Puu Heleakala Community Association v. Collins ( 2024 )


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  •   NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    15-OCT-2024
    08:00 AM
    Dkt. 41 SO
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
    PUU HELEAKALA COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION,
    by and through its Board of Directors, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
    GABI KIM COLLINS, Defendant-Appellant
    APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    (CASE NO. 1RC181007771)
    SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
    (By: Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, Hiraoka and McCullen, JJ.)
    Defendant-Appellant Gabi Kim Collins (Collins) appeals
    from the February 22, 2021 Judgment (Judgment) entered by the
    District Court of the First Circuit, Wai#anae Division (District
    Court),1 against Collins and in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Puu
    Heleakala Community Association, by and through its Board of
    Directors (Puu).     Collins also challenges the District Court's
    February 4, 2021 Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
    Judgment (SJ Order).
    Collins raises two points of error on appeal,
    contending that the District Court erred by:             (1) assuming
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    The Honorable James C. McWhinnie presided.
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    jurisdiction and adjudicating the case in violation of District
    Court Rules of Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 12.1, and Hawaii
    Revised Statutes (HRS) § 604-5(d) (2016); and (2) granting
    summary judgment to, and entering judgment in favor of, Puu
    because Collins presented substantial evidence that the claim was
    barred on multiple statutory grounds.
    Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
    submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
    the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we
    resolve Collins's points of error as follows:
    (1)   Collins argues that, pursuant to HRS § 604-5(d)
    and DCRCP Rule 12.1, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
    resolve Puu's Complaint and motion for summary judgment.           HRS §
    604-5 (2016) states, in pertinent part:
    § 604-5   Civil Jurisdiction.
    . . . .
    (d)   The district courts shall not have cognizance of
    real actions, nor actions in which the title to real estate
    comes in question . . .
    DCRCP Rule 12.1 states:
    Rule 12.1.   DEFENSE OF TITLE IN DISTRICT COURTS.
    Pleadings. Whenever, in the district court, in
    defense of an action in the nature of an action of trespass
    or for the summary possession of land, or any other action,
    the defendant shall seek to interpose a defense to the
    jurisdiction to the effect that the action is a real action,
    or one in which the title to real estate is involved, such
    defense shall be asserted by a written answer or written
    motion, which shall not be received by the court unless
    accompanied by an affidavit of the defendant, setting forth
    the source, nature and extent of the title claimed by
    defendant to the land in question, and such further
    particulars as shall fully apprise the court of the nature
    of defendant's claim.
    Collins's arguments that title is in dispute are
    loosely based on separate foreclosure proceedings involving the
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    NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    subject property (Property).       However, Puu's Complaint herein is
    in the nature of assumpsit, seeking money owed stemming from the
    time in which Collins owned the Property.          Whether Bank of
    America, Collins, or another person or entity currently owns the
    Property is not relevant.       Puu is plainly not attempting to
    collect from Collins Property-related fees owed after August 15,
    2016, when the Property was transferred to Federal Home Loan
    Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) via a Commissioner's Deed.            We
    conclude that Collins's argument that the District Court lacked
    jurisdiction is without merit.
    (2)   Collins makes several arguments in support of her
    second point of error challenging the SJ Order.
    The essence of Collins's first argument appears to be
    that she was not in privity with About Time Acquisition, LLC, a
    single member limited liability company owned by Collins (ATA).
    Some of Collins's arguments are difficult to discern, but it
    appears that Collins contends that she was wrongly found liable
    for association fees accrued during the period of ATA's ownership
    of the Property because that liability was founded in theories of
    privity or piercing of the corporate veil.          However, that was not
    the case.    To the extent that the Judgment was founded in part on
    unpaid assessments prior to ATA's transfer of the Property to
    Collins, the District Court's SJ Order stated:
    (iv) Pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes § 421J-10.5,
    [Collins] is jointly and severally liable with [ATA] (the
    preceding owner of the Subject Property) for all unpaid
    assessments on the Subject Property which were due to the
    Association prior to ATA conveying the Subject Property to
    [Collins] in her individual capacity on November 26, 2014.
    HRS § 421J-10.5 (Supp. 2017) states, in pertinent part:
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    § 421J-10.5 Association fiscal matters; lien for
    assessments. (a) All sums assessed by the association, but
    unpaid for the share of the assessments chargeable to any
    unit, shall constitute a lien on the unit.
    . . . .
    In the case of a voluntary conveyance, the grantee of
    a unit shall be jointly and severally liable with the
    grantor for all unpaid assessments against the latter for
    the grantor's share of the common expenses up to the time of
    the grant or conveyance, without prejudice to the grantee's
    right to recover from the grantor the amounts paid by the
    grantee. . . .
    (Emphasis added).
    Collins, acting for ATA, voluntarily conveyed the
    Property to herself via quitclaim deed on November 26, 2014.
    Thus, pursuant to HRS § 421-J-10.5, Collins, as grantee, is
    jointly and severally liable with ATA, as grantor, for ATA's
    unpaid assessments, and her arguments concerning privity are
    without merit.
    Collins's next argument appears to be that Puu should
    be collaterally estopped from this collection action because the
    claim is barred by the final judgment in the foreclosure action;
    Collins contends that the claim was thus extinguished in the
    foreclosure action.    However, contrary to Collins's assertion,
    the circuit court in the foreclosure action specifically found
    that Puu had a statutory lien against the Property pursuant to
    HRS § 421J-10.5, which was not extinguished by the foreclosure.
    Collins's argument is without merit.
    Collins further argues that Puu's claim is barred
    pursuant to HRS § 514B-146(b) (2018) because the purchaser of the
    Property, FHLMC, should have been responsible for expenses or
    assessments at an earlier date.         It appears, however, that
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    Collins's argument may be based on an incomplete or incorrect
    reading of the statute.
    § 514B-146   Association fiscal matters; lien for
    assessments.
    . . . .
    (b)   Except as provided in subsection (j), when the
    mortgagee of a mortgage of record or other purchaser of a
    unit obtains title to the unit as a result of foreclosure of
    the mortgage, the acquirer of title and the acquirer's
    successors and assigns shall not be liable for the share of
    the common expenses or assessments by the association
    chargeable to the unit that became due prior to the
    acquisition of title to the unit by the acquirer. The
    unpaid share of common expenses or assessments shall be
    deemed to be common expenses collectible from all of the
    unit owners, including the acquirer and the acquirer's
    successors and assigns. The mortgagee of record or other
    purchaser of the unit shall be deemed to acquire title and
    shall be required to pay the unit's share of common expenses
    and assessments beginning:
    (1)   Thirty-six days after the order confirming the
    sale to the purchaser has been filed with the
    court;
    (2)   Sixty days after the hearing at which the court
    grants the motion to confirm the sale to the
    purchaser;
    (3)   Thirty days after the public sale in a
    nonjudicial power of sale foreclosure conducted
    pursuant to chapter 667; or
    (4)   Upon the recording of the instrument of
    conveyance;
    whichever occurs first; provided that the mortgagee of
    record or other purchaser of the unit shall not be deemed to
    acquire title under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) , if transfer
    of title is delayed past the thirty-six days specified in
    paragraph (1), the sixty days specified in paragraph (2), or
    the thirty days specified in paragraph (3), when a person
    who appears at the hearing on the motion or a party to the
    foreclosure action requests reconsideration of the motion or
    order to confirm sale, objects to the form of the proposed
    order to confirm sale, appeals the decision of the court to
    grant the motion to confirm sale, or the debtor or mortgagor
    declares bankruptcy or is involuntarily placed into
    bankruptcy. In any such case, the mortgagee of record or
    other purchaser of the unit shall be deemed to acquire title
    upon recordation of the instrument of conveyance.
    (Emphasis added).
    In the subject foreclosure action, the order to confirm
    sale was entered on April 28, 2016.        Collins filed a motion for
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    reconsideration of, inter alia, the April 28, 2016 order to
    confirm sale.    Therefore, the final sentence (bolded) above is
    controlling.    Title was conveyed on August 15, 2016, by way of
    Commissioner's Deed filed in the Office of the Assistant
    Registrar of the Land Court of the State of Hawai#i.      Collins's
    argument based on HRS § 514B-146(b) is without merit.
    Collins cites HRS § 667-33 (2016) and contends that the
    foreclosure on the Property extinguished junior liens against the
    Property.    Collins provides no discernible arguments regarding
    her request for relief from the District Court's money judgment
    against her.    We conclude that this argument is without merit.
    Collins makes additional arguments regarding assumpsit
    and bad faith.    However, these arguments are difficult to discern
    and are not made in compliance with Hawai#i Rules of Appellate
    Procedure Rule 28(b)(4), (7).    We conclude that these arguments
    are waived and/or no appellate relief is warranted based on these
    arguments.
    For these reasons, the District Court's February 22,
    2021 Judgment is affirmed.
    DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, October 15, 2024.
    On the briefs:                        /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
    Acting Chief Judge
    Gabi Kim Collins,
    Defendant-Appellant Pro Se.           /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
    Associate Judge
    R. Laree McGuire,
    (Porter McGuire Kiakona, LLP),        /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
    for Plaintiff-Appellee.               Associate Judge
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Document Info

Docket Number: CAAP-21-0000224

Filed Date: 10/15/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/15/2024