Hueston v. State ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    30-APR-2021
    07:56 AM
    Dkt. 77 SO
    NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    LINCOLN HUESTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v.
    STATE OF HAWAI#I, Respondent-Appellee
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    (CR. NO. 5SPP-17-1-0001)
    SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
    (By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, and Hiraoka, and Wadsworth, JJ.)
    Petitioner-Appellant Lincoln Hueston (Hueston) appeals
    from the "Order Denying [Hueston's] Petition for Revocation of
    Restitution [(Petition)] Filed on August 24, 2017," entered on
    March 21, 2019 (March 21, 2019 Order), in the Circuit Court of
    the Fifth Circuit (circuit court).1/        Hueston contends that the
    circuit court erred in denying the Petition, because it contained
    allegations that if proven would have entitled Hueston to relief.
    After reviewing the record on appeal and the relevant
    legal authorities, and giving due consideration to the issues
    raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve
    Hueston's contention as follows.
    I. Background
    In 2009, Hueston pleaded guilty to and was convicted of
    one count of Theft in the First Degree and forty-nine counts of
    1/
    The Honorable Randal Valenciano presided.
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER
    Forgery in the Second Degree.2/  At a June 3, 2009 sentencing
    hearing, the following exchange between the circuit court and
    Hueston regarding restitution occurred:
    [THE COURT:] And the amount of restitution that the
    Court is ordering -- this is through a freestanding order,
    as requested by the prosecutors -- is $212,060.10. This is
    what has been verified by the probation department. The
    Court is, as I said, ordering a freestanding order.
    . . . [Y]ou're going to start making the payments on
    the restitution, followed by the crime victim compensation
    fees, and I'm not going to waive any of that. You're going
    to start making payments 60 days after you're released from
    prison, and I'm proposing that you pay minimum payments of
    $200 a month.
    Now, Mr. Hueston, I know looking down the road, you
    don't know what you're going to be doing, you don't know
    what kind of employment you're going to be doing, but
    setting it at $200 a month, Mr. Hueston, do you foresee a
    problem with that after you get out of prison and get
    employment?
    [HUESTON]:   No, your Honor.
    THE COURT: All right. Very well. Then I'll note
    that for the record.
    Pursuant to the June 10, 2009 Judgment of Conviction
    and Sentence (Judgment), Hueston was sentenced to, inter alia,
    ten years imprisonment for Theft in the First Degree and five
    years imprisonment for each count of Forgery in the Second
    Degree, all sentences to run concurrently. As was discussed at
    the sentencing hearing, Hueston's sentence also included the
    order to pay restitution in the amount of $212,060.00, as well as
    certain other fees, in monthly installments of no less than $200
    commencing 60 days after release from incarceration.
    On June 10, 2009, the circuit court also entered its
    "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting
    [Respondent-Appellee State of Hawaii's (State)] Oral Motion for
    Free-Standing Restitution Order," as well as a separate "Order of
    Restitution." The circuit court "conclude[d] that a separate
    free-standing restitution order obligating [Hueston] to pay the
    outstanding restitution beyond the expiration date of his
    2/
    The Honorable Kathleen N.A. Watanabe presided.
    2
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER
    probation3/ term [was] warranted."4/ (Footnote added.)
    On August 24, 2017, Hueston filed the Petition.
    Hueston alleged that he was sentenced "to make payments of
    restitution totaling the amount of $217,400.00"; "[n]o hearing
    was held to determine if the amount of restitution was an amount
    that [Hueston] could afford to pay"; and "the amount of
    restitution imposed by the Court is an amount of which [Hueston]
    is unable to pay." He further stated that he was currently
    incarcerated; he earned 25 cents an hour in prison, which he
    "used for the purchase of basic needs"; and he would remain
    incarcerated until the end of his maximum sentence on May 28,
    2019. Hueston concluded that "[p]ursuant to [HRS] § 706-645 and
    § 706-644(d)   [sic], the Circuit Court may revoke [Hueston's]
    restitution"   in this case, and requested a hearing on the
    Petition.
    In   its March 21, 2019 Order, the circuit court denied
    the Petition   without a hearing.
    II. Discussion
    We treat the Petition as a non-conforming Hawai#i Rules
    of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 petition. See infra. We
    review an order denying an HRPP Rule 40 petition without a
    hearing de novo, using the right/wrong standard of review. Dan
    v. State, 76 Hawai#i 423, 427, 
    879 P.2d 528
    , 532 (1994). "The
    3/
    It appears that the court meant to reference Hueston's
    "imprisonment term," rather than "probation term," as Hueston was not
    sentenced to a term of probation in this case.
    4/
    On January 7, 2014, pursuant to a motion by the State, and
    following a December 16, 2013 hearing, the circuit court issued an "Order Re
    State's Motion to Amend the Judgment Filed on 6/10/09 to Conform to [Hawaii
    Revised Statutes (HRS)] 353-22.6" (January 7, 2014 Order). The January 7,
    2014 Order concluded that HRS "§ 353-22.6 is to be applied to Hueston" and
    "the original judgment herein is not to interfere with the Department of
    Public Safety's, or any other State agency['s], enforcement of HRS § 353-
    22.6[.]" The January 7, 2014 Order further provided that "the director of
    public safety shall enforce the instant victim restitution order against all
    moneys earned by Hueston or deposited or credited to his individual account
    while he is incarcerated[,]" by deducting twenty-five percent of the total of
    such amounts, to be paid as restitution "to the victim once the amount reaches
    $25, or annually, whichever is sooner."
    The Petition does not challenge the January 7, 2014 Order, and it is not
    mentioned in Hueston's opening brief. We thus deem any such issue waived.
    See Hawai#i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(b)(4), (7).
    3
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER
    question on appeal of a denial of a Rule 40 petition without a
    hearing is whether the trial record indicates that Petitioner's
    application for relief made such a showing of a colorable claim
    as to require a hearing before the lower court." Lewi v. State,
    145 Hawai#i 333, 345, 
    452 P.3d 330
    , 342 (2019) (quoting Dan, 76
    Hawai#i at 427, 
    879 P.2d at 532
    ). To establish a colorable claim
    of illegal sentence, the allegations of the petition must show
    that if taken as true the facts alleged would change the
    petitioner's sentence; however, a petitioner's conclusions need
    not be regarded as true. See 
    id.
     (quoting Dan, 76 Hawai#i at
    427, 
    879 P.2d at 532
    ).
    Hueston argues that the Petition established a
    colorable claim for relief under HRS § 706-645 by "assert[ing]
    [Hueston's] inability to pay restitution due to the length of his
    incarceration and the high amount of the restitution."5/ Hueston
    further argues that these allegations "if taken as true, could
    have potentially changed the restitution amount to which
    [Hueston] was sentenced."
    HRS § 706-645 (2014) provides:
    (1) A defendant who has been sentenced to pay a fine
    or restitution and who is not in contumacious default in the
    payment thereof may at any time petition the court which
    sentenced the defendant for a revocation of the fine or
    restitution or of any unpaid portion thereof.
    (2) If it appears to the satisfaction of the court
    that the circumstances which warranted the imposition of the
    fine or restitution have changed, or that it would otherwise
    be unjust to require payment, the court may revoke the fine
    or restitution or the unpaid portion thereof in whole or in
    part. Prior to revocation, the court shall afford the
    prosecuting attorney an opportunity to be heard.
    (Emphasis added.) The statute thus authorizes the sentencing
    court "to alter, amend, or revoke restitution orders on the basis
    of unforeseen or changed circumstances[.]" State v. Gaylord, 78
    Hawai#i 127, 153 n.50, 
    890 P.2d 1167
    , 1193 n.50 (1995). A
    petition under HRPP Rule 40 is the appropriate way to seek relief
    5/
    The Petition also cited HRS § 706-644(d) as authorizing the
    circuit court to revoke Hueston's restitution. To the extent that Hueston may
    have intended to cite HRS § 706-644(4), which applies where "the defendant's
    default in the payment of a fee, fine, or restitution is not contumacious,"
    that section did not apply here, where Hueston presented no evidence that he
    was in default of the payment of restitution. Hueston does not rely on HRS
    § 706-644 in the opening brief.
    4
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER
    under HRS § 706-645. See State v. Kealoha, 142 Hawai#i 46, 63,
    
    414 P.3d 98
    , 115 (2018).
    Here, the Petition did not establish a colorable claim
    for revocation of restitution under HRS § 706-645. Hueston
    alleged in the Petition that "the amount of restitution imposed
    by the Court is an amount of which [Hueston] is unable to pay."
    However, Hueston's asserted inability to pay the amount of
    restitution was not, as a matter of law, an unforeseen or changed
    circumstance or other injustice authorizing a revocation of
    restitution. Specifically, HRS § 706-646(3) provides that "[i]n
    ordering restitution, the court shall not consider the
    defendant's financial ability to make restitution in determining
    the amount of restitution to order." HRS § 706-646(3) (Supp.
    2016) (emphases added); see Commentary on HRS § 706-646 (2014)
    (noting that "Act 230, Session Laws 2006, amended this section
    to, among other things, require that when restitution is ordered,
    the amount ordered is not based on the defendant's financial
    ability to make restitution[.]"). Thus, a defendant's financial
    inability to make restitution was a foreseen circumstance, and
    the legislature determined that the amount of restitution ordered
    must not be based on the defendant's ability to make payment.6/
    In contrast, "[t]he court . . . shall consider the
    defendant's financial ability to make restitution for the purpose
    of establishing the time and manner of payment." HRS § 706-
    646(3). Here, at the June 3, 2009 sentencing hearing, Hueston
    stated that he did not "foresee a problem" in making minimum
    payments of $200 per month toward his restitution obligation
    after his release from prison. When Hueston filed the Petition
    in 2017, he stated that he was currently incarcerated and would
    remain incarcerated until the end of his maximum sentence on
    May 28, 2019. He did not allege unforeseen or changed
    circumstances or other injustice regarding the time or manner of
    payment of his restitution obligation after his release. Indeed,
    rather than seeking an alteration of the payment terms, i.e.,
    6/
    Accordingly, when the circuit court ordered restitution in 2009,
    it was not required to hold a hearing "to determine if the amount of
    restitution was an amount that [Hueston] could afford to pay."
    5
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER
    monthly installments of $200 commencing 60 days after his release
    from prison, Hueston sought revocation of restitution based on
    his asserted inability to pay the amount of $212,060.00.
    We conclude that Hueston's asserted inability to pay
    the amount of restitution did not constitute an unforeseen or
    changed circumstance or other injustice authorizing a revocation
    of restitution under HRS § 706-645. Because Hueston failed to
    establish a colorable claim for relief under HRS § 706-645, the
    circuit court did not err in denying the Petition without a
    hearing.
    III. Conclusion
    For the reasons discussed above, the "Order Denying
    [Hueston's] Petition for Revocation of Restitution Filed on
    August 24, 2017," entered on March 21, 2019, in the Circuit Court
    of the Fifth Circuit, is affirmed.
    DATED:   Honolulu, Hawai#i, April 30, 2021.
    On the briefs:
    /S/ Katherine G. Leonard
    Rosa Flores                           Presiding Judge
    (Greg Ryan and Associates)
    for Petitioner-Appellant.
    /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
    Tracy Murakami,                       Associate Judge
    Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
    County of Kauai,
    for Respondent-Appellee.              /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
    Associate Judge
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CAAP-19-0000353

Filed Date: 4/30/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/30/2021