State v. Truglio ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
29-MAY-2024
09:26 AM
Dkt. 110 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
LESLIE L.C. TRUGLIO, Defendant-Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CR. NO. 1CPC170001522)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, Hiraoka and McCullen, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Leslie L.C. Truglio (Truglio)
appeals from the February 6, 2020 Second Amended Judgment of
Conviction and Probation Sentence (Second Amended Judgment)
entered by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (Circuit Court)
in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai#i (State).1
Truglio also challenges the Circuit Court's November 16, 2018
Findings of Fact [(FOFs)]; Conclusions of Law [(COLs)); Order
Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment (Order Denying
Motion to Dismiss).
On October 26, 2017, Truglio was indicted by grand jury
with one count of Theft in the First Degree in violation of
1
The Honorable Karen T. Nakasone presided.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 708-830(1) (2014),2 and 708-
830.5(1)(a) (2014).3 4 On September 23, 2019, the Circuit Court
found Truglio guilty of the lesser included offense of Theft in
the Second Degree under HRS § 708-831(1)(b) (2014).5 On February
6, 2020, Truglio was sentenced to four years of probation and
ordered to make restitution payments to the Department of Human
Services and John Cruz (Cruz).
Truglio raises three points of error on appeal,
contending that: (1) the Circuit Court erred in denying
Truglio's motion to dismiss; (2) the Circuit Court erred by
failing to consider Truglio's authorized control over TuneCore
funds; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to convict Truglio
of Theft in the Second Degree.
2
HRS § 708-830 provides, in pertinent part:
§ 708-830 Theft. A person commits theft if the
person does any of the following:
(1) Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over
property. A person obtains or exerts
unauthorized control over the property of
another with intent to deprive the other of
the property.
3
HRS § 708-830.5 provides, in pertinent part:
§ 708-830.5 Theft in the first degree. (1) A
person commits the offense of theft in the first
degree if the person commits theft:
(a) Of property or services, the value of
which exceeds $20,000[.]
4
Truglio was indicted on a second count, for which the Circuit
Court entered a Judgment of Acquittal on May 3, 2019.
5
HRS § 708-831 provides, in pertinent part:
§ 708-831 Theft in the second degree. (1) A person
commits the offense of theft in the second degree if the
person commits theft:
(a) Of property from the person of another;
(b) Of property or services the value of which exceeds
$300[.]
2
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we
resolve Truglio's points of error as follows:
(1) Truglio argues that the Circuit Court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss the grand jury indictments on the
grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. Truglio argues that the
grand jury was misled because the State allowed Cruz to lie about
Truglio's ownership interest in certain businesses and asked
misleading questions about Truglio's ownership interests.
"In cases involving allegations of prosecutorial abuse
or misconduct, this court has applied an abuse of discretion
standard when reviewing a motion to dismiss an indictment."
State v. Taylor, 126 Hawai#i 205, 214, 269 P.3d 740, 749 (2011).
"The burden of establishing abuse of discretion is on appellant,
and a strong showing is required to establish it." State v.
Deguair, 136 Hawai#i 71, 84-85, 358 P.3d 43, 56-57 (2015)
(quoting State v. Hinton, 120 Hawai#i 265, 273, 204 P.3d 484, 492
(2009)).
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
establish probable cause before the grand jury, every
legitimate inference that may be drawn from the evidence
must be drawn in favor of the indictment and neither the
trial court nor the appellate court on review may substitute
its judgment as to the weight of the evidence for that of
the Grand Jury. The evidence to support an indictment need
not be sufficient to support a conviction.
State v. Shaw, 150 Hawai#i 56, 61, 497 P.3d 71, 76 (2021) (citing
Taylor, 126 Hawai#i at 215, 269 P.3d at 750).
Here, none of the Circuit Court's FOFs are specifically
challenged on appeal and they state as follows:
3
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
1. This case was presented to the Grand Jury on
October 26, 2017 through testimony of the Complainant [Cruz]
and Special Agent John Thompson.
2. During the grand jury proceedings, [Cruz]
testified that [Truglio] placed herself on the company's
existing registration at the [Department of Commerce and
Consumer Affairs (DCCA)] as an owner/manager of his
business.
3. [Cruz] further testified that [Truglio] did this
without his knowledge or consent.
4. [Cruz] further testified that the DCCA informed
him that this unilateral change was not binding.
5. [Cruz] further testified that he terminated
[Truglio] as his business manager in writing on June 3,
2013.
6. Special Agent John Thompson, the lead
investigator on the case, testified that monies earned from
[Cruz's] music sales at TuneCore were re-directed from his
business bank account to [Truglio's] personal bank account
on June 9, 2013.
7. Special Agent Thompson testified only that
[Truglio] had access to this TuneCore account.
8. [Cruz] further testified that he and [Truglio]
memorialized the termination of their business relationship
via [an Agreement] effective July 31, 2013.
9. [Cruz] further testified that the [Agreement]
terminated all interest that [Truglio] may have had in all
of Cruz's music companies.
10. [Cruz] and Special Agent Thompson both testified
that the monies taken by [Truglio] from the effective date
of the [Agreement] (July 31, 2013) through August 17, 2015
exceeded $20,000.
[FOF 11 was deleted by the Circuit Court]
12. Special Agent John Thompson testified to
correspondence between [Cruz], TuneCore, and [Truglio].
13. That correspondence indicated that TuneCore made
a determination that [Cruz] was the rightful recipient of
the royalty payments and redirected them accordingly.
14. That correspondence further indicated that
[Truglio] inquired about the stoppage of TuneCore payments
but made no further inquiry after TuneCore explained their
reasoning.
(Record citations omitted).
Notwithstanding, as Truglio points out, questions and
statements by members of the Grand Jury concerning Truglio's
alleged ownership interests, the Grand Jury indicted Truglio.
4
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
"[U]nchallenged findings of fact are binding upon this court."
State v. Rodrigues, 145 Hawai#i 487, 494, 454 P.3d 428, 435
(2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In light
of the unchallenged FOFs in this case, which are supported by the
record in this case, we cannot conclude that the Circuit Court
abused its discretion in concluding that Truglio failed to meet
her burden of establishing prosecutorial misconduct in the grand
jury proceedings.
(2) Truglio contends that she maintained ownership
over the TuneCore funds despite the Agreement because (1) she
only entered the Agreement out of economic duress and (2) the
Agreement is otherwise void because Cruz materially breached the
Agreement by locking her out of certain email account.
In a criminal case, duress is an affirmative defense.
See HRS § 702-231 (2014).6 A defendant has "the burden of going
forward with the evidence to prove the facts constituting such
defense" under a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. HRS
§ 702-231(5). A defendant must prove that (1) the defendant was
coerced by another, (2) through "the use of, or a threat to use,
6
HRS § 702-231 provides, in pertinent part:
§ 702-231 Duress. (1) It is a defense to a penal
charge that the defendant engaged in the conduct or caused
the result alleged because he was coerced to do so by the
use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his
person or the person of another, which a person of
reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable
to resist.
. . . .
(5) In prosecutions for any offense described in this
Code, the defense asserted under this section shall
constitute an affirmative defense. The defendant shall have
the burden of going forward with the evidence to prove the
facts constituting such defense, unless such facts are
supplied by the testimony of the prosecuting witness or
circumstance in such testimony, and of proving such facts by
a preponderance of the evidence pursuant to section 701-115.
5
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
unlawful force against the [defendant]," and (3) "a person of
reasonable firmness" would not be able to resist such coercion.
HRS § 702-231(1); State v. Ortiz, 93 Hawai#i 399, 406, 4 P.3d
533, 540 (App. 2000). The Circuit Court concluded that Truglio
failed to meet this burden. Truglio makes no cogent argument to
the contrary on appeal.
Truglio argues that because Cruz cut off her access to
the company email, she believed her actions were authorized, as
Cruz was obligated under the Agreement to continue her email
access. Truglio cites no legal authority supporting this
proposition as a defense to a charge of theft, but it appears
that she contends that this alleged "material breach" of the
Agreement should have created reasonable doubt by the trier-of-
fact. Clearly, the trier-of-fact rejected this theory of
defense. We conclude that Truglio has not established grounds
for appellate relief based on Cruz's alleged breach of contract.
(3) Truglio argues that there was insufficient
evidence to convict her of Theft in the Second Degree. We review
the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to
prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 148 Hawai#i 152, 166,
468 P.3d 166, 180 (2020). "A conviction of theft in the second
degree pursuant to HRS § 708-831(1)(b) (2014) requires that the
defendant intentionally or knowingly commit theft of property
valued in excess of $300." State v. Means, 148 Hawai#i 212, 220,
468 P.3d 226, 234 (2020) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
6
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, there is ample evidence to support the
conviction.
For these reasons, the Circuit Court's February 6, 2020
Second Amended Judgment is affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, May 29, 2024.
On the briefs: /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Acting Chief Judge
Jacob G. Delaplane,
for Defendant-Appellant. /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Associate Judge
Michelle M.L. Puu,
Deputy Attorney General, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Department of the Attorney Associate Judge
General, State of Hawai#i,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
7