Kaihewalu v. Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism ( 2021 )


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  •   NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    23-APR-2021
    07:52 AM
    Dkt. 67 MO
    NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    GENGHIS KAIHEWALU, Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
    AND TOURISM, STATE OF HAWAII, HAWAII HOUSING
    FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
    Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    v.
    REALTY LAUA, LLC, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee,
    and
    JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10, DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10, DOE
    PARTNERSHIPS 1-10, DOE UNINCORPORATED ORGANIZATIONS 1-10,
    and DOE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES 1-10, Defendants
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    (CIVIL NO. 13-1-2827)
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    (By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, Hiraoka and Nakasone, JJ.)
    Plaintiff-Appellant Genghis Kaihewalu (Kaihewalu)
    appeals from:   (1) the September 22, 2016 Final Judgment in Favor
    of Defendants[-Appellees] State of Hawai#i, Department of
    Business, Economic Development and Tourism [(DBEDT)], and Hawai#i
    Housing Finance and Development Corporation [(HHFDC)]
    [(collectively, the State)] and Against [Kaihewalu] (Judgment);
    and (2) the December 8, 2017 Amended Final Judgment in Favor of
    [the State] and Against [Kaihewalu] (Amended Judgment), entered
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (Circuit Court).1
    Kaihewalu also challenges the Circuit Court's:           (1) July 7, 2016
    Order Granting [the State's] Motion for Summary Judgment (Order
    Granting Summary Judgment); and (2) November 2, 2016 Order
    Denying [Kaihewalu]'s Motion for Reconsideration of [the Circuit]
    Court's Judgment Entered on September 22, 2016, of the [Order
    Granting Summary Judgment] (Order Denying Reconsideration).
    I.      BACKGROUND
    On October 23, 2013, Kaihewalu filed the Complaint in
    this action against the State.        Kaihewalu alleged that from about
    December 2010 to October 17, 2011, he was employed as a general
    laborer with Realty Laua, LLC, (Realty Laua), the company that
    had contracted with HHFDC to manage the Honokowai Kauhale
    affordable housing project on Maui.         Kaihewalu alleged that he
    was hired after meeting the needs of the position, that he never
    received any complaints about his job performance from the
    residents or other employees at Honokowai Kauhale, and that he
    was only ever praised by the foreman.
    According to the Complaint, Kaihewalu's foreman, Glenn
    Ishikawa (Ishikawa), was relieved of his duties by Realty Laua in
    June 2011, and subsequently — "out of what is believe[d] to be
    spite" — Ishikawa informed HHFDC Executive Director Karen Seddon
    (Seddon) that Kaihewalu was a felon.         Kaihewalu also alleged that
    various local news articles were published regarding Realty
    Laua's hiring of convicted felons to work on the Honokowai
    1
    The Honorable Edwin C. Nacino entered the Judgment.   The Honorable
    Dean E. Ochiai entered the Amended Judgment.
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    Kauhale project, specifically naming Kaihewalu, and that Seddon
    had reacted to the articles by demanding that Realty Laua
    immediately relieve Kaihewalu and another felon-employee of their
    duties.   Kaihewalu alleged that Seddon had cited "numerous
    newspaper articles" as well as reports from residents that they
    felt unsafe with felons being on the property.
    The Complaint further alleged that based on the news
    articles, Seddon requested a September 2011 site inspection be
    conducted at Honokowai Kauhale, which differed from those
    previously conducted in that the September 2011 inspection
    included only tenant interviews, as opposed to unit inspections
    and file folder reviews.   According to the Complaint, Seddon then
    demanded, via a September 28, 2011 letter, that Realty Laua
    "[r]emove existing staff and replace in accordance with Contract
    Requirements[,]" citing that "[i]t is unclear what current
    maintenance qualifications are and whether or not they are
    qualified in accordance with the Contract to be employed in such
    position."   The Complaint alleged that Realty Laua had no non-
    discriminatory reason to terminate its employees and that,
    because of Realty Laua's refusal to terminate Kaihewalu, the
    State terminated its contract with Realty Laua on October 17,
    2011, thereby causing Kaihewalu's employment to be terminated
    with Realty Laua.
    Kaihewalu asserted four counts against the State:       (1)
    attempted arrest and court record discrimination (Count I), in
    violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 378-2(A)(3) (Supp.
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    2011);2 (2) violation of public policy (Count II); (3)
    intentional interference with economic relations (Count III); and
    (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IV).
    Kaihewalu sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as
    consequential, special, and punitive damages, plus attorneys'
    fees and costs.
    On March 25, 2014, the State filed an Answer to
    Complaint; on April 1, 2014, the State filed a Third-Party
    Complaint against various Doe Entities, as well as an Amended
    Answer to Complaint and Cross-Claim Against [Doe Entities] for
    indemnification.        On September 29, 2014, the State filed a Motion
    to Identify Realty Laua, LLC, as Doe Corporation 1, which the
    Circuit Court granted on December 5, 2014.
    On March 31, 2015, the State filed a Motion for
    Judgment on the Pleadings on the Complaint, which the Circuit
    Court granted, in part, on May 21, 2015, dismissing with
    2
    HRS § 378-2 provided, in pertinent part:
    § 378-2 Discriminatory practices made unlawful;
    offenses defined. (a) It shall be an unlawful
    discriminatory practice:
    (1)   Because of race, sex including gender identity
    or expression, sexual orientation, age,
    religion, color, ancestry, disability, marital
    status, arrest and court record, . . .:
    (A)   For any employer to refuse to hire or
    employ or to bar or discharge from
    employment, or otherwise to discriminate
    against any individual in compensation or
    in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
    employment;
    . . . .
    (3)     For any person, whether an employer, employee,
    or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce
    the doing of any of the discriminatory practices
    forbidden by this part, or to attempt to do
    so[.]
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    prejudice Counts II and IV, and without prejudice Count III of
    the Complaint.3
    A jury-waived trial was set for the week of July 18,
    2016.
    On May 17, 2016, the State filed a Motion for Summary
    Judgment with respect to Count I arguing, inter alia, that:             (1)
    it did not cause Kaihewalu to lose his employment with Realty
    Laua; (2) HHFDC lawfully terminated its contract with Realty Laua
    within the terms of the contract; and (3) HHFDC did not "aid,
    abet, incite, or coerce" any discriminatory practice that harmed
    Kaihewalu or otherwise violate HRS § 378-2(A)(3).          Instead, the
    State asserted, the contract between HHFDC and Realty Laua was
    terminated after a review by an independent consultant revealed
    that Realty Laua's performance did not meet the contract
    standards and the allegations that Seddon instructed Realty Laua
    to terminate the employment of any felons were untrue.
    In support of its motion, the State attached a
    declaration from Seddon (Seddon Declaration) countering various
    allegations in Kaihewalu's Complaint, which declaration included
    the following:
    4. In my capacity as the Executive Director of HHFDC,
    I became personally familiar with the Contract for Goods or
    Services Based Upon Competitive Sealed Proposals between
    HHFDC and Realty Laua, LLC, effective as of March 1, 2010,
    which I signed on behalf of HHFDC as its Executive Director
    on February 25, 2010; my signature is located on the second
    page of said Contract. A true and correct copy of the
    Contract is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
    . . . .
    7. [Kaihewalu] alleges in ¶ 10 of the Complaint filed
    in this matter that "Upon submitting his application to
    3
    Kaihewalu does not challenge this ruling on appeal.
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    Realty Laua, LLC[,] [Kaihewalu] was aware of the minimum
    qualifications, no experience necessary, of the general
    laborer as posted on the State of Hawai#i job listing."
    That statement is wrong as the job was not listed as a State
    of Hawai#i job listing as it was a position hired directly
    by Realty Laua.
    8. [Kaihewalu] alleges in ¶ 15 of the Complaint filed
    in this matter that "Thereafter, out of what is believe[d]
    to be spite, Glenn Ishikawa informed [HHFDC] Executive
    Director Karen Seddon of [Kaihewalu] being a felon." That
    statement is false as I never have been in communication
    with Glenn Ishikawa; I was not aware that [Kaihewalu] was
    employed by Realty Laua; and I was not aware that
    [Kaihewalu] was a felon prior to HHFDC terminating its
    Contract (described in ¶ 4) with Realty Laua.
    9. [Kaihewalu] alleges in ¶¶ 19 and 20 of the
    Complaint filed in this matter that "Ms. Seddon reacted to
    the news articles by demanding to [Realty Laua] that
    [Kaihewalu] and another employee be immediately relieved of
    their duties. The reason the State of Hawai #i wanted
    [Kaihewalu] terminated was due to 'numerous newspaper
    articles' written recently." Those statements are false. I
    made no such demand. HHFDC terminated a Contract with
    Realty Laua and all of Realty Laua's employees were told
    that they had to leave the property. There was no employer
    relationship between HHFDC and [Kaihewalu] or with any other
    Realty Laua employees. If the employment of any Realty Laua
    employees was terminated[,] Realty Laua chose to terminate
    such employment.
    10. [Kaihewalu] alleges in ¶ 21 of the Complaint
    filed in this matter that "Based on information and belief,
    Ms. Seddon stated that the residents and community were
    unsafe with felons being on the property." That statement
    is false. I made no such statement and had nothing to do
    with Realty Laua terminating any employees.
    . . . .
    12. [Kaihewalu] alleges in ¶ 31 of the Complaint
    filed in this matter that " . . . Ms. Seddon commanded
    Realty Laua, LLC to terminate their employees who are
    felons." That statement is false. Neither I nor anyone
    from HHFDC instructed Realty Laua to terminate any employees
    — felon or not. HHFDC required the removal of the Resident
    Manager (Lisa Felafine) [sic], not termination, as part of
    the "cure" for Realty Laua's defaults under the Contract and
    when Realty Laua did not perform the items required as part
    of the cure, HHFDC terminated the Contract. A true and
    correct copy of the NOTICE TO CURE, dated September 28, 2011
    is attached hereto as Exhibit B. A true and correct copy of
    the NOTICE OF CONTRACT TERMINATION, dated October 17, [2011]
    is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
    13. HHFDC (i) terminated the Contract after a review
    by an independent consultant based on Realty Laua's poor
    performance, and (ii) neither I nor anyone on behalf of
    HHFDC aided, abetted, incited, compelled or coerced Realty
    Laua in terminating [Kaihewalu]'s employment at Realty Laua.
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    As referenced in the Seddon Declaration, the exhibits
    thereto included:   (1) a copy of the State of Hawai#i Contract
    for Goods or Services Based Upon Competitive Sealed Proposals
    between HHFDC and Realty Laua, effective March 1, 2010 (Realty
    Laua Contract), signed by Seddon and Robert Faleafine (Mr.
    Faleafine), as President of Realty Laua; (2) a copy of the
    September 28, 2011 Notice to Cure, signed by Seddon and addressed
    to Mr. Faleafine (Notice to Cure); and (3) a copy of the October
    17, 2011 Notice of Contract Termination (Notice of Contract
    Termination), similarly signed by Seddon and addressed to Mr.
    Faleafine.   The Notice of Contract Termination cites ten reasons
    for the termination, including Realty Laua's failure to replace
    the Resident Manager of Honokowai Kauhale, as well as Realty Laua
    management and maintenance staff's failure to maintain the
    property in accordance with the contract requirements.
    On June 7, 2016, Kaihewalu filed a Memorandum in
    Opposition, arguing that there remained several disputed issues
    of material fact.   Kaihewalu submitted a declaration (Kaihewalu
    Declaration), which mirrored the allegations in the Complaint and
    attested to the following, in pertinent part:
    11.   Realty Laua, LLC's manager Lisa Faleafine [( Ms.
    Faleafine)] told me that, out of what is believe[d] to
    be spite, [relieved foreman] Glenn Ishikawa informed
    the [HHFDC] Executive Director Karen Seddon and Jim
    Dooley of the Hawaii Reporter Newspaper of me being a
    felon.
    . . . .
    13.   On or about August 22, 2011, an article was written in
    the Hawaii Reporter by Jim Dooley that stated, a
    convicted felon Genghis Kaihewalu had been hired at
    Honokowai Kauhale.
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    14.   Several follow up articles were also published in the
    Hawaii Reporter and Maui News regarding convicted
    felons working at Honokowai Kauhale.
    15.   Realty Laua[]'s manager [Ms.] Faleafine and Realty
    Laua[]'s owner Robert Faleafine told me that, Ms.
    Seddon reacted to the news articles by demanding to
    Realty Laua[] that myself and another employee - who
    is a felon - be immediately relieved of our duties.
    16.   The reason the [sic] Ms. Seddon and the State wanted
    me terminated was due to "numerous newspaper
    articles".
    17.   [Ms.] Faleafine, Realty Laua's manager, told me that
    Ms. Seddon informed her that the residents and
    community were unsafe with felons being on the
    property.
    . . . .
    19.   I was told by [Ms.] Faleafine, in or about September
    2011, Ms. Seddon requested an additional, second site
    inspection be conducted at Honokowai Kauhale based on
    the news articles.
    . . . .
    25.   [Ms.] Faleafine told me that, in a letter dated
    September 28, 2011 labeled "Immediate Action
    Required", Ms. Seddon demanded that Realty Laua, LLC,
    "Remove existing staff and replace in accordance with
    Contract Requirements." She goes on to state, "It is
    unclear what current maintenance qualifications are
    and whether or not they are qualified in accordance
    with the Contract to be employed in such position".
    . . . .
    27.   Realty Laua[]'s owner [Mr.] Faleafine told me that
    although Ms. Seddon commanded Realty Laua, LLC to
    terminate their employees who are felons, Realty Laua,
    LLC had no non-discriminatory reason to terminate its
    employees as their employees posed no threats to the
    residents, clients nor to the functioning of the
    business.
    28.   Mr. Faleafine went on to tell me that because I am a
    felon and also disabled it was illegal and not fair
    for the State to try to force Realty Laua, LLC to
    terminate me.
    29.   According to Lisa and Robert Faleafines prior
    information told to me, based on Realty Laua, LLC's
    refusal to terminate me, [HHFDC], on or about October
    17, 2011, terminated its contract with Realty Laua,
    LLC thereby causing my employment to be terminated as
    Realty Laua, LLC only had work for me on Maui based on
    their contract with the State of Hawai#i for the
    Honokowai Kauhale housing project.
    Kaihewalu attached to his declaration:          (1) a copy of
    three news articles published in August 2011; (2) a copy of a
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    State of Hawai#i job listing for General Laborer I, with a
    revised "Announcement Date" of December 10, 2009; and (3) a copy
    of a notarized letter of support dated July 25, 2013, and signed
    by Ms. Faleafine (Faleafine Letter).
    Kaihewalu also presented a five-paragraph declaration
    from Ms. Faleafine (Faleafine Declaration), in which she
    attested:
    1. Unless otherwise indicated, I make this
    declaration based upon my personal knowledge and belief.
    2.   I am competent to testify to the matters set forth
    herein.
    3. Attached hereto is a true and accurate copy of my
    four (4) page notarized July 25, 2013 letter written
    regarding Genghis Kaihewalu's employment at Realty Laua, LLC
    ("7/25/13 Letter").
    4. To the best of my recollection, the information
    and contents in the attached copy of the[]7/25/13 Letter are
    true and accurate.
    5. That declarant has read the above-stated facts and
    declares under penalty of law that they are true to the best
    of declarant's belief, knowledge and information at this
    time.
    A copy of the Faleafine Letter was also attached to the
    Faleafine Declaration.         The letter states, in full:
    To Whom It May Concern:
    Re:   Genghis Kaihewalu
    Mr. Kaihewalu was employed with Realty Laua for the period
    of December 2010 to October 17, 2011 as a General Laborer.
    Upon submitting his application, Mr. Kaihewalu was aware of
    the minimum qualification(s)- no experience necessary - of
    the General Laborer position as posted on the State [o]f
    Hawaii Job listing which is currently still listed on their
    web site. Mr. Kaihewalu met the needs of the position and
    was hired.
    During his employment, Realty Laua did not receive any
    complaints on his job performance, work ethic, from
    residents and his fellow employees. His Foreman Glenn
    Ishikawa only had praise for him of his willingness to work
    and being able to do his job as assigned - as Mr. Kaihewalu
    is an amputee.
    Upon Mr. Ishikawa being relieved of his duties in June 2011
    - it was Mr. Ishikawa who informed the [HHFDC] - (out of
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    spite and revenge) - Executive Director Karen Seddon of Mr.
    Kaihewalu being a convicted felon. A crime he did over ten
    (14) years ago.
    Ms. Seddon reacted on the newspaper articles and coerced
    actions into demanding Mr. Kaihewalu and another employee be
    relieved of their duties. As her reasoning for terminating
    his employment was the "numerous newspaper articles" as
    mentioned in her "Form SPO-007 (07/19/2011) [sic].
    Various newspaper articles with the Maui News and Hawaii
    Reporter - stating they were convicted felons living and
    working on the property. Ms. Seddon stated the residents
    and community was unsafe with felons being on the property.
    This is discriminating and derogatory statements by Ms.
    Seddon as Mr. Kaihewalu is in a protected class.
    September 2011, Ms. Seddon requested a site inspection be
    conducted based on the newspaper articles in which she hired
    Spectrum Enterprise.
    Spectrum Enterprise had conducted previous audits in 2008,
    2009, 2010 and February 2011 (6 months prior to the newest
    audit). During the 2008 - early 2011 audit - Spectrum
    conducted unit inspections and file folder reviews. During
    the September 2011 audit - Spectrum conducted tenant
    interviews only. The 2008 - early 2011 – the audits are all
    similar or exactly the same based on HHFDC not completing
    their side of responsibilities for the capital improvements
    of the property.
    The September 2011 audit -interviewer/auditor Lois Churchill
    and September 28, 2011 letter signed by Karen Seddon is
    found to be bias.
    In the newspaper articles and interviewed statements - it
    was found there was "no wrongdoing" on the property by Mr.
    Kaihewalu and another employee.
    The letter dated September 28, 2011 by HHFDC Karen Seddon
    demanding "Immediate Action Required" - "Remove existing
    staff and replace in accordance with Contract Requirements."
    As she states "It is unclear what current maintenance
    qualifications are and whether or not they are qualified in
    accordance with the Contract to be employed in such
    positions." However, as mentioned above, the job
    qualifications are listed on the State of Hawaii job
    listings and Mr. Kaihewalu [was] truly qualified for his
    position.
    Although the order had been made to remove Mr. Kaihewalu
    from his position, Realty Laua did not feel that any of
    their employees posed a threat to their clients nor business
    function.
    Mr. Kaihewalu being a convicted felon did not sit well with
    HHFDC/Karen Seddon and therefore, terminated its contract
    with Realty Laua that resulted in ending his employment
    evasively.
    Sincerely,
    [/s/ Lisa Faleafine]
    Lisa Faleafine
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    (Format altered).4
    In reply, the State objected to the exhibits attached
    to the Kaihewalu Declaration as well as various statements within
    the Kaihewalu Declaration and the Faleafine Letter, asserting
    that the majority of the "evidence" Kaihewalu put forth in his
    opposition was inadmissible and therefore unable to serve as the
    basis for denying the State's Motion for Summary Judgment.
    Specifically, the State argued that Kaihewalu failed to
    demonstrate personal knowledge as to the statements made by Mr.
    Faleafine and Ms. Faleafine to Kaihewalu with respect to Seddon's
    demands and that Kaihewalu also lacked personal knowledge of
    Seddon's reactions to the news articles or her reasons for
    terminating the Realty Laua Contract.          With respect to the
    Faleafine Declaration and Letter, the State similarly argued that
    Ms. Faleafine had failed to demonstrate personal knowledge with
    regard to Seddon's statements and motivation in terminating the
    Realty Laua Contract.       The State further objected to the
    Kaihewalu Declaration and Faleafine Declaration and Letter on
    hearsay grounds.      The State attached a brief supplemental
    declaration from Seddon (Seddon Supplemental Declaration), which
    stated, in pertinent part:
    2. When the contract with Realty Laua was terminated,
    [HHFDC] was required to contract with another company to
    manage the Honokowai Kauhale affordable rental housing
    project in Lahaina, Maui for approximately six months until
    a permanent management company could be secured after going
    through the normal procurement process required by Hawaii
    law.
    4
    Kaihewalu did not submit a declaration from Ishikawa or Mr.
    Faleafine.
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    3. As there was an immediate need to replace Realty
    Laua, I completed a State Procurement Office Notice of
    Request for Exemption from HRS Chapter 103D. This is
    know[n] as a SPO-007 form.
    . . . .
    5. I did not prepare any other Request for Exemption
    with respect to replacing Realty Laua.
    A copy of the approved SPO-007 form was attached to the
    Supplemental Seddon Declaration.
    The State concluded that Kaihewalu had offered no
    admissible evidence to contradict the evidence set forth in the
    Motion for Summary Judgment and that "[w]hen the inadmissible
    evidence is removed" from Kaihewalu's opposition, the Motion for
    Summary Judgment should be granted.
    At the June 15, 2016 hearing on the motion, the State
    reiterated its argument that Kaihewalu's opposition was devoid of
    any admissible evidence to defeat its Motion for Summary
    Judgment.    Kaihewalu engaged in the following exchange with the
    Circuit Court:
    [COUNSEL FOR KAIHEWALU]: . . . [T]here's two
    levels of hearsay we have to get by. And both of those
    levels of hearsay, there's exceptions to both of them on
    803(A)(2).
    In other words, [Seddon] tells Ms. -- Mr.
    Kaihewalu's boss that they must terminate him and another
    man because they're felons. That statement is clearly a
    party admission. Then the question becomes is [Mr.]
    Kaihewalu's boss' statement also an admission? And,
    clearly, now that they are a party to this action, that's
    also a party admission, Your Honor. So there's two levels
    of hearsay, but both of those levels of hearsay pass through
    the exceptions of 803(A)(2) without question.
    . . . .
    THE COURT: Let me ask this, counsel, did you
    amend over on the third-party complaint?
    . . . .
    [COUNSEL]:   No.
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    THE COURT: Then why are they a party to your
    lawsuit? They're a party in the third-party complaint filed
    by [the State]. You didn't amend your complaint; correct?
    [COUNSEL]: Correct. But I believe they're
    still a party to this lawsuit, Your Honor.
    THE COURT:   Okay, all right.
    In response, the State argued:
    [H]e keeps talking about [Seddon]'s alleged statements.
    However, we don't know what was said, to who it was said,
    when it was said. Is that an interpretation of somebody's
    statement? What were the words that were used? Who else
    was present? All we have is this alleged statement.
    There's no foundation that these people were even present
    when this was said. There's no foundation that it was said
    to them, nothing like that.
    The Circuit Court, in granting the motion, explained:
    The Court agrees with [the State] and the State's
    interpretation of the evidence presented. We're passed
    discovery deadline. The simple fact, counsel, is all you
    needed to do was either depose or include the Falofinis
    [sic] as part of the case.
    I don't believe there's . . . enough authentication and
    exception to the hearsay rule based on what you've put in
    your memo in opp. So there's no genuine issue of material
    fact and, therefore, I'm going to grant the motion on the
    last count[.]
    Kaihewalu did not address the State's objections to the
    lack of personal knowledge or foundation.
    On July 7, 2016, the Circuit Court entered the Order
    Granting Summary Judgment, dismissing Count I with prejudice.
    The Circuit Court entered the Judgment on September 22, 2016.
    On September 27, 2016, Kaihewalu filed a Motion for
    Reconsideration of [the Judgment], asserting that the Circuit
    Court erroneously "based its entire ruling on the proposition
    that a third-party admission is not a 'Declaration Against
    Interest' because a third-party is not a party to the Plaintiff
    herein."   Kaihewalu's memorandum in support of the motion
    addressed the sole issue of whether Realty Laua is a "party-
    opponent" to Kaihewalu with respect to Hawai#i Rules of Evidence
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    (HRE) Rule 803(a)(1), notwithstanding Kaihewalu's failure to
    amend the complaint to name Realty Laua as a defendant.
    Kaihewalu also argued that the statements in the Faleafine Letter
    regarding Seddon's reasoning for terminating Kaihewalu's
    employment were not offered for their truth but rather "to show
    that at a particular time and place[, HHFDC] made this ridiculous
    slanderous statement," and that, consequently, such a statement
    could not constitute hearsay.
    In response, the State argued that Kaihewalu's failure
    to amend the Complaint to include a claim against Realty Laua
    did, in fact, preclude adversity between the parties such that
    HRE Rule 803(a)(1) would apply.    The State further argued that
    independent bases supported the Circuit Court's ruling,
    reiterating its position that the Kaihewalu Declaration and
    Faleafine Declaration and Letter failed to establish sufficient
    foundation that the declarants possessed personal knowledge of
    the facts and statements set forth therein.
    The Circuit Court, without a hearing, entered an Order
    Denying Reconsideration on November 2, 2016.     On November 16,
    2016, Kaihewalu filed his notice of appeal under CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX,
    which this court dismissed on June 29, 2017, for lack of
    appellate jurisdiction.   Kaihewalu v. DBEDT, CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX,
    
    2017 WL 2829817
    , *2 (Haw. App. June 29, 2017) (Order).
    On July 17, 2017, Kaihewalu filed a second notice of
    appeal, which initiated the instant appeal.     On December 8, 2017,
    pursuant to this court's November 17, 2017 order for temporary
    remand, the Circuit Order entered the Amended Judgment.
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    II.   POINTS OF ERROR
    Kaihewalu raises three points of error on appeal,
    contending that the Circuit Court erred in ruling that:             (1)
    Realty Laua was not party to his case as it relates to the
    application of the rule against hearsay; (2) the statements of
    Ms. Faleafine and Mr. Faleafine as delineated in the Kaihewalu
    Declaration were inadmissible; and (3) the Faleafine Declaration
    was inadmissible.
    III. APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    The appellate court reviews the circuit court's
    granting or denial of summary judgment de novo.          Querubin v.
    Thronas, 107 Hawai#i 48, 56, 
    109 P.3d 689
    , 697 (2005) (citing
    Hawai#i Cmty. Fed. Credit Union v. Keka, 94 Hawai#i 213, 221, 
    11 P.3d 1
    , 9 (2000)).
    [S]ummary judgment is appropriate if the
    pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
    and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
    if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
    material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law. A fact is material if
    proof of that fact would have the effect of
    establishing or refuting one of the essential elements
    of a cause of action or defense asserted by the
    parties. The evidence must be viewed in the light
    most favorable to the non-moving party. In other
    words, we must view all of the evidence and the
    inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
    to the party opposing the motion.
    Durette v. Aloha Plastic Recycling, Inc., 105 Hawai#i 490, 501,
    
    100 P.3d 60
    , 71 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Hawai#i
    Cmty. Fed. Credit Union, 94 Hawai#i at 221, 
    11 P.3d at 9
    ).
    "Although [the courts] carefully scrutinize the
    materials submitted by the moving party to ensure compliance with
    the requirements of [Hawai#i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule
    56(e)], the courts are more indulgent towards the materials
    15
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    submitted by the non-moving party."        Eddins v. Morrison, 105
    Hawai#i 376, 378, 
    98 P.3d 247
    , 249 (App. 2004) (quoting Miller v.
    Manuel, 
    9 Haw. App. 56
    , 66, 
    828 P.2d 286
    , 292 (1991)).
    [D]ifferent standards of review must be applied to trial
    court decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence,
    depending on the requirements of the particular rule of
    evidence at issue. When application of a particular
    evidentiary rule can yield only one correct result, the
    proper standard for appellate review is the right/wrong
    standard. However, the traditional abuse of discretion
    standard should be applied in the case of those rules of
    evidence that require a "judgment call" on the part of the
    trial court.
    Kealoha v. Cty. of Hawai#i, 
    74 Haw. 308
    , 319-20, 
    844 P.2d 670
    ,
    676 (1993).
    IV.   DISCUSSION
    A.   Kaihewalu's Declaration
    Kaihewalu argues that the Circuit Court erred in
    determining that Realty Laua was not a "party" with respect to
    the application of the party-admission exception to the rule
    against hearsay and its consequent ruling that the Faleafines'
    statements in the Kaihewalu Declaration and the attached
    Faleafine Letter were inadmissible.        Kaihewalu asserts that the
    Faleafines' statements to Kaihewalu, as recounted in the
    Kaihewalu Declaration, are admissible under HRE Rule 803(a)(1)
    and (2), as vicarious admissions of a party-opponent.            According
    to Kaihewalu, Realty Laua is in effect an adverse party to
    Kaihewalu, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that Kaihewalu did
    not plead any claims against Realty Laua, and consequently, the
    statements of Realty Laua's agent should be admissible as
    exceptions to the hearsay rule.
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    We first note that Kaihewalu does not dispute that the
    State, in its Motion for Summary Judgment, satisfied its initial
    burden of showing that there is no genuine issue to material fact
    as to his claim in Count I.     As such, it was incumbent upon
    Kaihewalu to then come forward, through affidavit or other
    evidence, with specific facts showing that there is a genuine
    issue of material fact.     See, e.g., Miller, 9 Haw. App. at 65,
    
    828 P.2d at 292
    .   Kaihewalu points to his declaration and
    attached Faleafine Letter as evidence of Seddon's demands and
    motivation in terminating the Realty Laua Contract, and asserts
    that Seddon made certain statements to the Faleafines about
    Realty Laua's employment of felons, including Kaihewalu.
    Kaihewalu's Declaration states:
    15.   Realty Laua[]'s manager Lisa Faleafine and Realty
    Laua[]'s owner Robert Faleafine told me that, Ms.
    Seddon reacted to the news articles by demanding to
    [Realty Laua] that myself and another employee - who
    is a felon - be immediately relieved of our duties.
    17.   Lisa Faleafine, Realty Laua's manager, told me that
    Ms. Seddon informed her that the residents and
    community were unsafe with felons being on the
    property.
    . . . .
    19.   I was told by Lisa Faleafine, in or about September
    2011, Ms. Seddon requested an additional, second site
    inspection be conducted at Honokowai Kauhale based on
    the news articles.
    . . . .
    25.   Lisa Faleafine told me that, in a letter dated
    September 28, 2011 labeled "Immediate Action
    Required", Ms. Seddon demanded that Realty Laua, LLC,
    "Remove existing staff and replace in accordance with
    Contract Requirements." She goes on to state, "It is
    unclear what current maintenance qualifications are
    and whether or not they are qualified in accordance
    with the Contract to be employed in such position".
    . . . .
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    27.    Realty Laua[]'s owner Robert Faleafine told me that
    although Ms. Seddon commanded Realty Laua, LLC to
    terminate their employees who are felons, Realty Laua,
    LLC had no non-discriminatory reason to terminate its
    employees as their employees posed no threats to the
    residents, clients nor to the functioning of the
    business.
    28.    Mr. Faleafine went on to tell me that because I am a
    felon and also disabled it was illegal and not fair
    for the State to try to force Realty Laua, LLC to
    terminate me.
    29.    According to Lisa and Robert Faleafines prior
    information told to me, based on Realty Laua, LLC's
    refusal to terminate me, [HHFDC], on or about October
    17, 2011, terminated its contract with Realty Laua ,
    LLC, thereby causing my employment to be terminated as
    Realty Laua, LLC only had work for me on Maui based on
    their contract with the State of Hawai#i for the
    Honokowai Kauhale housing project.
    (Emphasis added).
    Kaihewalu attests that he only learned of Seddon's
    statements by way of statements made to him by the Faleafines.
    Thus, we must address whether the Faleafines' statements
    presented in the Kaihewalu Declaration are themselves admissible
    as exceptions to the hearsay rule.        HRE Rule 803(a) provides, in
    relevant part:
    Rule 803 Hearsay exceptions; availability of
    declarant immaterial. The following are not excluded by the
    hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a
    witness:
    (a)   Admissions.
    (1)   Admission by party-opponent. A statement that
    is offered against a party and is (A) the
    party's own statement, in either the party's
    individual or a representative capacity, or (B)
    a statement of which the party has manifested
    the party's adoption or belief in its truth.
    (2)   Vicarious admissions. A statement that is
    offered against a party and was uttered by (A) a
    person authorized by the party to make such a
    statement, (B) the party's agent or servant
    concerning a matter within the scope of the
    agent's or servant's agency or employment, made
    during the existence of the relationship, or (C)
    a co-conspirator of the party during the course
    and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
    As dictated by the plain language of HRE Rule 803, the
    exception for hearsay statements as admissions by party-opponents
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    applies to a statement that is offered against the same party who
    made the statement.   HRE Rule 803 (a)(1); HRE Rule 803 cmt.
    ("[T]here are two conditions of admissibility under this
    paragraph: (1) that the statement was made by a party to the
    litigation [(or its agent)], and (2) that the statement now be
    offered against that party.") (emphasis added); see also Kekua v.
    Kaiser Found. Hosp., 
    61 Haw. 208
    , 217, 
    601 P.2d 364
    , 371 (1979)
    ("The extrajudicial statements of a party-opponent, when offered
    against the same, are universally deemed admissible at trial as
    substantive evidence of the fact or facts stated.") (emphasis
    added).
    Here, whether Realty Laua is considered a party to the
    litigation initiated by Kaihewalu is inapposite to the
    determination of whether the Faleafines' statements are
    admissible as the agent admissions of Realty Laua, since
    Kaihewalu plainly does not seek to offer any of the Faleafines'
    statements against Realty Laua.    HRE Rule 803(a)(1).    Kaihewalu
    acknowledges he did not assert any claims against Realty Laua.
    Kaihewalu seeks instead to use the Faleafines' statements against
    the State, but has not sought to establish that the Faleafines'
    statements would somehow constitute admissions by the State, such
    that those statements would qualify as HRE Rule 803(a)(1) or (2)
    exceptions to the hearsay rule.    Thus, Kaihewalu has not
    established that any of the Faleafines' statements, as recounted
    in the Kaihewalu Declaration, or the contents of the Faleafine
    Letter attached thereto, constitute admissible evidence of
    Seddon's alleged statements that could give rise to a genuine
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    issue of material fact.     Accordingly, we conclude that
    Kaihewalu's argument is without merit.
    B.   The Faleafine Declaration and Letter
    Kaihewalu argues that the Circuit Court erred in
    determining that the Faleafine Declaration and attached Faleafine
    Letter were inadmissible, because the statements contained
    therein are not hearsay and thus no hearsay exception is
    necessary.   Kaihewalu argues that Seddon's statements as
    recounted in the Faleafine Declaration and Letter are not offered
    for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather as evidence
    that HHFDC, via Seddon, made the statements at a particular time
    and place.
    With respect to Seddon's purported statements, the
    Faleafine Letter states:
    Ms. Seddon reacted on the newspaper articles and coerced
    actions into demanding Mr. Kaihewalu and another employee be
    relieved of their duties. As her reasoning for terminating
    his employment was the "numerous newspaper articles" as
    mentioned in her "Form SPO-007 (07/18/2011).
    . . . .
    Ms. Seddon stated the residents and community was [sic]
    unsafe with felons being on the property.
    . . . .
    Ms. Seddon requested a site inspection be conducted based on
    the newspaper articles in which she hired Spectrum
    Enterprise.
    . . . .
    The letter dated September 28, 2011 by HHFDC Karen Seddon
    demanding "Immediate Action Required" – "Remove existing
    staff and replace in accordance with Contract Requirements."
    . . . .
    Mr. Kaihewalu being a convicted felon did not sit well with
    HHFDC/Karen Seddon and therefore, terminated its contract
    with Realty Laua[.]
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Arguably, Seddon's statements do not fall within the
    general rule against hearsay, since Kaihewalu is not seeking to
    establish, for example, whether residents and community were, in
    fact, unsafe with felons on the property.     Moreover, even if the
    statements constituted hearsay, the parties do not appear to
    dispute that Seddon's purported statements – if presented through
    admissible evidence – would fall within the party-admission
    exception of HRE Rule 803(a)(2).
    However, as the State argues, regardless of the
    proffered purpose, Ms. Faleafine fails to assert or demonstrate
    personal knowledge of Seddon's alleged statements – for example,
    by describing the time, place, and/or other circumstances of the
    alleged statements - which renders the evidence inadmissible.
    Pursuant to the Hawai#i Rules of Civil Procedure, affidavits
    submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment "shall
    be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
    would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively
    that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
    therein."    HRCP Rule 56(e).   As provided in HRE Rule 602, "[a]
    witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced
    sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal
    knowledge of the matter."    See also HRE Rule 602 cmt. ("Evidence
    of personal knowledge is a general foundation requirement for
    admissibility of all evidence[.]").     In the summary judgment
    context, this means that "the affidavit must adequately reflect
    that the affiant (1) perceived the event about which they
    testified; and (2) had a present recollection of that
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    perception."   Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Kanahele, 144 Hawai#i
    394, 403, 
    443 P.3d 86
    , 95 (2019) (citing HRE Rule 602; Adams v.
    CDM Media USA, Inc., 135 Hawai#i 1, 28, 
    346 P.3d 70
    , 97 (2015)).
    To the extent an affidavit does not comply with HRCP Rule 56(e),
    it should be disregarded.    Keka, 94 Hawai#i at 221, 
    11 P.3d at 9
    (quoting Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 
    56 Haw. 522
    ,
    539, 
    543 P.2d 1356
    , 1367 (1975)).
    Personal knowledge to testify may be inferred from an
    affiant's position and the nature of the affiant's participation
    in the matters as described in the affidavit.     Stallard v.
    Consol. Maui, Inc., 103 Hawai#i 468, 475-76, 
    83 P.3d 731
    , 738-39
    (2004) (citing Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass'n, 
    897 F.2d 999
    , 1018 (9th Cir. 1990), and holding that the affiants'
    personal knowledge of the operation of the resort and policy with
    respect to hotel districts could be reasonably inferred from
    their respective positions as president of the development
    company and deputy planning director of the county); Capital One
    Bank (USA), N.A. v. Huffman, CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 
    2014 WL 6488771
    , *3
    (Haw. App. Nov. 18, 2014) (SDO) (affiant's personal knowledge
    about the policies and procedures pertaining to credit card
    company's various credit card accounts could be reasonably
    inferred from her position as a Litigation Support Representative
    for the credit card company as described in her affidavit); see
    also In re Guardianship of Carlsmith, 113 Hawai#i 211, 230 n.28,
    
    151 P.3d 692
    , 711 n.28 (2006) (affiant's statements that she
    personally "tried to call and to visit" subject of the
    guardianship petition and that the matters averred to were based
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    on "personal knowledge" were sufficient to affirmatively
    demonstrate personal knowledge).       However, "[a] mere recitation
    that the witness 'understood' or was 'advised' of a fact is
    insufficient, in itself, to establish that the witness perceived
    the facts for which testimony is offered, i.e., that the
    testimony is based on personal knowledge."      Adams, 135 Hawai#i at
    29, 346 P.3d at 98 (holding that CEO's declaration seeking to
    establish legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not hiring
    plaintiff did not demonstrate personal knowledge because the
    bases for the information were unidentified third persons or
    external sources) (citing Addison M. Bowman, Hawai#i Rules of
    Evidence Manual § 602–1[3] (2014–15 ed.); State v. Apollonio, 130
    Hawai#i 353, 362, 
    311 P.3d 676
    , 685 (2013) (striking testimony of
    a witness where nothing in evidence would support a finding that
    the witness had personal knowledge of the fact at issue)).
    Moreover, evidentiary personal knowledge requirements
    "apply to a hearsay statement admitted under any of the hearsay
    exceptions . . . in that admissibility of a hearsay statement is
    predicated on the foundation requirement of the witness' personal
    knowledge of the making of the statement itself."      Kanahele, 144
    Hawaii at 403 n.12, 443 P.3d at 95 n.12 (citing HRE Rule 602
    cmt.).   An affiant therefore satisfies the "personal knowledge"
    requirements only if she has personal knowledge of how the
    hearsay statement was made.    Huffman, 
    2014 WL 6488771
    , at *2.
    Under this standard, the Faleafine Declaration and
    Letter are not admissible evidence of Seddon's statements or
    demands, because they fail to establish the requisite foundation
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    of Ms. Faleafine's personal knowledge of those statements and
    demands.    The Faleafine Declaration does not purport to attest
    that the facts and statements contained within the Faleafine
    Letter are based on Ms. Faleafine's personal knowledge.
    Instead, the Faleafine Declaration attests that while the
    declaration is based upon personal knowledge, it merely states
    that "the information and contents in the [Faleafine Letter] are
    true and accurate" to the best of Ms. Faleafine's recollection.
    The Faleafine Letter itself is devoid of any facts demonstrating
    her personal knowledge of Seddon's statements, reactions, or
    demands to Realty Laua.    Ms. Faleafine does not describe to any
    degree the circumstances under which Seddon made her purported
    statements or whether Ms. Faleafine actually "perceived the
    event" of Seddon making these statements.     Kanahele, 144 Hawai#i
    at 403, 443 P.3d at 95.
    It cannot be reasonably inferred from Ms. Faleafine's
    position or affiliated responsibilities that she would have had
    direct contact with Seddon or that any such conversations would
    have involved discussion of the status of the Realty Laua
    Contract.    While Ms. Faleafine is identified elsewhere in the
    record as Realty Laua's "manager" or "Resident Manager," nothing
    in the record, including the Faleafine Declaration or Faleafine
    Letter, describes the nature of this position, the dates of her
    employment in this position (including whether they coincided
    with Kaihewalu's dates of employment with Realty Laua or Seddon's
    effective dates as Executive Director of HHFDC), or any other
    evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that Ms.
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Faleafine's position with Realty Laua would likely expose her to
    direct communications of the nature attested to with the
    Executive Director of HHFDC.5       Indeed, the Notice to Cure,
    referenced in the Faleafine Letter as the "letter dated September
    28, 2011," is addressed only to Mr. Faleafine, as President of
    Realty Laua.    In any event, the Notice to Cure makes no mention
    of concerns regarding the hiring of felons or safety of residents
    with the presence of such employees on the premise.6
    Ultimately, the Faleafine Declaration and Letter do not
    allow for any reasonable inference of her personal knowledge of
    Seddon's statements or demands with respect to the Realty Laua
    Contract or her demands to Realty Laua to terminate Kaihewalu as
    a condition of the contract.        As such, the Faleafine Letter and
    Declaration are not admissible evidence of Seddon's alleged
    statements and cannot create a genuine issue of material fact in
    order to defeat the State's Motion for Summary Judgment.
    Accordingly, we conclude that Kaihewalu's arguments concerning
    the Faleafine Declaration and Letter are without merit.
    C.    Kaihewalu's Trustworthiness Argument
    Finally, Kaihewalu contends the Faleafines' statements
    were admissible as inherently reliable and trustworthy.
    5
    Ms. Faleafine is also identified in the newspaper articles as the
    sister of Mr. Faleafine, but there is nothing in her declaration, her letter,
    or the record that would indicate that Ms. Faleafine would have been in direct
    contact with a senior officer of HHFDC by virtue of her relation to Mr.
    Faleafine.
    6
    Of note, the Notice to Cure signed by Seddon cites statements
    purportedly made by Ms. Faleafine. However, this does not support an
    inference that Ms. Faleafine and Seddon were ever in direct contact to discuss
    the Realty Laua Contract, since the Notice to Cure reflects that Ms.
    Faleafine's statements were recorded as part of the September 2011 audit,
    which Kaihewalu asserts was conducted by a third-party.
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Kaihewalu argues that because Realty Laua was a party to the
    underlying action, the trustworthiness of its agents' statements
    could be assessed through the course of litigating the action.
    Kaihewalu asserts that the opportunity to confirm or refute any
    statements renders the statements admissible and that the
    statements "should have come into evidence."
    This argument lacks merit.     A motion for summary
    judgment can only be defeated by the presentation of admissible
    evidence, Keka, 94 Hawai#i at 221, 
    11 P.3d at 9
    , and we have
    concluded here that Kaihewalu presented no admissible evidence
    raising a genuine issue of material fact for trial.         Kaihewalu
    has presented no authority, and we find none, for the proposition
    that otherwise inadmissible evidence can defeat a motion for
    summary judgment, solely because a declarant is an agent of a
    third-party defendant and may potentially be called as a witness
    at trial.
    V.      CONCLUSION
    For these reasons, the Circuit Court's September 22,
    2016 Judgment and December 8, 2017 Amended Judgment are affirmed.
    DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, April 23, 2021.
    On the briefs:
    /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
    Elizabeth Jubin Fujiwara,                 Presiding Judge
    Joseph T. Rosenbaum,
    (Fujiwara and Rosenbaum, LLLC,            /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
    for Plaintiff-Appellant.                  Associate Judge
    Caron M. Inagaki,                         /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
    Kathy K. Higham,                          Associate Judge
    Deputy Attorneys General,
    State of Hawaii,
    for Defendants/Third-Party
    Plaintiffs-Appellees.
    26