Gao v. Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board ( 2022 )


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  •   NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    08-SEP-2022
    08:09 AM
    Dkt. 66 SO
    NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    GENBAO GAO, Claimant-Appellant,
    v.
    LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS APPEALS BOARD,
    STATE OF HAWAI#I, Agency-Appellee,
    and
    STATE OF HAWAI#I, DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY
    GENERAL, Employer-Appellee
    APPEAL FROM THE LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS APPEALS BOARD
    (CASE NO. AB 2009-020(S))
    SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
    (By:   Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, Nakasone and McCullen, JJ.)
    Self-represented Claimant-Appellant Genbao Gao appeals
    from: (1) the "Order Denying Motion to Award Attorney's Fees"
    entered by Agency-Appellee Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals
    Board (LIRAB) on April 25, 2018; and (2) the "Order Denying
    Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reopening" entered by LIRAB on
    June 6, 2018. It appears that LIRAB did not explain the factual
    or legal bases for its decisions. We vacate both orders and
    remand to LIRAB for entry of amended orders explaining the
    factual and legal bases for its decisions.
    The factual and procedural background for this appeal
    comes from Gao v. Haw. Lab. Rels. Bd., No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 
    2013 WL 656787
     (Haw. App. Feb. 22, 2013) (SDO) (Gao I); Gao v. Dep't
    of Att'y Gen., No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 
    2013 WL 3863101
     (Haw. App.
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    July 22, 2013) (SDO), cert. rejected, SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX, 
    2013 WL 5809980
     (Haw. Oct. 28, 2013) (Gao II); and Gao v. Dep't of Att'y
    Gen., No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 
    2015 WL 1880738
     (Haw. App. April 23,
    2015) (SDO) (Gao III), vacated by Gao v. Dep't of Att'y Gen., 137
    Hawai#i 450, 
    375 P.3d 229
     (2016) (Gao IV).
    Gao worked for Employer-Appellee State of Hawai#i
    Department of the Attorney General. He received a written
    reprimand on October 9, 2007; a 30-day suspension without pay on
    December 10, 2007; and a "Notice to Improve Performance" (NTIP)
    during a meeting on January 28, 2008.
    Gao's employment was terminated on January 20, 2009.
    He filed a prohibited practice complaint with the Hawai#i Labor
    Relations Board (HLRB). HLRB dismissed the complaint as
    untimely. Gao appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court
    affirmed, and denied Gao's motions for reconsideration and for a
    new trial. Gao appealed to this court. We affirmed in Gao I.
    Gao did not petition for certiorari.
    Gao also brought three grievances against the State,
    with the aid of his union. The grievances were arbitrated. The
    arbitrator issued a decision in favor of the State on all three
    grievances. Gao appealed to the circuit court. The circuit
    court dismissed the appeal. Gao appealed to this court. We
    affirmed in Gao II. The supreme court rejected Gao's petition
    for certiorari.
    Gao also made a claim for workers compensation benefits
    for psychological injury based on the NTIP. The Disability
    Compensation Division (DCD) denied the claim. Gao appealed to
    LIRAB. LIRAB affirmed the denial. Gao appealed to this court.
    We affirmed in Gao III. The supreme court granted Gao's petition
    for certiorari (Gao was represented by counsel from the Hawai#i
    Appellate Pro Bono Program). The supreme court held that the
    NTIP was not a "disciplinary action" as defined and used in HRS
    §§ 386–1 and 386–3 and, accordingly, that Gao's workers
    compensation claim was not barred by HRS § 386–3(c). Gao IV, 137
    2
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Hawai#i at 452, 
    375 P.3d at 231
    . The supreme court remanded the
    case to LIRAB for further proceedings.
    Gao retained counsel for the remand. LIRAB issued a
    pretrial order framing the issue presented:
    Whether [Gao] sustained a personal psychological injury on
    January 28, 2008, arising out of and in the course of
    employment.
    The State ultimately conceded that Gao "sustained a personal
    psychological injury on January 28, 2008, arising out of [his]
    employment, which was caused in part by the issuance of the
    Notice to Improve Performance (NTIP)[.]" The State reserved its
    "right to challenge the extent and degree of injury" and
    "limitations on the benefits" should Gao pursue [those] issues in
    another forum.1
    On March 16, 2018, LIRAB vacated its previous order
    affirming the DCD's denial of benefits and dismissed Gao's appeal
    as moot based upon the State's concession of liability. Gao did
    not appeal from that order.
    On March 22, 2018, Gao's counsel requested approval of
    his attorney fees and costs pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes
    (HRS) § 386-94 (2015).2 The request stated: "It is requested
    1
    The record does not indicate whether Gao's DCD claim was re-
    opened.
    2
    HRS § 386-94 provides, in relevant part:
    Attorneys, physicians, other health care providers, and
    other fees. Claims for services shall not be valid unless
    approved by the director or, if an appeal is had, by the
    appellate board or court deciding the appeal. Any claim so
    approved shall be a lien upon the compensation in the manner
    and to the extent fixed by the director, the appellate
    board, or the court.
    In approving fee requests, the director, appeals
    board, or court may consider factors such as the attorney's
    skill and experience in state workers' compensation matters,
    the amount of time and effort required by the complexity of
    the case, the novelty and difficulty of issues involved, the
    amount of fees awarded in similar cases, benefits obtained
    for the claimant, and the hourly rate customarily awarded
    attorneys possessing similar skills and experience. In all
    (continued...)
    3
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    that the award be against [the State]; to the extent the fees are
    not awarded against [the State], that [Gao] be responsible."
    LIRAB approved the fees and costs. The approved sum was made a
    lien upon any compensation payable by the State; otherwise, Gao
    was responsible for payment of the approved amount.
    On March 23, 2018, Gao (through counsel) filed a motion
    for award of attorneys fees from the State under HRS § 386-93(a).
    LIRAB entered the Order Denying Motion to Award Attorney's Fees
    on April 25, 2018. Gao filed a motion for reconsideration on
    May 23, 2018. LIRAB entered the Order Denying Motion for
    Reconsideration and/or Reopening on June 6, 2018. Gao's counsel
    withdrew on June 18, 2018. Gao — again self-represented — filed
    a notice of appeal on June 29, 2018, creating this appeal.3
    "Appellate review of a LIRAB decision is governed by
    HRS § 91-14(g)[.]" Botelho v. Atlas Recycling Ctr., 146 Hawai#i
    435, 442, 
    463 P.3d 1092
    , 1099 (2020). HRS § 91–14(g) (2012 &
    Supp. 2016) provides:
    Upon review of the record, the court may affirm the
    decision of the agency or remand the case with
    instructions for further proceedings; or it may
    reverse or modify the decision and order if the
    substantial rights of the petitioners may have been
    prejudiced because the administrative findings,
    conclusions, decisions, or orders are:
    (1)   In violation of constitutional or statutory
    provisions;
    (2)   In excess of the statutory authority or
    jurisdiction of the agency;
    (3)   Made upon unlawful procedure;
    (4)   Affected by other error of law;
    2
    (...continued)
    cases, reasonable attorney's fees shall be awarded.
    3
    Gao's opening brief fails to comply with Hawai#i Rules of
    Appellate Procedure Rule 28(b). Nevertheless, the Hawai#i Supreme Court
    instructs that to promote access to justice, pleadings prepared by self-
    represented litigants should be interpreted liberally, and self-represented
    litigants should not automatically be foreclosed from appellate review because
    they fail to comply with court rules. Erum v. Llego, 147 Hawai#i 368, 380-81,
    
    465 P.3d 815
    , 827-28 (2020).
    4
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    (5)   Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
    probative, and substantial evidence on the whole
    record; or
    (6)   Arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by
    abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
    exercise of discretion.
    Under HRS § 91-14(g):
    A court reviewing the decision of an agency should
    ensure that the agency make[s] its findings reasonably
    clear. The parties and the court should not be left to
    guess the precise finding of the agency. An agency's
    findings should be sufficient to allow the reviewing court
    to track the steps by which the agency reached its decision.
    In re Hawai#i Elec. Light Co., 145 Hawai#i 1, 11, 
    445 P.3d 673
    ,
    683 (2019) (cleaned up).
    The statute under which Gao sought attorneys fees
    provides, in relevant part:
    If the . . . appellate board . . . finds that proceedings
    under this chapter have been . . . defended without
    reasonable ground, the whole costs of the proceedings
    including reasonable attorney's fees may be assessed against
    the party who has . . . defended the proceedings.
    HRS § 386-93(a) (2015). Based upon the language of the statute,
    LIRAB's denial of Gao's motion appears to indicate that LIRAB
    found the State reasonably defended the remand. However, the
    Order Denying Motion to Award Attorney's Fees summarily denied
    the motion without explanation, and LIRAB did not enter findings
    of fact. We are unable to determine whether LIRAB's decision was
    clearly erroneous, right, wrong, or an abuse of discretion. See
    Botelho, 146 Hawai#i at 451, 463 P.3d at 1108 (stating that LIRAB
    must provide reasoning for how it awarded attorneys' fees that is
    more than a recitation of the statutory factors considered, and
    "must articulate how its considerations affected its ultimate
    determination of attorneys' fees"); see also In re Haw. Elec.
    Light Co., 145 Hawai#i at 11, 445 P.3d at 683.
    Accordingly, we vacate the "Order Denying Motion to
    Award Attorney's Fees" entered on April 25, 2018, and the "Order
    Denying Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reopening" entered on
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    June 6, 2018, and remand for LIRAB to enter amended orders
    explaining the factual and legal bases for its decisions. See
    Botelho, 146 Hawai#i at 451, 463 P.3d at 1108 (vacating
    attorney's fees order and remanding for further proceedings
    because "LIRAB recited factors it considered in reducing Masui's
    requested attorney's fees without explaining how it applied these
    factors[.]").
    DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, September 8, 2022.
    On the briefs:
    /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
    Genbao Gao,                           Presiding Judge
    Self-represented
    Claimant-Appellant.                   /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
    Associate Judge
    James E. Halvorson,
    Maria C. Cook,                        /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
    Deputy Attorneys General,             Associate Judge
    Department of the Attorney
    General, State of Hawai#i.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CAAP-18-0000530

Filed Date: 9/8/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/8/2022