State v. Ernes. ( 2020 )

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
17-JUN-2020
08:38 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
---o0o---
________________________________________________________________
STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ERIK ERNES, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 1DCW-XX-XXXXXXX)
JUNE 17, 2020
McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ., WITH RECKTENWALD, C.J.,
DISSENTING, WITH WHOM NAKAYAMA, J., JOINS
OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.
I. Introduction
This case arises from Erik Ernes’s (“Ernes”) conviction of
the offense of assault against a law enforcement officer in the
second degree, in violation of Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (“HRS”) §
707-712.6 (2014).1 On October 11, 2016, Ernes fell asleep while
1
HRS § 707-712.6 (2014) provides:
(1) A person commits the offense of assault against
a law enforcement officer in the second degree
(continued. . .)
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riding the bus home from work. After making several
unsuccessful attempts to wake Ernes, who appeared intoxicated,
representatives of the bus company called the Honolulu Police
Department (“HPD”) to request assistance. An HPD officer
responded to the scene and succeeded in waking Ernes through
sternum rubs. Apparently startled, Ernes then punched the HPD
officer in the face with his fist. He was arrested, charged,
and convicted after a bench trial.2 The Intermediate Court of
Appeals (“ICA”) affirmed Ernes’s conviction in a summary
disposition order (“SDO”). State v. Ernes, CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX,
2019 WL 2929017 (Haw. App. July 8, 2019).
Ernes presents the following question on certiorari:
Whether the ICA gravely erred in finding that the District
Court did not reversibly err in failing to obtain a valid
on-the-record waiver of Ernes’ constitutional right to a
jury trial.
We hold that under the totality of the circumstances,
taking into account the defendant’s language barrier and the
(continued. . .)
if the person recklessly causes bodily injury
to a law enforcement officer who is engaged in
the performance of duty.
(2) Assault of a law enforcement officer in the
second degree is a misdemeanor. The court
shall sentence the person who has been
convicted of this offense to a definite term of
imprisonment, pursuant to section 706-663, of
not less than thirty days without possibility
of probation or suspension of sentence.
2 The Honorable Paula Devens presided. Ernes was sentenced to the
mandatory 30 days of imprisonment, see supra note 1, and his sentence was
stayed pending appeal.
2
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lack of information regarding defendant’s background and
experience, State v. Gomez-Lobato, 130 Hawaiʻi 465, 472, 312 P.3d
897, 904 (2013), the record does not reflect an on-the-record
exchange sufficient to constitute the true colloquy required to
establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of Ernes’s
constitutional right to a jury trial. State v. Baker, 132
Hawaiʻi 1, 6, 319 P.3d 1009, 1014 (2014).
II. Background
A. District court proceedings
On February 15, 2017, the district court3 held a hearing to
determine whether Ernes would demand a jury trial or whether he
would waive that right. Ernes was provided with a court-
appointed Chuukese interpreter. Defense counsel opened by
stating, “Your Honor, at this time, my client will be waiving
his right to jury trial, will be pleading not guilty, [and will
be] asking for . . . a Chuukese interpreter for trial.” The
district court then addressed Ernes as follows:4
Court: Okay, good morning, Mr. Ernes.
Ernes: (In English) Good morning.
3 The Honorable Lono J. Lee presided.
4 In the transcript for this hearing, when Ernes responded to the
district court directly, without the interpreter’s assistance, the court
reporter specifically indicated in the transcript that Ernes spoke “(In
English).” When Ernes responded to the district court in Chuukese, requiring
the interpreter’s assistance, the court reporter specifically indicated that
Ernes spoke “(Through the interpreter).”
3
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Court: I just received a waiver of jury trial
form.[5] Did you sign it?
Ernes: (Through the interpreter) Yes.
Court: Okay. Did you review it with your
attorney?
Ernes: (Through the interpreter) Yes.
Court: Okay. Did she explain to you what a jury
trial is?
Ernes: (In English) Yes.
Court: Okay. For the record, a jury trial is
where you have an opportunity to help
select 12 people from the community. The
State needs to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt to all 12 jurors, and
all 12 jurors must agree before you can
be found guilty. Is that your
understanding?
Ernes: (Through the interpreter) Yes.
Court: Yes. Okay. Is your mind clear today?
Ernes: (In English) Yes.
Court: Okay, how much education do you have?
High school? College?
Ernes: (In English) No, just have high school.
Court: High school? Okay. Do you understand
your right to a jury trial?
Ernes: (Through the interpreter) Yes.
Court: Yes. Is anyone forcing you to give up
this right?
Ernes: (In English) No.
5 Because Ernes’s waiver of jury trial form was omitted from the record
on appeal, the ICA entered an order directing the district court clerk to
file a supplemental record on appeal including the form. However, the clerk
was unable to locate the form. The parties therefore stipulated to, inter
alia, the following facts: Ernes executed a waiver of jury trial form,
affixing his signature on the form after a paragraph stating, “I hereby waive
and give up my right to be tried by a jury and agree that my case may be
tried by a single judge.” The district court received the form and filed it
in open court.
4
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Court: All right, thank you. Court will find
defendant knowing, voluntary,
(indiscernible) right to jury trial,
enter a not guilty plea, request Chuukese
interpreter next proceeding.
The district court accepted Ernes’s jury trial waiver and
not guilty plea. Ernes was convicted after a bench trial.6
B. ICA proceedings
Ernes appealed his conviction to the ICA. With respect to
the jury trial waiver issue,7 the ICA concluded that Ernes failed
to carry his burden to demonstrate that his jury trial waiver
was involuntary. Ernes, SDO at 2. The ICA reasoned:
Ernes does not dispute that he signed a Waiver of
Jury Trial form that waived his right to a jury
trial. Ernes admits that the District Court
thereafter inquired whether Ernes reviewed the waiver
form, whether his attorney reviewed the form with
him, whether his attorney explained the concept of a
jury trial, whether he understood that a jury trial
is an opportunity to help select twelve people from
the community, and whether he understood that the
State was required to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt to all twelve jurors, and all twelve
jurors must agree before he can be found guilty.
Ernes answered in the affirmative to all of those
inquiries. Therefore, it appears from the record
that Ernes voluntarily waived his right to a jury
trial and, thus, he has the burden to demonstrate by
a preponderance of the evidence that his waiver was
involuntary.
6 Ernes was sentenced to the mandatory 30 days of imprisonment, see supra
note 2, and his sentence was stayed pending appeal.
7
Ernes raised two additional points of error before the ICA: (1) the
State failed to present sufficient evidence that he acted recklessly; and (2)
the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt facts negating self-
defense. The ICA resolved these points of error by concluding that, “[w]hen
the evidence adduced at trial is considered in the strongest light for the
prosecution, . . . there was sufficient evidence to convict Ernes of Assault
Against a Law Enforcement Officer in the Second Degree.” Ernes, SDO at 4.
5
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Ernes, SDO at 2-3 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and
ellipsis omitted).
The ICA cited to State v. Macaso, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2016
WL 2941071 (Haw. App. Apr. 13, 2016), for the proposition that
“stopping and addressing Ernes after stating each component of a
jury trial” was not required for the district court to obtain a
valid waiver of his right to a jury trial. Ernes, SDO at 3.
The ICA also determined that Ernes “failed to point to any
specific facts to support his claim that the colloquy conducted
[by the district court] was insufficient.” Id. It therefore
concluded that Ernes knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his right to a jury trial. Id.
C. Certiorari application
On certiorari, Ernes contends that the ICA misconstrued his
argument on appeal:
The ICA contended that Petitioner argued that the court was
required to present the concept of the jury trial into
“segments[,”] pausing after each “right[.]” . . . [T]he
ICA noted its determination in [Macaso] that “stopping
after each right of the Tachibana advisement to determine
whether the defendant understands that right is not a per
se requirement for an adequate Tachibana colloquy.”
That is not the point in this case. Petitioner is not
arguing for a per se requirement in the taking of an oral
jury waiver, even after a written waiver has been signed.
Rather, Petitioner is advocating the required colloquy
actually be . . . what it was intended to be, i.e., a
conversation between a defendant and the court [that]
allows the court to determine that the defendant has an
actual understanding of the rights that the defendant is
waiving.
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Ernes further argues on certiorari that the district court’s
colloquy was defective because it failed to engage him in a
verbal exchange in which it ascertained his understanding of the
proceedings and his rights, citing to State v. Celestine, 142
Hawaiʻi 165, 170, 415 P.3d 907, 912 (2018), and State v. Pomroy,
132 Hawaiʻi 85, 93, 319 P.3d 1093, 1101 (2014). He maintains
that the district court’s “single compound question” and his
one-word answers did not constitute a true colloquy, but rather
was in the nature of an advisement. In addition, Ernes asserts
that “[it] is revealing that [although he] answered some
questions in English, [he] had to answer the single jury trial
rights question through the interpreter.” He further argues
that the district court did not properly consider the fact that
he required the assistance of an interpreter. Ernes also
contends the district court failed to “ask any questions to
elicit whether [he] had any limitations [that] might influence
his comprehension of the compound question regarding his jury
trial rights.” Ernes concludes that the jury trial waiver was
invalid because the district court failed to engage him in “any
exchange to ascertain whether [the] waiver of his jury trial
right was based on his understanding of [that] right[.]”
III. Standard of review
The validity of a criminal defendant’s waiver of
[the] right to a jury trial presents a question of state
and federal constitutional law. . . . We answer questions
of constitutional law by exercising our own independent
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constitutional judgment based on the facts of the case.
Thus, we review questions of constitutional law under the
right/wrong standard.
Gomez-Lobato, 130 Hawaiʻi at 468-69, 312 P.3d at 900-01 (citation
omitted).
IV. Discussion
When a criminal defendant has the right to a jury trial,
the trial court is required to “inform the defendant of the
right to jury trial in the circuit court[,] and that the
defendant may elect to be tried without a jury in the district
court.” Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal Procedure (“HRPP”) Rule 5(b)(1)
(2014). This serves several purposes: “(1) it more effectively
insures voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waivers[;] (2) it
promotes judicial economy by avoiding challenges to the validity
of waivers on appeal[;] and (3) it emphasizes to the defendant
the seriousness of the decision[.]” State v. Friedman, 93
Hawaiʻi 63, 68, 996 P.2d 268, 273 (2000) (quoting United States
v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1985)).
A defendant may waive the right to trial by jury either
orally or in writing, provided that such waiver is knowing and
voluntary, and comes directly from the defendant. State v.
Ibuos, 75 Hawaiʻi 118, 121, 857 P.2d 576, 578 (1993). But, even
where the defendant executes a written waiver form, “the court
should also engage in an oral colloquy with the defendant to
establish that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and
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voluntary.” Gomez-Lobato, 130 Hawaiʻi at 469, 312 P.3d at 901.
The validity of a defendant’s waiver of the right to a jury
trial is reviewed “under the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the case, taking into account the defendant’s
background, experience, and conduct.” Friedman, 93 Hawaiʻi at
70, 996 P.2d at 275 (citation omitted). As set forth below,
under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the case,
the district court’s colloquy was insufficient in establishing a
valid waiver of Ernes’s right to a jury trial.
Our analysis of the validity of Ernes’s jury trial waiver
is guided by Gomez-Lobato, 130 Hawaiʻi 465, 312 P.3d 897;
Friedman, 93 Hawaiʻi 63, 996 P.2d 268; State v. Han, 130 Hawaiʻi
83, 306 P.3d 128 (2013); and United States v. Duarte-Higareda,
113 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 1997).
The defendant in Duarte-Higareda did not speak English, yet
he executed a jury trial waiver form written entirely in
English. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d at 1002. At a pretrial
hearing, defense counsel stated, “The defendant and I have had
an opportunity to discuss the matter. We would waive a jury. I
believe it’s beneficial to him to do that, after he and I
discussed it on two occasions.” Id. Although a Spanish
language interpreter was present to assist the defendant, the
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record did not reflect whether the form was sight-translated8
into Spanish for the defendant. Id. Before trial, the district
court asked defense counsel, “Is this still a court trial?” and
defense counsel responded, “Yes, your Honor.” Id. The district
court proceeded to trial without questioning Duarte-Higareda
about the waiver form or his understanding of the right to a
jury trial. Id.
The Ninth Circuit discussed the following guidelines set
forth for determining whether a defendant’s jury trial waiver is
valid:
The district court should inform the defendant that (1)
twelve members of the community compose a jury, (2) the
defendant may take part in jury selection, (3) a jury
verdict must be unanimous, and (4) the court alone decides
guilt or innocence if the defendant waives a jury trial.
Furthermore, the district court should question the
defendant to ascertain whether the defendant understands
the benefits and burdens of a jury trial and freely chooses
to waive a jury trial.
Id. (citations omitted). Although the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that a colloquy informing the defendant of the four
primary components of a jury trial is not required in every
case, it noted that, “where the record indicates a special
8 “Sight-translation” involves the oral translation of a document.
Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 573-74 (2012). Thus,
“sight-translation” in this context would have involved the interpreter
orally translating the English language jury trial waiver form into Spanish
for Duarte-Higareda. Without a sight-translation, a person with limited
English proficiency would not understand the document to which a signature is
affixed. Although defense counsel may have followed our guidance in Gomez-
Lobato that “where a defendant needs the assistance of an interpreter,
defense counsel is obligated to explain any waiver of the defendant’s
constitutional rights through an interpreter[,]” 130 Hawaiʻi at 472 n.8, 312
P.3d at 904 n.8 (emphasis omitted), it is incumbent on the court to confirm
that fact in the colloquy.
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disadvantage or disability bearing upon the defendant’s
understanding of the jury waiver, the district court must
conduct a colloquy with the defendant to ensure that the waiver
is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” 113 F.3d at 1003
(citing United States v. Christensen, 18 F.3d 822, 825 (9th Cir.
1994)). The Ninth Circuit explained:
Duarte[-Higareda’s] language barrier . . . is a “salient
fact” that was known to the district court and put the
court on notice that [his] waiver “might be less than
knowing and intelligent,” [Christensen,] 18 F.3d at 825.
Under these circumstances, the district court was obliged
to conduct a colloquy with Duarte[-Higareda] to carry out
its “serious and weighty responsibility” of ensuring that a
defendant’s jury waiver is voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent. By failing to address Duarte[-Higareda] at
all, the district court failed to discharge this
responsibility.
Id. (citation omitted).
Similarly, the defendant in Gomez-Lobato executed a written
jury trial waiver form in English despite not being fluent in
English. 130 Hawaiʻi at 466, 312 P.3d at 898. During a pre-
trial hearing, in which the defendant had the assistance of a
court-appointed interpreter, the family court questioned him
regarding the waiver form as follows:
Court: Good morning, Mr. Gomez[-]Lobato. I have
with me a waiver of jury trial form. Are
these your initials, and is this your
signature on this form?
Defendant: Yes.
Court: Prior to placing your initials and
signature on this form, did you
understand what you were doing and
signing?
Defendant: Yes.
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Court: And was that explained to you in Spanish?
Defendant: Yes.
Court: Did you discuss this with your attorney?
Defendant: Yes.
Court: Okay. Do you have any questions for me?
Defendant: No.
Court: Okay. The Court concludes that the
defendant knowingly, voluntarily,
intelligently waived his rights to a jury
trial.
130 Hawaiʻi at 468, 312 P.3d at 899 (capitalization removed).
Although the waiver form was translated for Gomez-Lobato,
and the court communicated with him through the interpreter,
this court held that, under Duarte-Higareda, the language
barrier between Gomez-Lobato and the family court was a “salient
fact” that should have prompted the family court to ask
additional questions to verify that Gomez-Lobato understood the
right he was waiving. 130 Hawaiʻi at 471, 312 P.3d at 903. We
explained:
[I]n light of Gomez-Lobato’s language barrier, his
affirmative answers to each of [the family court’s]
questions did not establish that he understood he was
waiving his right to a jury trial.
This is particularly true where, as here, the record
contains little information with respect to the defendant’s
background, experience and conduct. Friedman, 93 Hawaiʻi at
70, 966 P.2d at 275. . . . Indeed, there is nothing in the
record to indicate Gomez-Lobato’s educational or employment
background, or experience with the criminal justice system,
that could establish that he understood his right to a jury
trial.
130 Hawaiʻi at 472, 312 P.3d at 904 (footnote omitted).
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Although we recognized that “courts are best situated to
determine what questions need to be asked of individual
defendants,” we determined that, under Duarte-Higareda, the
family court’s questions were insufficient to ascertain that
Gomez-Lobato understood his right to a jury trial. Id.
(footnote omitted). We therefore held that the family court
erred in finding Gomez-Lobato’s waiver to be voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent. 130 Hawaiʻi at 473, 312 P.3d at 906.
Han, which addressed a Tachibana9 colloquy, is relevant to
colloquy requirements when a language barrier exists. In Han,
two advisements took place regarding the defendant’s right to
testify, one before trial began, and one at the close of the
defendant’s case, as required by Tachibana. 130 Hawaiʻi at 85-
86, 306 P.3d at 131-32. A Korean language interpreter was sworn
in to interpret both. 130 Hawaiʻi at 85, 306 P.3d at 131. The
Tachibana colloquy given at the close of the case was as
follows:
Court: Oh, okay. All right. And so let me take
this opportunity, then, to question your
client again and -- before we bring in
our jury. All right, [Petitioner], good
morning. Your attorney just informed the
court that you are not going to testify
on your behalf.
9
Tachibana v. State, 79 Hawaiʻi 226, 900 P.2d 1293 (1995), holding that
trial courts must advise criminal defendants of their right to testify and
must obtain an on-the-record waiver of that right in every case in which the
defendant does not testify.
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Han: (Through the interpreter) Yes.
Court: Okay. All right, remember in the beginning ——
beginning of our trial, this court advised you
of your rights. And that is, one, you have the
right to testify on your behalf, and that ——
that decision to testify —— whether to testify
or not is your decision alone and that nobody
can force you to testify. And then, of course,
second, you also have the constitutional right
to remain silent and that if you decide to
exercise your right to remain silent, the jury
will be instruct —— will be instructed not to
hold that against you.
Okay. And —— and I trust that you have
—— now that the State has finished its case and
you had a chance to discuss what happened with
your attorney, and based on that discussion,
you have decided that you are not going to
testify on your behalf. Is anybody threatening
or forcing you this morning not to testify?
Han: (Through the interpreter) No.
Court: The decision not to testify is yours and yours
alone after you have discussed the matter with
your attorney.
Han: (Through the interpreter) Yes.
130 Hawaiʻi at 85-86, 306 P.3d at 130-31.
We concluded the transcript did not indicate that a true
colloquy had occurred, as the court had merely advised Han of
his rights without any discussion, exchange, or ascertainment
that Han fully comprehended these rights. See 130 Hawaiʻi at 89,
306 P.3d at 134. Thus, we determined that, under the totality
of the circumstances, no valid on-the-record waiver was shown:
With respect to the Tachibana colloquy at the close of
defendant’s case, first, the court did not ask Petitioner
for appropriate responses to ensure that Petitioner
understood the rights articulated, and second, the risk
that Petitioner did not understood was exacerbated by the
fact that Petitioner needed an interpreter during the
proceedings. Accordingly, a review of the court’s
interactions with Petitioner with respect to the
constitutional right to testify establishes that the court
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did not obtain a valid on-the-record waiver of Petitioner’s
right to testify.
130 Hawaiʻi at 93, 306 P.3d at 138 (footnote omitted).
Trial courts must ensure adequate protection of the
constitutional rights of defendants who have limited English
proficiency (“LEP”). Our cases explain that the presence of
this “salient fact” underscores the importance of a court’s
colloquy as a procedural safeguard of the defendant’s right to
testify.10 Thus, this salient fact requires that a record show a
“true colloquy” occurred, which means a discussion and exchange
between the court and the defendant sufficient to establish that
the defendant truly understood the rights being waived. Hence,
in the instant case, the issue is whether, “under the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the case, taking into account
the defendant’s background, experience, and conduct,” the record
reflects that the district court carried out its “serious and
weighty” responsibility of ensuring that Ernes’s jury trial
waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Gomez-Lobato,
130 Hawaiʻi at 470, 479, 312 P.3d at 902, 911.
To repeat, this was the entirety of Ernes’s jury trial
waiver colloquy:
Court: Okay, good morning, Mr. Ernes.
Ernes: (In English) Good morning.
10 The requirement of a true colloquy is not limited to situations in
which the “salient fact” is a language barrier. We have also recognized
mental illness as a “salient fact.” Han, 130 Hawaiʻi at 92, 306 P.3d at 137.
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Court: I just received a waiver of jury trial
form. Did you sign it?
Ernes: (Through the interpreter) Yes.
Court: Okay. Did you review it with your
attorney?
Ernes: (Through the interpreter) Yes.
Court: Okay. Did she explain to you what a jury
trial is?
Ernes: (In English) Yes.
Court: Okay. For the record, a jury trial is
where you have an opportunity to help
select 12 people from the community. The
State needs to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt to all 12 jurors, and
all 12 jurors must agree before you can
be found guilty. Is that your
understanding?
Ernes: (Through the interpreter) Yes.
Court: Yes. Okay. Is your mind clear today?
Ernes: (In English) Yes.
Court: Okay, how much education do you have?
High school? College?
Ernes: (In English) No, just have high school.
Court: High school? Okay. Do you understand
your right to a jury trial?
Ernes: (Through the interpreter) Yes.
Court: Yes. Is anyone forcing you to give up
this right?
Ernes: (In English) No.
Court: All right, thank you. Court will find
defendant knowing, voluntary,
(indiscernible) right to jury trial,
enter a not guilty plea, request Chuukese
interpreter next proceeding.
First, like the defendants in Duarte-Higareda and Gomez-
Lobato, Ernes executed a written jury trial waiver form. While
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Ernes indicated that he reviewed the form with counsel, the
record does not indicate that the form was sight-translated into
Chuukese for him.
Second, as in Duarte-Higareda, Gomez-Lobato, and Han,
Ernes’s language barrier was a “salient fact” known to the
court. Even where a defendant executes a written waiver form,
“the court should also engage in an oral colloquy with the
defendant to establish that the waiver was knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary.” Gomez-Lobato, 130 Hawaiʻi at 469, 312 P.3d at
901 (citations omitted). The language barrier elevated the
district court’s obligation to “conduct a colloquy . . . to
carry out its ‘serious and weighty responsibility’ of ensuring
that [his] jury waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”
Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d at 1003; Gomez-Lobato, 130 Hawaiʻi at
471, 312 P.3d at 903; Han, 130 Hawaiʻi at 92, 306 P.3d at 137.
Third, the exchange between the court and the defendant
must be a “true colloquy,” which is discussion and exchange
between the trial court and the defendant sufficient for an
ascertainment based on the record that the defendant fully
comprehended the constitutional rights being waived. Han, 130
Hawaiʻi at 90, 306 P.3d at 135. When a language barrier is
involved, such a discussion and exchange is required to fulfill
a court’s responsibility.
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Applying these general principles to this case, other than
confirming that Ernes had signed the jury trial waiver form,
this was the entirety of the colloquy regarding Ernes’s
understanding of his right to a trial by jury:
For the record, a jury trial is where you have an
opportunity to help select 12 people from the community.
The State needs to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt
to all 12 jurors, and all 12 jurors must agree before you
can be found to be guilty. Is that your understanding?
As indicated by the district court’s prefatory statement, the
“exchange” with Ernes was an advisement “for the record,” not a
true colloquy, and was a confusing advisement at that. The
district court stated that “a jury trial is where [Ernes has] an
opportunity to help select 12 people from the community.”
Although the district court went on to state that “[t]he State
needs to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt to all 12
jurors, and all 12 jurors must agree before you can be found
guilty. Is that your understanding?,” conflating jury selection
with a jury trial was confusing.11
The district court also did not advise Ernes on the fourth
Duarte-Higareda aspect of a jury trial -- that “the court alone
decides guilt or innocence if the defendant waives a jury
trial.” Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d at 1002. Although a jury
trial waiver may be valid despite a trial court’s failure to
11
Thus, we disagree the dissent that the district court’s advisement was
a “succinct and clear explanation of what a jury trial entails.”
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inform a defendant of certain aspects of the right, the presence
of a “salient fact” triggers a trial court’s obligation to
conduct a more comprehensive colloquy that ascertains a
defendant’s understanding of the right they are waiving. See
Friedman, 93 Hawaiʻi at 70, 996 P.2d at 275.
Most countries, including the Federated States of
Micronesia (“the FSM”), do not have jury trials. And most
countries in the world have civil law traditions, as compared to
our country as well as forty-nine of its states, including
Hawaiʻi, which are based on common law traditions.12 In the
United States, jury-waived bench trials almost always involve
one judge, who becomes the sole decisionmaker. In civil law
countries, however, although the number may vary by country,
trial courts usually sit on panels of three judges. See U.S.
Dep’t of Justice Nat’l Sec. Div., International Legal Systems --
An Introduction 8.13 Thus, when a language barrier exists, this
difference between a jury and bench trial is extremely
important, and a trial court should ensure a defendant
understands the difference.14
12 Louisiana law is based on a civil law tradition.
13
Available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/nsd-
ovt/page/file/934636/download, also available at https://perma.cc/6TEC-R5YT.
14 The dissent believes we assume Ernes’s language barrier signified a
complete unfamiliarity with single-judge bench trials and points out that the
FSM has one judge bench trials. However, the record does not indicate Ernes
(continued. . .)
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The lack of information on the record regarding Ernes’s
background and experience contributes to the insufficiency of
the record to establish a valid waiver based on a totality of
circumstances. The “colloquy” does not reflect any information
regarding Ernes’s background, including his age, employment, how
long he had been in the United States, whether he had received
any schooling in the United States, or whether he had any
familiarity or experience with jury trials. The district court
did ask Ernes whether his mind was clear and questioned him
about his educational background. Cf. Gomez-Lobato, 130 Hawaiʻi
at 472, 312 P.3d at 904 (noting that nothing in the record
indicated that Gomez-Lobato’s educational background could
establish that he understood his right to a jury trial). When
probed about his educational background, however, Ernes
responded, “No, just have high school.” Although the dissent
asserts that Ernes therefore “had a high school education,”
“just have high school” does not indicate whether Ernes had
graduated from high school and if he had attended high school in
the United States.
The educational attainment of a defendant is obviously not
controlling; a person with some high school could be quite
(continued. . .)
had any experience with trials in the FSM; thus, the record does not indicate
his understanding that if he waived his right to a jury trial, his case would
be decided by one judge. In addition, it cannot be assumed that an LEP
person lived their entire life in the country of their native language.
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familiar with the jury trial process. The educational level of
a defendant can, however, be part of the information base that
might indicate a further inquiry is in order:
Thus, [State v.] Dickson[, 4 Haw. App. 614, 673 P.2d 1036
(1983) (holding that the record must indicate a defendant’s
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of
counsel)] indicates that a “trial court should
first examine” the facts and circumstances particular to
the defendant that will assist the court in assessing the
defendant’s level of comprehension. [4 Haw. App. at 619,
673 P.2d at 1041.] Once this initial inquiry is complete,
the trial court may tailor its colloquy with the defendant
to ensure that the court adequately conveys the risks and
disadvantages of self-representation in a manner that the
defendant will be able to understand. While courts are not
required to strictly adhere to Dickson’s analytical
framework [for a waiver of counsel], it provides an
important tool to ensure waivers are made knowingly and
intelligently in addition to establishing a complete record
for appellate review.
State v. Phua, 135 Hawaiʻi 504, 513, 353 P.3d 1046, 1055 (2015)
(emphases added).
The dissent recognizes that a language barrier is a salient
fact that necessitates a colloquy. It asserts, however, that
“Gomez-Lobato gave trial courts two examples of colloquies that
would be sufficient: (1) ask questions to ‘expressly confirm’
Ernes understood ‘that he had a right to trial by jury and that
he was waiving that right,’ or (2) ask Ernes open-ended
questions requiring more than a yes or no answer. 130 Hawaiʻi at
472, 312 P.3d at 904.” In this case, the only response Ernes
gave that was not “yes” or “no” was “just have high school.” We
disagree, however, that Gomez-Lobato gave a trial court such a
formulaic “choice.” That case required that, for a challenged
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waiver to be affirmed, the record contain a colloquy sufficient
to show that a defendant truly understood the right he was
waiving.
In Gomez-Lobato, this court therefore actually provided
examples of additional steps that “[a trial] court should take
. . . to ensure the defendant understands the right that [they
are] waiving,” where “a language barrier indicates that [the]
defendant’s written waiver executed outside the presence of the
judge ‘might be less than knowing and intelligent[.]’” Gomez-
Lobato, 130 Hawaiʻi at 472, 312 P.3d at 904. In other words, the
dissent actually omits a critical part of the passage from
Gomez-Lobato:
For example, in the instant case, the court did not
expressly confirm with Gomez–Lobato that he understood that
he had a right to trial by jury and that he was waiving
that right. The court could have asked those questions,
or, as Gomez–Lobato suggests, the court could have asked
Gomez–Lobato what the document he signed meant to him,
which would have required more than a yes or no answer and
would have allowed the court to assess whether Gomez–
Lobato truly understood the right he was waiving.
Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, in effect, the dissent now seeks to limit Gomez-
Lobato, which did not create a formulaic approach to whether a
valid waiver was established on the record; that case actually
gave examples of the types of inquiries that could be made for
appellate courts to be satisfied that, based on a totality of
circumstances, a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver had
been shown.
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As noted, Gomez-Lobato explicitly states that when a
language barrier exists, active questions requiring more than
“yes” or “no” responses can be helpful. Active questions are
encouraged in court proceedings to ascertain whether a defendant
needs a court interpreter. See this court’s “Order Adopting the
Policies for Interpreted Proceedings in the Courts of the State
of Hawaiʻi,” at 2.15 In addition to the examples given in Gomez-
Lobato, other active inquiries, such as, “Could you tell me your
understanding of a jury trial?” or, “Could you tell me who will
decide whether you are guilty or not guilty if I accept your
waiver of jury trial?,” also require more than a “yes” or “no”
response from a LEP defendant. Thus, active questions can help
show whether a defendant truly understands the right being
waived.
By raising examples of the kinds of inquiries that could
have been helpful, we do not deign to set out questions that
must be asked in each case involving a LEP defendant.16 Our case
law has, however, consistently required that the record reflect
a “true colloquy” establishing a voluntary, knowing, and
15 Available at https://www.courts.state.hi.us/wp-
content/uploads/2019/08/csli-Appendix-B.pdf, also available at
https://perma.cc/5MB5-C7MZ.
16 For example, a defendant with a language barrier could be a legal
scholar from another country specializing in U.S. criminal procedure law
charged with an offense while in Hawaiʻi to study U.S. jury trials.
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intelligent waiver of a constitutional right based on a totality
of circumstances, which must be apparent on the record on
appellate review.
Thus, for an appellate court to conclude that there was a
valid waiver of a defendant’s constitutional right to jury
trial, the record must reflect a colloquy establishing a true
understanding based on a totality of circumstances of the
particular case. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “colloquy” as
“[a]ny formal discussion, such as an oral exchange between a
judge . . . and a . . . defendant in which the judge ascertains
the defendant’s understanding of the proceedings and of the
defendant’s rights.” Colloquy, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019).
The dissent would rule that, because the district court
perfunctorily explained “for the record” “three things about
what happens during a jury trial” and Ernes responded “yes,”
“no,” and “just have high school” to the district court’s
advisements, the district court satisfied its “serious and
weighty responsibility” to determine whether a knowing and
intelligent waiver of Ernes’s constitutional right was shown.
We disagree. A court’s responsibility is not satisfied with
mere “for the record” recitations. The district court simply
did not engage in a colloquy with Ernes sufficient to ascertain,
based on the record, whether he truly understood the
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constitutional right he was waiving. Thus, the “for the record”
recitations do not establish, based on a totality of
circumstances, a knowing and intelligent waiver of Ernes’s
constitutional right to a jury trial. See U.S. v. Shorty, 741
F.3d 961, 966 (9th Cir. 2013).
V. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the ICA’s March 27, 2019 judgment
on appeal and the district court’s June 8, 2017 judgment and
notice of entry of judgment are vacated, and the case is
remanded to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Susan L. Arnett /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
for petitioner
/s/ Richard W. Pollack
Stephen K. Tsushima
for respondent /s/ Michael D. Wilson
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