State v. Talo ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
24-MAY-2022
07:52 AM
Dkt. 96 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
LOGOVII TALO, Defendant-Appellee, and
JASON M. KRAMBERG, Real Party in Interest-Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CRIMINAL NO. 1PC161000667)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Leonard, Presiding J., Hiraoka, J.; and
Circuit Court Judge Ashford, in place of Ginoza, C.J.,
and Wadsworth, Nakasone and McCullen, JJ., all recused)
Real Party In Interest-Appellant Deputy Public Defender
Jason M. Kramberg (Kramberg) appeals from the August 14, 2020
Findings of Fact [(FOFs)], Conclusions of Law [(COLs)], and Order
of Sanction Against Jason Kramberg, Esq. (Sanction Order) entered
by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (Circuit Court).1
Kramberg raises a single point of error on appeal,
contending that the Circuit Court abused its discretion in
imposing sanctions against Kramberg; Kramberg challenges FOFs 2-
10 as clearly erroneous and COLs 2-4 as wrong.
1
The Honorable Karen T. Nakasone presided.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve
Kramberg's point of error as follows:
Kramberg argues that the Circuit Court abused its
discretion in invoking its inherent powers under Hawaii Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 603-21.9 (2016) to impose sanctions against
Kramberg where he did not act in "bad faith."
Pursuant to HRS § 603-21.9, the circuit court has the
power to, inter alia:
(6) To make and award such judgments, decrees, orders, and
mandates, issue such executions and other processes,
and do such other acts and take such other steps as
may be necessary to carry into full effect the powers
which are or shall be given to them by law or for the
promotion of justice in matters pending before them.
HRS § 603-21.9 "is a legislative restatement of the
inherent powers doctrine." Kaina v. Gellman, 119 Hawai#i 324,
331, 197 P.3d 776, 783 (App. 2008) (citations omitted). Courts
have "inherent power to curb abuses and promote a fair process."
Enos v. Pac. Transfer & Warehouse, Inc., 79 Hawai#i 452, 458, 903
P.2d 1273, 1279 (1995) (citation omitted). However, "a court's
inherent power, [] should be exercised with restraint and
discretion." Id. (citation omitted).
A circuit court invoking its powers to sanction an
attorney must: (1) identify the appropriate sanctioning
authority; and (2) set forth specific findings of perceived
misconduct, i.e., bad faith, with reasonable specificity. Id. 79
2
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Hawai#i at 459, 903 P.2d at 1280 ("[A]n order imposing sanctions
should set forth findings that describe, with reasonable
specificity, the perceived misconduct (such as harassment or bad
faith conduct), as well as the appropriate sanctioning
authority[.]"); see also Bank of Haw. v. Kunimoto, 91 Hawai#i
397, 389, 984 P.2d 1198, 1215 (1999) ("It is well settled that a
court may not invoke its inherent powers to sanction an attorney
without a specific finding of bad faith."). The record must
support a finding of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence.
Erum v. Llego, 147 Hawai#i 368, 393, 465 P.3d 815, 840 (2020);
Kunimoto, 91 Hawai#i at 390, 984 P.2d at 1216 (determining
circuit court's bad faith findings were supported by clear and
convincing evidence in the record).
The sanctioning order does not need to expressly use
the words "bad faith," but "the court must make findings
tantamount to a specific finding of bad faith, i.e., findings
that are sufficient to enable the appellate court to infer a
specific finding of bad faith by the circuit court." Sandomire
v. Brown, 144 Hawai#i 314, 331, 439 P.3d 266, 283 (App. 2019)
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
In analyzing the imposition of sanctions, the supreme
court reasoned that:
[s]anctions are not to be assessed without full and fair
consideration by the court. They often entail a fine which
may have more than a token effect upon an attorney's
resources. More importantly, they act as a symbolic
statement about the quality and integrity of an attorney's
work - a statement which may have tangible effect upon the
attorney's career.
3
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Enos, 79 Hawai#i at 458, 903 P.2d at 1279 (citation omitted). It
has been noted, however:
These concerns are balanced with our observation that
lawyers who know how to think but have not learned how
to behave are a menace and a liability to the
administration of justice. The necessity for civility
is relevant to lawyers because they are living
exemplars - and thus teachers - every day in every
case and in every court; and their worst conduct will
be emulated more readily than their best.
Id. (citation, brackets and ellipses omitted).
Kramberg first argues that the Circuit Court erred in
relying on the Guidelines of Professional Courtesy and Civility
for Hawai#i Lawyers (Guidelines) as a basis for imposing
sanctions although they are not mandatory rules of professional
conduct and are only offered as guidance. However, Kramberg
cites no legal authority prohibiting a court from citing the
Guidelines to support a particular proposition. We note that the
supreme court has previously cited to the Guidelines to support
propositions regarding sanctions. Erum, 147 Hawai#i at 393 n.46,
465 P.3d at 840 n.46. Although the Guidelines provide that they
should not be used as an independent basis for disciplinary
charges or claims of professional negligence, the Guidelines also
expressly provide that a court may reference them. See
Guidelines Preamble (2018).
Here, in COL 3, after citing the Hawai#i Rules of
Professional Conduct (HRPC), the Circuit Court referenced the
Guidelines using a "see also" reference, in support of its
4
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
conclusion that Kramberg's unprofessional conduct failed to
comport with ethical standards for arguments to a tribunal, and
behavior toward the court. We conclude that the Circuit Court
did not err in referencing the Guidelines in this manner.
Kramberg further argues that the Circuit Court abused
its discretion because he did not act in bad faith. More
specifically, Kramberg submits that he did not engage in
"opportunistic and unprofessional argument" by bringing up Talo's
health condition only after the Circuit Court began to sentence
Talo to prison.
However, conduct that violates the HRPC may constitute
bad faith and warrant the imposition of sanctions. See Kunimoto,
91 Hawai#i at 392, 984 P.2d at 1218 (determining conduct that
failed to comply with HRPC warranted sanctions). The Preamble of
the HRPC, which was cited by the Circuit Court, includes, inter
alia:
[5] . . . A lawyer should demonstrate respect for
the legal system and for those who serve it, including
judges. . .
. . . .
[9] In the nature of law practice, however,
conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all
difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a
lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system
and to the lawyer's own interest[.] . . . These principles
include the lawyer's obligation zealously to protect and
pursue a client's legitimate interests, within the bounds of
the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous, and
civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal
system.
5
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
HRPC Rule 3.1, which was also cited by the Circuit
Court, provides:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a
basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a
criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that
could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend
the proceeding as to require that every element of the case
be established.
At a June 18, 2020 resentencing hearing, Kramberg
interrupted the court in the middle of its ruling. Kramberg
interrupted the court after the court explained that probation
would not be "an adequate deterrent" and that the nature of the
probation violation in combination with the underlying conviction
favored a prison term. Kramberg then proceeded to argue that
sentencing Talo to prison was tantamount to sentencing him to
die; and when the court rejected his argument, Kramberg said that
the court's actions were outrageous, reiterated that the court
was sentencing the defendant to die, and persisted in arguing
with the judge. As reflected in the transcript of the June 18,
2020 hearing, and as set forth in FOF 2:
THE COURT: . . . So when I look at the underlying
offense of a violent assault in the second degree, combined
with the nature of this particular probation violation, the
court's finding is that this particular weighing does
militate in favor of a prison term.
. . . .
So for all of these reasons, it is the judgment and
sentence of this court that [Talo] be committed to the
custody --
MR. KRAMBERG: Excuse me, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- and care --
6
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
MR. KRAMBERG: Before you finish that sentence, I'm
not sure if I placed on the record about Mr. Talo's medical
condition in terms of he does suffer from gout, he is
overweight, and he does have a pre -- and diabetes .
So, essentially, by sentencing him to imprisonment
with the corona virus, Mr. Talo is at very high risk of
death if it is to enter our prison system. So I would ask
the court to also consider that as a factor in whether or
not Mr. Talo deserves to die for the alleged violation ,
which is not supported by any direct testimony.
THE COURT: You gotta stand when you talk, Mr.
Kramberg.[2] And, Mr. Kramberg, the court's sentence is
based on the court's considered -- you know, I take
exception to you saying that I am sentencing him to die,
which I am not.
MR. KRAMBERG: I respectfully disagree. The high
possibility that people die in prison based on his health
condition. So I would before -- I would ask that mittimus
be delayed. We do intend to appeal. He is already out on a
hundred thousand dollars bond. He's shown that he's
compliant. I would ask that the bond be allowed to continue
while we pursue an appeal in this case. Especially,
considering the fact at this time we're trying to reduce
populations of our prisons, especially the vulnerable
inmates with pre-existing health conditions.
THE COURT: Okay. You cut me off before I was gonna
finish the sentence.
MR. KRAMBERG: I apologize.
THE COURT: The judgment and sentence of this court
that [Talo] be committed to the custody and care of the
Director of the Department of Public Safety for a term of
imprisonment of five years and [Talo] to receive any credit
time served.
Defense has made additional argument regarding COVID-
19 and [Talo's] alleged medical condition. And you are
requesting delay of the mittimus?
MR. KRAMBERG: Yes, Your Honor.
. . . .
THE COURT: I don't know that I can do that, because I
think that if he's convicted of a fel -– if it's a felony
and the sentence is imprisonment, I don't know that the law
allows a stay pending appeal.
MR. KRAMBERG: I believe it does, Your Honor.
2
While the Circuit Court did not sanction Kramberg for failing to
rise to his feet before making this argument, this lack of decorum by an
experienced courtroom attorney, combined with his interruption of the court
midsentence, is palpably discourteous and disrespectful.
7
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
. . . .
THE COURT: And the court took a recess to look at the
bail statute, and I have done that. 804-4 talks about when
a defendant is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
Subsection (a)(2) says no bail shall be allowed
pending appeal of a felony conviction where a sentence of
imprisonment has been imposed.
MR. KRAMBERG: And it goes on. To read -– please
continue reading, Your Honor. There are certain exceptions
to that.
. . . .
THE COURT: I don't agree with you. I think -- I'm
looking at subsection (2), no bail shall be -- I mean, he
falls into subsection (2).
MR. KRAMBERG: And.
THE COURT: And it goes on to list additional
situations where no bail is allowed.
. . . .
MR. KRAMBERG: Essentially, what I'm saying is I would
like the mitt to be postponed so I can file a notice of
appeal and then be asking that bail be continued. . . .
THE COURT: The court's -– okay. My decision on your
request is based on my reading of 804-4 subsection (2), the
court interprets this statute to not allow bail in this
situation because the court has imposed a sentence of
imprisonment. So your request, Mr. Kramberg, is denied.
And --
MR. KRAMBERG: Would it -- would it then be in effect
if I file an appeal? Would -- would the court then find
that that exception applies?
THE COURT: I don't know that the defendant would meet
the criteria. Subsection (b), I don't think it applies. So
that's why I disagree with you, and I'm gonna impose -- I
mean, I'm gonna order the mittimus to issue forthwith and
I'm finding it does not apply.
MR. KRAMBERG: That's outrageous, Your Honor.
THE COURT: It is not outrageous. It's outrageous
that you tell me that I'm sentencing this defendant to --
MR. KRAMBERG: To prison.
THE COURT: -- to death.
MR. KRAMBERG: You are.
8
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
THE COURT: No, you said that I am sentencing him to
die. I am not. I am imposing a prison term in accordance
with the law.
. . . .
THE COURT: The court has ruled on the sentence and
I've explained the reasons where I came out on that
sentence. Okay? So you are free to take a -- take up an
appeal, whatever remedy your lawyer and you decide you want
to take. But I have ruled and I've made the sentence, and
I'm ordering mittimus to issue forthwith and [Talo] to get
credit for any time served.
MR. KRAMBERG: What -- what reason do we have to issue
the mittimus right away? Why can't it be delayed for me to
simply file a notice of appeal? What is the urgency? When
the court has already had Mr. Talo out since February?
THE COURT: Mr. Kramberg.
MR. KRAMBERG: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I've ruled. You file whatever you need to
file. I have ruled.
MR. KRAMBERG: I would just -- my point of arguing is
to --
THE COURT: I've heard your argument. You cannot keep
arguing with the Judge after the Judge has ruled.
(Some emphasis added).
Prior to sanctioning Kramberg, the Circuit Court issued
an order to show cause (OSC) why Kramberg should not be
sanctioned for his unprofessional conduct, giving him an
opportunity to file a written response, and directing him to
appear at a hearing to show why he should not be sanctioned. In
addition to noting his conduct at the June 18, 2020 resentencing
hearing, in the OSC, the Circuit Court took judicial notice of
prior instances in which the court issued OSCs to Kramberg for
unprofessional conduct, but took "no further action" on possible
sanctions after hearing Kramberg's apology and explanation, and
instead cautioned Kramberg.
9
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
At the August 5, 2020 hearing on the OSC, Kramberg did
apologize to the Circuit Court, but his primary arguments against
a sanction was that he expected the court to re-sentence Talo to
probation, not to prison, and he was frustrated. Kramberg argued
that he never "specifically said" the court was sentencing Talo
to die, minimizing the clear implication of his words and the
accusatory and unprofessional manner in which he used them.
Kramberg contended that his argument at the resentencing hearing
was not made in bad faith. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
Circuit Court orally imposed a $50 sanction against Kramberg.
The Sanction Order was issued thereafter. Kramberg challenges
the following FOFs and COLs:
2. At the probation revocation and resentencing in
the above-entitled case on 6/18/20, after the Court had
already found [Talo] committed a probation violation for
possessing a shotgun and ammunition in his bedroom,
[Kramberg] engaged in unprofessional conduct by making
disrespectful arguments, refusing to acknowledge the court's
ruling, and displaying disrespectful conduct toward the
court, as shown in the following record:
[Excerpts from the transcript of the June 18, 2020
resentencing hearing, quoted in part above.]
. . . .
3. Counsel's argument that the Court should
consider whether [Talo] "deserves to die for the alleged
violation" and that the court was sentencing [Talo] to
death, was offensive and disrespectful. (6/18/20 TR: 30-31,
37).
4. Counsel's argument that the Court was sentencing
[Talo] "to die", was disruptive and disrespectful, because
it had not been supported by any timely argument or evidence
regarding the COVID-19 pandemic, [Talo]'s health conditions
and/or risk of death, prior to the Court's imposition of the
sentence, but was rather sprung on the Court last-minute.
Counsel also interrupted the Court mid-sentence as the Court
attempted to impose a prison term.
5. This argument regarding whether [Talo] "deserves
to die for the alleged violation" was also disrespectful,
because it refused to acknowledge the Court's finding of
10
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
probation violation, which [Kramberg] was still
characterizing as an "alleged violation, which was not
supported by any direct testimony." (Id.: 30). The Court
had already found a probation violation supported by a
comprehensive evidentiary record, testimony by numerous
witnesses, and had made detailed findings regarding the
probation violation. (See id.: 10-14).
6. [Kramberg] further engaged in unprofessional and
disrespectful conduct towards a tribunal, by persisting in
arguing with the Court after the Court had already imposed
sentence and denied the request to stay the mittimus, and by
declaring that the Court's ruling was "outrageous."
(6/18/20 TR: 31-39).
7. [Kramberg]'s prior 2019 OSC in the Liftee case
referenced supra, is an aggravating factor militating in
favor of sanctions. In the Liftee case, [Kramberg] engaged
in gamesmanship by making a last-ditch motion for fitness
examination without a good-faith basis. [Kramberg] said his
motion for a fitness examination was contingent upon whether
this Court would impose a prison term, yet he simultaneously
argued that he would be withdrawing the motion for fitness
examination if this Court imposed a probation term instead
of prison. (See 8/15/19 TR at 4-7, attached as Exhibit "A"
in the 2019 OSC). [Kramberg] lacked a good-faith basis to
request a fitness examination unde HRS § 704-404. Avoidance
of a prison term was not a good-faith basis to move for a
fitness examination.
8. At the 12/12/19 hearing on the 2019 OSC, this
Court issued a caution to [Kramberg] in open court, instead
of a sanction, and took "No Further Action", after
consideration of [Kramberg]'s written response and
presentation at the hearing.
9. The record in this establishes a similar pattern
to that in the 2019 OSC, of [Kramberg]'s unscrupulous resort
to unprofessional argument and/or questionable tactics, to
avoid a prison sentence for a client.
10. In light of this Court's leniency shown to
[Kramberg] at the 2019 OSC, and a similar pattern of conduct
occurring again in the current OSC proceeding, sanctions are
now warranted for this repeated conduct.
. . . .
[COL] 2. The unprofessional conduct in the findings
described above, undermines this Court's judicial power and
authority to administer and promote justice. See HRS § 603-
21.9.
3. The unprofessional conduct supra, also fails to
comport with ethical standards for arguments to a tribunal,
and behavior toward the court. See Hawai#i Rules of
Professional Conduct (HRPC) Rule 3.1 . . . ; HRPC Preamble
paragraph 5 . . .; HRPC Preamble paragraph 9 . . .; see also
Guidelines of Professional Courtesy and Civility for Hawai #i
Lawyers, SCRU-17-651, Section 12(b) . . . .
11
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
4. This Court concludes that a monetary sanction is
appropriate, and imposes a $50.00 sanction on [Kramberg]. A
low sanction amount was imposed, solely out of consideration
of the nature of [Kramberg]'s public service employment, and
is not reflective of the seriousness of [Kramberg]'s
conduct, for which a more substantial sanction would
otherwise be appropriate.
(footnotes omitted).
We conclude that the Circuit Court's FOFs are supported
by the record of these proceedings and are not clearly erroneous.
We reject Kramberg's argument that the prior instances in which
the Circuit Court issued OSCs to Kramberg should not have been
considered because they involved "dilatory conduct," rather than
the type of conduct at issue here. See generally Off. of
Disciplinary Couns. v. Breiner, 89 Hawai#i 167, 174-76, 969 P.2d
1285, 1292-94 (1999) (suspending attorney's license for making
argumentative and disrespectful comments to the court). In
addition, we conclude that the Circuit Court's FOFs are
tantamount to a finding of bad faith, and are sufficient to
support the imposition of a sanction. See Kunimoto, 91 Hawai#i
at 392, 984 P.2d at 1218; Sandomire, 144 Hawai#i at 331, 439 P.3d
at 283. Finally, we conclude that the Circuit Court's COLs are
supported by the court's FOFs and reflect an application of the
correct rule of law.
12
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
For these reasons, the Circuit Court's August 14, 2020
Sanction Order is affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, May 24, 2022.
On the briefs: /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Presiding Judge
Jon N. Ikenaga,
Deputy Public Defender, /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
for Real Party In Interest- Associate Judge
Appellant.
/s/ James H. Ashford
Patricia Ohara, Circuit Court Judge
Robyn B. Chun,
Lori N. Tanigawa,
Deputy Attorneys General,
for The Honorable Karen T. Nakasone.
13