State v. Tengan ( 2022 )


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  •   NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    24-JUN-2022
    08:30 AM
    Dkt. 48 SO
    NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
    JASON F. TENGAN, Defendant-Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    WAILUKU DIVISION
    (CASE NO. 2DTA-20-00442)
    SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
    (By:     Leonard, Presiding Judge, Wadsworth and McCullen, JJ.)
    Defendant-Appellant Jason F. Tengan (Tengan) appeals
    from the District Court of the Second Circuit, Wailuku Division's
    (district court) December 9, 2020 Judgment and Notice of Entry of
    Judgment.1
    On appeal, Tengan contends the district court erred by
    denying his Motion to Suppress because there was no reasonable
    suspicion to stop his vehicle.
    Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
    submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
    the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve Tengan's
    point of error as follows, and affirm.
    1
    The Honorable Douglas J. Sameshima presided.
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    The State charged Tengan with (1) Operating a Vehicle
    Under the Influence of an Intoxicant (OVUII), in violation of
    Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291E-61(a)(1), and/or 291E-
    61(a)(3) (Supp. 2019),2 (2) Inattention to Driving, in violation
    of HRS § 291-12 (Supp. 2019),3 and (3) Accidents Involving Damage
    to Vehicle or Property, in violation of HRS § 291C-13 (Supp.
    2019).4    After entering into a conditional guilty plea and
    reserving his right to appeal, Tengan was convicted of OVUII and
    Operating Generally, in violation of Maui Traffic Code (MTC)
    § 10.52.010.5
    2
    HRS § 291E-61 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
    (a) A person commits the offense of operating a
    vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant if the person
    operates or assumes actual physical control of a vehicle:
    (1)   While under the influence of alcohol in an
    amount sufficient to impair the person's normal
    mental faculties or ability to care for the
    person and guard against casualty;
    . . . .
    (3)   With .08 or more grams of alcohol per two
    hundred ten liters of breath[.]
    3
    HRS § 291-12, Inattention to Driving, provides as follows:
    Whoever operates any vehicle negligently as to cause a
    collision with, or injury or damage to, as the case may be,
    any person, vehicle or other property shall be fined not
    more than $500 or imprisoned not more than thirty days, or
    both, and may be subject to a surcharge of up to $100, which
    shall be deposited into the trauma system special fund.
    4
    HRS § 291C-13, Accidents Involving Damage to Vehicle or Property,
    provides as follows:
    The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting
    only in damage to a vehicle or other property that is driven
    or attended by any person shall immediately stop such
    vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close thereto as
    possible, but shall forthwith return to, and in every event
    shall remain at, the scene of the accident until the driver
    has fulfilled the requirements of section 291C-14. Every
    stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is
    necessary.
    5
    As part of the Maui County Code, MTC § 10.52.010, Operation
    Generally, provides that "[e]very operator of a motor vehicle shall exercise
    (continued...)
    2
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Tengan claims there was no reasonable suspicion to stop
    his vehicle because Maui Police Department Officer Caleb
    Guariello (Officer Guariello) "did not receive information from
    [the complaining witness] that Tengan violated any offense,
    criminal or otherwise.      Similarly, prior to pulling Tengan's
    vehicle over, the officer did not observe Tengan commit any
    violations."    Tengan, thus, argues that "Officer Guariello did
    not have objective specific and articulable facts to support the
    stop."
    The Hawai#i Supreme Court "has held that a stop of a
    vehicle for an investigatory purpose constitutes a seizure within
    the meaning of the constitutional protection against unreasonable
    searches and seizures."       State v. Heapy, 113 Hawai#i 283, 290,
    
    151 P.3d 764
    , 771 (2007) (citation, internal quotation marks, and
    brackets omitted).      A "narrowly defined exception to the warrant
    requirement is that a police officer may stop an automobile and
    detain its occupants if that officer has a reasonable suspicion
    that the person stopped was engaged in criminal conduct."              
    Id.
    (citation, internal quotation marks, emphasis, and ellipsis
    omitted).
    But, "the police officer must be able to point to
    specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
    rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
    intrusion."    Id. at 291, 
    151 P.3d at 772
     (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted).       "The totality of the circumstances
    5
    (...continued)
    due care in the operation of such vehicle upon any highway in order to avoid
    colliding with any vehicle, pedestrian, other object, or embankment on or off
    the roadway."
    3
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    measured by an objective standard, must indicate that criminal
    activity is afoot."   Id. at 292, 
    151 P.3d at 773
     (citation and
    emphasis omitted).
    Reasonable suspicion does not require an officer to
    prove every element of a crime was committed.     United States v.
    Blessinger, 
    752 F. App'x 765
    , 770 (11th Cir. 2018) ("[R]easonable
    suspicion does not require proof that every element of the
    offense has been met."); State v. Sisson, 
    417 P.3d 268
    ,
    No. 117,198, 
    2018 WL 2072802
     at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. May 4, 2018)
    (MO) (explaining that the state does not need to prove every
    element of the crime, only show officer reasonably believed the
    crime had been or was being committed based on totality of
    circumstances); Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Axt, 
    292 S.W.3d 736
    , 739 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) ("The state is not required to show
    an offense was actually committed or to prove every element of a
    specific offense" for reasonable suspicion).
    Here, Officer Guariello testified he heard over the
    radio there was a motor vehicle accident at Jack in the Box at
    700 Lower Main and proceeded to that location.     The complaining
    witness waived him down and informed him that the car that hit
    her left the scene going up Lower Main towards Waena.      She also
    provided a description of the car, a white sedan like a Crown
    Victoria with the license plate "LET 480."
    Officer Guariello left the scene, and located a white
    car around the intersection of Lower Main and Waena.      After
    confirming that the license plate matched, Officer Guariello
    stopped the car and identified Tengan as the driver.
    4
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    With information from the complaining witness, Officer
    Guariello had specific and articulable facts that constituted
    reasonable suspicion to stop Tengan.      Officer Guariello knew a
    motor vehicle accident was reported, he knew the description and
    license plate number of the car that left the scene of the
    accident, and he knew the direction in which the responsible car
    drove.   Officer Guariello located a car matching the description
    and license plate number in the location described by the
    complaining witness.    Under these circumstances, Officer
    Guariello had specific and articulable facts that, taken together
    with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted
    stopping Tengan.
    Officer Guariello need not have been told there was
    actual damage, or seen the damage himself under the circumstances
    of this case.    Notably, Inattentive Driving and Operation
    Generally do not require damage to a vehicle.      Nonetheless, the
    information Officer Guariello obtained from the complaining
    witness was specific enough to warrant a traffic stop.         Thus, the
    district court did not err by denying the Motion to Suppress.
    Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court's
    December 9, 2020 Judgment and Notice of Entry of Judgment.
    DATED:    Honolulu, Hawai#i, June 24, 2022.
    On the briefs:                        /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
    Presiding Judge
    Taryn R. Tomasa,
    Deputy Public Defender,               /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
    for Defendant-Appellant.              Associate Judge
    Mark R. Simonds,                      /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
    Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,          Associate Judge
    County of Maui,
    for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CAAP-20-0000759

Filed Date: 6/24/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/24/2022