Harbor Mall, LLC v. Jasper Properties, LLC ( 2024 )


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  • NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    19-SEP-2024
    07:59 AM
    Dkt. 81 SO
    NOS. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX,
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX and CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    HARBOR MALL, LLC, Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellant,
    v.
    JASPER PROPERTIES, LLC, Defendant/Counterclaimant-Appellee,
    and
    DOE DEFENDANTS 1-100, Defendants,
    and
    JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10;
    DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; DOE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
    ENTITIES 1-10; and DOE GOVERNAMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10,
    Counterclaim Doe Defendants,
    and
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    HARBOR MALL, LLC, Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellant,
    v.
    JASPER PROPERTIES, LLC, Defendant/Counterclaimant-Appellee,
    and
    DOE DEFENDANTS 1-100, Defendants,
    and
    JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10;
    DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; DOE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
    ENTITIES 1-10; and DOE GOVERNAMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10,
    Counterclaim Doe Defendants,
    and
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    HARBOR MALL, LLC, Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellant,
    v.
    JASPER PROPERTIES, LLC, Defendant/Counterclaimant-Appellee,
    and
    DOE DEFENDANTS 1-100, Defendants,
    and
    JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10;
    DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; DOE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
    ENTITIES 1-10; and DOE GOVERNAMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10,
    Counterclaim Doe Defendants,
    and
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    HARBOR MALL, LLC, Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellant,
    v.
    JASPER PROPERTIES, LLC, Defendant/Counterclaimant-Appellee,
    and
    DOE DEFENDANTS 1-100, Defendants,
    and
    JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10;
    DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; DOE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
    ENTITIES 1-10; and DOE GOVERNAMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10,
    Counterclaim Doe Defendants
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    (CASE NO. 5CCV-XX-XXXXXXX)
    SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
    (By:    Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, Hiraoka and Guidry, JJ.)
    Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellant Harbor
    Mall, LLC (Harbor Mall) appeals from the (1) February 2, 2021
    Order Awarding Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff[-Appellee]
    Jasper Properties, LLC's [(Jasper Properties)] Motion to Expunge
    [Harbor Mall's] Notice of Pendency of Action Filed October 23,
    2020 (Expungement Order), (2) February 25, 2021 Order Awarding
    Attorneys' Fees Re: [Jasper Properties'] Motion to Expunge
    [Harbor Mall's] Notice of Pendency of Action Filed October 23,
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    2020 (Attorney's Fees Order), (3) August 2, 2021 Order Granting
    [Jasper Properties'] Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to
    Counts I and II Filed June 7, 2021 (Summary Judgment Order), and
    (4) August 25, 2021 Judgment (Judgment), all entered by the
    Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit (circuit court).1
    This case involves a driveway that is located on, and
    "straddling the property line[,]" of adjacent properties owned
    by Harbor Mall and Jasper Properties.       The summary judgment
    record reflects that Jasper Properties acquired its property in
    2003, and that Harbor Mall and Jasper Properties executed a
    handwritten 2003 contract (the 2003 Agreement) that purports to
    memorialize an agreement to share the cost of improvements to
    the driveway.   Although the parties did not fulfill the terms of
    the 2003 Agreement due to the prohibitive cost, it appears that
    Harbor Mall continued to utilize the entire driveway, including
    the portion located on Jasper Properties' land, until Jasper
    Properties erected barriers in 2019 that prevented Harbor Mall
    from accessing the portion of the driveway located on Jasper
    Properties' land.   It appears that Harbor Mall arranged for the
    paving of the shared driveway after the 2003 Agreement was
    signed and prior to Jasper Properties' erecting of barriers in
    2019.
    1    The Honorable Kathleen N.A. Watanabe presided.
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    In October 2020, Harbor Mall filed its operative First
    Amended Complaint (FAC) against Jasper Properties, seeking
    damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief.             The FAC
    sets forth three counts, contending that Jasper Properties
    wrongly restricted its access to the entire driveway, and
    alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust
    enrichment.
    Jasper Properties subsequently moved for summary
    judgment on Harbor Mall's breach of contract and promissory
    estoppel claims.     The circuit court heard the motion, granted
    summary judgment in favor of Jasper Properties, and entered a
    Hawaiʻi Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 54(b) Judgment on
    Counts I and II.     Harbor Mall appealed from the Judgment.
    On appeal, Harbor Mall raises the following points of
    error, contending that the circuit court erred in: (1) awarding
    Jasper Properties attorney's fees;2 (2) granting summary judgment
    in favor of Jasper Properties and against Harbor Mall on Count I
    (breach of contract) of Harbor Mall's FAC; (3) granting summary
    judgment in favor of Jasper Properties and against Harbor Mall
    on Count II (promissory estoppel) of Harbor Mall's FAC; and (4)
    2     Harbor Mall raises this point of error in CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX and
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX. Briefing on this point of error was filed in CAAP-21-
    0000209.
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    denying Harbor Mall's request for an extension of time in which
    to conduct discovery pursuant to HRCP Rule 56(f).3
    Upon careful review of the record and relevant legal
    authorities, and having given due consideration to the arguments
    advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we resolve Harbor
    Mall's points of error as follows:
    (1) Harbor Mall contends that the circuit court erred
    by awarding Jasper Properties attorney's fees, in the amount of
    $6,471.20, as the prevailing party with regard to the
    Expungement Order.4     We review the circuit court's Attorney's
    Fees Order for abuse of discretion.        Kamaka v. Goodsill Anderson
    Quinn & Stifel, 117 Hawaiʻi 92, 105, 
    176 P.3d 91
    , 104 (2008).
    In Price v. AIG Hawaiʻi Ins. Co., 107 Hawaiʻi 106,
    
    111 P.3d 1
     (2005), the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court noted,
    We take this opportunity to remind all judges to specify
    the grounds for awards of attorneys' fees and the amounts
    awarded with respect to each ground. Without such an
    explanation, we must vacate and remand awards for
    redetermination and/or clarification.
    
    Id. at 113
    , 111 P.3d at 8 (citations omitted).
    3     Harbor Mall raises the points of error referenced in (2), (3),
    and (4) in CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX and CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX. Briefing on these points of
    error was filed in CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX.
    4       In March 2020, Harbor Mall filed a Notice of Pendency of Action
    (NOPA), or lis pendens. Jasper Properties moved for expungement of the NOPA;
    the circuit court granted Jasper Properties' motion and Attorney's Fees
    Order. Harbor Mall appealed the attorney's fees award in CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX and
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX. "An order awarding attorney fees is an appealable
    collateral order." Nakata v. Nakata, 
    7 Haw. App. 636
    , 636, 
    793 P.2d 1219
    ,
    1220 (1990).
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    In Erum v. Llego, 147 Hawaiʻi 368, 
    465 P.3d 815
     (2020),
    the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court further explained that,
    . . . [T]his court has recommended that orders imposing
    sanctions in other contexts "set forth findings that
    describe, with reasonable specificity, the perceived
    misconduct (such as harassment or bad faith conduct), as
    well as the appropriate sanctioning authority (e.g., HRCP
    Rule 11 or the court's inherent power)." Bank of Hawaii v.
    Kunimoto, 91 Hawaiʻi 372, 390, 
    984 P.2d 1198
    , 1216 (1999).
    When an order imposing sanctions does not follow this
    recommendation, the appellate court is compelled to review
    the entire record for an abuse of discretion. Fujimoto v.
    Au, 95 Hawaiʻi 116, 153, 
    19 P.3d 699
    , 736 (2001). However,
    we have stated that specific findings must be made in cases
    when it is warranted. See, e.g., Tagupa v. VIPDesk, 135
    Hawaiʻi 468, 479, 
    353 P.3d 1010
    , 1021 (2015) (stating that
    prior to a statutory award of attorneys' fees for a
    frivolous claim, the court must make a specific finding
    that all or a portion of the claims made by a party are
    frivolous); Fujimoto, 95 Hawaiʻi at 153, 
    19 P.3d at 736
    ("Absent a particularized finding of bad faith, the circuit
    court abused its discretion in sanctioning the
    plaintiffs."); Kunimoto, 91 Hawaiʻi at 389, 
    984 P.2d at 1215
    ("It is well settled that a court may not invoke its
    inherent powers to sanction an attorney without a specific
    finding of bad faith."); Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United
    Agri Prods., 86 Hawaiʻi 214, 258, 
    948 P.2d 1055
    , 1099 (1997)
    (affirming the circuit court's award of attorneys' fees
    because the court issued findings describing defendant's
    discovery violations in detail).
    We have also stated that specific findings that describe
    the perceived misconduct serve multiple important purposes.
    Enos, 79 Hawaiʻi at 459, 903 P.2d at 1280. First, findings
    permit a more meaningful and efficient appellate review as
    to whether "the trial court exercised its discretion in a
    reasoned and principled fashion." Id. Second, findings
    assure the litigants, as well as the court, "that the
    decision was the product of thoughtful deliberation." Id.
    Finally, findings clearly identify and explain to the
    sanctioned person the conduct underlying the sanction.
    Id. at 389-90, 465 P.3d at 836-37.
    The circuit court did not explain the grounds for its
    fees award, as Price and Erum require.        The circuit court did
    not cite any legal authority that provided the basis for the
    fees award.   Moreover, the circuit court reduced the amount of
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    attorney's fees from the $8,732.98 requested to "$6,471.20 (20.6
    hours x $300/hr plus GET)."    In doing so, the circuit court did
    not further explain its rationale for the reduced fees, nor did
    it make any finding that the reduced amount was reasonable.        On
    this record, we cannot effectively review whether the circuit
    court abused its discretion in its award of attorney's fees to
    Jasper Properties.
    We vacate the circuit court's Attorney's Fees Order,
    as well as the portion of the Expungement Order that, without
    further explanation, awards Jasper Properties "reasonable
    attorney's fees and costs incurred to bring the [expungement]
    Motion[,]" and remand for an explanation as to the grounds for
    awarding fees and the determination of a reasonable fees award
    in compliance with Price and Erum's instructions.
    (2) Harbor Mall contends that the circuit court erred
    by granting Jasper Properties' motion for partial summary
    judgment on Counts I and II of the FAC.     The circuit court
    granted summary judgment, concluding that there was no genuine
    issue of material fact with respect to Harbor Mall's contentions
    of "breach of contract" or "promissory estoppel."
    "On appeal, the grant or denial of summary judgment is
    reviewed de novo."    Ralston v. Yim, 129 Hawaiʻi 46, 55, 
    292 P.3d 1276
    , 1285 (2013) (citations omitted).     The court applies the
    following standard,
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    [S]ummary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,
    depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on
    file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
    is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
    moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A
    fact is material if proof of that fact would have the
    effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential
    elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the
    parties. The evidence must be viewed in the light most
    favorable to the non-moving party. In other words, we must
    view all of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in
    the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.
    Id. at 55-56, 
    292 P.3d at 1285-86
    .
    "[A] summary judgment movant may satisfy [their]
    initial burden of production by either (1) presenting evidence
    negating an element of the non-movant's claim, or (2)
    demonstrating that the nonmovant will be unable to carry [their]
    burden of proof at trial."     Id. at 60, 
    292 P.3d at 1290
    .        The
    burden then shifts to the respondent to establish that there is
    a genuine question of material fact for trial.         Id. at 57, 
    292 P.3d at 1287
    .
    "Implied contracts arise under circumstances which,
    according to the ordinary course of dealing and the common
    understanding of men, show a mutual intention to contract."
    Durette v. Aloha Plastic Recycling, Inc., 105 Hawaiʻi 490, 504,
    
    100 P.3d 60
    , 74 (2004) (citation omitted).        "An implied
    contract, in the proper sense, is where the intention of the
    parties is not expressed, but an agreement in fact, creating an
    obligation, is implied or presumed from their acts . . . ."             
    Id.
    (cleaned up).
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    In order to establish promissory estoppel,
    (1)   There must be a promise;
    (2)   The promisor must, at the time he or she made the promise,
    foresee that the promisee would rely upon the promise
    (foreseeability);
    (3)   The promisee does in fact rely upon the promisor's promise;
    and
    (4)   Enforcement of the promise is necessary to avoid injustice.
    Applications of Herrick, 82 Hawaiʻi 329, 337-38, 
    922 P.2d 942
    ,
    950-51 (1996) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90
    (Am. L. Inst. 1979)) (cleaned up).
    Generally, a claim for promissory estoppel may arise as an
    application of the general principle of equitable estoppel
    to certain situations where a promise has been made, even
    though without consideration, if it was intended that the
    promise be relied upon and was in fact relied upon, and a
    refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the
    perpetration of fraud or result in other injustice.
    Gonsalves v. Nissan Motor Corp. in Hawaii, Ltd., 100 Hawaiʻi 149,
    164, 
    58 P.3d 1196
    , 1211 (2002) (citation omitted).
    Harbor Mall provided evidence, in the form of Richard
    Jasper's5 deposition testimony, of his belief that Harbor Mall
    and Jasper Properties were "sharing" the driveway "in
    perpetuity."      Pursuant to this understanding, the summary
    judgment record reflects that the parties had entered into the
    2003 Agreement to share the cost of improvements to the
    driveway.    The summary judgment record further reflects that
    5     Richard Jasper testified that he signed the 2003 Agreement on
    behalf of Jasper Properties. He also testified to being the "member manager"
    of Jasper Properties.
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    Harbor Mall had been accessing Jasper Properties' portion of the
    driveway for years, and had been responsible for the paving of
    the driveway.    We conclude that Harbor Mall raised a genuine
    question of material fact, at the summary judgment stage, as to
    whether there existed a mutual agreement and/or promise pursuant
    to which Harbor Mall had a legal or equitable right to access
    the portions of the driveway that "straddled" Jasper Properties'
    land,6 such that Harbor Mall might be able to establish a claim
    to some form of damages and/or equitable relief.
    The circuit court erred in granting summary judgment
    on Counts I and II of Harbor Mall's FAC.
    (3) In light of our decision, as explained in section
    (2), supra, we need not reach Harbor Mall's contention that the
    circuit court erred in denying its request, pursuant to HRCP
    Rule 56(f), for additional time to conduct discovery at the
    summary judgment stage.
    For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the circuit
    court's Attorney's Fees Order, Summary Judgment Order, and
    Judgment.    We further vacate the portion of the Expungement
    Order that, without further explanation, awards Jasper
    Properties "reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred to
    6     Harbor Mall characterizes this alleged legal or equitable right
    variously as, or akin to, an "easement by estoppel," "irrevocable license,"
    "implied easement," "equitable servitude," and "servitude created by
    estoppel."
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    bring the [expungement] Motion."       We remand for further
    proceedings consistent with this summary disposition order.
    DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, September 19, 2024.
    On the briefs:                         /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
    Acting Chief Judge
    Matthew Mannisto,
    for Plaintiff/Counterclaim             /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
    Defendant-Appellant.                   Associate Judge
    Mark R. Zenger,                        /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
    for Defendant/                         Associate Judge
    Counterclaimant-Appellee.
    11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CAAP-21-0000046

Filed Date: 9/19/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/19/2024