic identified State’s Exhibits 14 through 17,
    which were then admitted into evidence and published to the
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    jury.      State’s Exhibit 16 is a photograph of the top of the
    picnic table with various IDs, membership cards, bank cards, and
    a bag strewn about on its surface.7            Stone was sitting in the
    area without items in State’s Exhibit 16.             Officer Korenic
    verified ownership of the items depicted in State's Exhibit 16
    through a “found property policy”; the items did not belong to
    Stone.      None of the individuals who owned these items were
    present in the park, none of those individuals approached the
    table when he saw Stone, and “they had to come later.”
    On cross-examination, Officer Korenic testified he could
    not have charged Stone for being in possession of other people’s
    confidential personal information because Stone was not in
    possession of the items on the picnic table, as they were on the
    table.      He generated multiple found property reports for those
    items, as he had been trained in the academy to detail
    everything recovered.         When defense counsel asked about the
    iPhone Found Property Report being the only such report, Officer
    Korenic claimed there were several other found property reports
    for the other recovered items.
    Defense counsel then showed Officer Korenic the five HPD
    reports that had been provided to the defense in discovery.
    7
    State’s Exhibit 14 is a photograph of the picnic table in relation to
    the sidewalk. State’s Exhibit 15 is a photograph of the park bench at a
    closer view. State’s Exhibit 17 is a photograph of the methamphetamine
    baggie placed next to a penny for comparative size.
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    After reviewing the reports, Officer Korenic stated, “There is a
    report number that’s not here.”
    The circuit court excused the jury, then held a bench
    conference regarding Officer Korenic’s testimony that there was
    a missing report.     Defense counsel stated that it appeared
    Officer Korenic was testifying to discovery that had not been
    provided to the defense.       The State responded, “[T]he defense is
    in receipt of all reports received by the State from the police
    department.    In reviewing the reports as turned over, there is
    no reference to other report numbers.”          Defense counsel then
    moved for mistrial:
    And generally in this situation, my understanding is if
    there are reports generated out of the same incident, there
    should be connecting reports referred to in the discovery,
    and there are not any.
    So I don’t know if the officer is deliberately trying
    to fabricate something at this point or hiding additional
    reports, I don’t know, but at this point, you know, we’d
    rely to our detriment in terms of questioning the officer.
    I mean, I feel compelled to move for a mistrial. I mean, I
    don’t think the officer’s been up front in –- or I mean HPD
    has been up front with disclosing everything to the defense
    at this point.
    The circuit court did not rule on the oral motion for
    mistrial, instead stating:
    THE COURT: I mean, I understand your position. I’m not -- I
    don’t think the record’s there yet. I think I need more
    information. We can put the witness on the stand outside
    the presence of the jury, and you can try and establish a
    record for what you’re arguing. Right now we’re just
    speculating. He could just be wrong, we don’t know. I
    mean, I think -- personally I’d like to know why does he
    think there’s a report that's not here, and follow that
    trail wherever it leads.
    [DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: Well, first, the State does
    acknowledge that usually if there is a connecting report,
    there’s a reference to it, the State would receive it, and
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    then turn it over in discovery. All reports received by
    the State have been provided to the defense.
    THE COURT: I understand what you’re saying, [deputy
    prosecuting attorney], but the witness has said something
    that’s concerning, and I need to get to the bottom of it.
    Officer Korenic was brought back for defense counsel to
    conduct voir dire.     Defense counsel asked, “So in the report
    that you submitted for this case, there is no mention of any
    connecting reports, correct?”        Having reviewed Court’s Exhibits
    A-E, Officer Korenic responded, “Incorrect,” stating there were
    six related reports listed on the front page of the incident
    report.   Because the State had not received the six related
    reports from HPD, the circuit court recessed for the State to
    procure them for defense review.
    During the mid-trial recess, the State procured, and
    defense counsel reviewed, the six related reports.            The State
    indicated the missing related reports were irrelevant because
    they referred to another incident with another defendant.
    Defense counsel responded:
    Just so that the jury is not left with the belief that it
    pertains to my client, I would like the opportunity to at
    least clarify with the officer and –- because he had
    related that there were other reports that were, I guess,
    created with respect to the found property, and that these
    are not them basically.
    . . . .
    And these are not them, and they don’t have to deal with my
    client.
    Upon resuming cross-examination, Officer Korenic, having
    reviewed the six related reports procured during the mid-trial
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    recess, admitted they had nothing to do with Stone.            With
    respect to whether there were additional found property reports,
    however, the following exchange occurred:
    Q. Also in your report, the last page of your report,
    there is a section entitled Related Reports, correct?
    A. Yes, ma’am.
    Q. And there are two report numbers under that report,
    correct?
    A. Can I see it? (Reviewing.) Yes, ma’am.
    Q. And those reports are for Park Closure under 16-136880
    and Found Property, 16-136878, correct?
    A. Yes, ma’am.
    Q. And the found property report is the report that I had
    previously shown you, correct?
    A. Yes, ma’am, I remember that.
    Q. And the only item that was detailed in that report is
    the iPhone, correct?
    A. Yes, ma’am.
    Q. Other than that, there are no other found property
    reports in your –-
    A. That’s correct.
    Q. So there’s no other itemization of any items that were
    recovered in your report, correct?
    A. Not in that report, no.
    (Emphasis added.)     Thus, Officer Korenic’s testimony indicated
    there were other found property reports containing itemization
    of the items.    Officer Korenic also conceded there was no
    mention in his report that Stone had other people’s IDs around
    him.
    Despite seeing other people’s IDs around Stone, Officer
    Korenic did not obtain a search warrant to search Stone’s
    belongings.    He also did not obtain a search warrant to search
    for drug related paraphernalia after he saw the methamphetamine
    baggie.   There were no drug paraphernalia items on the picnic
    table, and there was no mention of drug paraphernalia, such as a
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    scraper, straw, lighter, or pipe, in his report; the only
    indication of a presence of drugs was the baggie.
    On redirect examination, Officer Korenic clarified that the
    six related reports were not referenced in the narrative of his
    incident report, and only two related reports (park closure and
    iPhone Found Property Report) were referenced in the narrative.
    Although he was trained to document things like his observations
    or the elements of a crime, there were times he did not document
    some details, either through oversight or mistake.            In this
    case, he had testified about what he did and observed from
    memory.   He also answered in the affirmative when the State
    said, “I think it would be fair to say at this point that maybe
    there’s some things that your report had that were mistakes.”
    He did not, however, correct his previous testimony regarding
    the existence of other found property reports.
    On recross-examination, Officer Korenic stated there was
    “some form of ID” in State’s Exhibit 16 and he did not document
    that it was not Stone’s ID and did not identify whose ID it was.
    c.    Officer Paclib’s testimony
    HPD Officer Nichole Paclib (“Officer Paclib”), a bike
    detail officer, testified as follows.
    On April 5, 2016, at approximately 4:15 a.m., she responded
    to an incident at the Ala Moana Beach Park.           Upon arrival,
    Officer Paclib saw Stone sitting on the picnic table, who was
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    with Officer Korenic.      Officer Korenic informed her Stone was
    being arrested; he pointed to the baggie on the picnic table and
    instructed her to recover it.        Officer Paclib placed the baggie
    into a manila envelope and sealed it with red evidence tape; she
    also took pictures of the scene.
    On cross-examination, Officer Paclib testified that had she
    seen IDs or other cards not belonging to Stone, it would have
    raised a “red flag” and she would have documented those
    circumstances in her police report “[i]f it was pertaining to
    the case[.]”     She explained there were some personal items
    around the methamphetamine baggie, but she could not recall
    exactly what they were.      Her report did not state anything about
    IDs.    She did not see what transpired between Stone and Officer
    Korenic before her arrival.
    On re-direct examination, Officer Paclib stated she did not
    spend time looking at the other items on the picnic table
    because her assignment was to recover the methamphetamine
    baggie.
    d.    Other testimony
    The State’s other witnesses testified as to the chain of
    custody and identification of the substance in the baggie, which
    are not at issue in this case.
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    e.    Closing arguments and verdict
    In its closing argument, the State argued that whether
    Officer Korenic made mistakes in the incident report did not
    matter:
    Now, the standard we know is beyond a reasonable
    doubt. And you might be wondering in your mind, well, in
    order to know that the defendant was in possession of the
    baggie, we have to rely on Officer Korenic’s testimony.
    And we do know that, you know, he made some mistakes in
    that report, so how can I believe what he said?
    You know, he admitted that there were some mistakes.
    He left out maybe some related report numbers for the stuff
    that was on the table, maybe he didn’t fully describe in
    his report, you know, what was on the table, what IDs there
    were, who they belonged to, but remember he told us that
    the purpose of these reports, it’s meant to record the
    circumstances about what happened, what’s relevant for that
    case. And this is what Officer Paclib told us too, you
    know, the purpose of that part of the report is to talk
    about what is relevant for what the issue is.
    And this case is, and always has been, about the
    possession of methamphetamine. And Officer Korenic told us
    that he was testifying from his memory, that he wasn’t
    relying on what he had written six months ago, because he
    remembered what happened. But the report that he wrote
    recorded who the defendant was, where he was, what time it
    was, what was going on, what he was doing, what the
    defendant was doing, what the circumstances were, all
    related to this baggie of methamphetamine.
    Now defense might get up here and they might want you
    to believe that, you know, Officer Korenic and HPD, maybe
    they planted it, maybe they have nothing better to do with
    their time than to plant evidence, that they’re not busy
    dealing with real crime, that they have to make up
    something, that Officer Korenic isn’t busy enough
    patrolling the gigantic area that is Ala Moana Beach Park,
    as well as the other city and county public parks that he
    patrols, that he carries around little baggies of meth to
    plant on people. Seriously?
    They might want you to believe though that because
    there’s mistakes in his report, that you can’t believe
    anything that Officer Korenic said. And, yeah, you know
    what, he admitted he made some mistakes. He came back, he
    testified. He seemed a little embarrassed, maybe a little
    sheepish that these mistakes were pointed out, but he was
    clear about what he remembered, and making a mistake in
    your report does not make a conspiracy.
    Let’s also talk a little bit about that other stuff
    on the picnic table. Officer Korenic told us that they
    weren’t the defendant’s. Defense might come up here and
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    say that we don’t really know whose it was.   But does it
    even matter? . . . .
    (Emphasis added.)
    In her closing statement, defense counsel maintained the
    defense theory of the case, emphasizing the lack of found
    property reports for the other items found on the picnic table:
    So let’s take a look at the evidence presented in
    this case. One of the key pieces of evidence in this case
    is this picture, a picture of the bench that Kentaru Stone
    was sitting at on –- in the early morning of April 5th.
    Now, if we take Officer Korenic’s explanation as to where
    everything was positioned, Kentaru was sitting someplace
    around here, where there was no –- nothing on the table.
    Officer Korenic was positioned someplace over here, right
    in between the driver’s license and Mr. Stone.
    Now, the driver’s license is clearly visible in this
    picture, and it would’ve been right in front of Officer
    Korenic, and he was questioning Kentaru for approximately
    ten minutes. And what you can see in the picture too is
    also the size of the ID versus the size of the little
    baggie, and there’s a clear difference in size. And,
    basically, if you’re focused on getting someone’s
    identification at this point, I mean, and an ID is clearly
    in front of you, you’re going to see it. It just doesn’t
    make sense.
    It doesn’t make sense that Kentaru would basically
    empty his wallet in Ala Moana Beach Park at 3:45 in the
    morning. I mean, it’s dark, it’s dangerous, it’s close to
    a bus stop. He could get robbed at any time. It just
    doesn’t make sense that he would do this at 3:45 in the
    morning.
    It doesn’t make any sense that Officer Korenic
    testified that the various cards and ID belonged to other
    people, because there’s no inventory that was done, which
    would clearly have been relevant to this case or the other
    cases if he were going to return it. There’s no police
    reports for any of the IDs. There’s no mention of people’s
    IDs, bank cards or club cards mentioned anywhere in his
    police report.
    And he did mention doing a found property receipt,
    and I questioned him, and you got to see his response on
    the record. The only found property receipt that he put in
    his report was of the iPhone, nothing else.
    And why do you think he did that? He probably saw
    this ID after the fact and had to come up with an
    explanation as to why it was right there and he didn’t see
    it. Officer Korenic basically went into Kentaru’s things
    and rifled through it and just –- it was on the table, he
    took a picture of it, and only after the fact did he
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    realize that the ID was right there.   After all, a picture
    does say a thousand words.
    . . . .
    Officer Korenic is not credible. Officer Korenic
    knew he had to lie to tie Kentaru to the baggie and to
    establish knowing possession, and he distinguished that by
    –- in his testimony that said that’s why they couldn’t
    arrest him for sitting in a pile of other people’s IDs,
    because he wasn’t in possession of it.
    The empty baggie did not belong to Kentaru Stone. It
    might have been on the table, it might have been someplace
    in the area, but it’s not defense’s burden to say exactly
    where it came from. It didn’t belong to Kentaru, and
    Kentaru wasn’t in knowing position [sic] of the meth
    residue in the bag.
    . . . .
    Officer Korenic’s testimony is contradicted by his
    own report, the fact that it doesn’t mention that the IDs
    belonged to other people. Officer Korenic’s testimony is
    contradicted by the picture which shows Kentaru’s ID
    clearly right in front of where he would’ve been –-
    . . . .
    So you can consider the picture and where Officer Korenic
    would’ve been right in front of where the ID is.
    Officer Korenic’s testimony is contradicted by his
    own actions, not obtaining a search warrant to search
    Kentaru’s belongings for other IDs and related drug
    paraphernalia.
    And Officer Korenic’s testimony is contradicted by
    Officer Paclib, who testified that it would raise a red
    flag if she saw an ID that belonged to another individual.
    She took pictures of the picnic table with all of those IDs
    sprawled out. Nothing about the IDs that were scattered on
    the table seemed to raise a red flag with her.
    And in weighing credibility, you can consider whether
    they concern matters of importance or matters of
    unimportant detail, and whether they result from innocent
    error or deliberate falsehood. Clearly, Officer Korenic’s
    testimony regarding the IDs present on the table are an
    important detail, and he deliberately lied on the stand
    about them.
    . . . .
    Hold the State to their burden in this case, proof
    beyond a reasonable doubt. Not only do those discrepancies
    go to judging Officer Korenic’s credibility, they go to the
    lack of evidence as well. And let’s talk a little bit
    about the lack of evidence.
    Don’t fill in the holes for the State. Require them
    to provide you with enough credible evidence. Where are
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    these reports for these other IDs? Where are they? The
    State has not proven their case beyond a reasonable doubt.
    In rebuttal, the State again argued that it did not matter
    who the items belonged to, and that Officer Korenic was credible
    despite the mistakes made in his incident report:
    Ladies and gentlemen, the defense seems to revolve
    around this photograph, which is State’s Exhibit 16, and
    they’re asking you to look at what’s in it and identify
    what they are, who they belong to. But the reality is it
    doesn’t actually matter, because even if the defendant had
    been sitting right next to his driver’s license, if an
    officer asks you for your identification, how’s he supposed
    to know that that’s yours without you picking it up and
    handing it to him?
    All of that is to distract you from what the real
    question in this case was, is if the defendant possessed
    methamphetamine on April 5th, 2016. No ques—- it’s not
    about if he possessed other IDs or if he possessed the bag
    that’s sitting on the bench, if he possessed any of the
    other cards that are depicted in State’s Exhibit 16, but
    it’s whether or not he did possess this little baggie. And
    we do know exactly where it came from. It came from the
    defendant’s hand, his hand attached to him.
    . . . .
    And if we believe what the defense is arguing, that
    Officer Korenic isn’t believable because he made some
    mistakes in his report, then we are actually holding him to
    a different standard, a higher standard, a standard where
    his report would need to be flawless in order for us to
    believe him.
    . . . .
    Officer Korenic, you know, he made some mistakes in
    his report, he admitted that to you, but he’s human, and he
    is not to be held to a different standard just because he
    wears a uniform.
    On October 28, 2016, the jury found Stone guilty of the
    charged offense.
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    3.   Motion for new trial
    a.    Motion
    Stone filed his motion for new trial under HRPP Rule 33.
    In relevant part, Stone argued he was entitled to a new trial
    because “‘justice’ was not served.”         He contended he did not
    have the benefit of newly discovered evidence, namely Officer
    Korenic’s found property reports, or, in the alternative,
    information regarding the lack thereof.          He also argued trial
    courts have an affirmative duty to grant a new trial if they are
    convinced that a miscarriage of justice would result by allowing
    the verdict to stand.
    b.    Memorandum in opposition
    In her declaration attached to the State’s opposition
    memorandum, the deputy prosecuting attorney stated:
    Officer Korenic pointed out that on the face page of his
    report there were listed six (6) additional police report
    numbers that were not included in the body of Officer
    Korenic’s report and were not in the State’s possession.
    The State was not aware of these reports prior to Officer
    Korenic pointing them out.
    The deputy prosecuting attorney also stated: “Subsequent to
    trial, this Declarant looked for the alleged property reports
    and, as of this filing [November 23, 2016], has been unable to
    locate them.”     (Emphasis added.)
    The State contended, however, that the jury was the sole
    judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the
    evidence, and Stone did not present any new information
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    warranting a new trial.         The State maintained that after being
    cross-examined, Officer Korenic later retracted his position and
    admitted he may have made mistakes in his incident report.
    Stone then continued with his theory and, during closing
    argument, argued Officer Korenic was not credible because of the
    mistakes he made in his report, and the miscellaneous items
    belonged to him and that Officer Korenic could have easily
    looked at them when questioning him.8            According to the State,
    because Stone proceeded to trial with a specific theory centered
    on his ownership of the items on the picnic table and was able
    to fully present that defense to the jury, there was no
    miscarriage of justice.9
    The State also asserted that ownership of the miscellaneous
    items and IDs was not material or relevant to this drug
    possession case.        It argued that it was only required to
    disclose material and relevant evidence and the six missing
    related reports were not material because they would not have
    affected the outcome of trial.
    The State also noted that in the declaration of counsel in
    support of Stone’s motion for new trial, defense counsel stated
    8
    The State also asserted that had Officer Korenic examined the IDs on
    the picnic table, that examination may have raised possible privacy and
    suppression issues before trial.
    9
    The State also argued Stone was not entitled to a new trial under
    HRS § 635-56 (2016), as the jury’s verdict was not “manifestly against the
    weight of the evidence.”
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    “the miscellaneous IDs were not mentioned in Officer Korenic’s
    police report, no inventory of the ID[]s were included in the
    discovery provided to Defense, in fact the miscellaneous ID[]s
    were not mentioned anywhere in the discovery.”           The State noted
    that during the mid-trial recess, it located the missing related
    reports and provided them to Stone.         It argued those reports
    proved to be irrelevant, that Stone acknowledged there was no
    mention of any other reports in Officer Korenic’s incident
    report, and that Officer Korenic’s incident report neither
    confirmed nor denied Stone’s ownership of the miscellaneous
    items and IDs.     Instead, the State contended, the only evidence
    the other found property reports existed was Officer Korenic’s
    testimony, which he admitted could have been a mistake.             It also
    noted Stone did not request additional discovery be conducted
    during trial.
    Arguing that ownership of the IDs was irrelevant, the State
    contended Stone failed to establish how his mistaken belief
    impacted his right to a fair trial.         Although conceding Officer
    Korenic’s reports did not state who owned the miscellaneous
    items, the State argued that Stone making an erroneous inference
    did not equate to the denial of a fair trial; his choice to
    build his defense around a “belief” was his trial strategy.
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    c.    Hearing on motion for new trial
    On December 27, 2016, the circuit court heard Stone’s
    motion for new trial.      Stone argued that Officer Korenic’s
    testimony “caught the defense quite off guard” and came as
    “quite a shock to the defense”:
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. In light of the
    evidence that came out at trial, namely the testimony of –-
    THE COURT: The officer.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: -- the officer, Officer [Korenic’s]
    testimony that, I guess, he had prepared these reports
    regarding the found property of other people that were
    located on the picnic table, I realized that we did take a
    recess in order to research the connecting reports that he
    had referenced on the front sheet of his report, and they
    were unrelated in nature.
    This caught the defense quite off guard as it was not
    –- these found property reports were not disclosed in the
    discovery that was received. In talking with my client and
    in preparation for trial, it was defense’s argument and
    belief and position that the IDs and the various cards that
    were on the picnic table belonged to him. Officer
    [Korenic’s] testimony on the stand was in direct contrast
    of –- with that –- with our –- with the argument that we
    were going to present. It did come as quite a shock to the
    defense since we were provided absolutely no notice.
    In addition, I believe in the State’s response to our
    motion, they had indicated that there were no found
    property reports that the State could find when researching
    this particular case, which is significant for the jury
    because I believe that the State argued to the jury that
    these cards did not belong to the defendant.
    Defense would be in a much stronger position if the
    defense could argue to the jury that there were actually no
    reports that were generated by the police officer that
    could be found within the HPD system. I believe it
    directly goes to Officer [Korenic’s] credibility as he
    would have basically been caught in a lie in terms of his
    response to defense’s question regarding those found
    property receipts.
    The defense did do a partial impeachment of him, but
    without the jury or without being able to establish to the
    jury that there were actually no reports generated, I
    believe that puts us at a disadvantage because I don’t know
    what the jury believed in terms of if they believed the
    officer that he actually did do these reports or –- and
    there was no way to establish at that point that these
    reports, in fact, did not exist.
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    And I believe that it would be outcome determinative.
    I think it does go –- this is basically a credibility
    contest between the defense and the officer. And I believe
    that his testimony contained a significant lie which was
    argued by the State in its closing argument to the jury in
    light of the fact that they did do the research afterwards
    and established that there was no found property reports
    that was ever prepared by this officer.
    So for those reasons, defense is arguing for a new
    trial in this case because it was basically only
    established mid-trial after Officer [Korenic's] response to
    defense’s question that there was any reference to any of
    this found property reports.
    THE COURT: Okay.   It’s not that –- I mean, I understand
    that was –-
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And there was no way for us to prepare.
    The circuit court indicated its doubt as to how the other
    found property reports would have impacted Stone’s case:
    [THE COURT]: Let me finish my thought, bear with me. I
    understand things didn’t unfold the way I think anyone
    would want them to unfold. But what I’m trying to get a
    grasp on is what difference would it really have made? I
    mean, this case came down to the officer comes upon the
    defendant in the park, he’s asking him about ID. The
    officer’s testimony is clear that he was getting resistance
    to his request for ID. It was after hours so he was –-
    whoever was there, regardless of ID or not, he was not
    supposed to be there so the officer had a legitimate basis
    to be asking for ID. And then when he informed the
    defendant he was going to arrest him, he throws the packet
    away that has drugs in it.
    So that’s a pretty simple story so I’m trying to see
    how the found property reports might have really had an
    impact on any of that.
    Defense counsel responded that Officer Korenic’s testimony
    concerning the existence of other found property reports
    undermined the defense theory:
    And the defense’s whole theory of the case and its argument
    to the jury was premised on the fact that there was an ID
    that was right between where the defendant was seated and
    the officer, and he was asking my client for an ID for a
    period of about ten minutes. If the jury were to believe
    that the ID on the picnic table was my client’s ID, that
    would raise serious questions as to the credibility of the
    officer’s testimony that he was asking for –- my client for
    an ID and the ID was right in front of him.
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    . . . .
    And, again, this all happened, you know, like midway
    through the trial, during questioning that happened. I was
    unprepared for the officer’s response and they got the
    benefit of the fact that the State was able to argue that
    this property did not belong to the defendant and was
    unable –- and –- and defense was unable to establish that
    there was actually no report that was generated at all by
    this officer.
    The State then responded to Stone’s arguments:
    First, the State did not argue in closing argument that the
    property did, in fact, belong to the defendant. The
    closing argument of the State in part was that we don’t
    actually know who the owner –- what the ownership of these
    IDs and other miscellaneous items truly was because Officer
    [Korenic] testified at first it was the defendant, but upon
    being pointed out that may have been erroneous, he did
    concede that his report does not contain, in fact, who it
    belonged to.
    So his reports were, in fact, silent as to whether or
    not those items did or did not believe –- belong to the
    defendant. Any inferences drawn therefrom is not the
    responsibility of the State.
    Secondly, the defense did present argument during
    closing argument that the ID on the picnic table did, in
    fact, belong to the defendant. She pointed to the
    photograph and asked the jury to draw their own conclusions
    as to who they truly belonged to. So the defense was not,
    in fact, precluded from presenting their arguments as
    originally anticipated.
    Furthermore, even if their argument had, I guess,
    relied on the fact that the ID on the table belonged to the
    defendant, Officer [Korenic] would not have been in a
    position legally to simply just look at that ID out of
    privacy concerns for the items. Under the law there are
    proper procedures for doing so.
    Basically, what it comes down to is the defense does
    not point to any specific prejudice suffered as a result of
    the trial and, thus, the motion for new trial should not be
    granted.
    In rebuttal, Stone argued that whether Officer Korenic
    filed other found property reports was material because it went
    to Officer Korenic’s credibility, whether Officer Korenic
    followed proper police procedure, and prevented Stone from fully
    presenting his defense to the jury.
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    The circuit court denied the motion for new trial, stating:
    THE COURT: But what’s the big deal about whether or not
    there’s a found property report? I mean, basically there
    was testimony that there was stuff on the table. Whether
    there was a found property report or not might be of
    interest to –-
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Because he –-
    THE COURT: -- might be of interest to attorneys, but is the
    jury really going to care?
    . . . .
    THE COURT: All right. All right, I’ve got it. All right.
    The motion is denied. I mean, I just don’t –- you know, an
    appellate court wants to correct me, that’s fine, I stand
    corrected. But I’m just not seeing how this information
    would have changed the heart –- I mean, the heart of this
    trial was police officer comes across Mr. Stone in the
    park, it’s after hours, tries to get ID, testifies that Mr.
    Stone is resisting him, he tells him I’m going to arrest
    you, throws away the drugs.
    It’s a very simple picture. And, you know, whether
    he should have done a closing report or shouldn’t have done
    a closing report, I just do not –- I cannot find that it
    was –- there’s any reasonable possibility that that would
    have made any difference to the jury’s determination.
    Motion is denied.
    4.   Sentence and appeal
    On January 18, 2017, the circuit court sentenced Stone to a
    five-year imprisonment term and filed its judgment of conviction
    and sentence.     On February 16, 2017, Stone appealed the circuit
    court’s judgment of conviction and sentence to the ICA.
    B.     ICA proceedings
    In his appeal to the ICA, Stone raised a single point of
    error:
    The trial court erred in denying Stone’s motion for new
    trial based on the post-trial revelation that Officer
    Korenic had not written any “found property” reports for
    the several ID and credit-type cards shown in photo S-
    Exh.16, contrary to his unrebutted trial testimony that (1)
    he had written such reports; (2) that the cards did not
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    belong to Stone; and (3) the cards were reclaimed by their
    owners, because his credibility was critical to the State’s
    case, and Stone was prejudiced by his inability to marshal
    this information before the jury.
    Specifically, Stone argued that he met the four-part test
    the ICA established in Teves for granting a new trial based on a
    prosecution witness giving false testimony at trial:
    We hold that upon a proper and timely motion under Rule 33,
    HRPP, a new trial must be granted by the trial court when
    it decides that (1) it is reasonably satisfied that the
    testimony at trial of a material prosecution witness is
    false; (2) defendant and his agents did not discover the
    falseness of the testimony until after the trial; (3) the
    late discovery is not due to a lack of due diligence by
    defendant or his agent; and (4) the false testimony is not
    harmless because there is a reasonable possibility that it
    contributed to the conviction.
    5 Haw. App. at 96, 679 P.2d at 141 (footnote omitted).             Stone
    also argued his right to a fair trial was violated because the
    State failed to correct Officer Korenic’s false testimony.10
    In its November 27, 2019 SDO, the ICA ruled in relevant
    part as follows.
    The ICA concluded Stone met the first Teves requirement.
    Stone, SDO at 5.     The ICA noted Officer Korenic was a material
    prosecution witness, as he was the only witness to Stone’s
    possession of the methamphetamine.         Id.   The ICA concluded
    10
    Stone also argued he met the McNulty test, see supra note 3, which we
    do not further address due to applicability of the Teves test to the
    circumstances of this case.
    For the first time on appeal, Stone also argued the evidence of the
    other people’s IDs was prejudicial evidence of other crimes under Hawaiʻi
    Rules of Evidence (“HRE”) Rule 404(b) (1994) that should have been excluded
    under HRE Rule 403 (1980). Because we vacate Stone's conviction on other
    grounds, we do not address this argument.
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    Officer Korenic’s testimony was false,11 as he testified to the
    existence of found property reports which were not referenced in
    his reports.    Id.   Stating there was no evidence these reports
    existed other than Officer Korenic’s testimony, the ICA
    concluded Stone demonstrated a material prosecution witness
    provided false testimony.       Id.
    As to the second Teves requirement, the ICA concluded the
    falsity of the testimony was discovered during trial.             Id.    The
    ICA stated that during a mid-trial recess, after Officer Korenic
    testified he had submitted found property reports for the IDs,
    the State caused a search for the related reports Officer
    Korenic testified were missing, but the related reports had
    nothing to do with Stone’s case.            Id.   The ICA noted Stone
    cross-examined Officer Korenic on the fact that his written
    reports did not corroborate his assertion that found property
    reports were submitted for the IDs found at the scene and the
    only found property report mentioned in Officer Korenic’s report
    was for an iPhone.     Id.   As such, the ICA concluded Stone failed
    to meet the second Teves requirement, and the fact that the
    State conducted a further search and still found no reports did
    not change its conclusion.       Id.
    11
    The ICA stated that false testimony is “[t]estimony that is not
    true[,]” and is broader than perjury because it lacks a state of mind
    element. Stone, SDO at 5 (alterations in original) (quoting False Testimony,
    Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)).
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    As to the third Teves requirement, the ICA concluded that
    even if the false testimony had not been discovered at trial,
    any failure of the defense to discover the false testimony may
    have been due to a lack of diligence.          Stone, SDO at 5-6.
    Noting that although defense counsel seemed to be surprised by
    the lack of the found property reports, the ICA stated discovery
    provided to the defense clearly showed IDs belonging to
    different people were found at the scene, and the incident
    report identified related reports numbers for which no copies
    were provided.     Stone, SDO at 6.       The ICA stated that, had the
    defense requested discovery of those missing reports, it would
    have discovered no found property reports regarding the IDs were
    created, which would have placed the defense in a better
    position to challenge Officer Korenic’s testimony that found
    property reports for the IDs existed.          Id.
    As to the fourth Teves requirement, the ICA concluded there
    was no reasonable possibility Officer Korenic’s false testimony
    contributed to Stone’s conviction because Stone was able to
    fully cross-examine Officer Korenic on the absence of the found
    property reports.     Id.   The ICA reasoned Officer Korenic’s false
    testimony provided an avenue for attacking his credibility that
    otherwise would not have been open to Stone.           Id.   It noted that
    in closing argument, Stone “thoroughly attacked” Officer
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    Korenic’s testimony and the lack of reports supporting the
    existence of other people’s IDs.          Id.
    Accordingly, the ICA ruled that the circuit court did not
    abuse its discretion by denying Stone’s motion for new trial and
    affirmed the circuit court’s January 18, 2017 judgment.             Id.
    The ICA filed its judgment on appeal on February 5, 2020.
    C.     Certiorari application
    In his March 5, 2020 application for writ of certiorari,
    Stone asks this court to vacate the ICA’s February 5, 2020 SDO.
    III. Standard of review
    A.     Motion for new trial
    As a general matter, the granting or denial of a
    motion for new trial is within the sound discretion of the
    trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse
    of discretion. . . . . The trial court abuses its
    discretion when it clearly exceeds the bounds of reason or
    disregards rules or principles of law or practice to the
    substantial detriment of a party litigant.
    State v. Yamada, 108 Hawaiʻi 474, 478, 
    122 P.3d 254
    , 258 (2005).
    IV.   Discussion
    A.     The ICA erred in ruling that Stone failed to meet the Teves
    test
    As held by the ICA in Teves,
    upon a proper and timely motion under Rule 33, HRPP, a new
    trial must be granted by the trial court when it decides
    that (1) it is reasonably satisfied that the testimony at
    trial of a material prosecution witness is false; (2)
    defendant and his agents did not discover the falseness of
    the testimony until after the trial; (3) the late discovery
    is not due to a lack of due diligence by defendant or his
    agent; and (4) the false testimony is not harmless because
    there is a reasonable possibility that it contributed to
    the conviction.
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    5 Haw. App. at 96, 679 P.2d at 141 (footnote omitted).
    The ICA correctly concluded that Stone satisfied the first
    Teves requirement, that “[the trial court] is reasonably
    satisfied that the testimony at trial of a material prosecution
    witness is false[.]”
    As to the second Teves requirement, that “defendant and his
    agents did not discover the falseness of the testimony until
    after the trial,” however, the ICA incorrectly concluded Stone
    discovered the falsity of Officer Korenic’s testimony during
    trial.     After Officer Korenic falsely testified, the circuit
    court took a mid-trial recess so the State could search for the
    six related reports that the HPD did not provide to the State
    after he asserted a report number was missing.            The six related
    reports were irrelevant to Stone’s case.           Stone cross-examined
    Officer Korenic regarding the inconsistency of his written
    reports with his testimony that other found property reports
    existed.    However, Officer Korenic persisted in his testimony
    that there was at least one additional found property report.
    Stone then filed a motion for new trial, indicating a lack of
    awareness of whether additional found property reports actually
    existed.    It was not until the State’s response to the motion
    for new trial that the lack of any additional found property
    reports was established.        Therefore, Stone discovered Officer
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    Korenic’s false testimony after trial, meeting the second Teves
    requirement.12
    The ICA also incorrectly ruled as to the third Teves
    requirement, that “the late discovery is not due to a lack of
    due diligence by defendant or his agent.”          The ICA stated that
    although defense counsel was apparently surprised by the lack of
    the found property reports, discovery provided to the defense
    showed the IDs belonged to different people.           State’s Exhibit
    16, which showed the top of the picnic table and the various
    cards strewn about it, showed at least three IDs.            Noting that
    Officer Korenic’s incident report identified the six related
    reports not provided in discovery, the ICA concluded that had
    the defense requested discovery of those missing reports, it
    would have discovered that no found property reports regarding
    the IDs were created, and if the defense had done so, it would
    have been in a better position to better challenge Officer
    Korenic’s false testimony.
    The ICA’s analysis is misfocused.        The third Teves
    requirement pertains to whether the late discovery of Officer
    Korenic’s false testimony was due to a lack of due diligence by
    Stone or defense counsel.       Even if Stone had requested the six
    missing related reports, which had nothing to do with his case,
    12
    As the ICA also correctly stated, the fact that the State conducted a
    further search and still did not find reports related to his case does not
    change this conclusion.
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    and therefore assumed that there were no additional found
    property reports generated regarding the items on the table, he
    would not have been able to ascertain through due diligence that
    Officer Korenic would testify falsely at trial that he had
    generated additional found property reports for the other items.
    The ICA also erred as to the fourth Teves requirement, that
    “the false testimony is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
    because there is a reasonable possibility that it contributed to
    the conviction.”     The ICA stated Officer Korenic’s false
    testimony “provided an avenue for attacking his credibility that
    otherwise would not have been open to Stone.”           Stone, SDO at 6.
    Yet, Officer Korenic’s persistence in his false testimony
    directly undermined the defense’s theory of the case.
    Therefore, there was a reasonable possibility that the false
    testimony could have contributed to Stone’s conviction.             Hence,
    Officer Korenic’s false testimony was not harmless beyond a
    reasonable doubt.
    Therefore, the ICA erred in ruling Stone failed to meet the
    Teves test and in affirming the circuit court’s denial of his
    motion for new trial.      The circuit court abused its discretion
    because Stone was entitled to a new trial based on the Teves
    test.
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    B.     Stone’s due process right to a fair trial was violated
    Stone also argues that his due process rights were violated
    because Officer Korenic’s false testimony deprived him of his
    right to fair trial.      In 2018, after Stone’s reply brief but
    before the ICA’s SDO and Stone’s certiorari application, we
    decided Birano.     Although Birano was decided after Stone’s reply
    brief, due process principles regarding Stone’s right to a fair
    trial are fundamental, and we address his contention that his
    right to a fair trial was violated.
    “A defendant’s right to due process is guaranteed by the
    Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
    article I, section 5 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution.”            Birano, 143
    Hawaiʻi at 181, 426 P.3d at 405.          “‘[I]t is established that a
    conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be
    such by representatives of the State, must fall under the’
    constitutional dictates of due process.”          Id.   “The same result
    obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence,
    allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.”           Id.
    Officer Korenic falsely testified that he had generated
    other found property reports for the miscellaneous items on the
    picnic table.    During Stone’s cross-examination, Officer Korenic
    persisted in his false testimony that other found property
    reports existed for the other items on the picnic table.
    Although Officer Korenic later admitted upon State questioning
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    that “there’s some things that [his] report had that were
    mistakes,” that testimony related to the fact that he listed six
    completely unrelated police reports in his incident report
    regarding Stone.     Officer Korenic's cross-examination testimony
    that other found property reports existed was therefore never
    corrected.
    With respect to a prosecutor's obligations, we have noted
    that “[t]he most rudimentary of the access-to-evidence cases
    impose upon the prosecution a constitutional obligation to
    report to the defendant and to the trial court whenever
    government witnesses lie under oath.”         143 Hawaiʻi at 189, 426
    P.3d at 413 (alteration in original).         “This principle ‘does not
    cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes only to
    the credibility of witnesses.’”        Id.   We have stated:
    It is of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon
    the witness’ credibility rather than directly upon
    defendant’s guilt. A lie is a lie, no matter what its
    subject, and, if it is in any way relevant to the case, the
    district attorney has the responsibility and duty to
    correct what he [or she] knows to be false and elicit the
    truth. . . . That the district attorney’s silence was not
    the result of guile or a desire to prejudice matters
    little, for its impact was the same, preventing, as it did,
    a trial that could in any real sense be termed fair.
    Id. (ellipsis and alteration in original).          “‘[T]he crux’ of a
    due process violation arising from a prosecutor’s failure to
    correct false testimony is the ‘deception’ of the finder of
    fact[.]”   Id. (first alteration in original).          “[A] prosecutor’s
    constitutional duty to correct testimony is triggered even when
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    a witness’s testimony is ‘at best misleading.’”           143 Hawaiʻi at
    190, 426 P.3d at 414.
    In this case, it appears the deputy prosecuting attorney
    did not know about the falsity of Officer Korenic’s testimony
    that additional found property reports existed before trial
    concluded.    As we stated in Birano, however, “the good faith of
    the prosecutor in failing to correct false testimony regarding
    impeachment material has no bearing on whether a defendant
    received a fair trial as required by due process[.]”            143 Hawaiʻi
    at 189, 426 P.3d at 413.       Thus, Stone’s due process right to a
    fair trial was implicated by the lack of a correction of Officer
    Korenic’s false testimony before conclusion of trial.
    The violation of Stone’s right to a fair trial is also
    subject to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt analysis.
    “[A] violation of a constitutional right is subject to the
    harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.           This standard
    requires a court to ‘examine the record and determine whether
    there is a reasonable possibility that the error complained of
    might have contributed to the conviction.’”           State v. Tetu, 139
    Hawaiʻi 207, 225, 
    386 P.3d 844
    , 862 (2016) (citation omitted).
    For the reasons discussed in our analysis of the fourth Teves
    requirement as applied in this case, there was a reasonable
    possibility that Officer Korenic’s false testimony contributed
    to Stone’s conviction.      Hence, Officer Korenic’s false testimony
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    was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in the
    violation of Stone’s due process right to a fair trial.
    V.    Conclusion
    For the reason above, we vacate the ICA’s February 5, 2020
    judgment on appeal and the circuit court's January 18, 2017
    judgment of conviction and sentence and remand to the circuit
    court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    Shawn A. Luiz,                     /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
    for petitioner
    /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
    Brandon H. Ito
    (on the briefs),                   /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
    for respondent
    /s/ Richard W. Pollack
    /s/ Michael D. Wilson
    39
    

Document Info

Docket Number: SCWC-17-0000078

Filed Date: 6/15/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/15/2020