KL v. DL ( 2023 )


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  •    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    28-FEB-2023
    08:11 AM
    Dkt. 80 SO
    NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    KL, Petitioner-Appellee,
    v.
    DL, Respondent-Appellant
    APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    (FC-DA No. 18-1-0235)
    SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
    (By:    Leonard, Presiding Judge, Hiraoka and Chan, JJ.)
    Respondent-Appellant DL (Father) appeals from the Order
    for Protection entered by the Family Court of the First Circuit
    on April 30, 2018.1 For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
    Petitioner-Appellee KL (Mother) filed a Petition for an
    Order for Protection, for herself and for IL (Child), against
    Father on January 26, 2018. A temporary restraining order
    against Father was entered the same day,2 without an evidentiary
    hearing.3 The evidentiary hearing was set for February 5, 2018,
    but was continued to March 5, 2018, March 19, 2018, and April 23,
    1
    The Honorable David J. Gierlach presided.
    2
    The Honorable Steven M. Nakashima presided.
    3
    "The existence of exigent circumstances justifies dispensing with
    the requirement of holding a hearing before the ex parte TRO is granted."
    Hamilton ex rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 126 Hawai#i 294, 303, 
    270 P.3d 1024
    , 1033
    (2012).
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    2018. The evidentiary hearing was conducted on April 23 and 30,
    2018. The family court heard testimony from Mother, Father, and
    a number of other witnesses. The Order for Protection was
    entered on April 30, 2018.
    This appeal followed. Father raises six points of
    error and makes four arguments.4
    1.   Father argues that the family court erroneously
    granted the Order for Protection based "on numerous allegations
    of harm and threat of harm not alleged in [Mother]'s TRO
    petition, especially undated, non-specific and unreliable hearsay
    claims of sexual abuse."
    Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 586-3 (2006) provides,
    in relevant part:
    Order for protection. (a) There shall exist an action known
    as a petition for an order for protection in cases of
    domestic abuse.
    . . . .
    (c)   A petition for relief shall be in writing upon
    forms provided by the court and . . . be accompanied by
    . . . a statement made under penalty of perjury stating the
    specific facts and circumstances from which relief is
    sought.
    Mother signed the Petition under penalty of perjury.
    It stated:
    [Father] abused   :   me   :   and/or has hit my daughter[.]
    . . . .
    [Father]:
    . . . .
    D.    :         may need supervised visitation with the
    child(ren) because:
    physically abusive past and inappropriate
    touching with children.
    (Underscored words were handwritten.)
    4
    Hawai#i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(b)(7) provides, in
    part: "Points not argued may be deemed waived."
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    The family court found and concluded:
    A.    The court determined it was in the best interest
    of [Child] that [Father] have no contact with her unless
    [Child Welfare Services] sanctioned such contact, because
    [Father] engaged in inappropriate sexual touching of
    [Child.]
    . . . .
    i.    The court found that [Child] was the victim of
    sexual contact or conduct including molestation and sexual
    fondling when [Father] touched her and rubbed her on her
    private spot.
    Father argues that the family court erred by issuing
    the Order for Protection based upon Father's alleged sexual abuse
    of Child. At the April 23, 2018 evidentiary hearing, Mother
    testified:
    [Mother's Counsel] What -- what made you feel that you had
    to protect your daughter?
    [Mother] Um -- because when I came back from filing the
    restraining order, um -- my daughter -- we were talking and she
    was telling me how she felt yucky and didn't like herself[.]
    . . . .
    [Mother] And I asked [Child] if [Father] touched her
    private area. . . . And she said yes.
    Mother testified on cross-examination:
    [Father's Counsel] Now, you wrote inappropriate
    touching in your TRO, and you're referring, if I understand
    your testimony correctly, my client rubbing her leg?
    [Mother] When -- when I wrote that I'm referring to
    my son and hitting my daughter.
    [Father's Counsel] Hitting your daughter. But you put
    no allegations in [Petition] about [Father] hitting either
    your son or your daughter. You didn't specify those as
    allegations. And -- sorry. Is that correct?
    [Mother] It said inappropriate touching of my children
    and I believe that throwing my son is very inappropriate to
    do that.
    Thus, Father contends that the family court issued the
    Order for Protection based upon allegations of sexual abuse not
    contained in Mother's Petition.
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    Father received actual notice, before the evidentiary
    hearing, that Child (then seven years old) told a Hawai#i
    Department of Human Services (DHS) social worker that Father
    touched her "private area" and "private girl part"; Child told a
    forensic interviewer that Father "used his hand to touch her on
    'my spot'"; and that DHS had concluded that "the sexual abuse and
    threat of abuse allegations to [Child] by [Father] is confirmed."
    Father reviewed a DVD of Child's interview before the evidentiary
    hearing, and cross-examined the DHS social worker about Child's
    allegations at the trial.
    Hawai#i Family Court Rules (HFCR) Rule 15(b) states, in
    relevant part:
    (b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When
    issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or
    implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
    respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
    amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them
    to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be
    made upon motion of any party at any time, even after
    judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result
    of the trial of these issues.
    HFCR Rule 15(b) brings the pleadings in line with the
    actual issues upon which the case was tried, thus promoting the
    objective of deciding cases on their merits rather than on the
    basis of a statement of the claim made at a preliminary point in
    the action. See Cresencia v. Kim, 
    10 Haw. App. 461
    , 477, 
    878 P.2d 725
    , 734 (1994) (applying Hawai#i Rules of Civil Procedure
    (HRCP) Rule 15(b)); Child Support Enf't Agency v. Carlin, 96
    Hawai#i 373, 379, 
    31 P.3d 230
    , 236 (App. 2001) ("In interpreting
    HFCR Rule 15(b), the cases and treatises interpreting cognate
    rules of civil procedure are persuasive authority in parsing the
    HFCR.").
    HFCR Rule 15(b) is mandatory, not permissive; as long
    as issues are tried by the express or implied consent of the
    parties, the issues shall be treated as if raised in pleadings.
    Consent is generally implied when the party opposing a Rule 15(b)
    motion fails to object to the introduction of evidence relevant
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    to an unpleaded issue, or produces evidence bearing on the new
    issue. Cresencia, 
    10 Haw. App. at 478
    , 
    878 P.2d at
    734 (citing
    Hamm v. Merrick, 
    61 Haw. 470
    , 473-74, 
    605 P.2d 499
    , 501-02
    (1980)). In this case, Father had actual notice of Child's
    allegations of sexual abuse, did not object when Mother elicited
    evidence of sexual abuse at the evidentiary hearing, testified
    about having seen the DVD of Child's interview, and denied
    sexually abusing Child. The issue of Father's sexual abuse of
    Child was tried by implicit consent under HFCR 15(b). See
    Schefke v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 96 Hawai#i 408, 434,
    
    32 P.3d 52
    , 78 (2001) (concluding that termination issue was
    tried by implied consent under HRCP 15(b)).
    Father argues that the evidence of sexual abuse was
    inadmissible hearsay. Father did not object on that basis during
    the evidentiary hearing. The objection was waived. See Hawaii
    Rules of Evidence Rule 103(a)(1); State v. Crisostomo, 94 Hawai#i
    282, 290, 
    12 P.3d 873
    , 881 (2000) ("A hearsay objection not
    raised or properly preserved in the trial court will not be
    considered on appeal.") (citation omitted).
    2.   Father argues that "[t]he family court entered
    inconsistent, insufficient, and clearly erroneous findings, and
    no reasonable person, normally constituted, would consider
    [Father]'s parental discipline domestic violence or inappropriate
    touching."
    We review findings of fact under the "clearly
    erroneous" standard. Est. of Klink ex rel. Klink v. State, 113
    Hawai#i 332, 351, 
    152 P.3d 504
    , 523 (2007). A finding of fact is
    clearly erroneous when the record lacks substantial evidence to
    support the finding or when, despite substantial evidence to
    support the finding, we are left with a definite and firm
    conviction that a mistake has been committed. 
    Id.
     "Substantial
    evidence" is "credible evidence which is of sufficient quality
    and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to
    support a conclusion." 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
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    Father specifically challenges conclusion of law (COL)
    no. 10.A:
    10.   Hawaii Revised Statutes Section
    571-46(b)((l)[sic]. In determining what constitutes the
    best interest of the child the court shall consider any
    sexual or physical abuse of a child by a parent.
    A.    The court determined it was in the best
    interest of [Child] that [Father] have no contact with her
    unless CWS sanctioned such contact, because [Father] engaged
    in inappropriate sexual touching of [Child], and sustained
    and/or witnessed domestic violence on herself of [sic] her
    mother and brother[.]
    (Emphasis added.)
    The family court found:
    17.   [The DHS report of its investigation into
    alleged sexual abuse of Child by Father stated]:
    . . . .
    D.    [Child] reported:
    . . . .
    vi.   She has witnessed her father pull
    her brother['s] arm and drag him into the house. This
    happened during her . . . birthday party. Her father did it
    because [her brother] disrespected him so he pulled him out
    of the party, "threw" him in his room, and "screamed" at
    him.
    Father argues that the family court erred because his
    pulling of Child's brother's arm, dragging him into the house,
    throwing him into his room, and screaming at him was "parental
    discipline," not "domestic violence or inappropriate touching."
    Father did not make that argument to the family court. Had he
    done so, it would have been the family court's role to weigh the
    evidence and make an appropriate finding; it is not an issue to
    be resolved on appeal. See State v. Kikuta, 125 Hawai#i 78, 89,
    
    253 P.3d 639
    , 650 (2011) (noting that assessment of witness
    credibility and weighing of the evidence is not within the
    province of an appellate court, but a function of the fact finder
    at trial). Father's argument was waived. 
    Id.
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    3.    Father argues that "the [family] court
    impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to [Father] to disprove
    and negative the allegations in [Mother]'s Petition, rather than
    requiring her to prove her allegations of domestic violence and
    child abuse" by a preponderance of the evidence.
    The Order for Protection was issued pursuant to HRS
    § 586-5.5 (2006). The statute provides, in relevant part:
    (a)   If, after hearing all relevant evidence, the court
    finds that the respondent has failed to show cause why the
    [temporary restraining] order should not be continued and
    that a protective order is necessary to prevent domestic
    abuse or a recurrence of abuse, the court may order that a
    protective order be issued for a further fixed reasonable
    period as the court deems appropriate.
    (Emphasis added.) The supreme court has held that under the
    statute, "the petitioner has the burden to prove the allegations
    in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence. . . . [T]he
    petitioner retains the burden of proof during the [show cause]
    hearing[.]" Hamilton ex rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 126 Hawai#i 294,
    303, 
    270 P.3d 1024
    , 1033 (2012) (citing Kie v. McMahel, 91
    Hawai#i 438, 442, 
    984 P.2d 1264
    , 1268 (App. 1999) ("While at that
    hearing the respondent must 'show cause why' the protective order
    is not necessary, HRS § 586–5.5(a), the burden remains on the
    petitioner to prove the petitioner's underlying allegations by a
    preponderance of the evidence.")).
    In Kie we explained:
    In our view, the order to a respondent to show cause is a
    direction from the court to appear at a hearing to answer
    and to respond to the petition's allegations, rather than a
    mandate which places the burden on the respondent of
    initially going forward with evidence to prove the negative
    of the allegations.
    Kie, 91 Hawai#i at 442, 984 P.2d at 1268.
    The family court made a conclusion of law stating:
    5.    Hawaii Revised Statutes Section 586-5.5. If,
    after hearing relevant evidence, a respondent fails to show
    cause why a restraining order should not be granted, an
    order, for a fixed period of time as the court deems
    appropriate, shall issue.
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    This conclusion of law fails to state that the petitioner has the
    burden to prove the allegations in the petition by a
    preponderance of the evidence. Thus, this conclusion erroneously
    places the burden of proof on Father. Hamilton ex rel. Lethem,
    126 Hawai#i at 303, 
    270 P.3d at 1033
    .
    Nevertheless, the family court evaluated the
    credibility of the witnesses and correctly weighed the evidence
    in the context of Mother's burden to prove the allegations by a
    preponderance of the evidence, finding and concluding:
    70.   After weighing the evidence and the credibility
    of the parties and the witnesses[,] [Mother]'s evidence was
    credible and indicated more likely than not:
    A.     [Father] physically abused [Mother] on
    several occasions.
    B.    More likely than not [Father] engaged in
    inappropriate touching of the parties' minor [C]hild.
    C.    A 10-year order of protection should issue
    against [Father] beginning April 30, 2018 to April 30, 2028.
    A mixed finding of fact and conclusion of law is
    reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard because the
    determination is dependent on the facts and circumstances of each
    individual case. Est. of Klink, 113 Hawai#i at 351, 
    152 P.3d at 523
    . The family court's findings were supported by substantial
    evidence in the record. They were not clearly erroneous. As in
    Kie, although the family court erred in stating the law in COL
    no. 5, the court applied the correct burden of proof and found
    that Mother proved the allegations of abuse by a preponderance of
    the evidence. 91 Hawai#i at 444, 984 P.2d at 1270.
    4.   Father argues that he was "'convicted' of sexual
    misconduct . . . based entirely on hearsay, confirmed by a [Child
    Protective Services] worker without disclosing the allegations to
    him or allowing [him] to respond to these hearsay claims."
    Father was not "convicted" of anything because the family court
    proceeding below was civil, not criminal, in nature. For the
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    reasons discussed in the previous sections, Father's other
    arguments lack merit.
    For the foregoing reasons, the Order for Protection
    entered by the family court on April 30, 2018, is affirmed.
    DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, February 28, 2023.
    On the briefs:
    /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
    Peter Van Name Esser,                 Presiding Judge
    for Respondent-Appellant.
    /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
    Rosa Flores,                          Associate Judge
    for Petitioner-Appellee.
    /s/ Derrick H.M. Chan
    Associate Judge
    9