State v. Milne ( 2020 )


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  •   NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    30-OCT-2020
    08:16 AM
    Dkt. 45 AMMO
    NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    NOGUCHI MILNE, Defendant-Appellee
    APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    (CR. NO. 1FFC-XX-XXXXXXX)
    AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION
    (By:    Ginoza, Chief Judge, Leonard and Wadsworth, JJ.)
    Plaintiff-Appellant State of Hawai#i (State) appeals
    from an "Order Granting Defendant's Oral Motion to Dismiss Count
    II without Prejudice" (Dismissal Order) entered on July 26, 2019,
    by the Family Court of the First Circuit (Family Court).1
    In this case, the State filed a Complaint against
    Defendant-Appellee Noguchi Milne (Milne), charging him with two
    counts: Abuse of Family or Household Members with respect to
    Complaining Witness #1 (CW1), in violation of Hawaii Revised
    Statutes (HRS) § 709-906(1) and (5)2 (Count 1); and Assault in
    1
    The Honorable Kevin A. Souza presided.
    2
    HRS § 709-906 (2014) provides, in relevant part:
    (1) It shall be unlawful for any person, singly
    or in concert, to physically abuse a family or
    household member or to refuse compliance with the
    (continued...)
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    the Third Degree with respect to Complaining Witness #2 (CW2), in
    violation of HRS § 707-712(1)(a)3 (Count 2).          Both charges are
    based on alleged conduct occurring on the same date.
    On appeal, the State contends that the Family Court
    erred by dismissing Count 2 on the basis that it lacked subject
    matter jurisdiction over Count 2.
    We hold the Family Court has jurisdiction with regard
    to Count 2, and therefore, we vacate the Dismissal Order and
    remand for further proceedings.
    I. Background
    On July 22, 2019, at a trial call for this case, the
    State requested a continuance because CW1 and CW2 failed to
    appear despite being served with subpoenas. The Family Court
    granted a continuance over Milne's objection. Milne then orally
    moved to dismiss Count 2 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
    Milne asserted that CW2 was the father of CW1, CW1 is Milne's
    girlfriend, and that CW2 and Milne did not live or reside in the
    same household.
    When asked by the Family Court its basis for subject
    matter jurisdiction over Count 2, the State requested a written
    motion so that it could respond in writing and also so that it
    could have the input of the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney who
    charged the case as to why Count 2 was included. Instead, the
    Family Court asked the State to review HRS § 571-14. HRS Chapter
    2
    (...continued)
    lawful order of a police officer under subsection (4).
    The police, in investigating any complaint of abuse of
    a family or household member, upon request, may
    transport the abused person to a hospital or safe
    shelter.
    . . . .
    (5) Abuse of a family or household member and
    refusal to comply with the lawful order of a police
    officer under subsection (4) are misdemeanors[.]
    3
    HRS § 707-712(1)(a) (2014) provides, in part: "(1) A person commits
    the offense of assault in the third degree if the person: (a) Intentionally,
    knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another person[.]"
    2
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    571 addresses Family Courts, and HRS § 571-14(b), provides:
    HRS § 571-14 Jurisdiction; adults.
    . . .
    (b) The court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the
    district court over violations of sections 707-712, 707-717,
    707-722, 708-822, 708-823, 710-1010.5, 711-1106, and
    711-1106.5 when multiple offenses are charged through
    complaint or indictment and at least one offense is a
    violation of an order issued pursuant to chapter 586 or a
    violation of section 709-906.
    HRS § 571-14(b) (2014) (emphases added).4
    In addressing the Family Court's request to review HRS
    § 571-14, the State asserted:5
    And, your honor, under section (9)(b) the -- the court
    would have concurrent jurisdiction over the Assault
    Third given the -- it'd be one of the offenses in this
    case would be under the jurisdiction of Family Court,
    which would be the Count 1.
    In turn, Milne's counsel responded:
    . . . my response to that is that under subsection
    (9)(b) is that that's if it was as to pertaining to
    the same complaining witness. However, in this matter
    the two different counts are represented by offenses,
    again [sic] two different complaining witnesses.
    Therefore the court does not have jurisdiction over
    Count 2 relating to the second complaining witness.
    The Family Court asked Milne's counsel "where do you get the
    limiting language that it has to relate to the same complaining
    witness?" Milne's counsel answered that "there is no limiting
    language but that is the defense's argument." The State asserted
    that HRS § 571-14(b) contains no language that limits the
    statute's provisions to the same CW.
    The Family Court then orally ruled as follows:
    The court reads 571-14 as permissive and not mandatory
    as to subsection (b), and because the complaining
    witness in Count 2 is not a family or household member
    to Mr. Milne, the court is, based on the
    representations of counsel, going to be dismissing
    4
    As noted above, Milne was charged with violating HRS § 707-712
    (Assault in the Third Degree) as to CW2 and charged with violating HRS § 709-
    906 (Abuse of Family or Household Members) as to CW1.
    5
    In the transcript of the proceeding, the Family Court and both
    counsel referred to "subsection 9(b)," but it appears that they all were
    referencing HRS § 571-14(b).
    3
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Count 2 without prejudice and the State would be free
    to refile Count 2 in District Court as to that
    complaining witness.
    Subsequently, on July 26, 2019, the Family Court
    entered the written Dismissal Order which contains no findings
    and states in relevant part:
    After consideration of the arguments of counsels, this
    Court granted the Defendant's oral motion to dismiss Count
    II for lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and it is
    further ordered that Count II be dismissed without
    prejudice.
    IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Oral Motion
    to dismiss Count II is GRANTED. Furthermore, Count II is
    dismissed without prejudice for lack of Subject Matter
    Jurisdiction.
    (Emphasis added).
    II. Interpretation of HRS § 571-14(b)
    "Statutory interpretation is a question of law
    reviewable de novo." State v. Castillon, 144 Hawai#i 406, 411,
    
    443 P.3d 98
    , 103 (2019) (citing Panado v. Bd. of Trs., Emps.'
    Ret. Sys., 134 Hawai#i 1, 10, 
    332 P.3d 144
    , 153 (2014)).6 In
    reviewing questions of statutory interpretation, we are guided by
    the following principles:
    First, the fundamental starting point for
    statutory-interpretation is the language of the
    statute itself. Second, where the statutory language
    is plain and unambiguous, our sole duty is to give
    effect to its plain and obvious meaning. Third,
    implicit in the task of statutory construction is our
    foremost obligation to ascertain and give effect to
    the intention of the legislature, which is to be
    obtained primarily from the language contained in the
    statute itself. Fourth, when there is doubt,
    doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or
    6
    Milne asserts the Family Court’s decision to decline jurisdiction
    should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, relying on NB v. GA, 133
    Hawai#i 436, 444, 
    329 P.3d 341
    , 349 (App. 2014). However, Milne’s reliance on
    NB is misplaced as NB did not address the issue of concurrent jurisdiction.
    In NB, this court vacated the Family Court’s decision to decline jurisdiction
    based on its lack of findings on statutory factors that made Hawaii an
    "inconvenient forum" pursuant to HRS § 583A–207, which provides, in part: "A
    court of this State which has jurisdiction under this chapter to make a
    child-custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any
    time if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances
    and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum." HRS § 583A–
    207(a) (2006).
    Here, the Family Court's written order states that it lacks subject
    matter jurisdiction. This is a question of law.
    4
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    uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an
    ambiguity exists.
    Id. (quoting Panado, 134 Hawai#i at 10-11, 332 P.3d at 153-54).
    It appears that Milne now concedes on appeal that the
    Family Court had concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over
    Count 2 as long as Count 1 was pending.7 We conclude this
    concession is proper. Here, under the plain language of HRS
    § 571-14(b), the Family Court has concurrent jurisdiction with
    the district court over violations of specified offenses,
    including HRS § 707-712 (Assault in the Third Degree), when
    multiple offenses are charged in a complaint or an indictment and
    at least one offense is, inter alia, a violation of HRS § 709-906
    (Abuse of Family or Household Members). The Complaint in this
    case meets the requirements for concurrent jurisdiction under HRS
    § 571-14(b).
    Even assuming there is an ambiguity as to whether HRS
    § 571-14(b) limits charges of multiple offenses to the same
    complaining witness, as Milne argued below, the legislative
    history reflects otherwise.
    When there is ambiguity in a statute, "the meaning of
    the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the
    context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and
    sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their
    true meaning." Moreover, the courts may resort to
    extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent, such
    as legislative history, or the reason and spirit of
    the law.
    Castro v. Melchor, 142 Hawai#i 1, 24, 
    414 P.3d 53
    , 76 (2018)
    (citation omitted).
    Subsection (b) to HRS § 571-14 was added in 1998 by way
    of Act 64. Relevant legislative history for S.B. No. 2697, which
    became Act 64, provides:
    The purpose of this bill . . . is to modify the
    jurisdiction of the family, district and circuit
    courts to rectify jurisdictional conflicts resulting
    from criminal and other related activities involving
    children, parents, spouses, and other family members.
    7
    Milne's answering brief incorrectly refers to himself as the
    "Appellant." Moreover, the answering brief does not accurately cite or quote
    HRS § 571-14 in several instances.
    5
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    Your Committee finds that there is a great need
    for concurrent jurisdiction to streamline the judicial
    process in family related cases which are assigned to
    separate courts due to the nature of the offense. For
    example, if a person assaults another individual while
    violating a family court restraining order, under
    current law the the [sic] two violations of law would
    be heard in separate courts. Your Committee further
    finds that concurrent jurisdiction will make the
    judicial process in these instances more efficient and
    effective. However, your Committee finds that the
    provisions of this bill, as submitted, are too broad
    to provide adequate direction as to which court would
    have jurisdiction in the types of cases which are
    often assigned to both family court and district or
    circuit court.
    Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 2649, in 1998 Senate Journal, at 1071
    (emphasis added).8 This legislative history shows that the
    Legislature intended to provide for concurrent jurisdiction under
    Act 64, even when the multiple charged offenses involve different
    complaining witnesses.
    Thus, the Family Court erred in its Dismissal Order by
    dismissing Count 2 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
    III. The Family Court Did Not Exercise Discretion
    Milne's main contentions on appeal are based on what
    the Family Court stated orally, that the court "reads [HRS §]
    571-14 as permissive and not mandatory as to subsection (b)."
    Notwithstanding that the Family Court's written Dismissal Order
    states that it dismissed Count 2 for "lack of Subject Matter
    Jurisdiction," Milne argues the Family Court "did not abuse its
    8
    Another committee report for S.B. No. 2697 states, in relevant part:
    Your Committee finds that one incident can give rise
    to several different charges. Some of these charges, like a
    violation of a family court restraining order or misdemeanor
    abuse of family and household member, fall under the
    jurisdiction of the family court, while others may fall
    under the jurisdiction of the circuit or district courts.
    Current law prevents the State from bringing all the related
    charges at one time before one court.
    This bill addresses that problem by giving the
    circuit, district, and family courts concurrent
    jurisdictions over certain offenses[.]
    House Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1055-98, in 1998 House Journal, at 1482.
    Ultimately, Act 64 provided for concurrent jurisdiction over the specified
    offenses in the family court and district court (but not the circuit court).
    6
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    discretion when it declined to exercise its concurrent
    jurisdiction over Count 2 because based on the State's
    representations, it was uncertain whether the State would have
    been able to proceed in both counts at the next trial call, and
    [the] State failed to show that except for different
    complainants, the evidence in both counts was the same." Milne
    makes speculative arguments as to why the Family Court allegedly
    decided not to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction, based on
    Milne's assertion of different scenarios that could occur and
    purported inferences that have no basis in the record. In short,
    notwithstanding the oral statements of the Family Court, the
    written Dismissal Order filed thereafter is based on a lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction.
    Given the record in this case, we need not address
    whether the Family Court has discretion to decline its concurrent
    jurisdiction. Even if the Family Court had such discretion,
    there were no proper findings or explanation by the Family Court
    on that issue.9
    9
    The notice of appeal was filed on August 23, 2019. On November 22,
    2019, the Family Court filed "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law"
    (11/22/19 FOF/COL) related, in part, to the Dismissal Order. Here, where an
    adult is charged with a crime, the Hawai#i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP)
    govern. See State v. Gonsales, 91 Hawai#i 446, 449, 
    984 P.2d 1272
    , 1275
    (1999); Hawai#i Family Court Rules (HFCR) Rule 81(c) ("Cases for adults
    charged with the commission of a crime coming within the jurisdiction of the
    family courts shall be governed by the Hawai #i Rules of Penal Procedure.").
    HRPP Rule 23(c) provides for a court to make findings "[i]n a case tried
    without a jury" and if requested, to make special findings "at any time prior
    to sentence." HRPP Rule 23(c) does not apply here to authorize the 11/22/19
    FOF/COL pertaining to the Dismissal Order. In short, the Family Court did not
    have jurisdiction to enter the 11/22/19 FOF/COL related to the Dismissal
    Order.
    None of the appellate briefs in this appeal, all filed after the
    11/22/19 FOF/COL was entered below, make any reference to the 11/22/19
    FOF/COL. Even if we were to consider the findings therein related to the
    Dismissal Order, the Family Court stated in relevant part:
    [b]ecause Family Court is a Court of limited jurisdiction,
    and because the Defendant and Complaining Witness in Count
    II are not family or household members, the Court granted
    Defendant's Oral Motion to Sever and Dismiss Count II
    without prejudice. The Court informed the State that they
    may refile the matter in District Court.
    (continued...)
    7
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    IV.   Conclusion
    Based on the foregoing, the "Order Granting Defendant's
    Oral Motion to Dismiss Count II without Prejudice" entered on
    July 26, 2019, by the Family Court of the First Circuit, is
    vacated. This case is remanded to the Family Court for further
    proceedings.
    DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, October 30, 2020.
    On the briefs:                            /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
    Chief Judge
    Chad M. Kumagai,
    Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,              /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
    for Plaintiff-Appellant.                  Associate Judge
    William H. Jameson, Jr.,                  /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
    Deputy Public Defender,                   Associate Judge
    for Defendant-Appellee.
    9
    (...continued)
    Thus, similar to the Dismissal Order, this indicates the Family Court
    dismissed Count II based on a determination that it lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction.
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CAAP-19-0000594

Filed Date: 10/30/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2020