State v. Ballesteros ( 2021 )


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  •    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    28-JUN-2021
    08:19 AM
    Dkt. 49 SO
    NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    RUEL S. BALLESTEROS, Defendant-Appellant
    APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    (CASE NO. 1DTA-19-00511)
    SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
    (By:    Ginoza, Chief Judge, Wadsworth and Nakasone, JJ.)
    Defendant-Appellant Ruel S. Ballesteros (Ballesteros)
    appeals from the Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or Order and
    Plea/Judgment, entered June 22, 2020, in the District Court of
    the First Circuit, Honolulu Division (District Court).1
    Following a bench trial, the District Court found Ballesteros
    guilty of, inter alia, Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of
    an Intoxicant as a Third Offense Within Five Years (OVUII 3), in
    violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291E-61(a)(1),(b)(3)
    (Supp. 2016).2
    1
    The Honorable James C. McWhinnie presided.
    2
    HRS § 291E-61(a)(1),(b)(3) has since been revised; the version
    applicable at the time of the offense provided, in relevant part:
    (a) A person commits the offense of operating a
    vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant if the
    person operates or assumes actual physical control of
    a vehicle:
    (1) While under the influence of alcohol
    in an amount sufficient to impair the person's normal
    mental faculties or ability to care for the person and
    guard against casualty[.]
    (continued...)
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Ballesteros's sole point of error is that the District
    Court improperly relied on Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai#i's
    (State) Exhibits 4 through 8 in finding him guilty of OVUII 3,
    when the exhibits "had no relevan[ce] to the OVUII charge other
    than impermissible propensity evidence," and without that
    evidence, there was no substantial evidence to support the
    conviction. While he concedes Exhibits 4 through 8 were
    relevant, inter alia, to "confirm [his] prior convictions for
    OVUII for sentencing," he argues they could not be relied on to
    prove he drove while impaired, as such use would violate Hawai#i
    Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 404(b).3
    Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
    submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
    the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we
    affirm for the reasons set forth below.
    In State v. Ruggiero, the Hawai#i Supreme Court
    addressed a dispute over whether the aggravating factors in HRS §
    291E-61(b) are elements of the offense that must be charged and
    proven to a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt or are
    sentencing factors to be considered by the sentencing court. 114
    Hawai#i 227, 237-38, 
    160 P.3d 703
    , 713-14 (2007), abrogated on
    other grounds by Christian v. State, 131 Hawai#i 153, 158, 
    315 P.3d 779
    , 784 (App. 2013), overruled by Schwartz v. State, 136
    Hawai#i 258, 
    361 P.3d 1161
     (2015); see State v. Wagner, 139
    Hawai#i 475, 484, 
    394 P.3d 705
    , 714 (2017) (distinguishing
    2
    (...continued)
    . . . .
    (b) A person committing the offense of
    operating a vehicle under the influence of an
    intoxicant shall be sentenced without possibility of
    probation or suspension of sentence as follows:
    . . . .
    (3) For an offense that occurs within
    five years of two prior convictions for offenses under
    this section or section 291E-4(a) . . . .
    3
    HRE Rule 404(b) provides, in relevant part: "Evidence of other
    crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person
    in order to show action in conformity therewith."
    2
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Ruggiero, but recognizing its continued validity). The supreme
    court concluded that the aggravating factors in HRS § 291E-61(b)
    are not sentencing factors, and though not explicitly
    categorizing them as "elements," nonetheless found them to be
    "attendant circumstances that are intrinsic to and 'enmeshed' in
    the hierarchy of offenses that HRS § 291E–61 as a whole
    describes," and that due process therefore requires those factors
    to be alleged in the charging instrument and proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt at trial. Ruggiero, 114 Hawai#i at 238, 
    160 P.3d at 714
    . Therefore, the District Court did not err in
    considering evidence of Ballesteros's prior OVUII offenses in
    finding him guilty of the offense of OVUII 3, provided such
    evidence was only considered for the purpose prescribed in
    Ruggerio.
    As to Ballesteros's contention that the District Court
    improperly considered the prior offenses as impermissible
    propensity evidence that he drove while impaired, he points to
    nothing in the record supporting that conclusion other than that
    the District Court discussed the evidence of impairment and the
    evidence of prior OVUII offenses in the same paragraph of the
    trial transcript. In that same paragraph, however, the District
    Court made the finding that the State had "proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt the violation of HRS § 291E-61(a)(1)(b)(3)."
    (Emphasis added). Therefore, the District Court was also
    addressing in that paragraph the attendant circumstances
    applicable in this case. "[W]here a case is tried without a
    jury, it is presumed that the presiding judge will have
    disregarded the incompetent evidence and relied upon that which
    was competent." State v. Kiese, 126 Hawai#i 494, 507, 
    273 P.3d 1180
    , 1193 (2012) (citations and internal quotation marks
    omitted). "This means that when evidence is admissible for a
    limited purpose, we presume that the judge only considered the
    evidence for the permissible purpose." State v. Lioen, 106
    Hawai#i 123, 133, 
    102 P.3d 367
    , 377 (App. 2004). Because the
    evidence of prior OVUII offenses is admissible for limited
    purposes here, this court must presume it was only considered for
    3
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    those purposes. While the presumption is rebuttable, Ballesteros
    points to no evidence in the record to rebut it. See Kiese, 126
    Hawai#i at 507 n.7, 
    273 P.3d at
    1193 n.7.
    Finally, even if the District Court had improperly
    considered the prior OVUII offenses as propensity evidence, the
    conviction would nonetheless be supported by substantial
    evidence. The appellate court reviews a sufficiency-of-the-
    evidence challenge as follows:
    [E]vidence adduced in the trial court must be
    considered in the strongest light for the prosecution
    when the appellate court passes on the legal
    sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction.
    . . . . The test on appeal is not whether guilt is
    established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether
    there was substantial evidence to support the
    conclusion of the trier of fact . . . . "Substantial
    evidence" . . . is credible evidence which is of
    sufficient quality and probative value to enable a
    person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion.
    State v. Matavale, 115 Hawai#i 149, 157-58, 
    166 P.3d 322
    , 330-31
    (2007) (internal brackets omitted).
    Here, the State produced evidence that Ballesteros
    drove on the wrong side of the road and passed over a directional
    arrow which should have informed him he was driving in the wrong
    direction; when asked for his documents, Ballesteros had a "blank
    stare" and appeared nervous; he "continuously avoid[ed] eye
    contact," and Officer Janghoon Cho smelled a "moderate to strong"
    odor of alcohol coming from him when he spoke; he refused to
    participate in a Field Sobriety Test (FST)4; Officer Young Kim
    also smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from him and
    observed that his eyes were red and watery; while Ballesteros
    rode in the back of the police car, the odor of alcohol filled up
    the cabin and remained there after Ballesteros exited; and during
    processing, Ballesteros repeatedly said "he was sorry" and that
    he is "not a perfect person." Considered in the strongest light
    4
    Though not a factor cited by the District Court here, a
    defendant's refusal to take an FST may be used as substantial evidence to
    infer guilt of OVUII. See e.g., State v. Ferm, 94 Hawai#i 17, 29, 
    7 P.3d 193
    ,
    205 (App. 2000) (upholding OVUII conviction based, inter alia, on trial
    court's finding that the defendant's refusal to submit to FST was indicative
    of guilt).
    4
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    for the prosecution, we find there is substantial evidence in the
    record supporting Ballesteros's conviction.5 See 
    id.
    Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Notice of
    Entry of Judgment and/or Order and Plea/Judgment, entered June
    22, 2020, in the District Court of the First Circuit, Honolulu
    Division, is hereby affirmed.
    DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, June 28, 2021.
    On the briefs:                     /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
    Chief Judge
    Brian S. Kim
    (Park & Kim, LLLC)                 /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
    for Defendant-Appellant            Associate Judge
    Donn Fudo                                 /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
    Deputy Prosecuting Attorney               Associate Judge
    for Plaintiff-Appellee
    5
    We do not reach Ballesteros's argument that the traffic violation
    is attributable to the fact that he is not a U.S. citizen and "likely not
    wholly familiar with the area and traffic markings," as he failed to raise
    this argument to the District Court. See State v. Miyazaki, 
    64 Haw. 611
    , 616,
    
    645 P.2d 1340
    , 1344 (1982) ("[A]n issue not preserved at trial is deemed to be
    waived.").
    5