State v. Deguerra ( 2023 )


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  •  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    16-JUN-2023
    07:57 AM
    Dkt. 32 SO
    NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
    DEAN ROSS DEGUERRA, Defendant-Appellee
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    (CASE NO. 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)
    SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
    (By: Ginoza, Chief Judge, and Leonard and Wadsworth, JJ.)
    Plaintiff-Appellant State of Hawai#i (State) appeals
    from the June 18, 2021 "Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law and
    Order Granting Defendant[-Appellee Dean Ross Deguerra's
    (Deguerra)] Motion to Dismiss For De Minimis Violation Filed on
    January 29, 2021" (FOFs/COLs/Order), entered in the Circuit Court
    of the First Circuit (Circuit Court).1/         For the reasons explained
    below, we affirm.
    The following findings of fact by the Circuit Court are
    unchallenged on appeal and thus binding on the parties and this
    court, see State v. Rodrigues, 145 Hawai#i 487, 494, 
    454 P.3d 428
    , 435 (2019): On April 13, 2019, at approximately 9:23 a.m.,
    Honolulu Police Department (HPD) Officer Aaron Eveland (Officer
    Eveland) was on-duty, conducting traffic speed enforcement near
    the intersection of Farrington Highway and Plantation Road.                 Upon
    1/
    The Honorable Kevin A. Souza presided.
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER
    observing a speeding violation,2/ Officer Eveland performed a
    traffic stop and approached the driver's-side door. As Officer
    Eveland approached, and before he could identify himself or the
    reason for the stop, Deguerra stated: "I don't have a license and
    I have a warrant." At that time, Officer Eveland observed a
    cylindrical glass pipe with a bulbous end, as well as a green
    lighter, laying on the front passenger's seat in plain view.
    Officer Eveland informed Deguerra that he was being arrested for
    possession of the pipe, and arrested Deguerra without incident.3/
    The pipe was recovered, submitted for chemical analysis, and
    found to have a residual substance containing methamphetamine
    with a net weight of 0.25 grams. On October 30, 2019, Deguerra
    was charged via felony information and non-felony complaint with
    Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree, in violation of
    Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 712-1243 (2014)4/ (Count One), and
    Driving Without a License, in violation of HRS § 286-102.
    On January 29, 2021, Deguerra filed a motion to dismiss
    for de minimis violation (Motion to Dismiss), which sought
    dismissal of the felony information (i.e., Count One) pursuant to
    HRS § 702-236. That section states, in relevant part:
    The court may dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the
    nature of the conduct alleged and the nature of the
    attendant circumstances, it finds that the defendant's
    conduct . . . [d]id not actually cause or threaten the harm
    or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the
    offenses or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant
    the condemnation of conviction[.]"
    2/
    In their respective submissions to the Circuit Court for
    Deguerra's motion to dismiss, both parties asserted that Officer Eveland used
    an HPD-issued radar device that indicated Deguerra's vehicle was traveling 40
    miles per hour. Deguerra's motion indicated, and the State did not contest,
    that the posted speed limit where Deguerra's vehicle had been traveling was 25
    miles per hour.
    3/
    Deguerra was also arrested for the outstanding warrant and Driving
    Without a License.
    4/
    HRS § 712-1243 provides:
    (1) A person commits the offense of promoting a
    dangerous drug in the third degree if the person knowingly
    possesses any dangerous drug in any amount.
    (2) Promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree is
    a class C felony.
    2
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    HRS § 702-236(1)(b) (2014) (formatting altered). The State
    opposed the motion, arguing that Deguerra "was not in possession
    of an infinitesimal amount of methamphetamine so the attendant
    circumstances of [Deguerra's] arrest are irrelevant for
    considering dismissal as de minimis."
    At a May 19, 2021 hearing on the Motion to Dismiss,
    Officer Eveland testified, as did HPD Detective Dale Morita
    (Detective Morita). Detective Morita was determined to be an
    expert in, and testified regarding: "(1) methods that
    methamphetamine is used, particularly in relation to a glass pipe
    and residue in a glass pipe; and (2) the amounts or quantities of
    methamphetamine that are generally sold on the Island of Oahu."
    On June 18, 2021, the Circuit Court entered the
    FOFs/COLs/Order, which granted the Motion to Dismiss and
    included, among others, the following COLs:
    9. A consideration of the nature of the conduct and
    the nature of the attendant circumstances reveals that the
    facts of this case are comparable to [State v. ]Enos[, 147
    Hawai#i 150, 
    465 P.3d 597
     (2020)] in many important ways.
    10. First, like in Enos, [Deguerra's] initial
    interaction with the police was prompted by what appears to
    be a very low-level, nonviolent allegation - to wit, a
    routine speeding violation.
    11. Second, like in Enos, the illicit substance was
    not found on [Deguerra's] person, but instead was in close
    proximity to him.
    12. Third, like in Enos, [Deguerra] was not engaged
    in nor suspected of engaging in any violence or committing
    any violent crime.
    13. Fourth, like in Enos, [Deguerra] was not engaged
    in nor suspected of engaging in any property crime, let
    alone the type of high-level property crime the Legislature
    sought to be prevented via HRS [§] 712-1243.
    14. Fifth, while a glass pipe with residue was found
    in the vehicle [Deguerra] was operating, there is no
    evidence that he was observed actively using the glass pipe
    to ingest methamphetamine or any other substance, or
    consuming illicit drugs in any way. Officer Eveland
    testified that the pipe was not warm to the touch when he
    recovered it.
    15. Finally, there is no evidence that [Deguerra] was
    intoxicated or under the influence of illicit drugs
    throughout his entire interaction with Officer Eveland. Per
    Officer Eveland, [Deguerra] complied with the traffic stop,
    pulled over immediately, and did not attempt to evade
    Officer Eveland in any way. As soon as Officer Eveland
    approached, [Deguerra] voluntarily uttered, "I don't have a
    license and I have a warrant." Moreover, [Deguerra] fully
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    complied and cooperated with Officer Eveland's instructions
    to step out of the vehicle, did not attempt to reach for or
    conceal the pipe or lighter, and did not resist arrest or
    struggle in any way.
    16. Accordingly, this court has considered the nature
    of the conduct and the nature of the attendant
    circumstances, and finds, like in Enos, that [Deguerra's]
    conduct did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil
    sought to be prevented by [HRS §] 712-1243, or did so only
    to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of
    conviction for promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third
    Degree.
    17. Lastly, while the State proffered Detective
    Morita as an expert witness to testify that the 0.25 grams
    of residue contained in the pipe is capable of being
    consumed or sold (i.e., useable or saleable), the Court has
    several concerns with Detective Morita's expert conclusions:
    a. First, Detective Morita is the HPD detective
    assigned to investigate this case. This is his case.
    Should this case go to trial, it is expected that Detective
    Morita would be called as a lay witness for the State.
    While nothing precludes Detective Morita from testifying as
    an "expert" in this de minimis inquiry, the Court does
    consider his interest in the outcome of this case in
    weighing the effect and value of his testimony.
    b. Second, although Detective Morita is the
    assigned HPD Detective in this case, there is no evidence
    that he ever personally observed or inspected the pipe or
    residue in question.
    c. Third, while Detective Morita may have
    previously purchased quantities of methamphetamine as low as
    0.18 grams, he admits that the 0.18 grams he previously
    purchased was in a pure, clear white, crystalline state, and
    not in the form of burnt residue scraped from the inside of
    a pipe.
    d. Finally, and perhaps most significantly,
    while Detective Morita claims that it's possible to
    "consume" 0.25 grams of methamphetamine residue, this
    blanket assertion is meaningless without tethering it to the
    facts and circumstances of this case. Notably, no further
    analysis was conducted to determine how much of the residual
    substance analyzed by Criminalist Brown was in fact
    methamphetamine. Therefore, it's not known how much of the
    0.25 grams of residual substance actually contained
    methamphetamine versus other, unnamed chemical
    compounds. . . . Accordingly, without more information,
    this Court cannot simply conclude, as a matter of law, that
    the residual substance recovered from [Deguerra's] pipe was
    indeed 0.25 grams of methamphetamine, or that it could be
    "consumed" as such.
    (Footnote omitted.)
    On appeal, the State contends that the Circuit Court
    abused its discretion in dismissing the case as a de minimis
    violation. Relatedly, the State challenges COLs 9 through 17 and
    the Circuit Court's "Order generally."
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    "[T]he defendant bears the burden of establishing that
    'his or her conduct neither caused nor threatened to cause the
    harm or evil that the statute, under which he or she is charged,
    seeks to prevent.'" State v. Fukagawa, 100 Hawai#i 498, 507, 
    60 P.3d 899
    , 908 (2002) (quoting State v. Oughterson, 99 Hawai#i
    244, 256, 
    54 P.3d 415
    , 427 (2002)).
    We review the dismissal of a prosecution for a de
    minimis violation for abuse of discretion. State v. Pacquing,
    129 Hawai#i 172, 179-80, 
    297 P.3d 188
    , 195-96 (2013) (citing
    State v. Rapozo, 123 Hawai#i 329, 336, 
    235 P.3d 325
    , 332 (2010)).
    "A court abuses its discretion if it clearly exceeded the bounds
    of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice
    to the substantial detriment of a party litigant." State v.
    Enos, 147 Hawai#i 150, 159, 
    465 P.3d 597
    , 606 (2020) (quoting
    Rapozo, 123 Hawai#i at 336, 
    235 P.3d at 332
    ).
    "Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo under the
    right/wrong standard of review." State v. Miranda, 147 Hawai#i
    171, 179, 
    465 P.3d 618
    , 626 (2020) (citing State v. Lavoie, 145
    Hawai#i 409, 421, 
    453 P.3d 229
    , 241 (2019)). However, "[a]
    conclusion of law that presents mixed questions of fact and law
    is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard because the
    conclusion is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the
    particular case." Baker v. Galuteria, 141 Hawai#i 468, 475, 
    413 P.3d 372
    , 379 (App. 2018) (emphasis omitted).
    HRS § 702-236(1)(b) authorizes a court to dismiss a
    charge if, in light of the attendant circumstances, it finds that
    the defendant's conduct "[d]id not actually cause or threaten the
    harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the
    offenses or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the
    condemnation of conviction[.]" The Hawai#i Supreme Court has
    stated that "the harm sought to be prevented by [HRS § 712-1243]
    is 'the use of the proscribed drug or its sale or transfer for
    ultimate use.'" State v. Melendez, 146 Hawai#i 391, 395, 
    463 P.3d 1048
    , 1052 (2020) (original brackets and some internal
    quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Hironaka, 99 Hawai#i
    198, 209, 
    53 P.3d 806
    , 817 (2002) (quoting State v. Vance, 
    61 Haw. 291
    , 307, 
    602 P.2d 933
    , 944 (1979))). However, in Enos, the
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    court further clarified:
    Although Promotion of a Dangerous Drug in the Third
    Degree on its face applies explicitly to drugs in any
    amount, "where a literal application of HRS § 712-1243 would
    compel an unduly harsh conviction for possession of a
    microscopic trace of a dangerous drug, HRS § 702-236 . . .
    may be applicable to mitigate this result." Vance, 
    61 Haw. at 307
    , 
    602 P.2d at 944
    ; see also Fukagawa, 100 Hawai #i at
    504, 
    60 P.3d at 905
    . The quantity possessed of a dangerous
    drug is "microscopic" or "infinitesimal," Vance, 
    61 Haw. at 307
    , 
    602 P.2d at 944
    , and de minimis dismissal is warranted
    if the amount could not "produce a pharmacological or
    physiological effect." Fukagawa, 100 Hawai #i at 506, 
    60 P.3d at
    907 (citing State v. Hironaka, 99 Hawai #i 198, 209,
    
    53 P.3d 806
    , 817 (2002); State v. Balanza, 93 Hawai #i 279,
    283–85, 
    1 P.3d 281
    , 285–87 (2000)).
    Even so, we have long insisted that "quantity is only
    one of the surrounding circumstances a court must consider."
    Id. at 505, 
    60 P.3d at 906
    . "Before the de minimis statute
    can be properly applied in a criminal case, all of the
    relevant facts bearing upon the defendant's conduct and the
    nature of the attendant circumstances regarding the
    commission of the offense should be shown to the judge."
    [State v. ]Park, 55 Haw[. 610,] 616, 525 P.2d [586,] 591[
    (1974)]. Possession of an amount of drugs capable of
    producing a "pharmacological or physiological effect" may
    nonetheless warrant dismissal as de minimis if the amount
    possessed approaches "infinitesimal" - which is to say, a
    very small amount - and the other attendant circumstances
    indicate that the defendant "did not cause or threaten the
    harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the
    offense." Vance, 61 Haw[.] at 307, 
    602 P.2d at 944
    ; HRS §
    702-236(1)(b); see also [State v. ]Viernes, 92 Hawai #i
    [130,] 134, 988 P.2d [195,] 199[ (1999)].
    Enos, 147 Hawai#i at 162, 465 P.3d at 609 (original emphasis and
    brackets omitted; emphasis added).
    The State argues that the Circuit Court abused its
    discretion by dismissing the charge against Deguerra on de
    minimis grounds because he:
    failed to present to the circuit court any evidence to
    suggest that the drugs in [his] possession w[ere] not
    saleable or useable. Under such circumstances, there was no
    basis upon which the circuit court could conclude that 0.250
    grams of a substance containing methamphetamine in
    [Deguerra's] possession was incapable of producing a
    pharmacological or physiological effect.
    The State's argument is flawed. Whether the amount
    possessed of a dangerous drug could (or could not) "produce a
    pharmacological or physiological effect" is not necessarily
    determinative of whether HRS § 702-236 can be properly applied in
    a criminal case. Enos, 147 Hawai#i at 162-63, 465 P.3d at 609-
    10.
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    The supreme court stated in Enos:
    To be clear, the quantity of drugs possessed remains a
    critical consideration when deciding a de minimis motion on
    a drug charge. It would be an abuse of discretion, for
    instance, if a court gave no consideration at all to the
    quantity possessed. Cf. Fukagawa, 100 Hawai #i at 504–05, 
    60 P.3d at
    905–06. This would run counter to the legislature's
    intent to criminalize possession of "any dangerous drug in
    any amount." HRS § 712-1243 (emphasis added). We only hold
    in the instant case that the quantity possessed by a
    defendant may pass the threshold into an amount capable of
    "produc[ing] a pharmacological or physiological effect"
    without precluding a court from dismissing a charge as de
    minimis. Fukagawa, 100 Hawai#i at 506, 
    60 P.3d at 906
    . As
    here, if the amount possessed is capable of producing such
    an effect but is nonetheless very small, and if the other
    attendant circumstances weigh in favor of dismissal, it is
    within a court's sound discretion to dismiss the charge as
    de minimis.
    Id. at 163, 465 P.3d at 610 (emphases added).
    Here, as in Enos, the Circuit Court determined that the
    "amount of substance of unknown purity, containing
    methamphetamine" was "very small," and the other attendant
    circumstances supported dismissal. See id. at 163, 465 P.3d at
    610. In particular, the Circuit Court found in COLs 10 through
    15 that: Deguerra's initial interaction with the police was "a
    very low-level, non-violent allegation"; "the illicit substance
    was not found on [Deguerra's] person, but instead was in close
    proximity to him"; Deguerra was "not engaged in nor suspected of
    engaging in any violence" or "in any property crime"; there was
    "no evidence that [Deguerra] was observed actively using the
    glass pipe to ingest methamphetamine" or "consuming illicit drugs
    in any way"; there was "no evidence that [Deguerra] was
    intoxicated or under the influence of illicit drugs throughout
    his entire interaction with Officer Eveland"; and Deguerra
    "complied with the traffic stop," "fully complied and cooperated
    with Officer Eveland's instructions to step out of the vehicle,
    did not attempt to reach for or conceal the pipe or lighter, and
    did not resist arrest or struggle in any way."
    COLs 9 through 17 present mixed issues of fact and law.
    In particular, COLs 10 through 15 and 17 include factual
    findings. The State presents no discernible argument as to why
    any of the factual findings stated in COLs 10 through 14 are
    clearly erroneous. Nor does the State cite any evidence in the
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    record that contradicts or undermines any of these findings. To
    the extent the State challenges the factual findings stated in
    COLs 10 through 14, that argument is deemed waived. See HRAP
    Rule 28(b)(7); Hawaii Ventures, LLC v. Otaka, Inc., 114 Hawai#i
    438, 478, 
    164 P.3d 696
    , 736 (2007) ("an appellate court is not
    obliged to address matters for which the appellant has failed to
    present discernible arguments").
    As to COL 15, the State argues that the Circuit Court's
    finding — i.e., "there is no evidence that [Deguerra] was
    intoxicated or under the influence of illicit drugs throughout
    his entire interaction with Officer Eveland" — is unsupported by
    the evidence. However, the State points to no evidence in the
    record that contradicts or undermines the Circuit Court's
    finding, and we have found none. COL 15 is not clearly
    erroneous.
    As to the Circuit Court's conclusions that "the facts
    of this case are comparable to Enos in many important ways" (COL
    9), and that certain facts are "like [those] in Enos" (COLs 10
    through 13), the State argues that the Circuit Court "failed to
    recognize the significant ways in which [this case] differed
    [from Enos]." In particular, the State notes "the dissimilarity
    in the amount of methamphetamine recovered on [Deguerra] and
    defendant Enos, that is 0.250 grams and 0.005 grams,
    respectively[,]" and asserts that "[Deguerra] possessed 50 times
    the amount of methamphetamine than defendant Enos[.]" In making
    this assertion, however, the State ignores the fact — which it
    also does not dispute — that the recovered residue in this case
    was determined to be "a substance containing methamphetamine with
    a net weight of 0.25 grams." (Emphasis added.) Given that the
    purity of the recovered substance is unknown,5/ the State's
    5/
    In COL 17.d., the Circuit Court found and concluded:
    [N]o further analysis was conducted to determine how much of
    the residual substance analyzed by [the HPD criminalist] was
    in fact methamphetamine. Therefore, it's not known how much
    of the 0.25 grams of residual substance actually contained
    methamphetamine versus other, unnamed chemical
    compounds. . . . Accordingly, without more information,
    this Court cannot simply conclude, as a matter of law, that
    the residual substance recovered from [Deguerra's] pipe was
    (continued...)
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    argument lacks an evidentiary basis in the record. Cf. Enos, 147
    Hawai#i at 163-64, 465 P.3d at 610-11 ("Morever, even though the
    circuit court did not credit the defendant's argument that the
    substance containing methamphetamine was not tested for purity,
    the form of the drug and the place it was found – residue in a
    pipe and a bag – bears on the de minimis analysis"). The Circuit
    Court did not err in concluding in COL 9 that "the facts of this
    case are comparable to Enos in many important ways[,]" and in
    COLs 10 through 13 that the identified facts are "like [those] in
    Enos[.]"6/
    Considering "the nature of the conduct alleged and the
    nature of the attendant circumstances," including the "very small
    amount" of residual substance containing methamphetamine found,
    it was not an abuse of discretion for the Circuit Court to
    conclude that Deguerra's conduct "[d]id not actually cause or
    threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by [HRS § 712-
    243,] or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the
    condemnation of conviction[.]" Accordingly, COL 16 is not wrong,
    and the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
    Count One, pursuant to HRS § 702-236.
    5/
    (...continued)
    indeed 0.25 grams of methamphetamine, or that it could be
    "consumed" as such.
    Although the State claims to challenge COL 17, it points to no
    evidence in the record that contradicts or undermines the factual findings in
    COL 17 that underpin the Circuit Court's "several concerns with Detective
    Morita's expert conclusions[.]" The State asserts that the last sentence of
    COL 17.d. is "unsupported by any evidence in the record[,]" but the last
    sentence is supported by the first two sentences, which are in turn supported
    by unchallenged FOF 12, as well as the testimony of Detective Morita
    confirming that "once [methamphetamine is] smoked, you don't know what the
    purity is[.]" Further, the State's argument regarding the amount of residual
    substance possessed by Deguerra focuses on its pharmacological or
    physiological effect, which, for the reasons discussed above, is not
    determinative of a de minimis ruling in these circumstances. COL 17,
    including COL 17.d., is not clearly erroneous.
    6/
    The State also argues that the Circuit Court "did not indicate
    whether it applied the 'totality of the circumstances' test announced in State
    v. Park," 
    55 Haw. 610
    , 
    525 P.2d 586
     (1974), and failed to address all of the
    Park factors. This argument was not made below and is thus deemed waived.
    See State v. Moses, 102 Hawai#i 449, 456, 
    77 P.3d 940
    , 947 (2003) ("As a
    general rule, if a party does not raise an argument at trial, that argument
    will be deemed to have been waived on appeal[.]"); State v. Hoglund, 
    71 Haw. 147
    , 150, 
    785 P.2d 1311
    , 1313 (1990) ("Generally, the failure to properly
    raise an issue at the trial level precludes a party from raising that issue on
    appeal." (citing State v. Cummings, 
    49 Haw. 522
    , 
    423 P.2d 438
     (1967))).
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    For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the June 18,
    2021 "Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law and Order Granting
    Defendant's Motion to Dismiss For De Minimis Violation Filed on
    January 29, 2021," entered in the Circuit Court of the First
    Circuit.
    DATED:   Honolulu, Hawai#i, June 16, 2023.
    On the briefs:
    /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
    Stephen K. Tsushima,                  Chief Judge
    Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
    City & County of Honolulu,
    for Plaintiff-Appellant.              /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
    Associate Judge
    Jon N. Ikenaga,
    Deputy Public Defender,
    for Defendant-Appellee.               /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
    Associate Judge
    10