State v. Preston ( 2020 )

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Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
26-JUN-2020
07:46 AM
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
TAZ PRESTON, Defendant-Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(HONOLULU DIVISION)
(CASE NO. 1DCW-XX-XXXXXXX)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Ginoza, Chief Judge, Leonard and Hiraoka, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Taz Preston (Preston) appeals from
a Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or Order entered on August 22,
2017 (Judgment), by the District Court of the First Circuit,
Honolulu Division (District Court).1 After a bench trial, the
District Court convicted Preston of one count of Harassment,2 in
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The Honorable Paula Devens presided.
2
Preston was acquitted of Disorderly Conduct, in violation of HRS
§ 711-1101(1)(a) (2014).
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violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 711-1106(1)(a)
(2014).3
Preston raises three points of error on appeal,
contending that: (1) the District Court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss after Honolulu Police Department (HPD) Officer
Richard Townsend (Officer Townsend) failed to appear for further
cross-examination on April 19, 2017; (2) Preston was denied his
speedy trial and due process rights because the District Court
continued the case for further trial multiple times over a span
of 173 days; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to support a
conviction of Harassment.
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we
resolve Preston's points of error as follows:
(1) Preston argues that the District Court erred by
denying a motion to dismiss he purportedly made at trial, on
April 19, 2017. Although a transcript of the proceeding is
included in the record on appeal, it reflects no motion to
dismiss. Minutes of the proceeding provide: "State omot [sic]
to continue-off Townsend not present (was ordered to return);
Denied Defense objection/move to dismiss-denied." However,
3
HRS § 711-1106(1)(a) provides: "A person commits the offense of
harassment if, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm any other person, that
person . . . [s]trikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise touches another person in
an offensive manner or subjects the other person to offensive physical
contact[.]"
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Preston was tried along with co-defendants Joseph Dietz (Dietz)
and Sierra Iona, and each defendant was represented by separate
counsel. The minutes do not specify which defense counsel made
the motion, the basis of the motion, or the District Court's
reason for denying the motion. Thus, the minutes do not provide
a sufficient record to review the issue on appeal.
It was Preston's duty to obtain a complete transcript.
"[A] defendant has a duty to reconstruct, modify, or supplement
the missing portions of the record, and a failure to make a
reasonable attempt to do so precludes him or her from alleging
reversible error." State v. Bates, 84 Hawai#i 211, 217, 933 P.2d
48, 54 (1997). Hawai#i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rules
10(c) and (e) "provide a criminal defendant with several remedies
to correct or modify inaudible portions of the trial transcript."
Bates, 84 Hawai#i at 218, 933 P.2d at 55. Upon review, it
appears that Preston made no attempt to reconstruct the record
pursuant to HRAP 10(c) or to correct or modify the record
pursuant to HRAP 10(e) to cure the apparent omission in the
transcript of the April 19, 2017 proceedings. See State v.
Shigetani, CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2019 WL 1397385, *6 (Haw. App. Mar.
28, 2019) (SDO) ("In this case, the appellate record shows no
attempt by Shigetani to supplement the record or otherwise
utilize [HRAP] Rules 10(c) and (e) (2016) [to correct the
transcript].").
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Without a transcript of the motion to dismiss and the
District Court's ruling on the motion, there is an insufficient
record before the court to address Preston's contention that the
District Court erred in denying an April 19, 2017 motion to
dismiss.
(2) Preston argues that the District Court deprived
him of his right to confront Officer Townsend because Preston's
cross-examination of the officer was extremely brief, spanned
non-consecutive trial days, and was interspersed with testimony
by other witnesses. Preston maintains that neither he nor the
District Court could "adequately assess the credibility of the
witness over such a disjointed duration." Related to this point
is Preston's assertion that the District Court erred by
continuing Officer Townsend's cross-examination when the officer
failed to appear at trial on April 19, 2017, as ordered, and
presented no excuse for his absence.
There is nothing in the record on appeal indicating
that Preston objected to the District Court's continuation of
Officer Townsend's cross-examination, the order in which the
State presented witnesses, or the length of time Preston was
given to cross-examine Officer Townsend. Therefore, Preston
waived these points. See HRAP Rule 28(b)(4).
Nevertheless, because the issues implicate a
fundamental constitutional right, we review them for plain error.
See State v. Yoshino, 50 Haw. 287, 290, 439 P.2d 666, 668 (1968)
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("We have stated in numerous cases that where fundamental
constitutional rights are involved, this court will take
cognizance of the issue though it is raised in this court for the
first time.") (citations omitted); see also State v. Sprattling,
99 Hawai#i 312, 322, 55 P.3d 276, 286 (2002); State v. Bunn, 50
Haw. 351, 355, 440 P.2d 528, 532 (1968). "[T]he main and
essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent
the opportunity of cross-examination, and the exposure of a
witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important
function of the constitutionally protected right of cross
examination." Birano v. State, 143 Hawai#i 163, 183-84, 426 P.3d
387, 407-08 (2018) (citation, internal quotation marks, and
brackets in original omitted). On the other hand, "[a] criminal
defendant's 'right to confront and to cross-examine is not
absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other
legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.'" State v.
Locken, 134 Hawai#i 376, 384, 341 P.3d 1176, 1184 (App. 2014)
(citation omitted).
Hawai#i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 611(a) provides:
Control by court. The court shall exercise reasonable
control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses
and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation
and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the
truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3)
protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
"[HRE Rule 611(a)] states the common-law principle
allowing the court broad discretion in determining order and mode
of interrogation" and is intended "to define broad objectives and
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to leave the attainment of those objectives to the discretion of
the court." Commentary to HRE Rule 611. Under Rule 611, a trial
court has discretion to schedule and determine courtroom
procedure. State v. Christian, 88 Hawai#i 407, 422, 967 P.2d
239, 254 (1998). Still, "the rules of evidence cannot override
the constitutional rights of the accused." State v. Loher, 140
Hawai#i 205, 219, 398 P.3d 794, 808 (2017) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
On March 2, 2017, while Preston's counsel was cross-
examining Officer Townsend, the District Court interrupted to
announce that the adjournment time had passed and that the
District Court would have to continue trial. The District Court
set the continued trial for April 19, 2017, and ordered several
of the State's witnesses, including Officer Townsend, to appear
on that date. On April 19, 2017, Officer Townsend was absent
from trial. Officers Sean Costigan and William Suarez were
questioned, and the District Court continued the trial to May 11
and 12, 2017. On May 11, 2017, Officer Townsend was absent due
to illness. On May 12, 2017, Officer Townsend appeared, and
Preston finished cross-examining him.
At the March 2, 2017 trial, Preston impeached Officer
Townsend regarding his testimony that Preston was being
aggressive when Officer Townsend arrived at the scene of the
incident. Preston asked Officer Townsend to draw diagrams
showing, among other things, where Corporal Derrick Sagawa
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(Corporal Sagawa) was pushed. When Preston resumed his cross-
examination of Officer Townsend on May 12, 2017, Preston began by
reminding the officer that he had drawn diagrams on March 2,
2017. Preston showed him the diagrams and asked if he recognized
them. Officer Townsend responded "Yes." Preston proceeded to
ask a number of questions regarding how and why the push
occurred.
Although Preston claims he was not given adequate time
to cross-examine Officer Townsend or a sufficient opportunity to
impeach the officer's credibility due to the "disjointed" nature
of his cross-examination, Preston cross-examined the officer at
length, Preston's cross-examination on May 12, 2017 appeared to
flow seamlessly from his questioning on March 2, 2017, Preston's
cross-examination of Officer Townsend overall appeared to have
been effective, and Preston does not contend that any query
remained unasked or unanswered.
We conclude that the District Court did not plainly err
or abuse its discretion when it continued Preston's cross-
examination of Officer Townsend and allowed the State to call
other police officers to testify on April 19, and May 11, 2017,
when Officer Townsend failed to appear. We further conclude that
Preston has failed to show that the District Court deprived him
of his due process right to meaningfully cross-examine Officer
Townsend.
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(3) Preston argues that his constitutional right to a
speedy trial was violated because "173[] days from commencement
of trial to resolution [of trial] was unreasonable, oppressive,
and disorderly."
This court has previously considered whether a
defendant's speedy trial rights have been violated in
circumstances where the trial commenced within 180 days of
arrest, in compliance with Hawai#i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule
48, but a relatively short evidentiary trial was conducted over a
prolonged period of time. See State v. Paulmier, CAAP-15-
0000381, 2018 WL 3490557 (Haw. App. July 20, 2018) (mem. op.).
In analyzing whether a defendant's constitutional right to a
speedy trial has been violated, Hawai#i courts apply the
four-part test articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972). See State v. White, 92 Hawai#i 192, 201, 990 P.2d 90, 99
(1999). "The four Barker factors are: (1) length of delay; (2)
the reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his
or her right to speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the
defendant." Id. at 201-02, 990 P.2d at 99-100 (citation
omitted).
Here, Preston objected to the lengthy and interrupted
trial process as a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The
District Court stated that it was due to the many other matters
it has to handle on any given day and that it was taking into
consideration the schedules of the various attorneys. While
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there are no other "findings" in the record that touch upon the
Barker factors, and no written findings entered, it appears that
Preston's trial was conducted over a period of nearly six months,
on seven trial days, in roughly one to two hour segments.4
In State v. Visintin, 143 Hawai#i 143, 157-58, 426 P.3d
367, 381-82 (2018), the supreme court held that this court erred
in considering the defendant's speedy trial claim on the merits
because the trial court in that case had not considered the
Barker factors and had not made any written findings, nor had it
stated findings or conclusions evaluating the Barker factors.
Consistent with the supreme court's ruling in Visintin, this case
must be remanded to the District Court for rendering of findings
of fact and conclusions of law and applying the Barker factors.
Id. at 163, 426 P.3d at 387.
(4) Preston argues that his conviction was based on
insufficient evidence because Corporal Sagawa testified
inconsistently regarding whether a video camera was recording at
the time of the incident underlying the Harassment charge against
Preston, i.e., when Corporal Sagawa was reportedly shoved by
Preston.
"On appeal, the test for a claim of insufficient
evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most
4
As the length of some of the trial sessions is unclear from the
transcripts, and there are no findings of fact, this observation is merely in
aid of review of this point of error and should not be considered a factual
finding by this court.
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favorable to the State, there is substantial evidence to support
the conclusion of the trier of fact." State v. Pesentheiner, 95
Hawai#i 290, 293, 22 P.3d 86, 89 (App. 2001) (citation omitted;
format altered).
In this case, the District Court found that all of the
State's witnesses were credible and testified credibly. See id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ("[I]t is well-
settled that an appellate court will not pass upon issues
dependent upon the credibility of witnesses[.]"). Officer
Townsend testified that when he arrived at the scene of the
incident, Officer Kubo told him there had been a fight inside the
club and bouncers escorted Preston outside. Officer Townsend saw
Preston, apparently intoxicated, aggressively and angrily
confronting police officers who were preventing him from re-
entering the club. Preston yelled and swore at the officers for
five to ten minutes. Corporal Sagawa also testified he also saw
Preston yelling and trying to re-enter the club.
Officer Townsend testified that at some point, Dietz,
Preston's brother, exited the nightclub. Officer Kubo testified
that Preston and Dietz, both clearly upset and agitated, swore
and called out the staff to fight because they would not let
Preston and Dietz back into the club. The police asked Preston
and Dietz to leave. Officer Suarez and Corporal Sagawa testified
that the men eventually walked away, yelling, screaming, and
challenging officers to fight. Officer Suarez testified that the
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men walked to the back of the club and argued with a group of
officers who asked them to leave, then continued walking.
Corporal Sagawa testified that as Preston and Dietz
walked, they continued to behave aggressively. When Corporal
Sagawa told the men they were under arrest and grabbed Preston's
arm, Preston turned around and shoved the corporal with both
hands in the chest area, sending him back a few feet. Four
officers all testified that they saw Preston push Corporal Sagawa
in the chest area, sending the corporal backwards.
The aforementioned testimony provides substantial
evidence showing Preston shoved Corporal Sagawa. The District
Court reasonably inferred that Preston shoved Corporal Sagawa
with the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm him, as immediately
before the shove, Corporal Sagawa told Preston and Dietz they
were under arrest, and throughout the incident, Preston had been
acting belligerently toward the police. See HRS § 711-
1106(1)(a).
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's August
22, 2017 Judgment is vacated, and this case must be remanded to
the District Court for rendering of findings of fact and
conclusions of law and applying the Barker factors. If the
District Court concludes that Preston's constitutional right to a
speedy trial was violated, the District Court must dismiss the
case with prejudice. See Visintin, 143 Hawai#i at 157, 426 P.3d
at 381. If the District Court concludes that Preston's
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constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated, an
amended judgment of conviction may be entered.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, June 26, 2020.
On the briefs:
/s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
Jacob G. Delaplane, Chief Judge
for Defendant-Appellant.
/s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Donn Fudo, Associate Judge
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
City and County of Honolulu, /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
for Plaintiff-Appellee. Associate Judge
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