Franco v. Reinhardt ( 2023 )


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  •   NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    28-FEB-2023
    07:53 AM
    Dkt. 160 MO
    NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    KAWIKA FRANCO, Individually and as Personal Representative for
    the Estate of TIARE FRANCO; PEACHES KONG AND APPLES ELABAN, as
    Next Friends of LOVELY FRANCO (Minor); TAUA GLEASON, as Next
    Friend of KOLOMANA KONG KANIAUPIO GLEASON AND KAULANA KONG
    KANIAUPIO GLEASON (Minors); and CHERYL RUSSELL, as Next Friend of
    JEANNE RUSSELL (minor), Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    SABIO REINHARDT, Defendant/Cross-Claim Plaintiff/Appellee,
    and
    JOSIAH OKUDARA, Defendant/Cross-Claim Defendant/Appellee,
    and
    JOHN DOES 2-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; DOE
    PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOE "NON-PROFIT" CORPORATIONS 1-10; and DOE
    GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    (CIVIL NO. 12-1-0458(1))
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    (By:   Ginoza, Chief Judge, Nakasone and McCullen, JJ.)
    This case arises from a motor vehicle accident in which
    Defendant-Appellee Sabio Reinhardt (Reinhardt) was allegedly
    driving a 2005 Dodge Ram pickup truck (Truck) owned by his
    girlfriend, Reinette Kama (Kama).    On May 14, 2011, Reinhardt was
    allegedly driving the Truck with Tiare Franco (Franco) as a
    passenger when Reinhardt crashed and Franco died at the scene.
    National Interstate Insurance Company, Inc. (NIIC) issued an
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    automobile insurance policy (Policy) for the Truck.1             Following
    Franco's death in 2011, her estate, spouse, and four minor
    children (collectively, Plaintiffs)2 initiated a wrongful death
    action against Reinhardt.
    This appeal concerns whether counsel retained by NIIC
    to defend Reinhardt (Retained Counsel) could withdraw from
    representing Reinhardt, then re-represent Reinhardt and file
    motions on his behalf without re-establishing contact or
    obtaining Reinhardt's consent.3
    Plaintiffs appeal from the: (1) "Order Granting
    [Reinhardt's] Motion to Set Aside Final Judgment Filed on May 18,
    2016 and Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Taxation of Costs
    and Pre-Judgment Interest Filed on July 28, 2016 and for New
    Trial" (Order Granting Motion to Set Aside); and (2) "Order
    Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Disqualify Counsel" (Order Denying
    Motion to Disqualify), both entered on September 6, 2017 by the
    Circuit Court of the Second Circuit (Circuit Court).4
    On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the Circuit Court
    erred in: (1) granting the Motion to Set Aside because there were
    no exceptional circumstances to justify relief under Hawai#i
    Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 60(b); (2) granting a new
    1
    NIIC issued the Policy to Kama's ex-husband, William A. Cornelio, Jr.
    2
    Plaintiffs include Kawika Franco, Individually and as Personal
    Representative for the Estate of Tiare Franco; Peaches Kong and Apples Elaban,
    as Next Friends of Lovely Franco (Minor); Taua Gleason, as Next Friend of
    Kolomana Kong Kaniaupio Gleason and Kaulana Kong Kaniaupio Gleason (Minors);
    and Cheryl Russell, as Next Friend of Jeanne Russell (Minor).
    3
    This case is currently before us on remand from the Hawai#i Supreme
    Court after this court dismissed the Plaintiffs' appeal for lack of
    jurisdiction because the Circuit Court had set aside the final judgment and
    granted a new trial, which we deemed was an unappealable interlocutory and
    non-final order. Franco v. Reinhardt, SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX, 
    2018 WL 1392334
    , at *1
    (Haw. March 20, 2018). The Hawai#i Supreme Court held that the post-judgment
    Order Granting Motion to Set Aside and Order Denying Motion to Disqualify are
    appealable for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. 
    Id.
     Accordingly, the
    supreme court vacated our dismissal order and remanded the case to this court
    for disposition. 
    Id.
     Thus, in light of the Hawai#i Supreme Court's order, we
    address Plaintiffs' appeal on the merits.
    4
    The Honorable Rhonda I.L. Loo presided.
    2
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    trial and a second bite at the apple where NIIC decided not to
    defend Reinhardt while the issue of NIIC's duty to defend was not
    fully resolved; and (3) denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Disqualify
    because Reinhardt's Retained Counsel had voluntarily withdrawn
    from representing Reinhardt and failed to newly obtain
    Reinhardt's consent to representation pursuant to Hawai#i Rules
    of Professional Conduct (HRPC) and Hawai#i law.
    For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that
    Retained Counsel did not have the authority or Reinhardt's
    consent to file motions on behalf of Reinhardt and the Circuit
    Court erred in denying the Motion to Disqualify and granting the
    Motion to Set Aside. Thus, we vacate the Order Granting Motion
    to Set Aside and the Order Denying Motion to Disqualify.
    I. Procedural Background
    A. Reinhardt's Representation in the Instant Case
    On May 3, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against
    Reinhardt alleging, inter alia, that Reinhardt operated the Truck
    in a "negligent, grossly negligent, reckless or wanton and
    willful manner, which action or omission was the legal and
    substantial cause of and/or a substantial factor in causing
    [Franco's] wrongful death[.]" On June 11, 2012, NIIC informed
    Reinhardt that it had retained the Law Offices of Cary T. Tanaka
    to defend him under a reservation of rights.
    On March 20, 2013, NIIC filed a separate action in the
    Circuit Court for declaratory judgment (DJ Action) to determine
    whether NIIC owed a duty to defend and indemnify Reinhardt.5 In
    the DJ Action, the Circuit Court granted NIIC's motion for
    summary judgment, concluding there was no possibility of
    insurance coverage for Reinhardt under the Policy. Plaintiffs
    appealed in National Interstate Insurance Company, Inc. v.
    Reinhardt, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 
    2017 WL 1210101
     (Haw. App. March
    31, 2017) (Mem. Op.), as corrected (May 15, 2017) (DJ Appeal).
    5
    The Honorable Rhonda I.L. Loo also presided over the DJ Action.
    3
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    On July 29, 2014, following the Circuit Court's grant
    of summary judgment in favor of NIIC in the DJ Action, Retained
    Counsel filed a "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for [Reinhardt]"
    (Motion to Withdraw) in this case citing, inter alia, HRPC Rule
    1.16.6 In support of the Motion to Withdraw, Retained Counsel
    attested to the following:
    5. On June 11, 2012, NIIC informed [Reinhardt] that it had
    retained our office to defend him in the subject lawsuit
    under a reservation of rights.
    . . . .
    7. During such representation, our office's attorneys' fees
    and costs have been billed to and paid for by NIIC and not
    [Reinhardt].
    . . . .
    9. On November 21, 2013, this Court granted NIIC's Motion
    for Summary Judgment . . . finding that there was no
    possibility of coverage for [Reinhardt].
    . . . .
    11. On July 30, 2014, our office received a copy of a
    letter from Gregory K. Markham, Esq., attorney for NIIC, to
    6
    In 2014, HRPC Rule 1.16 (2014) provided in pertinent part:
    Rule 1.16. DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION.
    (a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not
    represent a client or, where representation has commenced,
    shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:
    . . .
    (3) the lawyer is discharged.
    (b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw
    from representing a client if:
    . . .
    (6) the representation will result in an unreasonable
    financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered
    unreasonably difficult by the client[.]
    . . . .
    (c) A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring
    notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a
    representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a
    lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good
    cause for terminating the representation.
    (d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take
    steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a
    client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the
    client, allowing time for employment of other counsel,
    surrendering papers and property to which the client is
    entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense
    that has not been earned or incurred.
    4
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    [Reinhardt], wherein NIIC notified [Reinhardt] that NIIC
    "hereby withdraws coverage of your defense effective
    immediately." ....
    12. Subsequent to this letter, I contacted the NIIC
    insurance adjuster, Walter Tani, assigned to this matter and
    confirmed that our office would no longer be retained to
    defend [Reinhardt].
    13. I informed Mr. Tani that I would be required to file
    this Motion to Withdraw.
    14. On July 22, 2014, I informed [Reinhardt], who is
    currently incarcerated on [sic] at the Maui Correctional
    Facility, that our office was no longer retained by NIIC to
    defend him in this case, and that we would be filing this
    Motion to Withdraw.
    15. [Reinhardt] indicated that he understood that our Firm
    would be withdrawing from representation and agreed with
    such withdrawal. He requested that we copy and transmit all
    documents and materials in the litigation to him, which we
    are in the process of doing. He further acknowledged that he
    has no source of income to pay our office to continue to
    defend him.
    On March 11, 2015, the Circuit Court granted Retained
    Counsel's Motion to Withdraw. Thereafter, Reinhardt proceeded to
    defend this case pro se. Approximately one month before the
    trial date, the Plaintiffs and the Circuit Court lost contact
    with Reinhardt who had been released from prison.7 A jury trial
    took place during the week of April 25, 2016, without Reinhardt's
    presence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs and
    the Circuit Court entered Final Judgment on May 18, 2016.
    B. Post-DJ Appeal
    On March 31, 2017, after the Circuit Court entered
    Final Judgement in the instant case, this court in the DJ Appeal
    vacated the Circuit Court's judgment in favor of NIIC. In the DJ
    Appeal, we held that the Circuit Court erred in granting summary
    judgment because there were "genuine issues of material fact
    regarding whether Reinhardt reasonably believed he was entitled
    7
    During a hearing on April 21, 2016, the Circuit Court stated that the
    court clerk was unable to contact Reinhardt and that the court contacted
    Reinhardt's last criminal attorney who was unable to provide Reinhardt's e-
    mail or mailing address, or a telephone number. At the hearing, Plaintiffs'
    counsel also stated that she had no contact with Reinhardt, had tried to
    contact Reinhardt's criminal attorney, and had been mailing everything to the
    prison.
    5
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    to operate the Truck at the time of the fatal accident." 
    2017 WL 1210101
    , at *7-8. Following the DJ Appeal, NIIC again retained
    the same law firm and attorney to represent Reinhardt under a
    reservation of rights.8
    In this case, on May 16, 2017, nearly a year after the
    Final Judgement was entered, Retained Counsel filed the Motion to
    Set Aside, seeking relief pursuant to HRCP Rule 60(b)(5)9 and
    60(b)(6).    The Motion to Set Aside stated that "[t]o date,
    counsel for [Reinhardt] has still not been able to make contact
    with him." On June 15, 2017, Plaintiffs filed the Motion to
    Disqualify, arguing that Retained Counsel failed to obtain
    Reinhardt's informed consent and waiver of any potential
    conflicts of interest, and that Reinhardt had no idea he was
    being represented in this action or that a Motion to Set Aside
    had been filed on his behalf.
    During the hearing on August 24, 2017, for the Motion
    to Set Aside and the Motion to Disqualify (8/24/17 Hearing), the
    Circuit Court orally granted the Motion to Set Aside and denied
    the Motion to Disqualify. The written orders were entered on
    September 6, 2017.
    II. Discussion
    We address Plaintiffs' third point of error because our
    resolution of this point is dispositive of the issues on appeal.
    Plaintiffs contend the Circuit Court erred in denying the Motion
    to Disqualify because, inter alia, HRPC Rules and Hawai#i law
    8
    On remand in the DJ Action, it does not appear the Circuit Court has
    made any determination as to whether NIIC owes a duty to defend and/or
    indemnify Reinhardt.
    9
    Plaintiffs contend that the Motion to Set Aside was based on HRCP
    Rule 60(b)(1) and (6). In the memorandum in support of the Motion to Set
    Aside, Retained Counsel provided a block quote of HRCP Rule 60(b) which quoted
    subsections (1) and (6). However, the memorandum in support of the motion
    stated "Defendant REINHARDT's position is that this motion is brought under
    numbers (5) and (6) above which allows for the reasonable filing for
    relief[.]" Further, during the hearing on the Motion to Set Aside, Retained
    Counsel asserted that the motion was made pursuant to HRCP Rule 60(b)(5) and
    (6).
    6
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    required Reinhardt's knowledge and consent to Retained Counsel's
    representation.
    Appellate courts apply the abuse of discretion standard
    for reviewing a lower court's denial of a motion for
    disqualification. Hussey v. Say, 139 Hawai#i 181, 185, 
    384 P.3d 1282
    , 1286 (2016). "Under the abuse of discretion standard, the
    trial court may not be reversed by an appellate court unless the
    trial court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded
    rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial
    detriment of a party litigant." Id. at 185-86, 
    384 P.3d at
    1286-
    87 (citation omitted).
    During the 8/24/17 Hearing, Retained Counsel argued:
    [Retained Counsel]: Yeah, the position is well, you don't
    have authority. We tried, your Honor. There was a letter
    that was sent to Mr. Reinhardt that appears to have been
    signed by him via certified mail from National saying please
    contact [Retained Counsel] and his office because they were
    now retained to represent you and they need to file this
    motion to set aside.
    In addition to that, we hired a private investigator who was
    able to go to his house -- he wasn't there -- but to get a phone
    number, and I personally have left several messages with him
    asking him to call me. At the point when his number no longer
    worked, I sent the investigator out to go back once again to try
    to get another number. He was unsuccessful.
    We then hired a second set of investigators to see if
    they had -- they would have better success. They went out
    there twice. They weren't able to find him a second time.
    They delivered a letter from me informing him about the
    hearing today and our representation. So to say we haven't
    done everything we could to try to contact him, I think, is
    just not the case.
    We did do our best to try to contact him which then
    puts me in a weird position because what do I do? Sit on my
    hands and allow the one-year time period to lapse or do I do
    something and I file the motion? Well, I'm not going to sit
    on my hands. I'm going to do my best to try to defend him
    properly, and that's why we filed this motion, your Honor,
    and that's why we're here today.
    After the Circuit Court had already granted the Motion to Set
    Aside, the Circuit Court denied the Motion to Disqualify stating:
    [The Court]: The second motion regarding the disqualifying
    counsel, additionally, the Court also finds in light of the
    unusual facts surrounding this case, it would not be
    equitable to disqualify [Retained Counsel] as counsel. The
    Court does recognize plaintiff's concerns regarding the
    rules of professional conduct; however, the Court feels
    7
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    confident, as defense counsel assured in its brief, that
    defense counsel is making every effort – significant efforts
    to locate Mr. Reinhardt to receive his consent, and that any
    error in denying this motion can be quickly and harmlessly
    remedied if Defendant Reinhardt is finally located and
    contacted and expressed a desire, perhaps, not to retain
    [Retained Counsel] as counsel at that time.
    Accordingly, the Court is denying plaintiff's motion
    to disqualify counsel.
    (Emphases added.)
    "An attorney-client relationship is contractual and
    consensual, and such a relationship can be formed only with the
    consent of the attorney and the individual seeking
    representation. The consent of the parties must be personal and
    must flow between the particular individuals." Office of
    Disciplinary Counsel v. Cusmano, 93 Hawai#i 411, 415, 
    4 P.3d 1109
    , 1113 (2000) (brackets, ellipsis and citation omitted).
    Here, the parties do not dispute that following the
    Circuit Court's grant of Retained Counsel's Motion to Withdraw on
    March 11, 2015, Retained Counsel withdrew from representing
    Reinhardt in this case. Accordingly, the attorney-client
    relationship between Retained Counsel and Reinhardt was
    terminated and Retained Counsel was required to newly obtain
    Reinhardt's consent to representation. However, as explained
    above, despite Retained Counsel's multiple attempts to contact
    Reinhardt, Retained Counsel was unable to establish any means of
    contacting Reinhardt before filing the Motion to Set Aside.
    Although NIIC again hired Retained Counsel for
    Reinhardt after the DJ Appeal, NIIC's retention of counsel does
    not change the requirement for Reinhardt's consent to the
    representation and Reinhardt has the right to refuse
    representation under a reservation of rights. In this regard,
    Plaintiffs cite, inter alia, HRPC Rule 1.8(f) (2014), which
    provides:
    Rule 1.8.    CONFLICT OF INTEREST: PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS.
    . . . .
    (f)   A lawyer shall not accept compensation for
    representing a client from one other than the client unless:
    8
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    (1)   the client consents after consultation;
    (2)   there is no interference with the lawyer's
    independence of professional judgment or with the
    client-lawyer relationship; and
    (3)   information relating to representation of a
    client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.
    In Finley v. Home Ins. Co., 90 Hawai#i 25, 
    975 P.2d 1145
     (1998), the Hawai#i Supreme Court considered the application
    of the HRPC rules, including HRPC Rule 1.8(f), to the
    relationship between the insured, insurer, and the insurer's
    retained counsel for the insured. With regard to representation
    under a reservation of rights, the supreme court stated,
    "[a]lthough we acknowledge the contractual right of an insurer to
    select counsel for the insured in the tender of a defense under a
    reservation of rights, it is well settled that the insured must
    have the right to reject this tender." Id. at 35, 
    975 P.2d at 1155
     (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
    Moreover, the right to refuse an insurer's tender of a
    defense under a reservation of rights is mandated by the
    HRPC. See HRPC Rule 1.8(f), stating that "a lawyer shall not
    accept compensation for representing a client from one other
    than the client unless: (1) the client consents after
    consultation." The requirement of client consent necessarily
    implies the right not to consent. Therefore, if the client
    does not desire the representation under the terms offered
    by the insurer, the insurer must either choose to defend
    unqualifiedly or allow the insured to conduct its own
    defense of the action.
    
    Id.
     (emphases added) (brackets omitted).
    Therefore, without obtaining Reinhardt's consent to
    representation under a reservation of rights, Retained Counsel
    did not establish an attorney-client relationship and was not
    authorized to file motions on Reinhardt's behalf. See HRPC Rule
    1.2(a) (2015) ("a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions
    concerning the objectives of representation, and, as required by
    Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which
    the objectives are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action
    on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out
    the representation."). It follows that without Reinhardt's
    consent, Retained Counsel also did not have the right to appear
    9
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    in this case on Reinhardt's behalf. See Cusmano, 93 Hawai#i at
    415, 
    4 P.3d at 1113
    ; see also HRS § 605-8(a) (2016) ("The
    practitioners shall have the right to practice in all the courts
    of the State, and to appear therein as attorneys in behalf of
    persons who may choose to retain them, for the prosecution or
    defense of actions.").
    Retained Counsel does not argue that consent to
    representation was not required or that it should otherwise be
    excused in this case. Rather, the answering brief's arguments
    related to Plaintiffs' third point of error address Plaintiffs'
    contention that Retained Counsel was required to obtain
    Reinhardt's waiver of any potential conflicts of interest under
    the HRPC Rules.10 Retained Counsel also argues that given the
    one-year limitation in HRCP Rule 60(b), counsel "had to file the
    Motion to Set Aside before the one-year period for the Final
    Judgment expired on May 18, 2017[.]" However, Retained Counsel
    does not argue or provide authority that the time limitation in
    HRCP Rule 60(b) would allow an attorney to file a motion to set
    aside without consent of the client.
    Therefore, because Retained Counsel did not have the
    authority to file the Motion to Set Aside or appear in court on
    Reinhardt's behalf, the Circuit Court erred in granting the
    Motion to Set Aside and denying the Motion to Disqualify.
    Resolution of this issue is dispositive, and thus we do not reach
    whether the Circuit Court erred in granting the Motion to Set
    Aside on the merits.
    III. Conclusion
    For the reasons set forth above, we vacate the Circuit
    Court's (1) "Order Granting [Reinhardt's] Motion to Set Aside
    Final Judgment Filed on May 18, 2016 and Order Granting
    Plaintiffs' Motion for Taxation of Costs and Pre-Judgment
    Interest Filed on July 28, 2016 and for New Trial"; and (2)
    10
    Plaintiffs argue that Retained Counsel was required to obtain
    Reinhardt's waiver of any potential conflicts of interest under HRPC Rules 1.7
    and 1.8(h) because of potential bad faith claims against NIIC.
    10
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    "Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Disqualify Counsel" both
    entered on September 6, 2017. The case is remanded to the
    Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this
    memorandum opinion.
    DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, February 28, 2023.
    On the briefs:                         /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
    Chief Judge
    Rebecca A. Copeland,
    (Law Office of Rebecca A.              /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
    Copeland, LLC)                         Associate Judge
    and
    Sue V. Hansen,                         /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
    (Law Office of Sue Vo Hansen)          Associate Judge
    for Plaintiffs-Appellants
    Cary T. Tanaka,
    Alana B. Rask,
    (Law Office of Cary T. Tanaka),
    and
    Greg H. Takase,
    (Of Counsel)
    for Defendant-Appellee
    11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CAAP-17-0000666

Filed Date: 2/28/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/15/2023