Plasse v. Reid ( 2023 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 50208
VICTORIA ELIZABETH PLASSE, )
)
Petitioner-Respondent, ) Boise, February 2023 Term
)
v. ) Opinion Filed: May 2, 2023
)
MICHAEL LOREN REID, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, Teton
County. Jason D. Walker, Magistrate Judge.
The judgment of the magistrate court is affirmed.
Michael Loren Reid, appellant pro se. Michael Loren Reid argued.
Smith Woolf Anderson & Wilkinson, Idaho Falls, for respondent, Victoria Elizabeth
Plasse. Dennis P. Wilkinson argued.
_____________________
STEGNER, Justice.
Michael Loren Reid appeals from the magistrate court’s decision modifying the custody
and visitation schedule involving his minor child whose custody he shares with his ex-wife,
Victoria Elizabeth Plasse. This permissive and expedited appeal of the magistrate court’s decision
was brought pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 12.1 and 12.2. Both parties filed motions seeking
to modify the prior judgment, arguing that there had been a material, substantial, and permanent
change in circumstances requiring a modification of the child custody and visitation schedule.
The magistrate court conducted a bench trial and determined that there had been material,
substantial, and permanent changes in circumstances requiring modification of the custody and
visitation schedule. The magistrate court analyzed each of the factors listed in Idaho Code section
32-717 to determine how the schedule should be altered. The magistrate court then determined
that both parents would continue to share joint legal and physical custody of their minor child but
amended the visitation schedule to minimize interactions between the parents, which had been a
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source of contention between Reid and Plasse. Reid appealed the modified judgment. For the
reasons discussed below, we affirm the decision of the magistrate court.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Michael Loren Reid appeals from the magistrate court’s decision modifying the custody
and visitation schedule for him and Victoria Elizabeth Plasse. This case revolves around Reid’s
claimed frustrations and unsubstantiated allegations of bias against the magistrate judge who has
presided over the couple’s divorce since inception of this litigation. Though this appeal is limited
to review of an amended judgment, a procedural history of the prior proceedings is included to
provide context for the proceedings in general and Reid’s arguments in particular.
Plasse filed for divorce from Reid in 2019. The couple shares one minor child who will be
referred to by his initials, L.R. At the beginning of the proceedings, Reid requested the appointment
of a parenting time evaluator to assess whether he should be entitled to primary legal and physical
custody of L.R. After the parenting time evaluator submitted her findings to the magistrate court,
Reid, who was apparently dissatisfied with the parenting time evaluation, filed several objections
to it. Despite filing his objection, Reid failed to request that the magistrate court strike the
evaluation.
The magistrate court then presided over a five-day bench trial regarding the divorce and
custody proceedings, during which Reid stipulated to the admission of the parenting time
evaluation. The magistrate court considered the parenting time evaluation in its decision, though
it did not adopt the recommendations of the evaluator in their entirety. Two days after the
magistrate court rendered its decision, Reid appealed the judgment to the district court, arguing
that the magistrate court had improperly considered the parenting time evaluation. 1
The district court determined that because Reid had not objected to the parenting time
evaluation before the magistrate court, the issue had not been properly preserved for appeal. Reid
appealed this decision, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court.
Plasse v. Reid, No. 49472, 2022 WL 17334203, at *3 (Nov. 30, 2022). While Reid’s appeal of the
first judgment was pending, he filed several motions and petitions with the magistrate court, all
attempting to modify the first judgment. Plasse filed her own motion to modify as well as a motion
1
The magistrate court issued an amended judgment and decree one day after it issued its initial judgment and decree
which implemented minor changes from the original judgment. For purposes of this opinion, this 2020 amended
judgment and decree will be referred to as the first judgment and the 2022 amended judgment at issue in this appeal
will be referred to as the amended judgment.
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for contempt. Id. at *2. The magistrate court scheduled a trial to address the pending motions that
are the subject of the present appeal. During the second trial, the parties resolved all issues except
a determination of “whether there has been a material and substantial change in circumstances and
whether a modification of the current custody and visitation schedule is in the best interests of the
Minor Child.”
In response to the allegations of both parties regarding a material, substantial, and
permanent change in circumstances, the magistrate court “ordered a Brief Focused Assessment . . .
to provide consultation regarding what are the wishes of the child regarding custody, including the
context and basis for those wishes; whether or not the child is fearful of one of the parties . . .; and
the identification of any resist-refuse dynamics that may appear within the parent-child
relationship.” Upon Reid’s recommendation, the magistrate court appointed Robert DeWall,
Licensed Clinical Professional Counselor, to complete the Brief Focused Assessment (“the BFA”).
DeWall completed the BFA and submitted his report to the magistrate court for its consideration.
Over Reid’s post-trial objections, the magistrate court found that it could properly consider
the BFA because “[t]he parties did not object to the BFA before or during trial. However, Mr. Reid
called and cross-examined Mr. DeWall at length during the trial.” Reid argued for the first time in
his closing argument that the magistrate court could not consider DeWall’s conclusions in the BFA
because his methods did not follow the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts Model
Standards (“the AFCC Model Standards”) for BFAs. The magistrate court denied Reid’s post-trial
objection to the BFA as untimely. Additionally, the magistrate court found that the Idaho Rules of
Family Law Procedure governed the proceedings, and the Rules did not mandate use of the AFCC
Model Standards in the preparation of the BFA.
The magistrate court next determined that there had been “a material, substantial[,] and
permanent change in circumstances indicating to the court’s satisfaction that modification [of the
custody order] would be in the best interest of the Minor Child.” The magistrate court determined
that the relationship between Plasse and Reid had deteriorated throughout the litigation and was
“likely to remain permanently strained to the detriment of the Minor Child.” The magistrate court
reviewed the modifications proposed by both parents and discussed the proposals and evidence
presented at trial in the context of the factors listed in Idaho Code section 32-717.
The magistrate court spent a significant amount of time explaining “[t]he interaction and
interrelationship of the Minor Child with his parents” factor set out in section 32-717(1)(c), as that
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appeared to be the most contentious issue. In so doing, the magistrate court analyzed Exhibit 318,
a video recorded by Reid during a custody exchange, and the BFA prepared by DeWall, which
Reid also contests on appeal. Exhibit 318 shows Plasse getting in her car with L.R., the back door
opening, L.R. getting out of the car, briefly running away, then coming back to the car with Plasse.
In its decision, the magistrate court did not find that L.R.’s behavior as shown in Exhibit
318 supported Reid’s contention that the child was “afraid of his mother or that he would rather
spend time with his father[.]” Instead, the magistrate court concluded that, in Exhibit 318, “the
child is not upset or resistive, but actually seems at ease as if it were a game.”
After reviewing the BFA, the magistrate court stated that it “ha[d] concerns that the Minor
Child [was] influenced directly by Mr. Reid and that the Minor Child’s verbatim statements [were]
inconsistent with the level of comfort exhibited with both parents and observed by Mr. DeWall.”
As a result, the magistrate court explained that DeWall “found these statements [Reid’s assertions
regarding Plasse] unconvincing and inconsistent with his observations of the Minor Child with
each parent.” Commenting on Exhibit 318 and the BFA, the magistrate court stated that, given the
high amount of conflict between the parents, it was in L.R.’s best interest for the court to modify
the custody schedule to minimize interactions between Plasse and Reid.
The previous custody arrangement required Plasse and Reid to interact on various school
nights. For example, L.R. would go home from school with one parent and spend the evening with
him or her. At the end of the evening, that parent would meet the other in a parking lot to drop off
L.R. so he could spend the night with the other parent. This schedule resulted in several contentious
interactions between Plasse and Reid. The magistrate court considered these interactions when
devising the modified custody arrangement. The magistrate court explained in its decision that the
parents would no longer attempt to share custody of L.R. on weeknights. Instead, they would rely
on the school schedule to swap custody of L.R., so they would not have to interact with one another
more than was necessary. Now, on certain weekends for example, Reid has custody of L.R. “from
the time school lets out on Thursday afternoon until school resumes on Friday morning[,]” which
eliminates the contentious evening pickups. This change also resulted in Reid having more time
with L.R. than he did prior to the entry of the amended judgment.
The magistrate court entered an amended judgment. Reid then filed a motion to reconsider.
During the hearing for Reid’s motion to reconsider, Reid argued that Exhibit 318 also now included
security camera footage from a custody exchange occurring in a grocery store parking lot that
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“describes all the behavior that the [c]ourt said it didn’t see in the first video.” The magistrate court
declined to review this security footage because it had not been admitted in the trial as part of
Exhibit 318. The magistrate court explained that it would not consider the security camera footage
because “[t]he video of the [security camera] was not made a part of the record[,]” and Exhibit 318
had only included the video that Reid had recorded. We agree. In this opinion, “Exhibit 318” will
refer only to the video personally recorded by Reid, since that was the only video admitted into
evidence and considered by the magistrate court during the second trial.
The magistrate court denied Reid’s motion to reconsider. In denying Reid’s motion, the
magistrate court took the time to explain its role to Reid as the finder of facts. Arguing the
magistrate court was biased against him, Reid then filed a “Motion for New
Trial/Disqualification,” which the magistrate court also denied. After the magistrate court granted
Reid’s motion for permissive appeal, Reid filed his appeal with this Court.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Permissive appeals of custody issues before this Court are governed by Idaho Appellate
Rule 12.1. Permissive appeals involving custody are expedited and do not involve intermediate
appeals so as to serve the best interest of the child and minimize the number of appeals in an effort
to decrease cost and time from the beginning of a child custody appeal to its completion. As a
result, this Court directly reviews the decision of the magistrate court in permissive appeals. The
magistrate court’s decision will be upheld unless the magistrate court abused its discretion. Weaver
v. Weaver, 170 Idaho 72, 74–75, 507 P.3d 1102, 1104–05 (2021).
A trial court does not abuse its discretion as long as the court [1] recognizes the
issue as one of discretion, [2] acts within the outer limits of its discretion . . . [3]
[acts] consistently with the legal standards applicable to the available choices, and
[4] reaches its decision through an exercise of reason. When the trial
court’s decisions affect children, the best interests of the child [are] the primary
consideration. A magistrate court’s decision will be affirmed if supported by
substantial and competent evidence, even where conflicting evidence has been
presented.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Decisions to admit
evidence are also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d
1185, 1187 (2009). “When an appellate court reviews the magistrate judge’s findings of fact, the
appellate court ‘will not set aside the findings on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous such that
they are not based upon substantial and competent evidence.’ ” Searle v. Searle, 162 Idaho 839,
843, 405 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Reid’s briefing submitted to this Court is adequate (if only barely) to satisfy the
minimum requirements of Idaho Appellate Rule 35, and, as a result, his appeal
may proceed on its merits.
Plasse initially argues that Reid’s submissions to this Court do not comply with Idaho
Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) which requires that issues must be “supported by cogent argument and
authority[] in the opening brief.” Specifically, Plasse notes that allegations of bias and error on the
part of the magistrate court are unsupported by argument or authority. Plasse also contends Reid
has not specifically argued that the magistrate court abused its discretion in rendering the decision
it did. Plasse argues that Reid’s entire appeal should be rejected solely on this basis. Reid does not
provide any argument in response.
Idaho Appellate Rule 35 requires an appellant’s brief to “contain the contentions of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon.” I.A.R. 35(a)(6).
Most of Reid’s briefing expresses frustration regarding the magistrate court’s consideration
of certain evidence (and his arguments explaining how he thought the evidence should have been
interpreted), rather than an assignment of specific legal error to the magistrate court’s decision.
However, he does note at least two specific errors made by the magistrate court in its decision and
explains why he contends that the decision is clearly erroneous. He provides citations to the
portions of the magistrate court’s decision with which he disagrees and provides the same as it
relates to the transcript. Additionally, Reid tries to argue the necessary standard of review and lists
cases in his brief in an apparent attempt to support his position. As a result, we conclude Reid has
minimally passed the threshold set by Idaho Appellate Rule 35 and so we will proceed with a
discussion of the merits.
B. Preservation Issues
Reid makes several arguments in his briefing that are not properly before this Court. This
Court’s review is limited to questions that have been properly preserved for appeal. See, e.g., State
v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 222, 443 P.3d 231, 236 (2019). Reid’s objections to the first trial and
first judgment have previously been decided by the Idaho Court of Appeals. Because Reid did not
file a petition for review, a remittitur has been issued and those arguments are no longer subject to
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challenge and are not properly before this Court. We will not address any issues pertaining to the
first trial.
Additionally, Reid has not properly preserved his right to appeal DeWall’s purported
failure to use the AFCC Model Standards in the BFA because he failed to present an objection at
the trial before the magistrate court. Because that issue has not been preserved for appeal, we have
no need to address it further.
C. Remaining Assertions of Error within the Magistrate Court’s Decision
The remainder of Reid’s appeal argues that the magistrate court abused its discretion and
made findings that are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Reid argues that the
magistrate court abused its discretion in its review of Exhibit 318 during the trial, its refusal to
consider security camera footage which Reid sought to add to Exhibit 318 after the trial, its reliance
on Reid’s representations to the magistrate court, and its failure to admit the full reports created
by the Idaho Department of Health Welfare. In addition, Reid points to several of the magistrate
court’s findings that he believes to be clearly erroneous. Given the different standards of review,
each argument is addressed in turn.
1. The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the custody and
visitation schedule.
Reid argues that the magistrate court erred in four ways when it modified the custody and
visitation schedule—(1) improperly considering Exhibit 318; (2) declining to expand the scope of
Exhibit 318 to include security camera footage that was not admitted during the trial;
(3) incorrectly assessing Reid’s character in its consideration of the factors listed in Idaho Code
section 32-717(1); and (4) inappropriately refusing to admit the entire reports generated by the
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare related to the couple’s contentious custody battle.
Because these issues ultimately turn on their impact on the resulting modification of the custody
and visitation schedule, we will review them under an abuse of discretion standard.
a. The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of the original
Exhibit 318.
In support of his motion for modification of the first judgment, Reid submitted Exhibit 318
as evidence that Plasse reacts emotionally at custody exchanges and that her “relationship with
their son has deteriorated significantly since the entry of the decree.” The magistrate court
determined that custody exchanges between Plasse and Reid were areas of significant conflict and
that those exchanges appear to be “where the majority of the Minor Child’s behavioral outbursts
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have occurred.” The magistrate court found that, as seen in Exhibit 318, L.R. was “not upset or
resistive, but actually seem[ed] to be at ease as if it were a game.”
The magistrate court concluded that Exhibit 318 supported the allegation that Plasse was
frustrated at the exchanges, but it did not support Reid’s contention that the child was fearful of
his mother or that Plasse’s and L.R.’s relationship had deteriorated. The magistrate court further
concluded that “the emotions displayed by the Minor Child and Mr. Reid are incongruent with the
circumstances as framed by Mr. Reid’s testimony.” The magistrate court went on to state: “While
the court has significant concerns that the incident was contrived or encouraged, there is no
conclusive evidence on this issue. However, the court will cautiously consider the evidence for the
purposes it clearly supports.”
Reid argues on appeal that the magistrate court’s evaluation of Exhibit 318 amounts to
improper “expert testimony.” Reid contends that the magistrate court found facts that were not
included in the video and ignored Reid’s testimony concerning his interpretation of the exchange.
Because he was the only witness who testified about Exhibit 318, Reid contends that the magistrate
court must “consider the video only upon the basis of what was testified to by Mr. Reid[.]”
Plasse argues that the magistrate court correctly reviewed Exhibit 318 and drew reasonable
conclusions from it. Plasse also contends that Reid’s argument regarding the exhibit should be
rejected because he “provides no citation to law or reference to any specific factual error
committed by the Magistrate[.]” Instead, Plasse maintains that the magistrate court properly
understood its role as the fact finder and correctly applied the rules and law governing its review.
Ultimately, Plasse characterizes the magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding
Exhibit 318 as well within his “sound discretion[.]”
We hold that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in the way it analyzed Exhibit
318. Its findings of fact regarding the video are supported by substantial and competent evidence.
As an initial observation, Reid appears to misunderstand the role of the magistrate court as the trier
of fact. A judge in analyzing and characterizing evidence is not an “expert witness”; rather, he is
a neutral and detached magistrate interpreting and explaining what transpired. At oral argument,
Reid continued to argue that the magistrate court’s findings of fact regarding Exhibit 318 were
testimonial in nature, rather than a description of what the magistrate court concluded after
reviewing the evidence.
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“At the trial court level[,] the trier of fact . . . is the arbiter of conflicting evidence. It is the
province of . . . the trier of fact to weigh the conflicting evidence and testimony[.]” Abbott v.
Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 547, 808 P.2d 1289, 1292 (1991). The role of the
magistrate court as the trier of fact is to review the evidence before it and determine the appropriate
“credibility and weight” to give it. Sun Valley Shamrock Res., Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118
Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1990). In contrast, the role of the appellate court is limited
to a determination of “whether there is evidence in the record that a reasonable trier of fact could
accept and rely upon in making the factual finding that is challenged on appeal.” Reed v. Reed,
157 Idaho 705, 710, 339 P.3d 1109, 1114 (2014) (internal citation omitted).
Here, we cannot conclude that the magistrate court erred in its review of Exhibit 318.
Contrary to Reid’s assertion, the magistrate court is not required to blindly adopt Reid’s self-
serving testimony regarding the video. Instead, the magistrate court is empowered to draw its own
conclusions regarding the evidence, so long as those conclusions are supported by substantial and
competent evidence. We are persuaded the magistrate court did so when it reviewed the video for
itself. The magistrate court painstakingly analyzed Exhibit 318 nearly frame by frame to describe
the behaviors of the parties and explain the reasons underlying that behavior. See, e.g.,
I.R.C.P. 52(a); Searle, 162 Idaho at 844–45, 405 P.3d at 1185–86 (reversing the decision of the
magistrate court where it failed to “thoroughly analyze or apply the facts of this case to any
statutory factor[]”). Additionally, the magistrate court did not ignore Reid’s testimony, as argued
by Reid on appeal, because it considered its own interpretation of the video vis-à-vis Reid’s
testimony on the matter. (“The problem is that the emotions displayed by the Minor Child and Mr.
Reid are incongruent with the circumstances as framed by Mr. Reid’s testimony.”). As explained
above, it is the province of the trial court to consider and weigh the evidence before it. The
magistrate court properly determined the appropriate weight to be given to Reid’s testimony and
Exhibit 318 before issuing its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
When child custody is the issue, the best interest of the child is the primary consideration.
Searle, 162 Idaho at 843, 405 P.3d at 1184. Idaho Code section 32-717 lists multiple factors for a
court to consider in determining the best interest of the child for purposes of awarding child
custody. The magistrate court drew its conclusions regarding Exhibit 318 under the factor
“interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent or parents,” as stated in Idaho
Code section 32-717.
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The magistrate court did not err in determining that it was in the best interest of L.R. to
modify the custody schedule. The magistrate court explained in its decision that it had reviewed
Exhibit 318 extensively and found that the type of parental behaviors exhibited in it were “likely
to reduce the child’s sense of security and even cause emotional distance between parent and
child.” The magistrate court also determined that Exhibit 318 did not support Reid’s assertion that
the child was fearful of his mother. Reid has failed to point this Court to any evidence in the record
that contradicts the magistrate court’s findings or suggests that its interpretation of Exhibit 318
was anything other than reasonable. As a result, we hold that the magistrate court did not abuse its
discretion in analyzing and interpreting Exhibit 318 extensively under the framework of Idaho
Code section 32-717.
b. The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider the security
camera footage.
Exhibit 318 came up again at the hearing regarding Reid’s motion to reconsider. Reid
sought to augment Exhibit 318 with additional video between the time it had been admitted at trial
and at the motion to reconsider. At the later proceeding, Reid attempted to offer footage from a
grocery store security camera that purportedly refuted the magistrate court’s earlier findings
regarding the original Exhibit 318. The magistrate court refused to consider this footage because
it had not been admitted at the modification trial, and it was not “newly discovered evidence[,]” as
is necessary to be admitted at a reconsideration hearing.
Reid argues that the security camera footage offers further support for his arguments of
how the magistrate court should have interpreted Exhibit 318. This Court has previously
articulated that “when considering a motion for reconsideration ‘the trial court should take into
account any new facts presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the order[.]’ ”
Ciccarello v. Davies, 166 Idaho 153, 162, 456 P.3d 519, 528 (2019) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Under Reid’s interpretation, the security camera footage “bear[s] on the
correctness of the order” because it would aid the magistrate court in its review of Exhibit 318. Id.Accordingly, under the Ciccarello standard, the magistrate court should have reviewed the security
camera footage.
However, Reid’s argument fails to account for the other consideration—that the facts must
be “new[.]” Id. The magistrate court found that the security camera footage “was available at the
time of trial,” so it correctly excluded the footage from consideration. Reid fails to challenge this
finding on appeal. The magistrate court explained in detail that its role was limited to evaluating
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the evidence admitted at trial and it cannot consider additional evidence during a hearing on a
motion to reconsider when it “was [] available at the time of trial or would [] have been available
at the time of trial, given reasonable efforts of the parties.” We cannot find that the magistrate court
abused its discretion when it refused to consider evidence that could have been made available for
trial. (We also do not endorse Reid’s modifying an exhibit that was admitted at trial and adding
substantive video to an already admitted exhibit.)
c. The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in relying upon Reid’s
representations to the court when he was representing himself.
Next, Reid argues that, because he was representing himself pro se, the magistrate court
was only allowed to consider his under oath testimony, as opposed to his representations and
demeanor when representing himself. In essence, Reid asks this Court to reverse the magistrate
court because it did not draw a distinction between Reid the party and Reid the party’s
representative.
It is unclear from Reid’s briefing where in the record the magistrate court purportedly erred
in relying on Reid’s comments as the representative of himself. This Court will not scour the record
for error, so we need not address this argument further. I.A.R. 35(a)(6); Michalk v. Michalk, 148
Idaho 224, 230, 220 P.3d 580, 586 (2009) (declining to review arguments made without citations
to the record). At the same time, Reid has provided no authority for the proposition that there are
distinctions that must be drawn between him as the witness and him as the advocate. We are also
unaware of some impunity or latitude that would be afforded to a self-represented litigant which
would allow him to engage in inappropriate behavior when acting as his own counsel. Instead,
licensed attorneys, pro se advocates, and parties are all responsible for their actions in court. See,
e.g., Hall v. State, 151 Idaho 42, 47, 253 P.3d 716, 721 (2011) (quoting Haeberle v. Tex. Int’l
Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1984)) (“By voluntarily assuming the special status of trial
participants and officers of the court, parties and their attorneys subject themselves to greater
restraints on their communications than might constitutionally be applied to the general public.”).
The very premise of Reid’s argument is flawed. We are unaware of any dispensation afforded to
lawyers that they may act intemperately or aggressively in the practice of law. Attorneys are
officers of the court and must maintain that demeanor throughout a court proceeding. Indeed, this
heightened obligation requires candor to the court, a requirement that is over and above that owed
by a litigant. I.R.P.C. 3.3.
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d. The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the full reports
created by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare.
Next, Reid argues that the magistrate court erred when it refused to admit all the reports
prepared by the Children and Family Services division of the Idaho Department of Health and
Welfare (“CFS”). It appears from the record that Reid had “apparently reported [Plasse] to [CFS],
claiming [she] was abusive to [their] son.” The magistrate court admitted only the portions of the
reports that contained the findings and conclusions of CFS, rather than the full reports which
included the allegations of the reporting parties. The magistrate court reasoned that the redactions
throughout the entirety of the reports made it too difficult to understand what was being reported.
Reid argues that the Rules of Family Law Procedure render the admission of the entire CFS reports
mandatory.
Despite these arguments, Reid failed to identify which CFS reports he contends the
magistrate court erred in failing to admit and how the redacted reports would have added to the
resolution of this dispute. This Court does not presume error on appeal; “the burden of showing it
is on the party alleging it.” S Bar Ranch v. Elmore County, 170 Idaho 282, 309, 510 P.3d 635, 662
(2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As we have repeatedly held, this Court is
not obliged to “scour the record for error” and we will not do so here. Id.The Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure permit proceedings that do not strictly comply
with the Idaho Rules of Evidence and provide that
all relevant evidence is admissible, provided, however, that the court must exclude
evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, needless
presentation of cumulative evidence, lack of reliability, or failure to adequately and
timely disclose evidence.
I.R.F.L.P. 102(b)(2).
The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the CFS reports in
their entirety. All throughout the trials between these parties, the magistrate court was diligent in
explaining the procedural rules to Reid, who struggled to understand the intricacies of the Idaho
Rules of Family Law Procedure. For example, Reid attempted to submit evidence at various stages
of trial in contravention of the rules, including in some cases irrelevant evidence. The magistrate
court dedicated a significant amount of time explaining to Reid its role as the trier of fact. The
magistrate court also attempted to maintain the focus throughout the trials by ensuring that all
proffered evidence was relevant and helpful to the resolution of the dispute. However, Reid appears
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to have misunderstood the role of the magistrate court because he does not explain why the
redacted CFS reports were necessary for the magistrate court to consider. Here, the Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare closed the cases after conducting safety assessments with Plasse
and attempting to conduct an assessment with Reid. After investigating the claims, the Department
concluded that the claims of abuse were “unsubstantiated.” As a result, the magistrate court did
not abuse its discretion in determining that portions of these reports were irrelevant.
2. With few exceptions, the magistrate court’s factual findings are supported by
substantial and competent evidence.
Reid alleges that there are two factual findings made by the magistrate court that are not
supported by substantial and competent evidence which should result in the magistrate’s decision
being overturned on appeal. Reid also argues that the magistrate court was biased because it
purportedly considered evidence differently when offered by Plasse than when offered by Reid.
Reid’s arguments refer to magistrate court’s factual determinations. As a result, we review them
under the clearly erroneous standard. Searle, 162 Idaho at 843, 405 P.3d at 1184.
Plasse concedes that there are two factual findings made by the magistrate court that are
unsupported by the record. First, there is no support in the record for the magistrate court’s
conclusion that Reid is not close with his parents. Second, there is no support in the record for the
magistrate court’s finding that “[Reid] often refers to [L.R.] as his legacy.” Because Plasse
acknowledges the magistrate court’s findings are not supported by the record, we conclude that
these two points are clearly erroneous.
Nevertheless, this Court has previously held that where a party “has failed to show that his
substantial rights were affected[,]” then the error will be deemed harmless. Reed v. Reed, 160 Idaho
772, 775–76, 379 P.3d 1042, 1045–46 (2016); see also I.R.F.L.P. 806. Here, though Reid has
correctly pointed out that the magistrate court’s findings on these points are clearly erroneous, he
has failed to demonstrate how his substantial rights have been affected by these erroneous findings.
Without any indication of how Reid’s substantial rights have been affected by the magistrate
court’s unsupported findings, we hold that they amount only to harmless error.
Reid makes several additional arguments that boil down to assertions of bias challenging
the magistrate court’s interpretation of the evidence presented to it. Many of these arguments
appear to be ad homonym attacks against the magistrate court, which need not be considered by
this Court. See Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) (“Where an
appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with particularity and to support his position with
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sufficient authority, those assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the Court.”)
(internal citation omitted). Additionally, as described above, Reid’s assignments of error appear to
be his misunderstanding regarding the role of the magistrate court as the trier of fact, rather than
evidence of bias. Further, Reid fails to demonstrate how these purported errors affect his
substantial rights as required by Reed. See 160 Idaho at 775–76, 379 P.3d at 1045–46.
Apart from the two erroneous findings noted above, the magistrate court’s findings of fact
and conclusions of law are supported by substantial and competent evidence and, therefore, are
not clearly erroneous.
D. Plasse is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal.
Plasse argues that she is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho
Code section 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. Plasse argues that Reid’s arguments
are unsupported by both legal authority and factual support, and he failed to identify any
substantive way in which the magistrate court had erred. Plasse contends that Reid has not
presented a single triable issue, rendering his conduct frivolous and entitling her to attorney fees
on appeal.
We agree that Plasse is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. First, Plasse is the
prevailing party on every issue because Reid’s arguments were unsuccessful for the reasons
explained above. Next, it is clear from the record that Reid appealed the magistrate court’s
amended judgment and decree “frivolously[.]” I.C. § 12-121. This Court has previously held that
where the nonprevailing party “continued to rely on the same arguments used in front of the []
court, without providing any additional persuasive law or bringing into doubt the existing law on
which the [] court based its decision[,]” an award of attorney fees under section 12-121 is
warranted. Thornton v. Pandrea, 161 Idaho 301, 320, 385 P.3d 856, 876 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
A constant theme in this divorce, dating back to its origin in 2019, is the idea that Reid is
abusing Idaho’s judicial system by using it as an arena to host his disputes with Plasse. It was
suggested before the magistrate court that Reid had taken “Plasse to court for sport[.]” Such a
statement represents a trivialization of our role as neutral arbiters. Courts exist as forums for parties
to use to resolve legitimate disputes; they do not exist as boxing rings in which individuals may
spar over their personal vendettas. Proceedings before a tribunal are not a game. They are not sport.
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The matters before magistrate courts and this Court alike have serious repercussions for the parties
involved, and proceedings before them should be treated with the solemnity to which they are due.
We heard and understood Reid’s frustrations with the outcome of these proceedings before
the magistrate court, and, certainly, a fundamental tenet of our judicial system is the right to appeal
adverse rulings. However, we rejected his arguments because they were unsubstantiated or if
substantiated, immaterial in the scheme of things. The lack of support for Reid’s arguments
appears to be rooted in his misunderstanding of the legal process. Throughout this litigation, Reid
has attempted to have different courts reconsider evidence until they side with him. However, the
appeals process exists to correct errors made below, not to give parties a second attempt to have
their arguments considered by an additional trier of fact. We are an error correcting court, not a
finder of facts.
Reid argues that the magistrate court’s rejection of evidence amounts to bias against him,
but this is a misunderstanding of the responsibility of the magistrate court. As we explained in our
analysis of Exhibit 318, a trier of fact is not bound to interpret evidence in the same way as its
proponent would like. The role of the magistrate court as the trier of fact is to consider the evidence
before it and make a determination of its credibility. An adverse ruling, on its own, is insufficient
evidence of bias. Instead, the magistrate court’s findings (with two noted minor exceptions) appear
to be supported by the record. Reid is clearly frustrated with the magistrate court’s decision and it
appears that this appeal is another attempt to relitigate certain issues determined by the magistrate
court, rather than correct any substantive legal or factual errors. As a result of this frivolous appeal,
we award Plasse attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given our procedural rules and case law requiring arguments to be made with specificity,
we are unable to review several of Reid’s arguments, including purported error by the Idaho Court
of Appeals and issues that have not been preserved. However, of the arguments that we may
review, we affirm the magistrate court’s decisions. First, we affirm the modification of the custody
and visitation schedule because we cannot conclude that the magistrate court abused its discretion
in its decision to modify the original schedule. Next, we affirm the magistrate court’s rejection of
Reid’s argument regarding the BFA, which was not properly preserved for appeal. We further
affirm most of the magistrate court’s findings of fact, which are supported by substantial and
competent evidence, except for the two noted. However, we affirm the ultimate decision because
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the error was harmless. The vast majority of findings of fact are supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Finally, we conclude that Plasse is entitled to an award of attorney fees and
costs because Reid’s appeal to this Court was frivolous.
Chief Justice BEVAN, Justices BRODY, MOELLER, and ZAHN CONCUR.
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