Guity v. State. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 11/13/2023. ( 2023 )

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Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
16-OCT-2023
08:07 AM
Dkt. 69 OP
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
---o0o---
WALTER N. GUITY, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Respondent-Appellee
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CIVIL NO. 1CCV-XX-XXXXXXX)
OCTOBER 16, 2023
GINOZA, CHIEF JUDGE, HIRAOKA AND WADSWORTH, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY HIRAOKA, J.
Self-represented Petitioner-Appellant Walter N. Guity
petitioned the Circuit Court of the First Circuit,1 under Hawaii
Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 661B, for redress for wrongful
conviction and imprisonment. Respondent-Appellee State of
Hawai#i moved to dismiss. The Circuit Court granted the motion
and entered judgment in the State's favor, against Guity. Guity
1
The Honorable Jeffrey P. Crabtree presided.
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appeals. We hold that Guity's petition satisfied the pleading
requirements of HRS § 661B-1(b)(1) as to one of his convictions,
but not the other. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment; vacate
in part the Circuit Court's order dismissing Guity's petition;
and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts underlying Guity's petition were recited in
State v. Guity, 144 Hawai#i 557, 445 P.3d 138 (2019) (Guity II).
In May 2010 Guity was indicted on multiple counts, including
attempted sexual assault in the first degree (the Family Court
Case).2 The complaining witness in the Family Court Case was
Guity's wife. In March 2011 Guity was indicted on multiple
counts of sexual assault of a different woman (the Circuit Court
Case).3
Guity agreed to enter pleas in both cases. In the
Family Court Case, he pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of
Sexual Assault in the Third Degree. In the Circuit Court Case,
he pleaded guilty to one count of Sexual Assault in the Second
2
We judicially notice the documents filed in the Family Court Case
pursuant to Rule 201, Hawaii Rules of Evidence, Chapter 626, Hawaii Revised
Statutes (2016). The counts alleged in the indictment were: (1) Abuse of
Family or Household Members in violation of HRS § 709-906; (2) Terroristic
Threatening in the Second Degree in violation of HRS § 707-717(1);
(3) Kidnapping in violation of HRS § 707-720(1)(d); (4) and (5) Attempted
Sexual Assault in the First Degree in violation of HRS §§ 705-500 and
707-730(1)(a); and (6) Interference with Reporting an Emergency or Crime in
violation of HRS § 710-1010.5(1).
3
We also judicially notice the documents filed in the Circuit Court
Case. The counts alleged in the indictment were: (1), (2), and (3) Sexual
Assault in the Second Degree in violation of HRS § 707-731(1)(a); and (4),
(5), and (6) Sexual Assault in the Fourth Degree in violation of HRS § 707-
733(1)(a).
2
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Degree. The State agreed to dismiss all remaining counts in the
Family Court Case and the Circuit Court Case.
Before he was sentenced, Guity moved to withdraw his
guilty pleas. The trial court denied Guity's motion. Guity was
sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 12 months for the Family
Court Case and 18 months for the Circuit Court Case.4
Guity appealed. We held that Guity should have been
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea in the Family Court Case
because, under the law at that time, the offense of sexual
assault in the third degree could not be committed by a defendant
against their spouse.5 State v. Guity, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2016
WL 6427681, at *6-7 (Haw. App. Oct. 31, 2016), as amended,
(Nov. 21, 2016) (mem.) (Guity I), vacated on other grounds by
Guity II. We also held that the trial court failed to obtain a
valid waiver of Guity's right to counsel before the hearing on
his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Id. at *9. We vacated
the convictions and remanded for further proceedings.
Guity applied for a writ of certiorari. In Guity II
the supreme court held that Guity should have been allowed to
withdraw his guilty plea in the Circuit Court Case as well as the
Family Court Case, because the pleas were part of a global plea
agreement. 144 Hawai#i at 558, 563, 445 P.3d at 139, 144. The
4
Guity contends, and the State doesn't dispute, that he served the
full term of his sentences. See State v. Guity, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2016 WL
6427681, at *6 n.6 (Haw. App. Oct. 31, 2016), as amended, (Nov. 21, 2016)
(mem.) (Guity I) ("It appears that by the time briefing in this appeal was
completed, Guity had completed serving his concurrent terms of imprisonment on
both convictions."), vacated on other grounds by Guity II .
5
The relevant law has since been amended. See Guity I, 2016 WL
6427681, at *1 n.1.
3
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supreme court remanded both cases "with instructions to accept
Guity's withdrawal of both pleas and for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion." Id. at 563-64, 445 P.3d at 144-
45.
On remand in the Family Court Case, Guity moved to
dismiss Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5 because of defects in the
indictment. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed
Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5 without prejudice. The State moved to
nolle prosequi Counts 1 and 6 without prejudice "on the ground
that Counts 2-5 were dismissed without prejudice[.]" The trial
court granted the motion. The crime for which Guity pleaded
guilty and was convicted (sexual assault in the third degree)
wasn't charged in the indictment.
On remand in the Circuit Court Case, Guity moved to
dismiss all six counts because of defects in the indictment. The
trial court granted the motion "with prejudice, as the State can
no longer prosecute the case due to lack of contact with the
complainant."
Guity filed the petition below on May 14, 2021. He
sought redress from the State for wrongful convictions and
imprisonment under HRS Chapter 661B. The State moved to dismiss
the petition or, alternatively, for summary judgment. The
Circuit Court granted the motion. It ruled:
3. The court's analysis is straight-forward. HRS
Section 661B-1 is clear. To present an actionable claim
against the State for wrongful conviction and imprisonment,
Mr. Guity must allege that he was convicted, was sentenced,
and was imprisoned, and that his judgment of conviction was
reversed because he was actually innocent of the crimes for
which he was convicted, and the court decision so states (or
4
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the petitioner was pardoned and the pardon so states)
(emphasis added).
4. There is no dispute that Mr. Guity obtained
dismissal of a charge against him. However, it is also
undisputed that no court decision connected with the
dismissal states he was actually innocent. Mr. Guity argues
that the presumption of innocence should apply. Mr. Guity
is absolutely correct that he is presumed innocent in the
context of the criminal justice system. But he is now in a
different arena -- asserting a civil claim for damages. HRS
Section 661B-1 controls civil claims for wrongful
imprisonment. The presumption of innocence that cloaks
Mr. Guity in a criminal case does not apply in civil
litigation. The statute clearly states and is clearly
intended to limit financial claims against the State to
situations where there is an actual and express finding of
actual innocence by the court considering the criminal case.
A written order was entered on October 27, 2021.
This appeal followed. After briefing was completed, we
entered an order under Hawai#i Rules of Appellate Procedure
(HRAP) Rule 28(b)(4)6 for supplemental briefing on whether HRS
§ 661B-3(b)(1)7 should be applied in this appeal. Both parties
filed timely supplemental briefs.
6
HRAP Rule 28(b)(4) provides, in relevant part:
If an appellate court, when acting on a case on appeal,
contemplates basing the disposition of the case wholly or in
part upon an issue of plain error not raised by the parties
through briefing, it shall not affirm, reverse, or vacate
the case without allowing the parties the opportunity to
brief the potential plain-error issue prior to disposition.
7
HRS § 661B-3 (2016) provides, in relevant part:
(b) The following shall be affirmative defenses, on which the
State shall have the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) The petitioner was serving a term of imprisonment for
another crime, including crimes under the laws of the
United States, concurrently with imprisonment for the
crime or crimes for which petitioner was actually
innocent[.]
5
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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Motion to Dismiss
"A circuit court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is
reviewed de novo." Bank of Am., N.A. v. Reyes-Toledo, 143
Hawai#i 249, 256, 428 P.3d 761, 768 (2018) (citation omitted).
We apply the same standard applied by the circuit court:
[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
or her claim that would entitle him or her to relief.
The appellate court must therefore view a plaintiff's
complaint in a light most favorable to him or her in
order to determine whether the allegations contained
therein could warrant relief under any alternative
theory. For this reason, in reviewing a circuit
court's order dismissing a complaint . . . the
appellate court's consideration is strictly limited to
the allegations of the complaint, and the appellate
court must deem those allegations to be true.
Id. at 257, 428 P.3d at 769 (citation omitted). "However, in
weighing the allegations of the complaint as against a motion to
dismiss, the court is not required to accept conclusory
allegations on the legal effect of the events alleged." Kealoha
v. Machado, 131 Hawai#i 62, 74, 315 P.3d 213, 225 (2013)
(citation omitted).
The State's motion to dismiss included five exhibits
that were not excluded by the Circuit Court. That would
ordinarily have converted the motion to dismiss into one for
summary judgment. See Hawai#i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP)
Rule 12(b); Andrade v. County of Hawai#i, 145 Hawai#i 265, 268-69,
451 P.3d 1, 4-5 (App. 2019). The exhibits, however, consisted of
our memorandum opinion in Guity I; the supreme court opinion in
Guity II; and findings of fact, conclusions of law, and orders
6
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entered on remand in the Family Court Case and the Circuit Court
Case. Hawaii Rules of Evidence Rule 201 permits a court to
notice adjudicative facts if they are "not subject to reasonable
dispute." "The most frequent use of judicial notice of
ascertainable facts is in noticing the contents of court
records." Uyeda v. Schermer, 144 Hawai#i 163, 172, 439 P.3d 115,
124 (2019) (citation omitted).8 A trial court may judicially
notice the contents of court records without converting a motion
to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Khoja v.
Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018).9
Accordingly, we apply the standard of review applicable to HRCP
Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.
8
However:
a distinction must be carefully drawn between taking
judicial notice of the existence of documents in the Court
file as opposed to the truth of the facts asserted in those
documents. Factual allegations, conclusions, and findings,
whether authored by the court, by the parties or their
attorneys, or by third persons, should not be noticed to
prove the truth of the matters asserted even though the
material happens to be contained in court records. A court
may only take judicial notice of the truth of facts asserted
in documents such as orders, judgments, and findings of fact
and conclusions of law because of the principles of
collateral estoppel, res judicata, and the law of the case.
Uyeda, 144 Hawai#i at 172, 439 P.3d at 124 (cleaned up) (emphasis omitted).
9
Although cases interpreting provisions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence are not binding upon us, we may
refer to them for their persuasive authority in interpreting the Hawai#i Rules
of Civil Procedure and Hawaii Rules of Evidence. Ralston v. Yim, 129 Hawai#i
46, 57 n.15, 292 P.3d 1276, 1287 n.15 (2013) (noting Hawai#i courts "can look
to cases interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for persuasive
guidance." (citation omitted)); State v. Fitzwater, 122 Hawai#i 354, 366 n.7,
227 P.3d 520, 532 n.7 (2010) ("Although cases interpreting provisions in the
Federal Rules of Evidence are . . . not binding on us, we may refer to them
for persuasive authority in interpreting similar provisions of the Hawaii
Rules of Evidence." (citation omitted)).
7
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B. Statutory Interpretation
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law
reviewed de novo. Barker v. Young, 153 Hawai#i 144, 148, 528
P.3d 217, 221 (2023). We start with the statute's language;
"implicit in the task of statutory construction is our foremost
obligation to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language
contained in the statute itself." Id. (citation omitted). But
"when there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness
or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, . . . the
meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the
context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences
may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning." Id.(citation omitted). We may also "resort to extrinsic aids in
determining legislative intent, such as legislative history, or
the reason and spirit of the law." Id. (citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Guity argues that the Circuit Court erred by granting
the State's motion to dismiss "because Guity's case met all the
grounds according to the legislative statue [sic]."10 HRS
§ 661B-1 (2016) provides:
Statement of claim for compensation. (a) Any person
convicted in a court of the State and imprisoned for one or
more crimes of which the person was actually innocent may
10
Guity's opening brief doesn't comply with HRAP Rule 28(b). But to
promote access to justice, the supreme court instructs that self-represented
litigants shouldn't be foreclosed from appellate review because they fail to
comply with court rules. Erum v. Llego, 147 Hawai#i 368, 380-81, 465 P.3d
815, 827-28 (2020). Accordingly, we address what we discern to be Guity's
arguments.
8
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file a petition for relief pursuant to this chapter for an
award of damages against the State; provided that the
requirements of subsection (b) are met.
(b) To present an actionable claim against the State
for wrongful conviction and imprisonment, the petitioner
shall allege that the petitioner was convicted of one or
more crimes under the laws of the State, was subsequently
sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and has served all or
any part of the sentence and either that:
(1) The judgment of conviction was reversed or
vacated because the petitioner was actually
innocent of the crimes for which the petitioner
was convicted, and the court decision so states;
or
(2) The petitioner was pardoned because the
petitioner was actually innocent of the crimes
for which the petitioner was convicted and the
pardon so states.
(Bold italics added.)
Guity's petition, written in the first person, alleged
that he was convicted and sentenced in the Family Court Case and
in the Circuit Court Case; served his sentences; appealed his
convictions; the convictions were vacated "because I was innocent
of the crimes for which I was convicted"; and both cases were
dismissed on remand.
The State argues that "[t]he Hawai#i Supreme Court
vacated Guity's conviction because the circuit court wrongly
refused to let him withdraw his guilty plea. It made no finding
of 'actual innocence[,]'" nor did its opinion "so state[]." The
State also argues that "actually innocent" is a legal term of art
meaning "factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency[,]" and
that a person is "actually innocent" if "they did not commit the
underlying conduct upon which their conviction was based."
9
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A. The legislature did not define the phrase
"actually innocent" and the legislative
history does not provide definitive guidance.
HRS Chapter 661B doesn't define the phrase "actually
innocent." The State contends the phrase is a legal term of art
meaning "factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency." The
State appears to be referring to federal habeas corpus law.11 A
state prisoner who is procedurally unable to obtain habeas relief
from the state's highest court may seek relief from a federal
court if the petitioner demonstrates that a "constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is
actually innocent[.]" Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106
S. Ct. 2639, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986) (emphasis added). In such a
case, "failure to consider the claim[] will result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Thompson, 501U.S. 722, 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991). The
miscarriage of justice exception applies only in extraordinary
cases, and "'actual innocence' means factual innocence, not mere
legal insufficiency." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,
11
The State's brief cites Williams v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 3d
1115 (W.D. Wash. 2021), a federal habeas case, and In re Allen, 366 S.W.3d 696(Tex. 2012). Under the Texas wrongful imprisonment statute, "[a] person is
entitled to compensation if the person 1) has served in whole or in part a
sentence in prison under the laws of this state, and 2) has been granted
habeas relief on a court determination that he is 'actually innocent' of the
crime for which he was sentenced." In re Allen, 366 S.W.3d at 700.
10
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623, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998).12 HRS Chapter
661B doesn't mention federal law on habeas relief. Nor does the
legislative history mention federal habeas law.
HRS Chapter 661B was enacted on June 29, 2016. 2016
Haw. Sess. Laws Act 156, § 5 at 513. The bill for Act 156 (2016)
had been introduced during the previous legislative session.
H.B. 1046, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2015).13 The bill was carried
12
Even under federal law, "actual innocence" doesn't always mean
that the defendant did not commit the crime of which they were convicted. In
federal habeas cases when the petitioner challenges a state death penalty,
"actual innocence" is established by showing that but for a constitutional
error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the
death penalty under the applicable state law. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S.
333, 336, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 120 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1992).
13
The bill proposed this language:
(b) To present an actionable claim against the State for
wrongful conviction and imprisonment, the claimant shall
allege:
(1) That the claimant has been convicted of one or
more crimes, was subsequently sentenced to a
term of imprisonment, and has served all or any
part of the sentence, under the laws of this
State;
(2) On grounds consistent with innocence and
supported by findings that clearly state such
consistency, for the crime or crimes which the
claimant was sentenced:
(A) That the claimant was pardoned for the
crime or crimes;
(B) That the judgment of conviction was
reversed or vacated; and:
(i) The accusatory instrument was
dismissed; or
(ii) If a new trial was ordered, either
the claimant was found not guilty at
the new trial or the claimant was
not retried and the accusatory
instrument was dismissed; or
(C) The statute, or application thereof, on
which the accusatory instrument was based,
violated the constitution of the United
States or the State of Hawaii;
(continued...)
11
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over to the 2016 session.14 A "Special Committee On Redress for
Unlawful Imprisonment" was convened by the Hawai#i chapter of the
American Judicature Society (AJS) in 2015 to revise the bill's
language. H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 411-16, in 2016 House
Journal, at 903.15
The AJS committee's co-chair submitted written
testimony to the Senate Committee on Judiciary and Labor
explaining that the AJS committee had "reviewed legislation
adopted in many of the several states and also looked at some of
the objections to a 2015 proposed bill[.]" Senate Committee on
Judiciary and Labor on House Bill 1046, H.D.2, 28th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Mar. 14, 2016) (testimony of Mark J. Bennett16).17 The AJS
committee "believed the proposed statute afforded appropriate
13
(...continued)
(3) That the claimant did not commit any of the
crimes charged in the accusatory instrument, or
the acts or omissions charged in the accusatory
instrument did not constitute a crime;
(4) That the claimant did not commit or suborn
perjury or fabricate evidence to cause or bring
about the claimant's conviction; provided that
neither a confession or admission later found to
be false, nor a guilty plea to a crime the
claimant did not commit, shall constitute
perjury or fabrication under this paragraph[.]
H.B. 1046, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2015), available at https://www.capitol.
hawaii.gov/sessions/session2015/bills/HB1046_.PDF.
14
See Haw. Const. art. III, § 15 ("Any bill pending at the final
adjournment of a regular session in an odd-numbered year shall carry over with
the same status to the next regular session.").
15
Available at https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/sessions/session2016/
CommReports/HB1046_HD1_HSCR411-16_.pdf.
16
The other co-chair for the AJS committee was the Honorable
Jeannette H. Castagnetti.
17
Available at https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/sessions/session2016/
Testimony/HB1046_HD2_TESTIMONY_JDL_03-15-16.PDF.
12
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compensation and yet also provided appropriate safeguards for the
State and the taxpayers, striking a fair balance." Id. As
recognized by the Conference Committee and the Senate Committee
on Judiciary and Labor, the AJS committee's suggestions were
incorporated into the version of H.B. 1046 that was ultimately
enacted as HRS Chapter 661B. See Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 146-16, in
2016 House Journal, at 1410 ("Your Committee on Conference notes
that the language in this measure is substantially similar to the
draft legislation proposed by the Hawaii Chapter of the American
Judicature Society Special Committee on Redress for Unlawful
Imprisonment.");18 S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 3045, in 2016 Senate
Journal, at 1309 ("Your Committee finds that the language in this
measure is substantially similar to the draft legislation
proposed by the Hawaii Chapter of the American Judicature Society
special committee on redress for unlawful imprisonment.")19.
There is no indication that the AJS committee suggested
incorporating the phrase "actually innocent" in the proposed law
as a term of art meaning "factual innocence, not legal
insufficiency[,]" as in federal habeas law. Nor is there any
indication that the bill's final language was based on any other
state's statute. Indeed, the State's answering brief describes
the redress statutes of Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut,
18
Available at https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/sessions/session2016/
CommReports/HB1046_CD1_CCR146-16_.pdf.
19
Available at https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/sessions/session2016/
CommReports/HB1046_SD1_SSCR3045_.pdf.
13
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Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Texas,
Washington, and the District of Columbia, but our statute appears
to be uniquely worded.
The legislative committee reports don't clearly state
what the phrase "actually innocent" was intended to mean, either.
But they do give some indication of the general legislative
intent. The House Committee on Judiciary reported:
Your Committee finds that compensation for wrongful
imprisonment generates many viewpoints about the State's
responsibility in these circumstances. Wrongful convictions
and the subsequent incarcerations may be the result of many
factors, including eyewitness misidentification, false
confessions, improper forensic science, and government
misconduct. The conundrum confronting any compensation
scheme is to identify deserving individuals who are innocent
of crimes from those who are not.
. . . .
Upon careful consideration, your Committee has amended
this measure by deleting its contents and inserting the
language of H.B. No. 1046, H.D. 1, Proposed, which provides
compensation and expungement of conviction to persons who
can demonstrate that they were wrongfully convicted and
imprisoned when actually innocent.
H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 411-16, in 2016 House Journal, at 903
(emphasis added);20 cf. State v. Kamana#o, 103 Hawai#i 315, 321,
82 P.3d 401, 407 (2003) (noting that "[a] sentencing court may
not draw a negative inference of lack of remorse from the
defendant's silence at sentencing where he has maintained,
throughout the proceedings, that he did not commit the offense of
which he stands convicted — i.e., that he is actually innocent"
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
20
See supra note 15.
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Further, the Conference Committee reported, in relevant
part:
The purpose of this measure is to provide compensation
and expungement of conviction to persons who can demonstrate
they were wrongfully convicted and imprisoned when actually
innocent.
. . . .
Innocent persons who have been wrongly convicted of
crimes and subsequently imprisoned have been uniquely
victimized, have distinct challenges re-entering society,
and have difficulty achieving legal redress due to a variety
of substantive and technical obstacles in the law. . . .
Your Committee on Conference finds that these individuals
deserve a process of redress over and above the existing
tort remedies to seek compensation for damages from the
jurisdiction that wrongly convicted and imprisoned them.
Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 146-16, in 2016 House Journal, at 1410
(emphasis added).21
With this in mind, we address the convictions at issue
in Guity's HRS Chapter 661B petition.
B. The Circuit Court erred by dismissing Guity's
petition with respect to the Family Court
Case.
Guity pleaded guilty to, was convicted of, and was
imprisoned for 12 months for, Sexual Assault in the Third Degree,
in violation of former HRS § 707-732(1)(f) (Supp. 2009). The
statute provided, in relevant part:
(1) A person commits the offense of sexual assault in the
third degree if:
. . . .
(f) The person knowingly, by strong compulsion, has
sexual contact with another person or causes
another person to have sexual contact with the
actor.
21
Available at https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/sessions/session2016/
CommReports/HB1046_CD1_CCR1416-16_.pdf.
15
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(Emphasis added.) When Guity was convicted, "sexual contact"
meant:
any touching, other than acts of "sexual penetration", [sic]
of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person not
married to the actor, or of the sexual or other intimate
parts of the actor by the person, whether directly or
through the clothing or other material intended to cover the
sexual or other intimate parts.
HRS § 707-700 (Supp. 2009) (emphasis added).
The complainant in the Family Court Case was Guity's
wife. In Guity I we stated:
Under the law applicable to the charges in Guity's
cases, the offense of third-degree sexual assault to which
Guity pleaded guilty could not be committed by a defendant
against his or her spouse. . . . Accordingly, given the
Legislature's definition of the offense, Guity pleaded
guilty to an offense — third-degree sexual assault against
his wife — that was legally impossible for Guity to commit.
2016 WL 6427681, at *1 (emphasis added). We also noted:
Here, the Circuit Court clearly violated [Hawai#i
Rules of Penal Procedure] Rule 11(g) in entering judgment on
Guity's plea of guilty to third-degree sexual assault of his
wife. Not only did the Circuit Court and the parties know
that there was no factual basis for Guity's guilty plea to
third-degree sexual assault, but they affirmatively knew
that it was legally impossible for Guity to have committed
this offense. . . .
. . . [A] court's acceptance of, and entry of judgment
on, a guilty plea to an offense that it knows the defendant
could not legally commit implicates the integrity of the
judicial system. We conclude that allowing such action by a
court would be contrary to the truth-seeking function of the
criminal justice system and would serve to undermine the
integrity of the system and public confidence in the system.
Id. at *7-8 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we vacated Guity's
conviction in the Family Court Case.
The supreme court also stated, in Guity II:
At the time of the plea agreement, it was legally
impossible for Guity to have committed the crime to which he
had pleaded guilty in the family court case relating to his
wife. . . .
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. . . .
The ICA held correctly that Guity was entitled to
withdraw his guilty plea in the family court case because
"the Circuit Court definitively knew that it was legally
impossible for Guity to have committed third-degree sexual
assault of his wife[.]"
144 Hawai#i at 559, 562-63, 445 P.3d at 140, 143-44 (emphasis
added).
The State argues that the court decision reversing or
vacating a conviction must contain the precise words, "actually
innocent," because HRS § 661B-1(b)(1) requires that "the court
decision so state[]." Were that the case, any court could
subvert an actually innocent person's standing to make a claim
for redress by simply omitting the words "actually innocent" from
its decision. That result would be absurd. See Barker, 153
Hawai#i at 149 n.8, 528 P.3d at 222 n.8 (noting that "if a
literal construction of statutory language would produce an
absurd result, we presume that result was not intended and
construe the statute in accord with its underlying legislative
intent" (cleaned up)).
Neither Guity I nor Guity II contained the words
"actually innocent." However, Guity I states there was no
factual basis (because the complaining witness was Guity's wife)
or legal basis (because the definition of "sexual contact"
excluded contact with the defendant's spouse) for Guity's
conviction. And Guity II noted it was legally impossible for
Guity to have committed the offense to which he pleaded guilty in
the Family Court Case. Given the undisputed facts in the Family
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Court Case, that was the equivalent of stating that Guity was
actually innocent of the crime for which he had been convicted —
Sexual Assault in the Third Degree of his wife. Accordingly, we
hold that Guity's petition met the pleading requirements of HRS
§ 661B-1(b)(1) with respect to the Family Court Case,22 and that
the Circuit Court erred by dismissing Guity's petition with
respect to the Family Court Case.23
C. The Circuit Court did not err by dismissing
Guity's petition with respect to the Circuit
Court Case.
In the Circuit Court Case, Guity pleaded guilty to
Sexual Assault in the Second Degree, in violation of HRS § 707-
731(1)(a) (Supp. 2009). The trial court denied Guity's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. Guity had represented himself at the
hearing on the motion. In Guity I we held that the trial court
failed to obtain a valid waiver of Guity's right to counsel
before the hearing. 2016 WL 6427681, at *8-9. We remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings. Nothing in our
memorandum opinion can reasonably be interpreted as stating that
Guity was actually innocent of Sexual Assault in the Second
Degree.
In Guity II the supreme court noted that our "remand
instructions require the [trial] court to rehear the motion to
22
We express no opinion on whether, or how, HRS § 661B-3(b) should
be applied on remand, or whether Guity is entitled to redress under HRS
§ 661B-3(c). This opinion addresses only the propriety of the Circuit Court's
order granting the State's motion to dismiss.
23
Our holding is limited to the specific facts of this case.
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withdraw the plea, leaving the possibility open that the [trial]
court could deny Guity's motion to withdraw the remaining plea."
144 Hawai#i at 561, 445 P.3d at 142. The supreme court held that
Guity's plea agreement "was clearly a global plea agreement[,]"
id. at 562, 445 P.3d at 143, and "because Guity was entitled to
withdraw his plea in the family court case, he was also entitled
to withdraw his plea in the circuit court case[,]" id. at 563,
445 P.3d at 144. The supreme court remanded "with instructions
to accept Guity's withdrawal of both pleas and for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion." Id. at 563-64, 445
P.3d at 144-45. Nothing in the supreme court's opinion can
reasonably be interpreted as stating that Guity was actually
innocent of Sexual Assault in the Second Degree.
On remand Guity moved to dismiss all six counts because
of defects in the indictment. The trial court granted the motion
because the indictment failed "to define or specify 'compulsion'
as defined in HRS § 707-700[.]" The dismissal was "with
prejudice, as the State can no longer prosecute the case due to
lack of contact with the complainant." Nothing in the trial
court's order can reasonably be interpreted as stating that Guity
was actually innocent of Sexual Assault in the Second Degree — or
any other counts of the indictment. We also note that HRS
§ 661B-1(b)(1) requires that "the court decision" that "reversed
or vacated" the "judgment of conviction" state that the
petitioner was "actually innocent of the crimes for which the
petitioner was convicted[.]" The trial court's order dismissing
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the indictment did not reverse or vacate Guity's judgment of
conviction. It could not be relied on as the decision stating
that Guity was actually innocent for purposes of HRS § 661B-
1(b)(1).
On this record, Guity's petition did not — and could
not — satisfy the pleading requirements of HRS § 661B-1(b)(1)
with respect to the Circuit Court Case. The Circuit Court did
not err by dismissing Guity's petition with respect to the
Circuit Court Case.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we vacate the Circuit
Court's "Judgment" entered on December 15, 2021; and vacate in
part the Circuit Court's "Order Granting Defendant State of
Hawaii's Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary
Judgment, Filed August 17, 2021[,]" entered on October 27, 2021,
to the extent it dismissed Guity's petition with respect to his
conviction in the Family Court Case, but affirm that order to the
extent it dismissed Guity's petition with respect to his
conviction in the Circuit Court Case. We remand to the Circuit
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On the briefs: /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
Chief Judge
Walter N. Guity,
Self-represented /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Petitioner-Appellant. Associate Judge
Ewan C. Rayner, /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Deputy Solicitor General, Associate Judge
State of Hawai#i,
for Respondent-Appellee.
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