State v. Michels ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
24-MAR-2023
08:00 AM
Dkt. 68 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
KRISTINE MICHELS, Defendant-Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
(NORTH & SOUTH KONA DIVISION)
(CASE NO. 3DTA-18-00638)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Ginoza, Chief Judge, Leonard and Nakasone, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Kristine L.T. Michels (Michels)
appeals from the July 17, 2018 Judgment and Notice of Entry of
Judgment (Judgment) entered by the District Court of the Third
Circuit (District Court).1 Michels pled nolo contendere to
Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant (OVUII),
in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291E-61(a)(1)2
1
The Honorable Margaret K. Masunaga presided.
2
HRS § 291E-61 states, in pertinent part:
§ 291E-61 Operating a vehicle under the influence of
an intoxicant. (a) A person commits the offense of
(continued...)
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(2020). The District Court found her guilty and, inter alia,
revoked her driver's license for one year.
Michels raises five points of error on appeal,
contending that the District Court abused its discretion and
committed reversible error when it: (1) denied her March 27,
2018 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Affidavit and the June 12,
2018 Motion to Reconsider Denial of Motion to Dismiss; (2)
granted Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawaii's (State's) first
Motion to Quash at a hearing on April 25, 2018, without notice to
Michels or her counsel; (3) twice quashed subpoenas served on the
State; (4) denied her second Motion to Dismiss the Complaint with
Prejudice, for procedural due process violations; and (5) did not
strike memoranda and proposed orders that were untimely filed by
the State.
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised, as well as the
relevant legal authorities, we address Michels's points of error
as follows:
(1) Michels argues that the Complaint was defective
and should have been dismissed because it was not supported by
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(...continued)
operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant if
the person operates or assumes actual physical control of a
vehicle:
(1) While under the influence of alcohol in an
amount sufficient to impair the person's normal
mental faculties or ability to care for the
person and guard against casualty.
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the sworn statement of a witness with direct observations of
Michels's misconduct and that the supporting declaration was
insufficient as a matter of law. Whether the Complaint complied
with any applicable statute and/or rule is a question of law we
review de novo. State v. Thompson, 150 Hawai#i 262, 266, 500
P.3d 447, 451 (2021).
The Hawai#i Supreme Court recently held, in State v.
Mortensen-Young, –-P.3d--, 2023 WL 2519396, *15 (2023), that HRS
§ 805-1 (2014) applies only to criminal complaints used to obtain
a penal summons or arrest warrant.3 In other cases, such as the
OVUII prosecutions at issue in Mortensen-Young, Hawai#i Rules of
Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 7 provides the proper framework to
analyze the sufficiency of complaints.4 Id. at *14-15. In
3
HRS § 805-1 states, in pertinent part:
§ 805-1 Complaint; form of warrant. When a complaint
is made to any prosecuting officer of the commission of any
offense, the prosecuting officer shall examine the
complainant, shall reduce the substance of the complaint to
writing, and shall cause the complaint to be subscribed by
the complainant under oath, which the prosecuting officer is
hereby authorized to administer, or the complaint shall be
made by declaration in accordance with the rules of court.
4
HRPP Rule 7 states, in pertinent part:
Rule 7. INDICTMENT, INFORMATION, OR COMPLAINT
. . . .
(d) Nature and contents. The charge shall be a plain,
concise and definite statement of the essential facts
constituting the offense charged . . . . A complaint shall
be signed by the prosecutor. The charge need not contain a
formal conclusion or any other matter not necessary to such
statement . . . . The charge shall state for each count the
official or customary citation of the statute, rule,
regulation or other provision of law which the defendant is
alleged therein to have violated.
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Mortensen-Young, the supreme court held that the trial court
improperly dismissed the complaints against the appellees,
reasoning that the charging instruments had complied with HRPP
Rule 7(d), and were thus sufficient to initiate prosecutions for
OVUII. Id.
Here, as in Mortensen-Young, HRS § 805-1 is
inapplicable because the Complaint was not used to obtain a penal
summons or arrest warrant. The Complaint set forth a plain and
concise statement of the essential facts, was signed by the
prosecutor, and referenced the statute that Michels allegedly
violated, as required by HRPP Rule 7(d). Therefore, the
Complaint was sufficient to initiate the subject prosecution.
See Mortensen-Young, 2023 WL 2519396, at *15.
We conclude that the Complaint was not defective and
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Defendant's first Motion to Dismiss on that basis.
(2) Michels argues that the District Court abused its
discretion by granting the State's first Motion to Quash.
Michels submits that she was denied procedural due process when
the District Court granted the motion without Michels or her
counsel having notice or an opportunity to be heard. As the
supreme court has stated:
Article I, section 5 of the Hawai#i Constitution
provides in relevant part that "[n]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law[.]" Procedural due process claims are addressed in two
steps: "First, we must determine whether a 'liberty' or
'property' interest has been interfered with by the State;
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second, we must determine what specific procedures are
required to satisfy due process."
De La Garza v. State, 129 Hawai#i 429, 438-39, 302 P.3d 697, 706-
07 (2013) (quoting State v. Bani, 97 Hawai#i 285, 293, 36 P.3d
1255, 1263 (2001)). The State concedes that the District Court
improperly granted the first Motion to Quash a subpoena issued by
Michels, but argues that under the circumstances of this case,
the error was harmless.
Michels issued a subpoena to the deputy prosecutor who
signed the Complaint, which was quashed without proper notice to
Michels of the first Motion to Quash. Michels issued a second
subpoena to the deputy prosecutor, which was also quashed, but
only after Michels was provided proper notice and an opportunity
to be heard on the second Motion to Quash, as well as a related,
second Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.
We conclude that the District Court erred in granting
the first Motion to Quash, but that the court's error was
harmless. The first and second subpoenas were identical and the
issue of whether the State was required to produce the deputy
prosecutor for testimony was fully litigated before the District
Court less than a month after the District Court improperly
granted the State's first Motion to Quash. Michels was given an
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner on the issue, and there is no reasonable possibility that
the District Court's error may have contributed to Michels's
conviction.
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(3) Michels argues that the District Court erred in
granting the second Motion to Quash, contending that the deputy
prosecutor's testimony was needed to resolve a factual issue for
the Motion to Dismiss, i.e., whether the officer or the deputy
prosecutor were percipient witnesses and "to establish facts
determinative of the issues, to wit: A declaration in support of
a complaint must clearly state how, when and by whom the
information stated therein was gleaned. Neither the complaint
nor the declaration in this case do that." Michels states that
she is not challenging the sufficiency of the charging instrument
per se; rather she is challenging the form of the declaration
allegedly supporting the Complaint.
As discussed above, the Complaint complied with HRPP
Rule 7(d), which does not require any declaration in support of a
complaint. Rather, HRPP Rule 7 requires that a complaint be
signed by the prosecutor, which it was in this case. We conclude
that Michels's third point of error is without merit.
(4) Michels argues that the District Court abused its
discretion in denying Michels's second Motion to Dismiss, and the
State violated Michels's procedural due process rights by
declining to negotiate with Michels regarding Michels's proposed
stipulation of fact.
As to her due process rights, Michels contends that
dismissal should have been granted because she suffered the
following prejudice: (1) the inability to object to the State's
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first Motion to Quash; (2) unwarranted delay of more than one
month, which increased her emotional worry; and (3) additional
legal fees "created by the fight put up by the [State] trying to
keep its deputy off the stand, unreasonably refusing to negotiate
to a stipulated facts hearing."
As discussed above, although the District Court erred
in ruling on the first Motion to Quash, under the circumstances
of this case, the error was harmless.
The referenced delay appears to have stemmed from a
continuance. "A motion for continuance is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, and the court's ruling will not be
disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of that
discretion." State v. Williander, 142 Hawai#i 155, 162, 415 P.3d
897, 904 (2018) (quoting State v. Lee, 9 Haw. App. 600, 603, 856,
P.2d 1279, 1281 (1993)). In order for the grant or denial of a
continuance to amount to a procedural due process violation, the
moving party must establish the deprivation of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. See, e.g., Rapp v. Schmidt,
No. 27883, 2008 WL 4001189, at *2 (Haw. App. Aug. 29, 2008) (SDO)
(holding that the movants failed to show how denying their
continuance request deprived them of any protected property
interest or due process rights). Michels provides no factual or
legal support showing how a continuance deprived her of a
protected property interest or her due process rights, submitting
only that "[t]o have allowed a continuance is like laughing at
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the Defendant and belittling the protections she has under the
law." We glean no such inappropriate conduct from the record on
appeal and we conclude that this argument does not warrant the
requested relief.
Similarly, Michels provides no factual or legal support
for the proposition that incurring legal fees in response to the
State's efforts to preclude the deputy prosecutor's testimony was
tantamount to a due process violation. We conclude that this
argument is without merit.
Michels makes no discernible argument in support of her
assertion that the State's failure to negotiate a stipulation of
facts constituted a due process violation.
Accordingly, we reject Michels's argument that the
District Court erred in denying her second Motion to Dismiss.
(5) In her final point of error, Michels argues that
the District Court abused its discretion by declining to strike
late filings by the State.
Trial courts are granted broad discretion to decide
whether to accept late filings and grant appropriate relief.
HRPP Rule 45(c) sets deadlines for parties to serve, inter alia,
motions, opposing memoranda, and replies, but provides the court
discretion to alter the deadlines. See also HRPP Rule 49(d).
Here, the District Court exercised its discretion to
accept certain late filings by the State. Michels did not
identify any prejudice stemming from the District Court's
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decision at trial, and on appeal makes only conclusory statements
about prejudice being "apparent." On the record before us, we
cannot conclude that the District Court abused its discretion by
accepting the State's late filings.
For these reasons, the District Court's July 17, 2018
Judgment is affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, March 24, 2023.
On the briefs:
/s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
Frank L. Miller, Chief Judge
for Defendant-Appellant.
/s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Timothy J. Rodes, Associate Judge
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
County of Hawai#i, /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
for Plaintiff-Appellee. Associate Judge
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