Guyer v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC ( 2022 )


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  •   NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    30-NOV-2022
    10:08 AM
    Dkt. 49 SO
    NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    NELSON BARRY GUYER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC; FEDERAL NATIONAL
    MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, Defendants-Appellees,
    and
    DOE DEFENDANTS 1-50, Defendants
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    (CIVIL NO. 16-1-0631(1))
    SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
    (By:    Ginoza, Chief Judge, Leonard and McCullen, JJ.)
    In an appeal arising out of an action for return of
    title and possession and wrongful foreclosure, concerning the
    nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the leasehold interest in an
    apartment, Plaintiff-Appellant Nelson Barry Guyer (Guyer) appeals
    from the (1) "Final Judgment" entered on March 21, 2018 and (2)
    "Order Granting Defendants Nationstar Mortgage LLC's and Federal
    National Mortgage Association's Motion for Summary Judgment"
    entered November 1, 2017 (Order Granting MSJ), entered by the
    Circuit Court of the Second Circuit (Circuit Court).1
    On appeal, Guyer asserts the Circuit Court erroneously
    granted summary judgment for Defendants-Appellees Nationstar
    1
    The Honorable Rhonda I.L. Loo presided.
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) and Federal National Mortgage
    Association (Fannie Mae): 1) by concluding the wrongful
    foreclosure claim was barred by either the two-year statute of
    limitations under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 657-7 (2016)2
    or the six-year statute of limitations under HRS § 657-1(4)
    (2016);3 2) by concluding that the time for Guyer to file the
    wrongful foreclosure claim was triggered on September 28, 2010
    or, at the latest, on November 29, 2010; and 3) because a twenty-
    year statute of limitations under HRS § 657-31 (2016)4 applied to
    his claim to recover possession of the property at issue or
    equitable damages.
    I. Brief Background
    After Guyer was assigned a leasehold interest in an
    apartment located in Lahaina, Maui (Property), he executed a note
    and mortgage (Mortgage) in connection with the Property, granting
    the mortgagee a power of sale.         The Mortgage was later assigned
    to Nationstar. In 2010, Nationstar exercised its power of sale
    and purchased the Property at public auction. The parties do not
    dispute that on March 30, 2011, Nationstar assigned the leasehold
    interest in the Property to Fannie Mae, and that nearly a year
    later, Fannie Mae assigned the leasehold interest to Travis
    Bontorin (Bontorin).
    2
    HRS § 657-7 provides that: "[a]ctions for the recovery of
    compensation for damage or injury to persons or property shall be instituted
    within two years after the cause of action accrued, and not after, except as
    provided in section 657-13."
    3
    HRS § 657-1 provides, in pertinent part:
    § 657-1 Six years. The following actions shall be commenced within
    six years next after the cause of action accrued, and not after:
    . . . .
    (4) Personal actions of any nature whatsoever not specifically
    covered by the laws of the State.
    4
    HRS § 657-31 provides: "No person shall commence an action to recover
    possession of any lands, or make any entry thereon, unless within twenty years
    after the right to bring the action first accrued."
    2
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    On December 28, 2016, Guyer initiated this action in
    the Circuit Court. Guyer asserted two counts against both
    Nationstar and Fannie Mae: 1) return of title and possession of
    property (Count I) and 2) wrongful foreclosure (Count II).
    In Count I, Guyer alleged, inter alia, that the
    assignment by Nationstar to Fannie Mae "unlawfully deprived [him]
    of the title, possession, and use" of the Property and was void
    under prior cases, not simply voidable, because Nationstar, as
    the foreclosing mortgagee, violated multiple provisions of the
    power of sale in the Mortgage and nonjudicial foreclosure statute
    regarding notice. Guyer also asserted he had twenty years to
    bring a claim of title to or possession of the Property under HRS
    § 657-31. Further, Guyer alleged that because the assignment
    from Nationstar to Fannie Mae was void, the assignment from
    Fannie Mae to Bontorin was likewise void and if title could not
    be restored to Guyer then he would be entitled to damages.
    In Count II, Guyer alleged, inter alia, that the
    improper foreclosure and further assignment of the Property to
    Bontorin were part of a continuing tort against Guyer and fell
    within the six-year statute of limitations under HRS § 657-1(4)
    as measured from the date title or possession of the Property was
    lost; thus, Nationstar and Fannie Mae were liable to him for
    damages.
    Nationstar and Fannie Mae asserted several defenses in
    response to the Complaint, including that the Complaint was
    barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
    On July 25, 2017, Nationstar and Fannie Mae jointly
    filed a motion for summary judgment (MSJ), supported by a
    declaration of counsel and exhibits. Nationstar and Fannie Mae
    argued that for an actionable claim, a plaintiff only needs
    factual knowledge of the necessary elements. Thus, Guyer's
    claims accrued on September 28, 2010, when Nationstar recorded
    the "Notice of Mortgagee's Intention to Foreclose Under Power of
    Sale" (Notice of Sale) or, at the latest, on November 29, 2010,
    the date the Notice of Sale stated the foreclosure sale would
    take place but which actually occurred on December 28, 2010.
    3
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    The MSJ further argued that the two-year statute of
    limitations applied to tort claims and thus the wrongful
    foreclosure claim was barred. The MSJ also argued Guyer's claims
    were barred by the six-year statute of limitations when
    calculating accrual from either September 28, 2010, or November
    29, 2010.
    Regarding Guyer's complaint allegation that a twenty-
    year statute of limitations applies to his claim for recovery of
    title and possession, Nationstar and Fannie Mae argue the twenty-
    year statute of limitations under HRS § 657-31 only applies to
    adverse possession cases, and not wrongful foreclosure cases.
    In opposition to Nationstar and Fannie Mae's MSJ, Guyer
    argued that: 1) his claim for wrongful foreclosure was subject to
    at least the six-year statute of limitations because it pertained
    to an intangible and nonphysical injury to property; 2) the
    wrongful foreclosure claim accrued at earliest on January 10,
    2011, when the "Mortgagee's Affidavit of Foreclosure Under Power
    of Sale" (Foreclosure Affidavit) was recorded; and 3) the twenty-
    year statute of limitations applies to real actions against the
    land, including foreclosures claiming recovery of title and
    possession.
    On August 17, 2017, the Circuit Court held a hearing on
    the MSJ.   In the hearing, the Circuit Court ruled as follows:
    THE COURT: . . . The Court having had an
    opportunity to review the motion, the opposition, and the
    reply, the Court's going to grant Defendants' motion for
    summary judgment.
    The wrongful foreclosure claim accrued, at
    the latest, at the time of the auction on December 28, 2010
    but more likely September 28, 2010, the notice of sale. The
    complaint was filed six years after the alleged improper
    foreclosure sale.
    As pled, Plaintiff's claim sounds solely in
    tort; therefore, Plaintiff's wrongful foreclosure claim is
    barred by the two-year statute of limitations pursuant to
    HRS 657-7.
    Even if the two-year limitations does not
    apply, the six-year statute of limitations under HRS 657-11
    [sic] would bar Plaintiff's claims as well.
    4
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Therefore, the Court's going to grant
    Defendants' motion for summary judgment, ask Ms. Ching to
    prepare the order on the matter.
    MS. CHING: Thank you, Judge.
    Could I have a clarification? Our argument
    was notice of sale, which was - - I just want to make sure I
    have the dates correct for accrual - - September 28th, 2010
    or, at the latest, the date of the auction that did not
    occur, which was November 29, 2010.
    THE COURT: Correct. Sorry. Thank you for
    clarifying that for me.
    The Order Granting MSJ and Final Judgment were entered
    thereafter.
    II. Standard of Review
    We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de
    novo. See First Ins. Co. of Hawaii, Ltd. v. A & B Props., Inc.,
    126 Hawai#i 406, 413, 
    271 P.3d 1165
    , 1172 (2012) (citation
    omitted). It is well-established that:
    [S]ummary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,
    depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
    file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
    is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
    moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A
    fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect
    of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of
    a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. The
    evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
    non-moving party. In other words, we must view all of the
    evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
    favorable to the party opposing the motion.
    Id. at 413-14, 
    271 P.3d at 1172-73
     (citation omitted) (brackets
    in original).
    III. Discussion
    A.   Applicable Statute of Limitations
    Guyer first contends the Circuit Court erred in
    granting Nationstar and Fannie Mae's MSJ by concluding that the
    wrongful foreclosure claim was barred by either the two-year
    statute of limitations under HRS § 657-7 or the six-year statute
    of limitations under HRS § 657-1(4).
    Guyer argues that his wrongful foreclosure claim is
    subject to at least a six-year statute of limitations under HRS
    § 657-1(4) rather than the two-year statute of limitations under
    5
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    HRS § 657-7, because HRS § 657-7 does not govern a claim for
    wrongful foreclosure.
    Nationstar and Fannie Mae argue that the two-year
    statute of limitations under HRS § 657-7 applies here because it
    concerns compensation for "injury to persons or property" and
    Guyer "seeks to recover monetary damages resulting from his loss
    of possession and use of the Property."
    In Delapinia v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, 146 Hawai#i
    218, 224, 
    458 P.3d 929
    , 935 (App. 2020), affirmed in part,
    vacated in part, 150 Hawai#i 91, 
    497 P.3d 106
     (2021) (Delapinia
    II), this court observed that:
    [t]he supreme court has interpreted HRS § 657-7 "to apply to
    'claims for damages resulting from physical injury to
    persons or physical injury to tangible interests in
    property.'" Gomez[ v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 111 Hawai #i 67,
    70, 
    137 P.3d 381
    , 384 (2006)] (emphasis in original)
    (quoting Au[ v. Au, 
    63 Haw. 210
    , 216, 
    626 P.2d 173
    , 178
    (1981)]). On the other hand, the supreme court has applied
    HRS § 657-1 to claims concerning a non-physical injury to an
    intangible interest of the plaintiff. Higa v. Mirikitani, 
    55 Haw. 167
    , 170-73, 
    517 P.2d 1
    , 4-6 (1973) (applying the
    six-year statute of limitations of HRS § 657-1(1) to a legal
    malpractice claim involving non-physical injury to an
    intangible interest).
    Id. at 225, 458 P.3d at 936 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in
    original). There, plaintiffs did not allege any physical harm to
    the subject property and instead asserted that the defendants had
    wrongfully deprived them of title to and possession of the
    subject property. Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, as a
    nonphysical injury to their intangible interests, this court
    concluded that the plaintiffs' wrongful foreclosure claim was
    subject to the six-year statute of limitations under HRS § 657-
    1(4).   Id.
    Here, as in Delapinia, Guyer did not allege any
    physical harm to the Property. Instead, Guyer claims Nationstar
    and Fannie Mae caused a nonphysical injury to his intangible
    interest by wrongfully "depriv[ing him] of his possession, record
    title, and use of the Property[.]" Thus, the six-year statute of
    limitations under HRS § 657-1(4) governs Guyer's claim for
    wrongful foreclosure.
    6
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    B.   Trigger for Limitations Period
    Guyer next contends the Circuit Court erred in
    determining that the limitations period to file the wrongful
    foreclosure claim was triggered on September 28, 2010 or, at the
    latest, on November 29, 2010. Guyer contends that for wrongful
    foreclosure claims, the statute of limitations is triggered when
    a plaintiff has a cause of action for damages, i.e., when the
    foreclosure occurs "causing either a loss of title or possession
    or both." According to Guyer, this does not occur until both a
    foreclosure affidavit and a deed are recorded. Guyer further
    argues that because the discovery rule applies to wrongful
    foreclosure claims, the statute of limitations began to run at
    the earliest when the Foreclosure Affidavit was recorded on
    January 10, 2011, giving him notice of the foreclosure.
    Nationstar and Fannie Mae argue that instead of the
    discovery rule, the relevant inquiry "is what the plaintiff might
    'have known by the use of the means of information within his
    reach, with the vigilance the law requires of him[.]'" (Citing
    Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Newtown Meadows ex rel. Bd. of Dirs.
    v. Venture 15, Inc., 115 Hawai#i 232, 277-78, 
    167 P.3d 225
    ,
    270-71 (2007), as corrected (Sept. 20, 2007)). Thus, Nationstar
    and Fannie Mae argue the Circuit Court did not err because
    Guyer's claim for money damages accrued when the Notice of Sale
    was recorded and served on Guyer on September 28, 2010,
    considering the Notice of Sale provided him with the "information
    necessary to assert a claim of wrongful foreclosure."
    As discussed in Delapinia, "[u]nder Hawaii's discovery
    rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff
    'discovers or should have discovered the negligent act, the
    damage, and the causal connection between the former and the
    latter.'" 146 Hawai#i at 226, 458 P.3d at 937 (quoting Thomas v.
    Kidani, 126 Hawai#i 125, 132, 
    267 P.3d 1230
    , 1237 (2011)).
    There, because the "actual damage being claimed was the loss of
    title," the earliest date of accrual was when title was deeded by
    the mortgagee, i.e., "when title was transferred to someone other
    than the Delapinias." 
    Id.
    7
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    In Schick v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, No. CAAP-18-
    0000103, 
    2022 WL 2315570
    , at *6 (Haw. App. June 28, 2022) (mem.),
    this court similarly determined that where the appellant alleged
    "depriv[ation] of possession, title, use, and occupancy of the
    [p]roperty," the date of accrual was when title to the subject
    property was deeded to a party other than the appellant-
    mortgagor.
    Here, it is undisputed that Nationstar transferred
    title to someone other than Guyer, namely, Fannie Mae, on March
    30, 2011. The Complaint was filed on December 28, 2016, within
    the six-year statute of limitations. See 
    id.
     Therefore, the
    Circuit Court erred in granting summary judgment for Nationstar
    and Fannie Mae on grounds that Guyer's wrongful foreclosure claim
    was time-barred by the statute of limitations.
    C. Twenty-Year Statute of Limitations
    The remedy for a wrongful nonjudicial foreclosure
    governed by the six-year statute of limitations is that the
    transfer of property is voidable. Delapinia II, 150 Hawai#i at
    104, 497 P.3d at 119 ("Hawai#i law has moved unmistakably towards
    the conclusion that sales pursuant to a wrongful foreclosure are
    voidable, regardless of whether the violation was statutory or
    contractual, substantial or a mere irregularity."). Further,
    "where the property has passed into the hands of an innocent
    purchaser for value, rendering the voiding of a foreclosure sale
    impracticable, an action at law for damages is generally the
    appropriate remedy." Id. (citations omitted).
    Given our ruling above, that Guyer's wrongful
    foreclosure claim was not time-barred, we need not reach Guyer's
    third argument that a twenty-year statute of limitations applies
    under HRS § 657-31.
    IV. Conclusion
    Based on the foregoing, we vacate the (1) "Final
    Judgment" entered on March 21, 2018 and (2) "Order Granting
    Defendants Nationstar Mortgage LLC's and Federal National
    Mortgage Association's Motion for Summary Judgment" entered on
    8
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    November 1, 2017. We remand this matter to the Circuit Court of
    the Second Circuit for further proceedings consistent with this
    decision.
    DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, November 30, 2022.
    On the briefs:                        /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
    Chief Judge
    James J. Bickerton,
    Bridget G. Morgan,                    /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
    (Bickerton Dang, LLLP),               Associate Judge
    and
    John F. Perkin,                       /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
    (Perkin & Faria LLLC),                Associate Judge
    and
    Van-Alan H. Shima,
    (Affinity Law Group),
    Attorneys for
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    Andrew J. Lautenbach,
    Kukui Claydon,
    (Starn O'Toole Marcus
    & Fisher),
    Attorneys for
    Defendants-Appellees
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CAAP-18-0000236

Filed Date: 11/30/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/30/2022