State v. Womack ( 2015 )


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  •   NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    NO. CAAP-13-0004352
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    DANIEL WOMACK, Defendant-Appellee,
    v.
    EXODUS BAIL BOND,
    Real-Party-In-Interest-Appellant
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    (CR. NO. 09-1-0878)
    SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
    (By:     Fujise, Presiding Judge, Reifurth and Ginoza, JJ.)
    Real-Party-In-Interest-Appellant Exodus Bail Bond
    (Exodus) appeals from an "Order Denying Motion to Set-Aside Bail
    Forfeiture" (Order Denying Set Aside) filed on October 9, 2013 in
    the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (circuit court).1
    On appeal, Exodus contends the circuit court erred when
    it: (1) did not find "good cause" to set aside the bail
    forfeiture judgment because there was nearly a four year delay
    between Defendant-Appellee Daniel Womack's (Womack) failure to
    appear for trial call and the written notice given to Exodus of
    bail forfeiture; (2) refused to issue a subpoena to the military
    to release Womack's records; and (3) denied Exodus's request to
    1
    The Honorable Randal K.O. Lee presided.
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    enlarge the search period for a second time to locate Womack.2
    Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
    submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
    the arguments advanced and the issues raised, as well as relevant
    statutory and case law, we resolve Exodus's points of error as
    follows.
    Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai#i (State) charged
    Womack with: two counts of Assault in the Second Degree, in
    violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-711(1)(d)
    (2014); two counts of Terroristic Threatening in the First
    Degree, in violation HRS § 707-716(1)(e) (Supp. 2012); and
    Criminal Property Damage in the Third Degree, in violation of HRS
    § 708-822(1)(b) (2014). The court set bail for $15,000 and
    Exodus issued bail.
    On August 6, 2009, Womack failed to appear for trial
    call, after which the circuit court issued a bench warrant for
    his arrest and orally granted the State's request for bail
    forfeiture.
    On April 30, 2013, nearly four years after Womack
    failed to appear for trial call, the circuit court filed a
    "Judgment and Order of Forfeiture of Bail Bond" (Bail Forfeiture
    Judgment). On May 28, 2013, Exodus received written notice from
    the State of the Bail Forfeiture Judgment and timely filed its
    "Motion to Set-Aside Bail Forfeiture" (Motion to Set Aside) on
    June 20, 2013. Thereafter, on October 9, 2013, the circuit court
    issued its Order Denying Set Aside.
    2
    Exodus's Opening Brief does not comply with Hawai#i Rules of Appellate
    Procedure (HRAP) Rule 28 in several ways, which alone raises the potential for
    dismissal of the appeal and/or waiver of issues sought to be raised.
    Bettencourt v. Bettencourt, 80 Hawai#i 225, 230, 
    909 P.2d 553
    , 558 (1995).
    For example, the statement of the case does not include references to the
    record and two out of three points in the argument section of the brief do not
    include citations to authority. HRAP Rule 28(b)(3), (7). However, because we
    seek to address cases on the merits where possible, we address Exodus's
    arguments to the extent they are discernable. Bettencourt, 80 Hawai#i at 230,
    
    909 P.2d at 558
    . Exodus's counsel is again cautioned to comply with HRAP Rule
    28, and future non-compliance may result in sanctions. State v. Miles, 135
    Hawai#i 525, 526n.2, 
    354 P.3d 178
    , 179n.2 (App. 2015).
    2
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    (1)     Exodus's Motion to Set Aside Bail Forfeiture
    (a) "Good cause"
    Exodus contends that the circuit court erred when it
    did not find "good cause" to set aside the bail forfeiture,
    arguing that the nearly four-year delay between Womack's failure
    to appear and the written notice given to Exodus constituted good
    cause.
    Under HRS § 804-51 (2014),3 once a surety has notice of
    a bail forfeiture judgment, the surety has thirty days after
    notice to move to set aside the judgment for good cause. See
    State v. Diaz, 128 Hawai#i 215, 223, 
    286 P.3d 824
    , 832 (2012).
    "[G]ood cause why execution should not issue upon the judgment of
    forfeiture may be satisfied by the defendant, prior to the
    expiration of the thirty-day search period: (1) providing a
    satisfactory reason for his or her failure to appear when
    3
    HRS § 804-51 provides:
    § 804-51 Procedure. Whenever the court, in any
    criminal cause, forfeits any bond or recognizance given in a
    criminal cause, the court shall immediately enter up
    judgment in favor of the State and against the principal or
    principals and surety or sureties on the bond, jointly and
    severally, for the full amount of the penalty thereof, and
    shall cause execution to issue thereon immediately after the
    expiration of thirty days from the date that notice is given
    via personal service or certified mail, return receipt
    requested, to the surety or sureties on the bond, of the
    entry of the judgment in favor of the State, unless before
    the expiration of thirty days from the date that notice is
    given to the surety or sureties on the bond of the entry of
    the judgment in favor of the State, a motion or application
    of the principal or principals, surety or sureties, or any
    of them, showing good cause why execution should not issue
    upon the judgment, is filed with the court. If the motion or
    application, after a hearing held thereon, is sustained, the
    court shall vacate the judgment of forfeiture and, if the
    principal surrenders or is surrendered pursuant to section
    804-14 or section 804-41, return the bond or recognizance to
    the principal or surety, whoever shall have given it, less
    the amount of any cost, as established at the hearing,
    incurred by the State as a result of the nonappearance of
    the principal or other event on the basis of which the court
    forfeited the bond or recognizance. If the motion or
    application, after a hearing held thereon, is overruled,
    execution shall forthwith issue and shall not be stayed
    unless the order overruling the motion or application is
    appealed from as in the case of a final judgment.
    3
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    required; or (2) surrendering or being surrendered." State v.
    Camara, 81 Hawai#i 324, 330, 
    916 P.2d 1225
    , 1231 (1996)
    (quotation marks omitted). A satisfactory reason for failure to
    appear may be "uncontrollable circumstances [that] prevented
    appearance pursuant to the stipulations in the bond, or that the
    default of the principal was excusable." Id. at 330, 
    916 P.2d at 1231
     (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
    In this case, Exodus did not locate Womack during the
    search period. Exodus did not provide a satisfactory reason for
    why Womack failed to appear for trial call, and Womack was not
    surrendered. Thus, under relevant case law, Exodus did not
    satisfy the criteria for showing good cause to set aside the Bail
    Forfeiture Judgment.
    (b) Prejudicial effect
    Although Exodus argues that the delayed notification of
    bail forfeiture should constitute good cause, the delay is more
    properly addressed in terms of whether Exodus was prejudiced.
    In State v. Ranger Ins. Co. ex rel James Lindblad, Inc., 83
    Hawai#i 118, 
    925 P.2d 288
     (1996), the Hawai#i Supreme Court
    analyzed whether a delay of nearly three months between the
    circuit court's oral granting of the prosecution's motion for
    forfeiture of bail and the entry of a bail forfeiture judgment
    constituted reversible error. 
    Id.
     at 121-22 
    925 P.2d at 291-92
    .
    The supreme court stated that pursuant to HRS §§ 804-1, -7.4(2),
    -17, and -51 (1993):
    upon a defendant's unexcused failure to appear for a court
    proceeding, (1) the defendant's default shall be entered,
    (2) the default shall be evidence of the breach of an
    appearance bond, and (3) if the defendant's bail bond is
    forfeited, the court shall immediately enter a forfeiture
    judgment in favor of the State and against the defendant and
    his or her surety.
    Id. at 122, 
    925 P.2d at 292
     (internal quotation marks and
    brackets omitted). The supreme court concluded that "[h]aving
    orally granted the prosecution's motion for bail forfeiture, the
    circuit court should, sua sponte, 'immediately' have entered a
    forfeiture judgment." 
    Id.
     (emphasis added). Despite the fact
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    that the forfeiture judgment was not entered immediately in
    Ranger, the supreme court held that the surety was not prejudiced
    by the delay. 
    Id.
    The supreme court concluded that because the surety had
    actual notice of the defendant's failure to appear, the surety
    likely benefitted from the delay in entering the forfeiture
    judgment rather than being prejudiced by it. 
    Id.
     Therefore, the
    supreme court held "that the circuit court's 'delayed' entry of
    forfeiture judgment resulted in no prejudice to the [s]urety and
    did not render the judgment void or otherwise unlawful." 
    Id.
    In this case, the record is unclear and the circuit
    court did not make any findings as to whether Exodus had actual
    notice of Womack's failure to appear for trial call on August 6,
    2009, prior to the Bail Forfeiture Judgment being entered on
    April 30, 2013 and the written notice on May 28, 2013. The
    circuit court minutes indicate that at the trial call, Kevin
    O'Grady, Womack's attorney, stated that he "did not know where
    [Womack] was and he contacted [Exodus] and they also were not in
    contact with [Womack]." This indicates that Exodus may have had
    notice that Womack was missing and would not appear as required.
    However, the transcript from the trial call is not in the record,
    and the court minutes are not a substitute for the transcript
    because they "are merely prepared for the court's own use."
    State v. English, 
    68 Haw. 46
    , 52, 
    705 P.2d 12
    , 16 (1985)
    (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
    In light of Ranger, if Exodus had actual notice of
    Womack's failure to appear at the trial call in or around the
    same time period, Exodus was not prejudiced by the delay in
    entering the Bail Forfeiture Judgment. The record is not clear
    as to whether Exodus did in fact have such actual notice.
    Therefore, we conclude under Ranger that the case should be
    remanded for the circuit court to determine whether Exodus had
    actual notice of Womack's non-appearance in or around the time
    period of the trial call, and whether Exodus was prejudiced by
    the delayed entry of the Bail Forfeiture Judgment.
    5
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    (2)   Subpoena to the Military
    Exodus contends that the circuit court erred when it
    did not issue a subpoena to the military to release Womack's
    records to assist Exodus in determining Womack's whereabouts. In
    the first hearing on Exodus's Motion to Set Aside on June 25,
    2013, the circuit court denied Exodus's request for a subpoena on
    the basis that Exodus needed to first do its due diligence in
    contacting the military before the court would step in. At the
    second hearing held on September 24, 2013, Exodus could not
    provide any further information as to what efforts it had made to
    contact the military and obtain Womack's records.
    Based on this record, we conclude that the circuit
    court did not abuse its discretion in denying Exodus's request to
    subpoena Womack's military records.
    (3) Extension of search period
    Exodus contends that the circuit court erred when it
    denied Exodus's request to enlarge the search period.4 Based on
    Camara, Exodus was required to show good cause within the thirty-
    day search period. 81 Hawai#i at 330, 
    916 P.2d at 1231
    .
    Therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it
    denied Exodus's request to extend the time to locate Womack even
    further beyond the thirty-day search period.
    Therefore,
    IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the "Order Denying Motion to
    Set-Aside Bail Forfeiture," filed on October 9, 2013 in the
    Circuit Court of the First Circuit is affirmed to the extent that
    Exodus did not show "good cause" to set aside bail forfeiture.
    However, this case is remanded to the circuit court for further
    proceedings regarding whether Exodus was prejudiced by the
    4
    The circuit court had already continued the hearing on Exodus's Motion
    to Set Aside, allowing Exodus additional time to search for Womack.
    6
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    delayed entry of the Bail Forfeiture Judgment, consistent with
    this decision.
    DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, November 27, 2015.
    On the briefs:
    Anthony T. Fujii,
    for Real-Party-In-                         Presiding Judge
    Interest-Appellant.
    Stephen K. Tsushima,
    Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,               Associate Judge
    City and County of Honolulu,
    for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Associate Judge
    7