State v. Jardine ( 2021 )


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  •   NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    22-JUN-2021
    07:51 AM
    Dkt. 37 SO
    NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    JOHN KEONI JARDINE, also known as JOHN KEONI JARDINE III
    and JOHN JARDINE III, Defendant-Appellee
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    (CR. NO. 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)
    SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
    (By:    Leonard, Presiding Judge, Hiraoka and Wadsworth, JJ.)
    Plaintiff-Appellant State of Hawai#i appeals from the
    "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting
    Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Felony Information Based Upon a
    Defective Charge, Filed 1/27/20" (Order) entered by the Circuit
    Court of the First Circuit on February 20, 2020.1 For the
    reasons explained below, we affirm the Order.
    Defendant-Appellee John Keoni Jardine (also known as
    John Keoni Jardine III and John Jardine III) was charged by
    felony information with assault in the second degree in violation
    of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-711(1)(a) and/or (1)(d).
    Jardine moved to dismiss the charge. The circuit court dismissed
    the charge without prejudice, concluding that the charge was
    defective because it failed to recite the statutory definitions
    1
    The Honorable Karen T. Nakasone presided.
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    of "substantial bodily injury" and "dangerous instrument." This
    appeal followed.
    "Whether a charge sets forth all the essential elements
    of a charged offense is a question of law, which [an appellate
    court] reviews under the de novo, or right/wrong, standard."
    State v. Kauhane, 145 Hawai#i 362, 369, 
    452 P.3d 359
    , 366 (2019)
    (cleaned up).
    "A charge's essential elements include conduct,
    attendant circumstances, and results of conduct." Kauhane, 145
    Hawai#i at 370, 452 P.3d at 367 (citing HRS § 702-205 (2014))
    (other citations omitted). "Where a statute sets forth with
    reasonable clarity all essential elements of the crime intended
    to be punished, and fully defines the offense in unmistakable
    terms readily comprehensible to persons of common understanding,
    a charge drawn in the language of the statute will be
    sufficient." Id. (cleaned up). However, where the statutory
    definition of an element of the crime "does not necessarily
    coincide with its common meaning[,]" State v. Baker, 146 Hawai#i
    299, 307, 
    463 P.3d 956
    , 964 (2020), the statutory definition must
    be included in the charge. State v. Pacquing, 139 Hawai#i 302,
    308, 
    389 P.3d 897
    , 903 (2016).
    Jardine was charged with violation of HRS § 707-
    711(1)(a) and/or (1)(d). HRS § 707-711 (2014 & Supp. 2018)
    provides, in relevant part:
    Assault in the second degree. (1) A person commits the
    offense of assault in the second degree if:
    (a)   The person intentionally, knowingly, or
    recklessly causes substantial bodily injury to
    another; [or]
    . . . .
    (d)   The person intentionally or knowingly causes
    bodily injury to another with a dangerous
    instrument[.]
    (Emphasis added.)
    2
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    The felony information charging Jardine stated:
    On or about August 25, 2019, in the City and County of
    Honolulu, State of Hawaii, JOHN KEONI JARDINE . . . did
    intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause substantial
    bodily injury to Paul Costa, and/or did intentionally or
    knowingly cause bodily injury to Paul Costa with a dangerous
    instrument, thereby committing the offense of Assault in the
    Second Degree, in violation of Section 707-711(l)(a) and/or
    Section 707-711 (l)(d) of the Hawaii Revised Statutes.
    (Emphasis added.)
    The issues presented by this appeal are whether the
    statutory definitions of "substantial bodily injury" and
    "dangerous instrument" coincide with the common meanings of those
    terms. Concerning "substantial bodily injury," the Oxford
    Learner's American English Dictionary contains the following
    definitions:
    substantial: large in amount, value, or importance2
    bodily: connected with the human body3
    injury: harm done to a person's or an animal's body4
    HRS § 707-700 (2014) provides, in relevant part:
    "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any
    impairment of physical condition.
    . . . .
    "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury which
    causes:
    (1)   A major avulsion, laceration, or penetration of
    the skin;
    (2)   A burn of at least second degree severity;
    2
    Substantial, Oxford Learner's Dictionaries,
    https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/substantial?q
    =substantial (last visited June 17, 2021).
    3
    Bodily, Oxford Learner's Dictionaries,
    https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/bodily_1?q=bo
    dily (last visited June 17, 2021).
    4
    Injury, Oxford Learner's Dictionaries,
    https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/injury?q=inju
    ry (last visited June 17, 2021).
    3
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    (3)   A bone fracture;
    (4)   A serious concussion; or
    (5)   A tearing, rupture, or corrosive damage to the
    esophagus, viscera, or other internal organs.
    The HRS § 707-700 definition of "substantial bodily injury" is
    limited to five specific types of bodily injury. The common
    meaning of "substantial bodily injury" could encompass more types
    of bodily injury than the five specified in the statute. Because
    the common meaning of "substantial bodily injury" is broader than
    the statutory definition, the charge against Jardine was
    defective. See, e.g., Kauhane, 145 Hawai#i at 371, 452 P.3d at
    368 (common meaning of "obstructs" was broader than defined term
    in Obstructing statute, HRS § 711-1105); Pacquing, 139 Hawai#i at
    308, 389 P.3d at 903 (common meaning of "confidential personal
    information" was broader than defined term in UPCPI statute,
    HRS § 708-839.55); State v. Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i 383, 394, 
    219 P.3d 1170
    , 1181 (2009) (common meaning of "operate" was broader
    than defined term in OVUII statute, HRS § 291E-61).
    Quoting State v. Mita, 124 Hawai#i 385, 
    245 P.3d 458
    (2010), the State argues that requiring inclusion of the
    statutory definition of "substantial bodily injury" "would render
    charges unduly complex, in contravention of the policy reflected
    in [Hawai#i Rules of Penal Procedure] Rule 7(d) that '[t]he
    charge shall be a plain, concise and definite statement of the
    essential facts constituting the offense charged.'" 
    Id. at 392,
    245 P.3d at 465
    . The supreme court has noted, however, that if
    the statutory definition of an element of an offense is complex
    or lengthy, the specific conduct, attendant circumstance, or
    result of conduct may be specified in a "to wit" clause of the
    charge. See Pacquing, 139 Hawai#i at 308, 389 P.3d at 903 ("The
    State should have included in the charge the statutory definition
    of 'confidential personal information' under HRS § 708-800 or at
    least specified in the charge the items of information that
    allegedly were unlawfully possessed.") (emphasis added).
    4
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    The State's argument lacks merit under the
    circumstances of this case. The charge against Jardine neither
    recited the statutory definition of "substantial bodily injury"
    nor specified what type of bodily injury Jardine allegedly
    inflicted upon the complaining witness. The circuit court did
    not err by dismissing the felony information without prejudice on
    that basis.
    In light of the foregoing, we need not reach the
    State's other arguments. We affirm the circuit court's Order
    entered on February 20, 2020.
    DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, June 22, 2021.
    On the briefs:
    /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
    Stephen K. Tsushima,                  Presiding Judge
    Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
    City and County of Honolulu,          /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
    for Plaintiff-Appellant.              Associate Judge
    Emmanuel G. Guerrero,                 /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
    for Defendant-Appellee.               Associate Judge
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CAAP-20-0000153

Filed Date: 6/22/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/22/2021