State v. Ogata ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •   NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    23-JUN-2020
    07:54 AM
    NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    SEAN KEKAULIKE OGATA, Defendant-Appellant
    APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    HONOLULU DIVISION
    (Case No. 1DTA-17-02774)
    SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
    (By:    Ginoza, Chief Judge, Chan and Hiraoka, JJ.)
    Defendant-Appellant Sean Kekaulike Ogata (Ogata) was
    convicted of Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an
    Intoxicant (OVUII) in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS)
    § 291E-61(a)(1).1  Ogata appeals from the "Notice of Entry of
    Judgment and/or Order and Plea/Judgment" (Judgment),2 filed on
    July 6, 2018, and the "Amended Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or
    Order and Plea/Judgment" (Amended Judgment),3 filed on April 24,
    2019, in the District Court of the First Circuit, Honolulu
    1
    HRS § 291E-61(a) (Supp. 2016) provides, in relevant part:
    (a)   A person commits the offense of operating a vehicle
    under the influence of an intoxicant if the person operates
    or assumes actual physical control of a vehicle:
    (1)   While under the influence of alcohol in an
    amount sufficient to impair the person's normal
    mental faculties or ability to care for the
    person and guard against casualty[.]
    2
    The Honorable Melanie Mito May signed the Judgment.
    3
    The Honorable Sherri-Ann L. Iha signed the Amended Judgment.
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Division, State of Hawai#i. Ogata contends the district court
    erred by (1) partially denying his motion to suppress and (2)
    denying his motion to compel discovery. We affirm.
    The only witnesses called during Ogata's trial were
    Honolulu Police Department (HPD) officers Taylor Patten, Jonathan
    Roberts Kauka, and John Funtanilla. Officer Patten testified
    that at about 6:00 a.m. on Saturday, July 15, 2017,4 he was on
    patrol when he received a call about a traffic hazard at the
    intersection of Kalaniana#ole Highway and #Āinakoa Avenue.
    Officer Patten observed a vehicle stopped on the #Āinakoa Avenue
    side of the intersection. He parked behind the vehicle,
    activated his blue lights, and walked to the driver-side door.
    The engine was running, the vehicle was in drive, and the windows
    were rolled up. Ogata was in the driver's seat, leaning back,
    with his foot on the brake. He appeared to be either sleeping or
    unconscious.
    Officer Patten knocked on the window and announced,
    "[p]olice officer." Ogata did not respond. Officer Patten
    raised his voice and repeated the announcement over 10 times.
    Officer Patten testified: "[A]t times [Ogata] would kind of come
    to, come to it, look at me, and then lean back and either go back
    to sleep or lose consciousness in some way."
    At some point Ogata took his foot off the brake and his
    vehicle started rolling slowly downhill in the makai direction,
    through the intersection of #Āinakoa Avenue and Kalaniana#ole
    Highway. HPD officer Siave Seti was also at the scene. As
    Ogata's vehicle was moving forward, Officers Patten and Seti told
    Ogata to "stop the vehicle, put your foot on the brake, put the
    car in [p]ark[.]" Ogata's vehicle had rolled through all three
    #Ewa-bound lanes of Kalaniana#ole Highway before Officer Seti used
    his baton to break the window and the police officers were able
    to stop the vehicle. After Ogata's vehicle was stopped, Ogata
    was extracted from his vehicle and placed in handcuffs. Officer
    4
    We take judicial notice, pursuant to Rule 201 of the Hawaii Rules
    of Evidence, that July 15, 2017, was a Saturday.
    2
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Patten noticed a strong odor of alcohol and observed that Ogata
    had a hard time standing.
    Officer Roberts Kauka, who was also at the scene by
    then, testified that Ogata was very disoriented, had watery eyes
    and slurred speech, gave off a strong smell of alcohol, and could
    not stay on his feet. A third witness, Officer Funtanilla,
    testified that he observed Ogata at the scene with "red,
    bloodshot and watery eyes[]" and that Ogata had the odor of
    alcohol on his breath.
    Officer Patten testified that Ogata was not able to
    respond to questions or verbal commands. He chose not to conduct
    the standardized field sobriety tests because Ogata "[could]
    barely stand" and was having "a hard time answering just basic
    questions." An ambulance was called because Ogata and Officer
    Seti had received minor cuts from shards of glass when Officer
    Seti broke the window of Ogata's vehicle. Officer Patten stood
    by as Ogata was treated in the ambulance, because Ogata was under
    arrest. Officer Patten heard Ogata tell the paramedic that he
    had been drinking.
    Ogata made an oral motion to suppress after the State
    rested its case. Ogata argued there was no reasonable suspicion
    to take Ogata out of his vehicle and handcuff him, which placed
    him in custody. Ogata requested to suppress everything that
    happened after Officer Patten approached Ogata's vehicle while it
    was stopped. Ogata also claimed there was no probable cause to
    arrest him after he was extracted from his vehicle because
    sleeping at an intersection and then subsequently rolling through
    the intersection was not a criminal offense. Thus, Ogata
    requested everything that happened after he was extracted from
    his vehicle be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.
    The district court granted Ogata's motion to suppress
    in part, suppressing all statements Ogata made after he was
    handcuffed. The motion was denied in all other respects. Ogata
    did not present any witnesses and declined to testify. After
    closing arguments, the district court found the witnesses who
    testified credible, and found Ogata guilty of OVUII. This appeal
    followed.
    3
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    (1)   The district court did not err by partially deny-
    ing Ogata's motion to suppress.         We review a trial court's ruling
    on a motion to suppress de novo, to determine whether the ruling
    was right or wrong. State v. Spillner, 116 Hawai#i 351, 357, 
    173 P.3d 498
    , 504 (2007). The movant has the burden of establishing,
    by a preponderance of the evidence, that the statements or items
    sought to be excluded were unlawfully secured and that the right
    to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures was violated
    under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
    article I, section 7 of the Hawai#i Constitution.
    Id. First, we
    determine whether the person was "seized"
    within the meaning of the United States and Hawai#i
    Constitutions. Second, if the person was seized, we
    determine whether the seizure was lawful, i.e., whether the
    police could have temporarily detained the individual
    because they have a reasonable suspicion based on specific
    and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot. If
    the seizure was not supported by reasonable suspicion, the
    seizure was unlawful, and any evidence obtained as a result
    of the initial seizure is inadmissible at trial.
    State v. Weldon, 144 Hawai#i 522, 531, 
    445 P.3d 103
    , 112 (2019)
    (cleaned up).
    Ogata contends that everything that happened after
    Officer Patten first approached Ogata's vehicle should have been
    suppressed, because sleeping at an intersection and then rolling
    through that intersection are not criminal offenses. We
    disagree. Under the circumstances of this case, Officer Patten
    had reasonable suspicion to stop Ogata. After Officer Patten
    announced that he was a police officer, Ogata woke up, looked at
    Officer Patten, and then fell back asleep without responding.
    Officer Patten was entitled to further investigate the situation,
    whether he thought Ogata was asleep, injured, intoxicated, or
    drugged. State v. Keller, 
    403 So. 2d 693
    , 696 (La. 1981) (a
    police officer seeing a person slumped over a steering wheel in a
    vehicle with the engine running, at 3:00 a.m., has reasonable
    suspicion to make an investigatory stop short of an arrest).
    When Ogata's vehicle rolled through the intersection
    and crossed Kalaniana#ole Highway, Officers Patten and Seti were
    authorized to take steps "reasonably necessary to protect their
    personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course
    4
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    of the stop." United States v. Hensley, 
    469 U.S. 221
    , 235
    (1985). "Once police have the reasonable suspicion needed to
    justify an investigatory stop, they may use the forcible means
    necessary to effectuate that stop, provided their actions are
    reasonable under the circumstances." United States v. Weaver,
    
    8 F.3d 1240
    , 1244 (7th Cir. 1993). In this case, Ogata's
    inability to control his vehicle placed the police officers and
    the public at risk of harm, in violation of HRS § 291-2.5
    Officer Patten had probable cause to arrest Ogata for
    OVUII after Ogata was removed from his vehicle.
    Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances
    within one's knowledge and of which one has reasonably
    trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves
    to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe
    that an offense has been committed. This requires
    more than a mere suspicion but less than a certainty.
    State v. Maganis, 109 Hawai#i 84, 86, 
    123 P.3d 679
    , 681 (2005)
    (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). While Ogata was
    being removed from his vehicle, Officer Patten smelled a strong
    odor of alcohol and observed that Ogata had a hard time standing
    and could not respond to questions or verbal commands given to
    him. Officers Roberts Kauka and Funtanilla corroborated that
    Ogata was very disoriented; had red, bloodshot, and watery eyes;
    slurred speech; gave off a strong odor of alcohol; and could not
    stay on his feet. Officer Patten witnessed Ogata operating (or
    failing to control) his vehicle under this condition. There was
    probable cause to arrest Ogata for OVUII.
    There is no indication that Ogata was advised of his
    Miranda rights after he was handcuffed, and the district court
    granted Ogata's motion to suppress his post-arrest statement to
    the paramedic that he had been drinking, and all other evidence
    5
    HRS § 291-2 (2007) provides:
    §291-2 Reckless driving of vehicle or riding of
    animals; penalty. Whoever operates any vehicle or rides any
    animal recklessly in disregard of the safety of persons or
    property is guilty of reckless driving of vehicle or
    reckless riding of an animal, as appropriate, and shall be
    fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than
    thirty days, or both.
    5
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    after he was handcuffed. Even without that evidence, there was
    sufficient evidence for the district court to find Ogata guilty
    of OVUII.
    (2) The district court did not err by denying Ogata's
    motion to compel discovery.     Ogata contends the State failed to
    conduct a search for Brady material concerning misconduct of the
    officers involved in his case. In State v. Peseti, 101 Hawai#i
    172, 
    65 P.3d 119
    (2003), the supreme court adopted the analysis
    of Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 
    480 U.S. 39
    (1987):
    In the typical case where a defendant makes only a
    general request for exculpatory material under Brady
    v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    , [
    83 S. Ct. 1194
    , 
    10 L. Ed. 2d 215
    ] (1963), it is the [prosecution] that decides
    which information must be disclosed. Unless defense
    counsel becomes aware that other exculpatory evidence
    was withheld and brings it to the court's attention,
    the prosecutor's decision on disclosure is final.
    Defense counsel has no constitutional right to conduct
    [their] own search of the State's files to argue
    relevance. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 
    429 U.S. 545
    ,
    559, [
    97 S. Ct. 837
    , 
    51 L. Ed. 2d 30
    ] (1977) ("There is
    no general constitutional right to discovery in a
    criminal case, and Brady did not create one[.]").
    Peseti, 101 Hawai#i at 
    185, 65 P.3d at 132
    (citing 
    Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 59-60
    ) (alterations in original). Ogata did not argue to
    the district court that specific exculpatory or impeachment
    evidence existed, as required by Peseti. The district court did
    not err by denying Ogata's motion to compel discovery.
    Based upon the foregoing, the district court's "Notice
    of Entry of Judgment and/or Order and Plea/Judgment," filed on
    July 6, 2018, and "Amended Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or
    Order and Plea/Judgment," filed on April 24, 2019, are affirmed.
    DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, June 23, 2020.
    On the briefs:
    Donn Fudo,                              /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
    for Plaintiff-Appellee.                 Chief Judge
    Alen M. Kaneshiro,                      /s/ Derrick H.M. Chan
    for Defendant-Appellant.                Associate Judge
    /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
    Associate Judge
    6