State v. Campbell. ( 2024 )

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
19-SEP-2024
08:08 AM
Dkt. 68 OP
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
---o0o---
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
COREY CAMPBELL, also known as
COREY RYAN TAYLOR, also known as
RONIE CABILI, Defendant-Appellant
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 2CPC-XX-XXXXXXX(1))
SEPTEMBER 19, 2024
LEONARD, ACTING CHIEF JUDGE, WADSWORTH AND NAKASONE, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEONARD, ACTING CHIEF JUDGE
Defendant-Appellant Corey Campbell (Campbell) appeals
from the September 29, 2023 Sua Sponte Order Striking "Ex Parte
Motion for Payment of Costs; Order" Filed On September 12, 2023
(Sua Sponte Order), and the November 17, 2023 Order Denying
[Campbell's] Motion for Reconsideration of Ex Parte Motion for
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Payment of Costs (Order Denying Reconsideration), both entered by
the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit (Circuit Court).1
The dispositive issue in this interlocutory appeal is
whether, pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 621-9(b)
(2016), the State of Hawai#i is required to pay travel costs for
Campbell, an indigent criminal defendant who resides outside of
Hawai#i, to return to Hawai#i for trial. Based on the language of
the statute and its legislative history, we hold that HRS § 621-
9(b) governs extradition expenses only; the statute does not
otherwise mandate that the State bear the expenses related to a
criminal defendant's return to Hawai#i for trial.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
On May 4, 2022, Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai#i
(State) filed a complaint charging Campbell with: Count One –
Assault Against a Law Enforcement Officer in the First Degree, in
violation of HRS § 707-712.5(1)(a) (2014);2 Count Two – Exclusion
1
The Honorable Kristin M. Hamman presided.
2
HRS § 707-712.5 provides:
HRS § 707-712.5 Assault against a law enforcement
officer in the first degree. (1) A person commits the
offense of assault against a law enforcement officer in the
first degree if the person:
(a) Intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury
to a law enforcement officer who is engaged in
the performance of duty; or
(b) Recklessly or negligently causes, with a
dangerous instrument, bodily injury to a law
enforcement officer who is engaged in the
performance of duty.
(2) Assault of a law enforcement officer in the first
degree is a class C felony. The court shall, at a minimum,
sentence the person who has been convicted of this offense
(continued...)
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of Intoxicated Person From Premises, in violation of HRS § 281-84
and subject to HRS § 281-102 (2020);3 and Count Three –
Disorderly Conduct, in violation of HRS § 711-1101(1)(a) and/or
(b) and/or (c) (2020).4
2
(...continued)
to:
(a) An indeterminate term of imprisonment of five
years, pursuant to section 706-660; or
(b) Five years probation, with conditions to include
a term of imprisonment of not less than thirty
days without possibility of suspension of
sentence.
3
HRS § 281-84 provides:
HRS § 281-84 Exclusion of intoxicated person from
premises; penalty. Every person who, being under the
influence of liquor, enters any premises licensed for the
sale of liquor, or being under the influence of liquor there
remains after having been requested by the licensee or any
person in the licensee’s employ to leave the premises, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall
be punished as in section 281-102 provided.
HRS § 281-102 provides:
HRS § 281-102 Other offenses; penalty. If any person
violates this chapter or any rule or regulation in effect by
authority of this chapter, whether in connection therewith a
penalty is referred to or not, for which violation no
penalty is specifically prescribed, the person shall be
imprisoned not more than six months or fined not more than
$1,000, or both.
4
HRS § 711-1101 provides, in relevant part:
HRS § 711-1101 Disorderly conduct. (1) A person
commits the offense of disorderly conduct if, with intent to
cause physical inconvenience or alarm by a member or members
of the public, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, the
person:
(a) Engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or
tumultuous behavior;
(b) Makes unreasonable noise;
(c) Subjects another person to offensively coarse
behavior or abusive language which is likely to
provoke a violent response;
. . . .
(continued...)
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The complaint alleges that on May 3, 2022, Campbell
caused bodily injury to a Maui police officer, and while under
the influence of liquor, Campbell entered a premises licensed for
the sale of liquor and remained after being requested by the
licensee to leave. The arresting officer's Declaration in
Support of Warrantless Arrest states "[Campbell] was asked to
leave their establishment because she was belligerent," and when
the officer arrived at the scene "she appeared to be intoxicated
as she was slurring her words and unsteady on her feet." The
declaration further states that "[w]hile at the Kihei Police
Station, I was attempting to put a seat belt on [Campbell] when
she bit me on my right bicep, breaking skin and leaving a mark."
Campbell resides in Massachusetts. The incident
resulting in criminal charges occurred while she was visiting
Maui using money left to her by her recently departed father.
On May 4, 2022, the District Court of the Second
Circuit, Wailuku Division (District Court), set bail at $7,000.5
Campbell obtained a surety bail bond for that amount the same
day. The District Court's May 4, 2022 order imposing conditions
of release required Campbell remain in Hawai#i absent court
approval. On May 6, 2022, an amended order was entered, which
specifically allowed Campbell to "fly back home to Massachusetts
4
(...continued)
(3) Disorderly conduct is a petty misdemeanor if it
is the defendant's intention to cause substantial harm or
serious inconvenience, or if the defendant persists in
disorderly conduct after reasonable warning or request to
desist. Otherwise disorderly conduct is a violation.
5
The Honorable Christopher M. Dunn presided.
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and live in Massachusetts." Campbell waived her right to a
preliminary hearing on the felony charge against her, and the
case was committed to the Circuit Court.
Campbell returned to Massachusetts. The record does
not reflect any further in-person court appearances. Campbell
made eleven appearances by Zoom. There were occasions when
Campbell did not appear, bench warrants were issued, and the
warrants were then recalled at further hearings.
On September 11, 2023, in advance of an October 23,
2023 trial date, Campbell filed an Ex Parte Motion for Payment of
Costs; Order (Motion for Travel Costs). The Motion for Travel
Costs was supported by a declaration of court-appointed counsel
stating that Campbell lived in Massachusetts, was "indigent,
unemployed and cannot afford to travel back to Maui for her
trial," and requested funds for her round-trip plane ticket,
lodging, and transportation. The motion cited HRS § 621-9(b) as
authority for the request. On September 12, 2023, the Circuit
Court entered an order approving the Motion for Travel Costs.
On September 29, 2023, the Circuit Court entered the
Sua Sponte Order, stating only that it "inadvertently" entered
the September 12, 2023 order.
Thereafter, there were various failed plea
negotiations, changes to the trial date, and a motion to dismiss,
which was orally denied.
On November 9, 2023, Campbell filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of Ex Parte Motion for Payment of Costs (Motion
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for Reconsideration), seeking reconsideration of the Sua Sponte
Order, which was orally denied at a hearing on November 13, 2023.
The Order Denying Reconsideration was entered on November 17,
2023.
On November 20, 2023, the case was called for jury
trial. Campbell appeared by Zoom and requested a short
evidentiary hearing on indigency before moving forward. After
Campbell was sworn in and examined by counsel and the Circuit
Court, the court found based on Campbell's testimony that
Campbell lacked income from any source, did not have any assets,
was eligible for court-appointed counsel, and was indigent.
Campbell then orally requested an interlocutory appeal, regarding
"that she cannot afford to come back to Hawaii for trial, even
though she would like to," and referenced HRS § 621-9. The
Circuit Court noted that the Judiciary would not front the costs
because she chose to leave Hawai#i pending trial, and therefore,
she is required to return on her own, or if the court issues a
bench warrant, then the State will pay for the cost of an
extradition to bring her back for trial. The court granted the
request to file an interlocutory appeal. Written orders were
entered thereafter, including on November 27, 2023. Campbell
filed a Notice of Appeal on December 16, 2023.
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II. POINTS OF ERROR
Campbell raises a single point of error, contending
that the Circuit Court erred when it denied the Motion for Travel
Costs and when it denied the Motion for Reconsideration.6
III. APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
"Statutory interpretation is a question of law
reviewable de novo." State v. Pickell, 154 Hawai#i 50, 53, 544
P.3d 1287, 1290 (2023) (citation omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
Campbell argues that, pursuant to HRS § 621-9, as an
indigent criminal defendant traveling from outside Hawai#i in
order to be physically present at her trial, the cost of her
airfare, ground transportation, and a per diem must be paid by
the State. On appeal, Campbell further argues that her
constitutional rights have been violated by the Circuit Court's
failure to order the State to bear her travel costs.7
6
The State objects to this court's consideration of Campbell's
point of error based on Campbell's failure to comply with Hawai #i Rules of
Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 10(b)(4), because fewer than all transcripts
were ordered, but Campbell failed to file a statement of points of error
within the time period required by the rule. Upon review, we conclude that
there is a sufficient record before this court to decide the matter.
Campbell's appellate counsel is nevertheless reminded that failure to comply
with applicable HRAP requirements could result in sanctions.
7
The Office of the Public Defender, as Amicus Curiae, filed a brief
in support of these arguments, and asserted that sound public policy warrants
fiscally efficient travel arrangements for indigent defendants, i.e., without
the added expenses associated with extradiction, and without requiring
indigent defendants to subject themselves to pretrial detention. The
consideration of such public policy arguments is firmly within the purview of
the Legislature.
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A. HRS § 621-9(b)
HRS § 621-9 provides, in relevant part:
§ 621-9 Witness and defendant expenses; budgetary
procedure.
(b) Whenever the presence of a defendant in a
criminal case or in a proceeding under chapter 704 or a
petitioner in a post conviction proceeding who is outside
the judicial circuit is mandated by court order or bench
warrant to appear, the cost of airfare, ground
transportation, any per diem for both the defendant or
petitioner and sufficient law enforcement officers to effect
the defendant's or petitioner's return, shall be borne by
the State. All such expenses shall be certified by the
court or public prosecutor or the attorney general. Duly
certified claims for payment shall be paid upon vouchers
approved by the state director of finance and warrants drawn
by the state comptroller. The court may order the
nonindigent defendant or petitioner who was returned to the
State of Hawaii to reimburse the State for the costs of such
extradition or return as specifically described above.
As the Hawai#i Supreme Court has explained:
Our statutory construction is guided by the following well
established principles:
[O]ur foremost obligation is to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the legislature, which is
to be obtained primarily from the language contained
in the statute itself. And we must read statutory
language in the context of the entire statute and
construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.
When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or
indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used
in a statute, an ambiguity exists.
In construing an ambiguous statute, the meaning of the
ambiguous words may be sought by examining the
context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and
sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their
true meaning. Moreover, the courts may resort to
extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent. One
avenue is the use of legislative history as an
interpretive tool .
Kanahele v. State, 154 Hawai#i 190, 201, 549 P.3d 275, 286 (2024)
(citations omitted).
Moreover, "[t]he legislative history of a statute
remains relevant 'even when the language appears clear upon
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perfunctory review.'" State v. Alangcas, 134 Hawai#i 515, 526,
345 P.3d 181, 192 (2015) (citation omitted).
HRS § 621-9(b) states a minimum of three requirements
for State-paid travel expenses: (1) the person seeking payment
must be a defendant in a criminal case or in a chapter 704
proceeding,8 or a petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding; (2)
the person must be outside the court's jurisdiction; and (3) the
person must be mandated by court order or bench warrant to
appear. A court may order a non-indigent defendant to reimburse
the State.
Campbell's isolated reading of portions of HRS § 621-
9(b) is argued as support for State-sponsored travel expenses for
any indigent out-of-state defendant ordered to appear for trial
in Hawai#i. However, the cost-shifting language specifically
references the airfare, ground transportation, and per diem, for
reference to "sufficient law enforcement officers to effect the
defendant's or petitioner's return," in addition to travel
expenses for the defendant or petitioner. And the provision that
"[t]he court may order the nonindigent defendant or petitioner
who was returned to the State of Hawaii to reimburse the State
for the costs of such extradition or return" strongly suggests
that HRS § 621-9(b) applies solely to extradition proceedings,
and at the very least, creates an ambiguity as to whether the
statute applies to voluntary returns not affected by extradition.
8
An HRS chapter 704 proceeding may involve, inter alia, a
determination of whether an individual shall not be held penally responsible
for their conduct or a determination of the individual's fitness to proceed.
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The legislative history of HRS § 621-9(b) establishes
that its payment provisions were intended to apply only to
extradition proceedings. In 1980, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill No. 2869 (S.B. 2869), which was signed into law as Act 306.
Act 306 modified HRS § 621-9 by adding a new subsection (b).
1980 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 306, § 1 at 961.
The reports of the Hawai#i Senate Judiciary and Senate
Ways and Means Committees, which were the first two committees to
hold hearings on S.B. 2869, confirm that the intent of the bill
was to make the State responsible for all extradition costs,
because some costs were being borne by the courts. Both
committee reports contained the following statement:
The purpose of this bill is to include expenses to
return defendants to a judicial circuit in the same
budgetary procedure as is currently used for witness
expenses.
Under present practice some expenses relating to
defendants are processed through the courts. A more
appropriate method is to remove the courts from having to
cover such expenses and have the State bear all costs of the
extradition procedure.
S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 60 (Judiciary) & No. 196 (Ways and
Means), in 1980 Senate Journal, at 1048, 1100 (emphasis added).
Both the House and Senate Conference Committee reports on the
bill in its final form, S.B. 2869 S.D. 3, H.D. 1, C.D. 1,
reiterated that the purpose of the bill was to have the State pay
for all extradition costs:
Under present practice, some expenses relating to
defendants are processed through the courts. A more
appropriate method is to remove the courts from having to
cover such expenses and have the State bear all costs of the
extradition procedure. This also relieves the court from
the financial burden of such expenses.
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Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 11-80, in 1980 House Journal, at 1074
(emphasis added); Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 9-80, in 1980 Senate
Journal, at 943 (emphasis added). There is no indication in any
of the Legislature's standing committee or conference committee
reports that Act 306 was intended to require the State to pay the
travel costs of criminal defendants outside of an extradition
procedure. See S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 518-80, in 1980 Senate
Journal, at 1241; H. Stand. Comm. Rep. Nos. 705-80 & 817-80, in
1980 House Journal, at 1604-05, 1659.
Campbell argues the language of the subsection is "more
than clear" in requiring the State to pay travel costs for "any
defendant 'who is outside of the judicial circuit [and] is
mandated by court order or bench warrant to appear.'" However,
Campbell's "plain language" interpretation would require the
State to advance the travel costs and per diem expenses for any
out-of-state defendant, whether indigent or non-indigent. HRS
§ 621-9(b) does not require a court to make a determination of
indigency as a prerequisite to payment. Rather, it is only after
extradition or return has occurred that "[t]he court may order
the nonindigent defendant or petitioner who was returned to the
State of Hawaii to reimburse the State for the costs of such
extradition or return." HRS § 621-9(b) (emphasis added). In
addition, HRS § 621-9(b) does not limit payment of travel
expenses to trial appearances.
We further note that "a rational, sensible and
practicable interpretation [of a statute] is preferred to one
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which is unreasonable or impracticable[.]" Keliipuleole v.
Wilson, 85 Hawai#i 217, 221-22, 941 P.2d 300, 304-05 (1997)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover,
"[e]very [statutory] construction which leads to an absurdity
shall be rejected." HRS § 1-15(3) (2009).
Reading the statutory language in the context of the
entirety of HRS § 621-9(b), and construing it in a manner
consistent with its purpose, we conclude that HRS § 621-9(b) was
not intended to require the State to pay for travel costs of
criminal defendants outside of an extradition procedure. It
would be an unreasonable interpretation of the Legislature's
intent, if not a wholly absurd result, to conclude that the
addition of subsection (b) to HRS § 621-9 was intended to go so
far beyond its stated purpose, which was simply to shift the
costs of extradition from the courts to the State.
Accordingly, we hold that the Circuit Court did not err
in rejecting Campbell's argument that, pursuant to HRS § 621-
9(b), the State was required to advance her travel expenses to
return to Hawai#i for trial.
B. Campbell's Constitutional Arguments
Campbell argues that, given the establishment of her
indigency, the Circuit Court's failure to order that her travel
costs be borne by the State violated her rights under the Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, including her right to equal protection, right to
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be present at trial, right to due process, and right to
interstate travel.
As the State argues, Campbell did not raise any
constitutional issues in either the Motion for Payment of Travel
Costs or the Motion for Reconsideration. "As a general rule, if
a party does not raise an argument at trial, that argument will
be deemed to have been waived on appeal; this rule applies in
both criminal and civil cases." State v. Moses, 102 Hawai#i 449,
456, 77 P.3d 940, 947 (2003) (citations omitted); see also State
v. Ildefonso, 72 Haw. 573, 584, 827 P.2d 648, 655 (1992) (due
process challenge waived where not raised at trial). We conclude
that Campbell waived any constitutional challenge to the Sua
Sponte Order and the Order Denying Reconsideration based on
Campbell's requests to be advanced travel costs to be present at
trial. Campbell also waived any argument that her equal-
protection-based right to travel was violated by the Circuit
Court's entry of the Sua Sponte Order and the Order Denying
Reconsideration.9
V. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Circuit Court's September 29,
2023 Sua Sponte Order and November 17, 2023 Order Denying
9
To be clear, however, Campbell has not yet been tried on the
charges against her. "It is axiomatic that ripeness is an issue of subject
matter jurisdiction." Blake v. Cnty. of Kaua #i Plan. Comm'n, 131 Hawai#i 123,
131, 315 P.3d 749, 757 (2013) (citation omitted). This opinion should not be
construed as determining or barring trial-related due process, confrontation
clause, or other trial-related claims that are currently premature and
speculative. See, e.g., People v. Cooks, 306 Cal. Rptr. 3d 536, 537-39 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2023); State v. Colsch, 284 N.W.2d 839, 841-842 (Minn. 1979); State
v. Ziegenfuss, 74 P.3d 1205, 1206 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
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Reconsideration are affirmed. This case is remanded to the
Circuit Court for further proceedings.
On the briefs: /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Acting Chief Judge
Kai Lawrence,
for Defendant-Appellant. /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Associate Judge
Renee Ishikawa Delizo,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
County of Maui, Associate Judge
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
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