Property Center, Inc. v. Sudaria ( 2023 )


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  •   NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    26-JUN-2023
    08:46 AM
    Dkt. 83 MO
    NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I
    PROPERTY CENTER, INC., Managing Agent, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
    JR SUDARIA and SCOTTY GEDDINGS, Defendants-Appellants.
    APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    HONOLULU DIVISION
    (CIVIL CASE NO. 1RC17-1-04580)
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    (By:     Ginoza, Chief Judge, Nakasone and McCullen, JJ.)
    Defendants-Appellants JR Sudaria and Scotty Geddings
    appeal from the District Court of the First Circuit, Honolulu
    Division, Regular Claims' (1) December 26, 2017 Denial of
    Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and Stay of
    Garnishment and (2) January 29, 2018 Order Denying Defendants'
    Motion to Set Aside Default, Judgment and Stay Garnishment
    (Filed December 8, 2017). 1
    1   The Honorable James C. McWhinnie presided.
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    On appeal, Sudaria and Geddings contend that the
    default judgment was void under Hawai‘i District Court Rules of
    Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 60(b)(4).          Sudaria and Geddings
    argue that they were deprived of due process, DCRCP Rule 55 was
    not satisfied, and they met the requirements under BDM, Inc. v.
    Sageco, Inc., 
    57 Haw. 73
    , 76-77, 
    549 P.2d 1147
    , 1150 (1976). 2
    For all of these arguments, Sudaria and Geddings primarily rely
    on the assertion that notice was improper.           For the reasons
    discussed below, we vacate and remand.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    A.     Small Claims Case – Geddings et al. v. Pirslin
    (Return of Security Deposit)
    Before the complaint in the case underlying this
    appeal was filed, Sudaria and Geddings (self-represented) filed
    a complaint on May 30, 2017 in the District Court of the First
    2Sudaria and Geddings also assert that (1) DCRCP Rule 55 was not
    satisfied because there was no supporting affidavit, the complaint was not
    verified, "and no one appeared at the hearing" to request a default; and
    (2) Plaintiff-Appellee Property Center, Inc. (Property Center) lacked
    standing because it was not a real party in interest. However, these points
    were not raised in their motion to set aside and, thus, we consider these
    points waived. See Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Wailea Elua v. Wailea Resort
    Co., 100 Hawai‘i 97, 107, 
    58 P.3d 608
    , 618 (2002) ("Legal issues not raised in
    the trial court are ordinarily deemed waived on appeal"); Lagondino v.
    Maldonado, 
    7 Haw. App. 591
    , 596, 
    789 P.2d 1129
    , 1132-33 (1990) (explaining
    that "a real party in interest objection raised for the first time on appeal
    is untimely").
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    Circuit, Small Claims for return of their security deposit from
    their former landlord Snezana Pirslin (Pirslin). 3
    During the August 23, 2017 hearing on the Small Claims
    matter, Geddings and Sudaria were present, along with Pirslin's
    property managers, Lynn and Malcolm Shiroma, at District Court
    in courtroom 10B at 1:36 p.m. 4         The court minutes stated,
    MRS SHIROMA REPRESENTED THAT SHE AND MR SHIROMA REPRESENT
    SNEZANA PIRSLIN AND THAT THERE IS A DAMAGES CLAIM AGAINST
    PLTFFS SET ON 9/5/17 10B. BY ORDER OF THE COURT, CASE
    CONTINUED FOR STATUS TO 10/25/17 10B 1:30 PM. REMINDER
    NOTICE PROVIDED TO PARTIES. MRS SHIROMA REQUESTS THAT THE
    DEFENDANT BE AMENDED TO PROPERTY CENTER INC; DENIED.
    (Emphasis added.)
    As stated in the court minutes, the Small Claims court
    continued the Small Claims case to October 25, 2017 "for status"
    and denied Lynn Shiroma's request that "Defendant be amended to
    Property Center, Inc."         (Formatting altered.)
    B.     Regular Claims Case - Property Center v. Sudaria et al.
    (Assumpsit-Money Owed)
    On July 17, 2017, while the Small Claims case was
    pending, Property Center (represented by counsel), filed a
    "Complaint (Assumpsit-Money Owed); Declaration; Exhibit(s);
    Summons" in Regular Claims court.           (Formatting altered.)     In the
    3  We take judicial notice of this Small Claims case, Case Number 1SC17-
    1-001105. See Roxas v. Marcos, 89 Hawai‘i 91, 110 n.9, 
    969 P.2d 1209
    , 1228
    n.9 (1998) (explaining that "courts have generally recognized that they may,
    in appropriate circumstances, take notice of proceedings in other courts,
    both within and without their judicial system, if those proceedings have a
    direct relation to the matter at issue") (citations and brackets omitted).
    4   The Honorable Hilary B. Gangnes presided.
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    Complaint, Property Center asked for judgment in the principal
    amount of $8,289.65.    Attached to the Complaint were the
    following:
    (1)   A copy of the rental agreement;
    (2)   A revised tenant ledger showing $8,289.65 owed to
    Property Center ($1,950.00 in rental and late
    fees, $7,814.65 in repairs, and $75.00 for
    security key and garage opener replacements, less
    $1,550.00 security deposit) plus attorney's fees
    and costs;
    (3)   An invoice from PLS Builders showing repair work
    totaling $7,814.65; and
    (4)   A two-page summons.
    The first page of the summons required the defendant
    to appear, stating:
    "IF YOU OR YOUR ATTORNEY FAIL TO ATTEND THE COURT
    HEARING AT THE TIME AND PLACE DESIGNATED, DEFAULT
    AND DEFAULT JUDMGENT WILL BE TAKEN AGAINST YOU
    FOR THE RELIEF DEMANDED IN THE COMPLAINT."
    (Formatting altered.)    The second page of the summons identified
    the location as "Honolulu Division, 1111 Alakea Street, 10th
    floor Courtroom 10A or 10B" and the time as "1:30 p.m. on the
    second Monday following date of service[.]"
    The return of service stated that the "Complaint
    (Assumpsit, Summary Possession/Landlord-Tenant, Damages;)
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    Declaration Exhibits(s)" were served on Sudaria and Geddings
    personally on August 23, 2017, 1:04 p.m. at "1111 Alakea Street
    10th Floor Honolulu, Hawaii 96813[,]" which was the same day and
    place as the hearing in the Small Claims case.           (Formatting
    altered.)
    On September 5, 2017, the day after the second Monday
    following the service of the Complaint, the court minutes show
    that neither party appeared, and the Regular Claims court
    entered default against Sudaria and Geddings:
    "ATTY RICHARD YANAGI NOT PRESENT FOR PLTFF
    PROPERTY CENTER . . . .       DEFTS JR SUDARIA AND
    SCOTTY GEDDINGS NOT PRESENT, BY ORDER OF THE
    COURT, DEFAULT ENTERED-VERIFIED."
    In late September 2017, Property Center filed an "Ex
    Parte Motion for Default Judgment; Declaration; Exhibit(s)
    1 through 5; Declaration of Counsel re: Attorney's Fees; Order." 5
    (Formatting altered.)      On September 28, 2017, the Regular Claims
    court granted the Ex Parte Motion for Default Judgment, awarding
    the principal amount of $8,289.65 requested in the Complaint
    plus $1,000.00 in attorney's fees and costs, for a total of
    $9,289.65.    The Regular Claims court entered a default judgment
    5  The document is stamped received by legal documents on September 22,
    2017 and stamped filed September 28, 2017.
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    against Sudaria and Geddings on October 3, 2017, awarding the
    $9,289.65 requested.
    C.     Post Default Judgment
    1.      Small Claims Case - Dismissed Without Prejudice
    On October 25, 2017, the return date for the Small
    Claims case, the court dismissed the case without prejudice. 6
    The court minutes note that although Sudaria and Geddings
    claimed they were not served with the Complaint in the Regular
    Claims case, the Small Claims court determined they were served
    and the security-deposit issue was resolved:
    "DEFTS CLAIM JUDGMENT FOR SECURITY DEPOSIT WAS
    ENTERED ON 9/5/2017.      PLTFFS CLAIM THEY WERE NOT
    SERVED WITH THE COMPLAINT.       DURING RECESS COURT
    REVIEWED FILE FROM CASE 1RC17-1-4580, AND
    DETERMINED THAT DEFTS WERE SERVED AND SECURITY
    DEPOSIT ISSUE WAS RESOLVED.        BY ORDER OF THE
    COURT, CASE DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE."
    (Emphasis added.)
    2.      Regular Claims Case - Garnishment and Motion to Set
    Aside
    In the Regular Claims case, Property Center moved to
    garnish Sudaria's and Geddings's wages, which was granted.            The
    return of service for the issuance of the garnishee summons
    6    The Honorable Maura M. Okamoto presided.
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    shows that Sudaria's and Geddings's employers were served on
    November 27 and 28, 2017.
    A little over a week later, on December 8, 2017,
    Sudaria and Geddings (still self-represented) filed a motion to
    "Set Aside Default, Judgment & Stay Garnishment[.]"            (Formatting
    altered.)    Sudaria and Geddings left blank the portion of the
    form that permits the movant to indicate the legal basis for the
    motion.   In a type-written declaration attached to their motion,
    Sudaria and Geddings stated they "were never informed for any
    other court date" with a handwritten notation, "Missing Page 2
    of Summons - Form 1DC50."       (Formatting altered.)
    Property Center opposed the motion.         At the hearing on
    the motion, Geddings explained that they appeared for the
    August 23, 2017 hearing in the Small Claims case and received
    the summons to appear on September 5, 2017, in the following
    exchange:
    [Geddings:] And when we left that day -- we had
    explained to the judge, too, that the date of
    September 5th, we -- that would create a hardship on our --
    on our work because we were already taking off time half of
    the month of September to go to the mainland for a wedding,
    family wedding. And we would be back at the beginning of
    October. So that's why she ordered us to come back
    October 25th on a status and if we had gotten together to
    discuss what was going on in this dispute.
    [Regular Claims Court:] Okay. But you were also
    informed at that time about the date of September 5th for
    the answer.
    [Geddings:] Yeah, but we explained the reason why.
    And, you know, when we received the slip to come back on
    October 25th, that's where, you know, it -- it became --
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    [Regular Claims Court:]     There are two different
    cases, you understand.
    [Geddings:] But we were under the understanding that
    -- or my thought was that if their case were being brought
    into this because they were submit -- their cases was
    subject to our security deposit and why they retained it.
    . . . .
    [Regular Claims Court:] I think you're conflating
    two different cases. You were told on the one case on
    August 23rd that you had an answer date of September 5th.
    [Geddings:]    It was -- I -- we -- were under the
    impression that we   were answering that day because we -- we
    recognized that we   got the summons but we were not in an
    understanding that   we had to come back on the 5th because
    when we --
    [Regular Claims Court:] Well, if you look at the
    papers they're two different cases.
    [Geddings:]    I know, Your Honor.
    [Regular Claims Court:]     And you didn't show up for
    one of them.
    [Geddings:] That was -- that was complete confusion.
    And on the day that September 5th came we, -- if we were --
    if it would have been explicitly explained that that was a
    necessary thing because we expressed a hardship on that,
    that taking off that, because we -- we had taken so many
    days off beforehand to -- to come down, file motions and we
    just feel like we are due our day in court for a fair trial
    and -- and justice should be served.
    (Emphases added.)
    The Regular Claims court then found that Sudaria
    and Geddings were told of the September 5, 2017 date to
    answer, and denied their motion to set aside the default:
    [Regular Claims Court:] . . . . [t]he law in Hawai‘i
    under the case of BDM, Inc. versus Sageco, Inc., a 1976
    case, is that a defendant moving to set aside a default
    judgment must establish that the plaintiff will not be
    prejudiced by setting aside the default judgment, that the
    defendants have a meritorious defense, and that the default
    was not the result of inexcusable neglect or a willful act.
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    It appears clear that the defendants were told at the
    August 23 or at the -- the hearing on the -- the -- the
    small claims case that there was a hearing set for
    September 5th, the answer date for the case, and that their
    case, the case on the security deposit, was continued to
    August [sic] 25th. They did not appear on September 5th.
    There was also a lot of argument today that was not
    in the motion. And the requirement is that they have to
    establish there's a meritorious defense and that their
    default was [sic] inexcusable and willful.
    And, therefore, based on what I have seen and heard
    today, I am going to deny the motion[.]
    After the Regular Claims court denied their motion to
    set aside, Sudaria and Geddings moved for reconsideration, which
    was also denied "as no new arguments or newly discovered
    evidence has been presented."
    Sudaria and Geddings (represented by counsel) appeal
    from the denial of their motion to set aside the default
    judgment.
    II.   STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    This court reviews DCRCP Rule 60(b)(4) decisions under
    the de novo standard.      See Wagner v. World Botanical Gardens,
    126 Hawai‘i 190, 195, 
    268 P.3d 443
    , 448 (App. 2011) (explaining a
    court's ruling under Hawai‘i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP)
    Rule 60(b)(4) is reviewed de novo); Commentary to DCRCP Rule 60
    (noting the language in DCRCP Rule 60 and HRCP Rule 60 is
    identical).
    Findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly
    erroneous standard.      Bhakta v. Cnty. of Maui, 109 Hawai‘i 198,
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    208, 
    123 P.3d 943
    , 953 (2005).    A finding "is clearly erroneous
    when, despite evidence to support the finding, the appellate
    court is left with the definite and firm conviction in reviewing
    the entire evidence that a mistake has been committed."       
    Id.
    (citation omitted).   A finding "is also clearly erroneous when
    the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding."
    
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    The denial of a motion to set aside an entry of
    default is reviewed for abuse of discretion.      See Chen v. Mah,
    146 Hawai‘i 157, 171, 
    457 P.3d 796
    , 810 (2020).
    III. DISCUSSION
    Sudaria and Geddings contend they were deprived of due
    process, DCRCP Rule 55 was not satisfied, and they met the
    requirements under BDM.   For all of these contentions, Sudaria
    and Geddings primarily rely on the assertion that they did not
    receive page two of the summons.
    Sudaria and Geddings claim in their amended opening
    brief that "they did not know the answering hearing date and
    time" and "[b]ecause they did not have this critical
    information, [they] were not present at their answer hearing
    . . . ."
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    A.     Denial Of The Motion To Set Aside Based On DCRCP
    Rule 60(b)(4) Was Not Error
    Sudaria and Geddings contend they were denied due
    process because they did not receive page two of the summons,
    claiming "they did not know the answering hearing date and
    time."
    "For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry
    of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may
    likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)."          DCRCP
    Rule 55(c).     DCRCP Rule 60(b) provides in relevant part that
    "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
    relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or
    proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (4) the judgment is
    void . . . ."     DCRCP Rule 60(b)(4).
    Whether a judgment is void under DCRCP Rule 60(b)(4)
    is not discretionary.      In re Application of Hana Ranch Co., 
    3 Haw. App. 141
    , 146, 
    642 P.2d 938
    , 941 (1982) (examining HRCP
    Rule 60(b)(4)).     "It has been noted that a judgment is void only
    if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of either the
    subject matter or the parties or otherwise acted in a manner
    inconsistent with due process of law."        
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    Under due process, notice must be "reasonably
    calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
    parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
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    opportunity to present their objections."        Eto v. Muranaka, 99
    Hawai‘i 488, 498, 
    57 P.3d 413
    , 423 (2002) (citation omitted);
    Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 
    553 F.3d 1193
    , 1202
    (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
    Here, the Regular Claims court found that Sudaria and
    Geddings were told about the September 5, 2017 Regular Claims
    answer date:
    It appears clear that the defendants were told at the
    August 23 or at the -- the hearing on the -- the -- the
    small claims case that there was a hearing set for
    September 5th, the answer date for the case, and that their
    case, the case on the security deposit, was continued to
    August [sic] 25th. They did not appear on September 5th.
    The record in this case, and the Small Claims case,
    support this finding.    The summons filed in the record on appeal
    shows a page two, notifying Sudaria and Geddings of when and
    where to appear.
    During the hearing on the motion to set aside the
    default, Geddings acknowledged receiving the summons at the
    August 23, 2017 hearing in the Small Claims case, stating, "when
    we appeared for court on August 23rd and the day we received the
    summons . . . ."   Geddings also acknowledged that he and Sudaria
    were aware of the September 5, 2017 date, explaining they told
    the judge in the Small Claims case that the September 5, 2017
    date "would create a hardship[.]"       Geddings stated, "we had
    explained to the judge, too, that the date of September 5th, we
    -- that would create a hardship on our -- on our work because we
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    were already taking off time half of the month of September to
    go to the mainland for a wedding[.]"
    The Regular Claims court asked, "[b]ut you were also
    informed at that time about the date of September 5th for the
    answer[,]" and Geddings answered, "[y]eah, but we explained the
    reason why."   After clarifying that there were two separate
    cases, the Regular Claims court stated, "[a]nd you didn't show
    up for one of them[,]" to which Geddings replied "that was
    complete confusion.   And on the day that September 5th came we,
    -- if we were -- if it would have been explicitly explained that
    that was a necessary thing because we expressed a hardship on
    that, that taking off that, because we -- we had taken so many
    days off beforehand . . . ."
    The court minutes for the Small Claims case also
    support the Regular Claims court's finding that Sudaria and
    Geddings were told of the September 5, 2017 date.      The
    August 23, 2017 court minutes for the hearing stated, "MRS
    SHIROMA REPRESENTED THAT SHE AND MR SHIROMA REPRESENT SNEZANA
    PIRSLIN AND THAT THERE IS A DAMAGES CLAIM AGAINST PLTFFS SET ON
    9/5/17 10B."   (Emphasis added.)    With no mention of the summons,
    the court minutes for the October 25, 2017 hearing show that
    Sudaria and Geddings claimed they were not served the complaint
    but the court minutes stated, "DURING RECESS COURT REVIEWED FILE
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    FROM CASE 1RC17-1-4580, AND DETERMINED THAT DEFTS WERE SERVED
    AND SECURITY DEPOSIT ISSUE WAS RESOLVED."
    Based on the record in this case, and the court
    minutes in the Small Claims case, the finding that Sudaria and
    Geddings were told of the September 5, 2017 answer date was not
    clearly erroneous.
    With this finding, we cannot say that Sudaria and
    Geddings were deprived of due process.        Instead, the record
    shows that they were apprised of the Regular Claims case and the
    September 5, 2017 date to answer in that case.
    B.     As To DCRCP Rule 55 And BDM, Denying The Motion To Set
    Aside Was An Abuse Of Discretion
    Again relying on their assertion that they did not
    receive page two of the summons, Sudaria and Geddings argue that
    the Regular Claims court "erred by denying [their] Motion to set
    aside the entry of default pursuant to DCRCP 55(c)[,]" and that
    they satisfied the three BDM factors.
    "A civil action is commenced by the filing of a
    complaint . . . ."      DCRCP Rule 3.    "Upon the filing of a
    complaint the clerk shall forthwith issue a summons.         Plaintiff
    shall deliver the complaint and summons to a person authorized
    to serve process."      DCRCP Rule 4(a).
    The summons must "be directed to the defendant,"
    "state the time within which these rules require the defendant
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    to appear and defend, and shall notify the defendant that in
    case of defendant's failure to do so judgment by default will be
    rendered against the defendant for the relief demanded in the
    complaint," and "contain a warning to the person summoned that
    failure to obey the summons may result in an entry of default
    and default judgment."      DCRCP Rule 4(b).
    "All defendants shall appear or answer at the time
    appointed in the summons, on the second Monday following the
    date of service . . . ."       DCRCP Rule 12(a) (emphasis added).
    "When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative
    relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as
    provided by these rules, and the fact is made to appear by
    affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter that party's
    default."    DCRCP Rule 55(a).      For a default judgment by the
    court, a party entitled to the default judgment "shall apply to
    the court therefor."      DCRCP Rule 55(b)(2).
    In BDM, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court articulated the
    standard for granting a motion to set aside entry of default or
    default judgment.     
    57 Haw. at 77
    , 
    549 P.2d at 1150
    .
    In general, a motion to set aside a default entry or a
    default judgment may and should be granted whenever the
    court finds (1) that the nondefaulting party will not be
    prejudiced by the reopening, (2) that the defaulting party
    has a meritorious defense, and (3) that the default was not
    the result of inexcusable neglect or a wil[l]ful act.
    
    Id.
       Though Chen v. Mah prospectively abrogated this standard,
    the supreme court held decisions prior to January 30, 2020 on
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    motions to set aside an entry of default would still be reviewed
    under the three-prong test outlined in BDM.          Chen, 146 Hawai‘i at
    177, 177 n.21, 457 P.3d at 816, 816 n.21.         Additionally, "if a
    moving party fails to establish any prong of the test, it is not
    an abuse of discretion to refuse to set aside the default."              146
    Hawai‘i at 170, 457 P.3d at 809 (brackets omitted) (citing
    Citicorp Mortg., Inc. v. Bartolome, 94 Hawai‘i 422, 439, 
    16 P.3d 827
    , 844 (App. 2000)).
    Regarding the first BDM factor, Property Center
    acknowledged to the Regular Claims court that "there will be no
    undue prejudice by setting aside the default judgment."
    As for the second BDM factor, Sudaria and Geddings
    argue they have a meritorious defense because there was no
    property condition form.      Hawaii Revised Statutes § 521-42
    (2018) provides in part that
    Prior to the initial date of initial occupancy, the
    landlord shall inventory the premises and make a written
    record detailing the condition of the premises and any
    furnishings or appliances provided. Duplicate copies of
    this inventory shall be signed by the landlord and by the
    tenant and a copy given to each tenant. In an action
    arising under this section, the executed copy of the
    inventory shall be presumed to be correct. If the landlord
    fails to make such an inventory and written record, the
    condition of the premises and any furnishings or appliances
    provided, upon the termination of the tenancy shall be
    rebuttably presumed to be the same as when the tenant first
    occupied the premises.
    (Emphasis added.)
    The record on appeal contains no property condition
    form.   Thus, the presumption is that the condition of the
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    property at the end of the rental agreement was the same as when
    the tenants first occupied the property pursuant to the
    agreement.   See Sasaki v. Morisako, 112 Hawai‘i 302, 309, 
    145 P.3d 845
    , 852 (App. 2006) (explaining that, without the required
    inventory form, "the condition of the property at the
    termination of the oral rental agreement was presumed to be the
    same as when Appellants first occupied the property pursuant to
    the oral agreement").
    Although Property Center argues it rebutted this
    presumption with receipts and photos, it appears the presumption
    in favor of the tenant could be a meritorious defense in this
    case.   To the extent the Regular Claims court found Sudaria and
    Geddings failed to show they had a meritorious defense, that
    finding was clearly erroneous.
    Finally, as for the third factor, Sudaria and Geddings
    argue that "the default occurred when [they] were not notified
    of the hearing date and time."    Contrary to their argument, and
    as discussed above, the record reflects that Geddings
    acknowledged they were notified of the answer date and time for
    the Regular Claims case.   Also discussed above, the finding that
    Sudaria and Geddings were apprised of the answer date was not
    clearly erroneous.
    However, Sudaria and Geddings had no attorney,
    actively litigated the Small Claims case, explained to the Small
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    Claims court the hardship regarding the Regular Claims case
    answer date, and explained to the Regular Claims court that they
    thought (albeit incorrectly) the continuance in the Small Claims
    case also applied to the Regular Claims case.      Given their self-
    represented status and the simultaneous cases, it appears
    Sudaria and Geddings were understandably confused by the court
    dates.
    We pause here to emphasize "that defaults and default
    judgments are not favored and that any doubt should be resolved
    in favor of the party seeking relief, so that, in the interests
    of justice, there can be a full trial on the merits."       BDM, 
    57 Haw. at 76
    , 
    549 P.2d at 1150
     (emphases added).      In other words,
    any doubt as to whether the failure to appear on September 5,
    2017 was due to inexcusable neglect or a willful act should have
    been resolved in favor of Sudaria and Geddings.      See generally,
    
    57 Haw. at 76, 77
    , 
    549 P.2d at 1150
    .     The court, however, made
    no mention of how this reasoning factored in its ruling, and
    made no credibility determination.
    Thus, to the extent the Regular Claims court found
    that Sudaria and Geddings failed to meet their burden of proving
    their non-appearance was not due to inexcusable neglect or a
    willful act, we are "left with the definite and firm conviction
    in reviewing the entire evidence that a mistake has been
    committed."   Bhakta, 109 Hawai‘i at 208, 124 P.3d at 953.
    18
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Accordingly, based on the particular circumstances in
    this case, we hold that the Regular Claims court's denial of
    Sudaria and Geddings's motion to set aside the entry of default
    was an abuse of discretion, and must be vacated.      Because the
    default judgment was based on the entry of default, it must also
    be vacated.
    IV.   CONCLUSION
    In conclusion, we vacate the Regular Claims court's
    (1) December 26, 2017 Denial of Defendants' Motion to Set Aside
    Default Judgment and Stay Garnishment and (2) January 29, 2018
    Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default, Judgment
    and Stay Garnishment (Filed December 8, 2017), and remand this
    case for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum
    opinion.
    DATED:   Honolulu, Hawai‘i, June 26, 2023.
    On the briefs:                         /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
    Chief Judge
    Justin A. Brackett,
    For Defendants-Appellants.             /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
    Associate Judge
    Richard A. Yanagi,
    Michel A. Okazaki,                     /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
    for Plaintiff-Appellee.                Associate Judge
    19