Nitta, M.D. v. Department of Human Services. ( 2022 )


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  •   FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    11-FEB-2022
    10:26 AM
    Dkt. 78 OP
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    ---o0o---
    FREDERICK NITTA, M.D., Appellant-Appellant, v.
    DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, STATE OF HAWAI#I,
    and CATHY BETTS, DIRECTOR,1 Appellees-Appellees
    NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    (CIVIL NO. 3CC16-1-0000297)
    FEBRUARY 11, 2022
    LEONARD, PRESIDING JUDGE, NAKASONE AND MCCULLEN, JJ.
    OPINION OF THE COURT BY MCCULLEN, J.
    This is a secondary appeal from an administrative
    proceeding regarding a physician's eligibility for enhanced
    payments through Medicaid's Primary Care Physician (PCP) Program.
    Appellant-Appellant Frederick Nitta, M.D. (Dr. Nitta) appeals
    from the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit's2 judgment and the
    underlying decision and order in favor of Appellee-Appellee
    1
    Pursuant to Hawaii Rules of Evidence Rule 201 and Hawai #i Rules of
    Appellate Procedure Rule 43(c)(1), we take judicial notice that Cathy Betts is
    the current Director of the Department of Human Services and she is
    automatically substituted as an Appellee-Appellee in place of Pankaj Bhanot.
    2
    The Honorable Greg K. Nakamura presided.
    FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Department of Human Services (DHS), State of Hawai#i.          On appeal,
    Dr. Nitta challenges the Circuit Court's finding that he was
    ineligible to participate in the PCP Program, thereby entitling
    DHS to monetary recoupment for Medicaid enhanced payments.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Medicaid provides medical assistance to qualifying
    individuals and families, and is jointly funded and administered
    by the federal and state governments.       
    42 U.S.C. § 1396-1
    .          In
    2010, Congress enacted the Affordable Care Act, which included a
    temporary increase in payments to particular physicians who
    provided primary-care services to Medicaid patients [hereinafter,
    Medicaid Enhanced Payment Statute] requiring:
    payment for primary care services (as defined in subsection
    (jj)) furnished in 2013 and 2014 by a physician with a
    primary specialty designation of family medicine, general
    internal medicine, or pediatric medicine at a rate of not
    less than 100 percent of the payment rate that applies to
    such services and physician under part B of subchapter XVIII
    (or, if greater, the payment rate that would be applicable
    under such part if the conversion factor under section
    1395w-4(d) of this title for the year involved were the
    conversion factor under such section for 2009)[.]
    42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(C) (emphasis added).
    At the federal level, the Centers for Medicare and
    Medicaid Services (CMS) administers the Medicaid program, and
    promulgated its rule relating to 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(C), the
    Final Medicaid Payment Rule.      
    42 C.F.R. § 447.400
    .      Requiring
    board certification or a sixty-percent billing threshold, CMS's
    Final Medicaid Payment Rule provided:
    (a) States pay for services furnished by a physician as
    defined in § 440.50 of this chapter, or under the personal
    supervision of a physician who self-attests to a specialty
    designation of family medicine, general internal medicine or
    pediatric medicine or a subspecialty recognized by the
    American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS), the American
    Board of Physician Specialties (ABPS) or the American
    Osteopathic Association (AOA). Such physician then attests
    that he/she:
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    FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    (1) Is Board Certified with such a specialty or
    subspecialty and/or
    (2) Has furnished evaluation and management services
    and vaccine administration services under codes
    described in paragraph (b) of this section that equal
    at least 60 percent of the Medicaid codes he or she
    has billed during the most recently completed CY or,
    for newly eligible physicians, the prior month.
    
    42 C.F.R. § 447.400
    (a).3
    At the state level, DHS, through its Med-QUEST
    division, is responsible for administering the Medicaid PCP
    Program in Hawai#i.       
    42 C.F.R. § 447.400
    .       DHS's online PCP
    Attestation Form relied on and tracked CMS's Final Medicaid
    Payment Rule as follows:
    Increases in reimbursement are limited to physicians who
    attest that they are either:
    1.    Practicing in the specialty of family medicine,
    general internal medicine, or pediatric medicine, or a
    subspecialty of one of these specialties recognized by
    the American Board of Medical Specialties, the
    American Osteopathic Association, or the American
    Board of Physician Specialties (refer to application
    form); and
    2.    a.     Are board certified in the eligible specialty in
    which they practice, or
    b.     Have billed at least 60% of Medicaid services
    provided, using the E&M vaccine administration
    codes list above, during calendar year 2012.
    For newly eligible physicians, the 60% billing
    requirement will apply to Medicaid claims for
    the prior month.
    Additionally, the instructions for DHS's Attestation Form stated
    that the "attestation may NOT be completed by anyone on the
    provider's behalf.        Attestations that are submitted by anyone
    3
    As a note, paragraph (c), not (b), list the applicable codes:
    Primary care services designated in the Healthcare Common
    Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) are as follows:
    (1) Evaluation and Management (E&M) codes 99201 through
    99499.
    (2) Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) vaccine
    administration codes 90460, 90461, 90471, 90472, 90473 and
    90474, or their successor codes.
    
    42 C.F.R. § 447.400
    (c).
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    FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    other than the individual provider named in the attestation
    constitutes a false claim for Medicaid reimbursement which may
    result in civil and criminal penalties . . . ."
    Dr. Nitta, a board certified Obstetrician-Gynecologist
    (OB-GYN) who has practiced as both an OB-GYN and a PCP for more
    than twenty years in Hilo, Hawai#i, enrolled in the PCP Program.
    Dr. Nitta testified that he treats his patients for any ailments,
    such as strokes and heart attacks, because his patients do not
    have other doctors.4      Dr. Nitta also testified, "I've been
    providing primary care in the Big Island, not because I wanted
    to, it's because the patients don't have doctors. . . .             I have
    no choice.    I have to do it."      He estimated that over 90 percent
    of his patients are eligible for Medicaid or Medicare.
    At the suggestion of an AlohaCare representative, a
    staff member from Dr. Nitta's office completed the online PCP
    Attestation Form on DHS's website.         Dr. Nitta, himself, was
    unaware he was participating in the program until he received
    DHS's July 7, 2015 letter notifying him that he was ineligible
    for the program.     In that letter, DHS informed Dr. Nitta that it
    found him ineligible because:        (1) "[p]ractice characteristics
    show [he was] not practicing in one of the designated specialties
    or sub-specialties[;]" (2) "Med-QUEST has no record that [he was]
    board certified in one of the designated specialties or sub-
    specialties[;]" and (3) "[a] review of claims history shows the
    4
    To that point, according to the amicus curiae brief filed by the
    Hawaii Medical Association and the American Medical Association, "it can be
    two to three times more difficult to find a primary care physician" on the
    island of Hawai#i, forcing residents to seek care at emergency rooms.
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    FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    designated codes . . . did not comprise at least 60% of all paid
    Medicaid claims billed to Med-QUEST."
    DHS subsequently demanded repayment in the amount of
    $205,940.13, prompting Dr. Nitta to request an administrative
    hearing.    Following the administrative hearing, the hearings
    officer found that Dr. Nitta (1) was not board certified in one
    of the specified specialties or recognized subspecialties,
    (2) was not known in the community as a PCP practicing in the
    specified specialties or recognized subspecialties, (3) did not
    self-attest, and (4) did not meet the sixty-percent billing
    threshold.    The hearings officer then concluded that DHS
    correctly determined Dr. Nitta "was not eligible to participate
    in the [PCP] Program as set forth in Title 42, Code of Federal
    Regulations §447.400," and that there was an overpayment of
    $205,220.86.
    Dr. Nitta filed exceptions and administratively
    appealed.    DHS's deputy director sustained the hearings officer's
    decision and adopted it as DHS's final decision.
    On appeal to the Circuit Court, Dr. Nitta attached to
    his opening brief the complaint in Averett v. U.S. Department of
    Health and Human Services, a case in the United States District
    Court, Middle District of Tennessee, filed by a group of
    Tennessee doctors.    In its answering brief, DHS asserted, among
    other things, that the plaintiffs in Averett were not similarly
    situated to Dr. Nitta and, thus, were distinguishable.
    Relying on the Medicaid Enhanced Payment Statute, CMS's
    Final Medicaid Payment Rule, and DHS's Self Attestation
    Instruction, the Circuit Court found that Dr. Nitta failed to
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    FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    self-attest that he satisfied the PCP Program's requirements, and
    Dr. Nitta was not board certified in one of the specialties.             In
    light of those findings, the Circuit Court concluded there was no
    need to reach the sixty-percent billing threshold issue.           The
    Circuit Court then found an overpayment of $205,338.88.
    Dr. Nitta filed a timely appeal with this Court.
    While this appeal was pending, the United States Court
    of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rendered its opinion in Averett
    v. United States Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs, 
    943 F.3d 313
    , 319
    (6th Cir. 2019), affirming the lower court's decision
    invalidating CMS's Final Medicaid Payment Rule.         Averett, 
    306 F. Supp. 3d 1005
    , 1020-21 (M.D. Tenn. 2018).         We ordered, and the
    parties filed, supplemental briefing as to the effect, if any,
    Averett has on this appeal.     Dr. Nitta argues that, based on
    Averett, he was entitled to enhanced payments.         DHS, however,
    avers that Averett supports its conclusion that Dr. Nitta was
    "never qualified for the program because he did not practice in a
    qualified specialty by his own self designation on his Medicaid
    provider application and his [National Provider Identifier]
    application."
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    This court must determine whether the circuit court was
    right or wrong in its decision, applying the standards set forth
    in Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 91-14(g) (2012) to the
    agency's decision.    HRS § 91-14(g) provides:
    Upon review of the record the court may affirm the
    decision of the agency or remand the case with instructions
    for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the
    decision and order if the substantial rights of the
    petitioners may have been prejudiced because the
    administrative findings, conclusions, decisions, or orders
    are:
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    FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    (1)   In violation of constitutional or statutory
    provisions; or
    (2)   In excess of the statutory authority or
    jurisdiction of the agency; or
    (3)   Made upon unlawful procedure; or
    (4)   Affected by other error of law; or
    (5)   Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
    probative, and substantial evidence on the whole
    record; or
    (6)   Arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by
    abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
    exercise of discretion.
    "Under HRS § 91-14(g), conclusions of law are reviewable under
    subsections (1), (2), and (4); questions regarding procedural
    defects under subsection (3); findings of fact under subsection
    (5); and an agency's exercise of discretion under subsection
    (6)."   United Pub. Workers, AFSCME, Local 646, AFL-CIO, v.
    Hanneman, 106 Hawai#i 359, 363, 
    105 P.3d 236
    , 240 (2005)
    (brackets in original omitted) (quoting Paul's Elec. Serv., Inc.
    v. Befitel, 104 Hawai#i 412, 416, 
    91 P.3d 494
    , 498 (2004)).
    III. DISCUSSION
    In this appeal, Dr. Nitta raises three points of error
    challenging the finding that he was disqualified from the PCP
    Program.   Dr. Nitta contends that:      (1) his staff completing the
    Attestation Form was a "mere technical defect;" (2) the statutory
    and regulatory framework was vague and ambiguous, the CMS
    regulations and guidance were arbitrary and capricious, and the
    DHS Attestation Form and Memoranda included misleading and
    incorrect statements; and (3) "the [sixty-percent] billing
    threshold and overpayment calculations were based upon redacted
    data that [he] was not able to fairly address."            Starting with
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    Dr. Nitta's challenge to the validity of CMS's Final Medicaid
    Payment Rule, we look to the federal courts for guidance.
    A.    CMS's Final Medicaid Payment Rule Was Invalid
    In Averett, the plaintiffs were twenty-one Tennessee
    physicians practicing family medicine, mostly in disadvantaged
    rural areas, who received increased payments in 2013 and 2014 for
    their participation in the Tennessee Medicaid program (TennCare).
    Averett, 306 F. Supp. 3d at 1011.     Each physician attested that
    he or she was eligible for enhanced payments under the Medicaid
    Enhanced Payment Statute and the Final Medicaid Payment Rule.
    Id.   None of the physicians were board certified, so they
    attested to having the required "primary specialty designation"
    based upon meeting the sixty-percent primary care services
    billing threshold.   Id.   Each physician was later audited and
    found to have not met the sixty-percent billing threshold.
    TennCare thus sought recoupment from the physicians.     Id.
    The Sixth Circuit first noted that Medicare and
    Medicaid providers were required to complete forms where they
    designated a primary specialty.    Averett, 943 F.3d at 315.   The
    Sixth Circuit then addressed whether CMS correctly "interpreted
    the phrase 'primary specialty designation' as used in § 1396a(a),
    to mandate not only that the physician have the requisite
    designation of primary specialty, but also that the physician
    either be board-certified in that specialty or satisfy the 60-
    percent-of-billings requirement."     Id. at 317.   In doing so, it
    compared the Medicare and Medicaid statutes.
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    Under Medicare, to be eligible for the enhanced
    payments, "a physician must have had a primary specialty
    designation of certain primary-care services (for example, family
    medicine or internal medicine)."       Id. at 315 (internal quotation
    marks omitted).   "The Medicare provision also required physicians
    to attest that primary-care services accounted for at least 60
    percent of their recent billings under Medicare."      Id. at 315-16
    (internal quotation marks omitted).      CMS "interpreted the phrase
    'a physician . . . who has a primary specialty designation' to
    refer simply to physicians who had enrolled in Medicare with a
    primary specialty designation of one of the specialties recited
    in § 1395l(x)(2)(A)(i)(I)," and per the Medicare statute, CMS's
    rule required a sixty-percent billing threshold.      Id. at 316
    (some internal quotation marks & brackets omitted).
    Under Medicaid, however, the statute "required a
    physician only to have a primary specialty designation of one of
    those same primary-care services . . . ."      Id. (internal
    quotation marks omitted).   But, CMS interpreted the phrase "a
    physician with a primary specialty designation" as requiring "the
    physician to show that (1) she was Board certified in that
    specialty or that (2) 60 percent of her recent Medicaid billings
    were for certain primary-care services . . . ."      Id.
    Employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
    the Sixth Circuit determined that the term "primary specialty"
    simply refers to "the physician's principal area of practice or
    expertise," and "designate" means "to indicate or specify; point
    out."   Id. at 317 (brackets omitted).     It then determined that
    Congress, in both the Medicare provision and Medicaid provision
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    of the Affordable Care Act, "used precisely the same term--
    'primary specialty designation'--in precisely the same context of
    providing a temporary bump in payments to primary-care
    providers."   Id.
    Turning to the sixty-percent billing threshold, the
    Sixth Circuit explained that "the actual content of the Final
    Medicaid Payment Rule only underscores its lack of any statutory
    basis," as Congress included a sixty-percent billing threshold in
    the Medicare Enhanced Payment Statute but chose to omit that
    requirement in the Medicaid Enhanced Payment Statute.    Id. at
    318.   And "[o]mitting a phrase from one statute that Congress has
    used in another statute with a similar purpose virtually commands
    the inference that the two statutes have different meanings."
    Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Prewett v. Weems,
    
    749 F.3d 454
    , 461 (6th Cir. 2014)).
    By enforcing the sixty-percent billing threshold
    requirement against Medicaid physicians in its Final Medicaid
    Payment Rule, the Sixth Circuit held that CMS "overlooked that,
    where a statute's language carries a plain meaning, the duty of
    an administrative agency is to follow its commands as written,
    not to supplant those commands with others it may prefer."
    Averett, 943 F.3d at 319 (citation, internal quotation marks, and
    brackets omitted); see also, e.g., Hadden v. United States, 
    661 F.3d 298
    , 303 (6th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the question
    whether "to treat Medicaid [physicians] differently from Medicare
    ones, is for Congress to decide").
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    In sum, the Sixth Circuit held that the phrase "a
    physician with a primary specialty designation" means "a
    physician who has himself designated, as his primary specialty,
    one of the specialties recited in those provisions," and that
    there was no sixty-percent billing threshold.    
    Id. at 319
    .   The
    Sixth Circuit further held that the Final Medicaid Payment Rule
    was "flatly inconsistent" with Congress' intent and, thus, was
    invalid. 
    Id.
    In addressing TennCare's argument that invalidating
    CMS's rule did not entitle the doctors to keep the enhanced
    payments, the Sixth Circuit stated, "this suit is not so much
    about whether these doctors are 'entitled to keep' monies paid to
    them years ago, as about whether the government is entitled to
    take those monies away."    Averett, 943 F.3d at 317.   "The
    payments at issue have been the plaintiff's property for years;
    the Tennessee Medicaid agency sought to deprive the plaintiffs of
    that property solely by means of enforcing the Final Medicaid
    Payment Rule[,]" which was deemed invalid.    Id.
    We find Averett particularly instructive and adopt the
    Sixth Circuit's analysis.    See In re Gardens at W. Maui Vacation
    Club v. Cty. of Maui, 90 Hawai#i 334, 343-44, 
    978 P.2d 772
    , 781-
    82 (1999) (applying the Sixth Circuit's analysis to determine
    whether county ordinance was unconstitutionally vague); State v.
    Lee, 
    75 Haw. 80
    , 103, 
    856 P.2d 1246
    , 1259 (1993) (adopting the
    federal courts' analyses to ascertain whether state law was void
    for vagueness).
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    B.   DHS's Attestation Form Was Invalid
    DHS's Attestation Form specifically relied on CMS's
    Final Medicaid Payment Rule stating, "Federal regulation 42 CFR
    447.400 requires that the physician must attest to practicing one
    of the designating specialities or subspecialties and must attest
    that s/he" is board certified or meets the sixty-percent billing
    threshold.   But, as the Sixth Circuit explained in Averett, the
    Medicaid Enhanced Payment Statute simply requires a physician to
    have a "primary specialty designation" in family, internal, or
    pediatric medicine.   Averett, 943 F.3d at 319; 42 U.S.C. §
    1396a(a)(13)(C).   And it is the "physician who has himself
    designated, as his primary specialty, one of the specialties
    recited in those provisions."    Averett, 943 F.3d at 319.
    Because DHS's Attestation Form, like CMS's Final
    Medicaid Payment Rule, conflicts with the Medicaid Enhanced
    Payment Statute, it too was invalid and cannot be the basis for
    which DHS may require repayment.      Camara v. Agsalud, 
    67 Haw. 212
    ,
    216, 
    685 P.2d 794
    , 797 (1984) (commenting that, in order for an
    agency's decision to be granted deference, it must be consistent
    with the legislative purpose).
    Since the Circuit Court relied on DHS's Attestation
    Form to determine that Dr. Nitta failed to self attest and relied
    on CMS's Final Medicaid Payment Rule to determine that Dr. Nitta
    was not board certified in one of the listed specialties, the
    Circuit Court's conclusion that Dr. Nitta was ineligible under
    the Medicaid Enhanced Payment Statute was likewise wrong.     See
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    Averett, 943 F.3d at 319.    Based on our disposition, we need not
    address Dr. Nitta's remaining points.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    The Circuit Court's May 19, 2017 judgment and the
    underlying April 12, 2017 decision and order is vacated.          The DHS
    Administrative Appeals Office's July 25, 2016 Final Decision on
    Administrative Appeal is also vacated, and this case is remanded
    to the DHS Administrative Appeals Office for further proceedings
    as may be necessary.
    On the briefs:                         /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
    Presiding Judge
    Eric A. Seitz
    Della A. Belatti                       /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
    Bronson Avila                          Associate Judge
    for Appellant-Appellant
    /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
    Heidi M. Rian                          Associate Judge
    Lili A. Young
    Deputy Attorneys General
    for Appellee-Appellee
    Department of Human Services,
    State of Hawai#i
    Jeffrey S. Portnoy
    (Cades Schutte)
    for Amicus Curiae
    Hawaii Medical Association and
    American Medical Association
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