State v. Parras ( 2020 )


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  •  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    30-JUN-2020
    08:21 AM
    NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
    JAYLORD PARRAS, Defendant-Appellant
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    (CRIMINAL NO. 1PC13-1-001603)
    SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
    (By: Leonard and Wadsworth, JJ., and
    Ginoza, Chief Judge, dissenting)
    Defendant-Appellant Jaylord Parras (Parras) appeals
    from the Judgment of Conviction and Sentence (Judgment), entered
    on February 6, 2019, in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit
    (Circuit Court).1/ After a jury trial, the Circuit Court
    convicted Parras of one count of Sexual Assault in the First
    Degree, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-
    730(1)(b) (2014)2/ (Count 1); one count of Sexual Assault in the
    1/
    The Honorable Glenn J. Kim presided.
    2/
    HRS § 707-730(1)(b) provides, in relevant part:
    (1) A person commits the offense of sexual assault in the
    first degree if:
    . . . .
    (b)   The person knowingly engages in sexual
    penetration with another person who is less than
    fourteen years old[.]
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER
    Third Degree, in violation of HRS § 707-732(1)(b) (2014)3/ (Count
    2); and two counts of Sexual Assault in the First Degree, in
    violation of HRS § 707-730(1)(c) (2014)4/ (Counts 3 and 4).             The
    convictions stemmed from charges that Parras had sexually
    assaulted the complaining witness ("CW"), his half-sister, on
    separate occasions when she was a minor. The Circuit Court
    sentenced Parras to twenty years of imprisonment on each of
    Counts 1, 3 and 4, and five years of imprisonment on Count 2,
    with the sentences for Counts 1, 3, and 4 to run concurrently,
    but consecutively to the sentence on Count 2.
    On appeal, Parras contends that the Circuit Court erred
    in: (1) precluding Parras's former girlfriend, CA, from
    testifying that he was a "peaceful, non-violent person"; and (2)
    sentencing Parras to consecutive terms of imprisonment allegedly
    based in part on his parents' mistreatment of the CW.
    For the reasons explained below, we vacate the Judgment
    and remand the case to the Circuit Court for further proceedings.
    3/
    HRS § 707-732(1)(b) provides, in relevant part:
    (1) A person commits the offense of sexual assault in the
    third degree if:
    . . . .
    (b)   The person knowingly subjects to sexual contact
    another person who is less than fourteen years
    old or causes such a person to have sexual
    contact with the person[.]
    4/
    HRS § 707-730(1)(c) provides, in relevant part:
    (1) A person commits the offense of sexual assault in the
    first degree if:
    . . . .
    (c)   The person knowingly engages in sexual
    penetration with a person who is at least than
    fourteen years old but less than sixteen years
    old; provided that:
    (i)    The person is not less than five years
    older than the minor; and
    (ii)   The person is not legally married to the
    minor[.]
    2
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    I.   RELEVANT BACKGROUND
    At trial, the CW testified in part as follows: In
    November 2007, when she was 13 years old, she, her mother and her
    step-father moved to a house in Waipahu. During that time,
    Parras "came to the door" and was "crying" because he had
    recently broken up with CA. Later that night, the CW was talking
    with Parras in the room where he was staying. Parras was laying
    next to the CW on the floor. At some point, the CW "was probably
    half asleep" or sleeping, when she woke up to Parras "fingering
    [her]." Parras had "reached into [her] shorts, and he started
    rubbing [her] vagina" with his hand and "inserted his fingers . .
    . into [her] vagina." Parras "got up on his knees" and pulled
    off CW's shorts and underwear, but left on her shirt. Parras
    then "inserted his penis into [her] vagina[.] CW said "no," but
    did not think Parras heard her. CW tried but was unable to push
    Parras off of her because he was bigger than she was.
    Eventually, the CW "just got up and left." The CW did not tell
    anyone about this incident right after it happened because she
    was hurt, embarrassed, angry and confused.
    The CW continued her testimony as follows: After the
    CW's family renovated their house in 2008, Parras "officially
    moved in." The CW was about 14 or 15 years old. One evening, as
    the CW and Parras were home alone, Parras "came up from behind
    [her,] and "started tickling [her]" with "his hands to . . .
    [her] sides." Parras and the CW were laughing as they fell to
    the floor. Parras was wearing only boxers. Parras "was on top
    of [the CW]," and "just kept tickling [her] and . . . pulled
    [her] shorts off as he was tickling [her]." Parras then
    "inserted his penis into [the CW's] vagina[.]" Parras also
    "fingered [the CW]" by putting "his fingers . . inside of [her]
    vagina." CW tried to fight Parras with her legs and told him
    "no." As she said "no," he put his hand over her mouth. Parras
    did not stop and "was just laughing." The CW tried to get Parras
    off of her, but she "was hurting, and . . . sad . . . so [she]
    just stopped. [She] got tired." Eventually, Parras ejaculated
    and "just left." The CW did not tell anyone immediately about
    this incident.
    3
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER
    Parras testified that he did not commit these acts, and
    it was "all a lie."5/ He said that "around 2005," he moved out
    of his family's house to live with CA, and in December 2008, when
    he and CA broke up, he went to live with his friend, Craig, for a
    short period of time. In early summer, 2009, he met his current
    wife.
    As part of his defense, Parras called CA as a witness.
    She testified that Parras was her ex-boyfriend and that, in 2006,
    she had a child with him. She further testified that her
    relationship with Parras continued from 2004 until December 2008
    or January 2009. According to CA, she and Parras began living
    together at her parents' house around March 2006, when she was
    about seven months pregnant. She stated that Parras lived with
    her until they broke up sometime after mid-December 2008.
    Having elicited testimony about the nature and length
    of CA's relationship with Parras, defense counsel continued his
    examination of CA as follows:
    Q. Would you say based on your knowledge of him that
    you could form an opinion about whether he is a peaceful
    person or a violent person?
    [DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY (DPA)]:      Your Honor, I'm
    going to object. Relevance and --
    THE COURT:   Sustained.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:   Your Honor, can we be heard on
    that?
    THE COURT: No. Sustained. I don't believe peaceful
    or nonviolent is relevant to the issues in this case.
    Sustained.
    In his redirect examination of CA, defense counsel
    continued:
    Q. State just asked you if you guys would fight
    during your relationship?
    A.   Yes.
    Q. Given your knowledge of [Parras], would you say
    that you could form an opinion about whether he's peaceful
    or violent?
    [DPA]:   Objection, Your Honor.   Relevance.
    THE COURT:   Sustained.
    5/
    It appears there was no physical, medical, or scientific evidence
    that directly supported either party's claims.
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    Q. (By [DEFENSE COUNSEL]) Did he -- was he ever -- was
    he ever aggressive or violent with you?
    [DPA]:    Same objection, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: I'll allow aggressive.
    THE WITNESS: No.
    II.   DISCUSSION
    Parras contends that the Circuit Court erred in
    precluding CA from providing opinion evidence of Parras's
    pertinent character traits — namely, that he was a "peaceful,
    non-violent person" — under Hawaii Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rules
    404(a)(1)6/ and 405.7/     He argues that such evidence was relevant
    and admissible based on this court's decision in State v. Iosefa,
    77 Hawai#i 177, 
    880 P.2d 1224
     (App. 1994).
    In Iosefa, the court held that a witness for the
    defense should have been allowed to testify that the defendant,
    who was charged with sexually assaulting a 16-year-old girl, was
    "a peaceful, non-violent person." Id. at 186, 
    880 P.2d at 1233
    .
    The court reasoned that testimony of the defendant's good and
    peaceful character directly related to whether he would sexually
    assault a young girl, and was therefore admissible under HRE Rule
    404(a)(1). 
    Id.
     (citing State v. Faafiti, 
    54 Haw. 637
    , 
    513 P.2d 697
     (1973)).
    6/
    HRE Rule 404(a)(1) provides:
    (a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's
    character or a trait of a person's character is not
    admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
    therewith on a particular occasion, except:
    (1)      Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent
    trait of character of an accused offered by an
    accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
    same[.]
    7/
    HRE Rule 405 provides, in relevant part:
    (a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence
    of character or a trait of character of a person is
    admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation
    or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On
    cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant
    specific instances of conduct.
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    The State points out that in Iosefa, the applicable
    sexual assault charges required the prosecution to prove that the
    defendant "knowingly subject[ed] another person to an act of
    sexual penetration" or "to sexual contact" "by strong
    compulsion." Id. at 184, 
    880 P.2d at 1231
     (emphasis added).
    Evidence of the defendant's peaceful and non-violent character
    was therefore relevant to whether he acted with "strong
    compulsion." In contrast, the State argues, Parras was charged
    with "strict liability sexual assaults" of the CW based on her
    age; thus, "strong compulsion" or physical force was not an
    element of the charged offenses. According to the State,
    testimony that Parras was a peaceful, non-violent person was
    therefore not admissible as evidence of a "pertinent trait of
    character" under HRE Rule 404(a)(1).
    The State is correct that evidence of physical force
    was not required to prove the charged offenses here.
    Nevertheless, as part of its theory of the case, the State
    presented evidence that Parras used physical force in committing
    the charged offenses. The State used this evidence to bolster
    the CW's credibility, arguing to the jury that the CW was
    believable based in part on her demeanor and manner while
    testifying that Parras had forced himself on her, she had told
    him "no," and she had tried unsuccessfully to fight him off.
    Moreover, the State used the evidence of force to argue to the
    jury that Parras knowingly engaged in the charged conduct, which
    was an element of each of the charged offenses. For example, in
    her closing, the DPA argued as to Count 2: "Defendant knew what
    he was doing because she told him to stop, and he didn't."
    Similarly, the DPA argued as to Count 3: "And we know that the
    defendant did this knowingly because she was trying to scream.
    She was trying to get him off of her. She was trying to fight
    him." Thus, while the State was not required to prove that
    Parras used force in committing the charged offenses, the State's
    theory of the case depended on his use of force. Under these
    circumstances, testimony by CA that Parras was a peaceful, non-
    violent person would have been evidence of a "pertinent trait of
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    character" under HRE Rule 404(a)(1).8/ The Circuit Court
    therefore erred in concluding that such evidence was irrelevant.
    Because the Circuit Court ruled on relevance grounds,
    it does not appear that the court evaluated whether the probative
    value of the excluded character evidence was "substantially
    outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
    issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
    delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
    evidence." HRE Rule 403. Based on this record, we cannot
    conclude, as the State argues, that the evidence was excludable
    on any of these bases as a matter of law. On remand, if the case
    is retried and Parras again offers CA's opinion testimony that he
    is a peaceful, non-violent person, the Circuit Court will have to
    weigh the potential prejudicial effects of the testimony against
    its probative value under HRE Rule 403.
    Furthermore, based on the record as a whole, we cannot
    conclude that the Circuit Court's error was harmless beyond a
    reasonable doubt. See State v. Haili, 103 Hawai#i 89, 100, 
    79 P.3d 1263
    , 1274 (2003). The only evidence available regarding
    the alleged sexual assaults was the conflicting testimony of the
    only two direct witnesses, the CW and Parras. As a result, the
    respective credibility of the CW and Parras was of paramount
    importance, and the trial was largely a credibility contest
    between these two witnesses. In this context, CA's testimony
    that Parras was a peaceful, non-violent person — an opinion based
    on her several-year relationship with him — could conceivably
    have boosted his credibility in the eyes of the jury. See State
    v. Rivera, 
    62 Haw. 120
    , 126, 
    612 P.2d 526
    , 531 (1980) ("An
    accused has the right to give evidence of personal character
    traits associated with the basic nature of the offense with which
    he is charged as circumstantial evidence of his innocence, and
    evidence of those traits to support his credibility as a
    witness." (internal citations omitted)).
    8/
    The Circuit Court did not find, and the State does not argue, that
    CA was not "sufficiently acquainted" with Parras to be competent to opine as
    to the character traits at issue. See Faafiti, 54 Haw. at 644, 513 P.3d at
    702.
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    The State argues that the exclusion of this evidence
    was harmless, because other evidence of Parras's character was
    admitted. Specifically, CA was allowed to testify that Parras
    was never "aggressive" with her. Similarly, Parras's wife, JP,
    testified that Parras was "peaceful" and not "sexually
    aggressive."9/ Given this other testimony by CA and JP, the
    State contends that the precluded testimony by CA was cumulative.
    We conclude otherwise for two reasons. First, evidence
    that Parras was not "aggressive" with CA or "sexually aggressive"
    with JP was not admitted for the purpose of establishing his
    character for peacefulness and non-violence. Indeed, the Circuit
    Court precluded CA from testifying even as to whether Parras was
    ever "violent" with her. Under HRE Rule 404(a)(1), Parras was
    entitled to offer evidence that he was a peaceful and non-violent
    person — a pertinent trait of good character — which may have
    carried greater weight with the jury than narrower testimony
    denying "aggressive" past conduct against a particular witness.
    See Commentary to HRE Rule 404. In short, the evidence admitted
    regarding Parras's character was materially incomplete.
    Second, the Circuit Court improperly undermined the
    effectiveness of any evidence of Parras's character for
    peacefulness and non-violence by stating in the jury's presence
    during CA's testimony, "I don't believe peaceful or nonviolent
    [sic] is relevant to the issues in this case." We cannot
    conclude that CA's testimony that Parras was a peaceful, non-
    violent person would have been cumulative, where the only other
    evidence that Parras was "peaceful" was offered through the
    testimony of his wife — the day after the Circuit Court made this
    prejudicial statement. Similarly, we cannot conclude that the
    Circuit Court's statement did not diminish in the eyes of the
    jury the other admitted testimony regarding Parras's character.
    Accordingly, we conclude that the Circuit Court erred
    in precluding CA from testifying that Parras was a "peaceful,
    non-violent person," and we cannot say that the error was
    9/
    JP also testified that Parras never forced her "to have sexual
    contact with . . . him."
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    harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Given our conclusion, we do
    not reach Parras's second issue on appeal.
    III. CONCLUSION
    For these reasons, we vacate the Judgment of Conviction
    and Sentence, entered on February 6, 2019, by the Circuit Court
    of the First Circuit. The case is remanded to the Circuit Court
    for further proceedings.
    DATED:   Honolulu, Hawai#i, June 30, 2020.
    On the briefs:                        /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
    Associate Judge
    William H. Jameson, Jr.,
    Deputy Public Defender,
    for Defendant-Appellant.              /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
    Associate Judge
    Stephen K. Tsushima,
    Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
    City & County of Honolulu,
    for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CAAP-19-0000146

Filed Date: 6/30/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/30/2020