Wurdemann v. State ( 2024 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 50403
JOHN DAVID WURDEMANN, )
)
Petitioner-Appellant, ) Boise, May 2024 Term
)
v. ) Opinion filed: August 22, 2024
)
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
Respondent. )
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Canyon County. Andrea L. Courtney, District Judge.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Cooper & Elliott, LLC, Columbus, Ohio, pro hac vice, and Strother Law Office,
Eagle, Idaho, for Appellant. Barton R. Keyes argued.
Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Alan Hurst
argued.
_______________________________________________
MOELLER, Justice.
This case raises a question of first impression concerning the recently enacted Idaho
Wrongful Conviction Act (“the Act”). John David Wurdemann was charged and later convicted
of seven felonies, all related to an attack against a woman in 2000. Sixteen years later, a district
court granted Wurdemann’s petition for post-conviction relief and vacated his convictions after
concluding that Wurdemann had been denied the right to effective assistance of counsel during his
trial. This Court later affirmed the district court’s decision. See Wurdemann v. State, 161 Idaho
713, 390 P.3d 439 (2017). Wurdemann has not been retried.
In 2021, Idaho Governor Brad Little signed S.B. No. 1027, the “Idaho Wrongful
Conviction Act.” 2021 Idaho Sess. Laws 38 (S.B. 1027) (codified as I.C. §§ 6-3501-3505). The
Act provides a right to compensation for wrongfully convicted claimants who meet certain
statutory criteria. Thereafter, Wurdemann filed a petition seeking monetary compensation and a
certificate of innocence, as provided in the Act. The State opposed the petition and moved for
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summary judgment, which the district court granted. The district court, citing the language of the
statute, concluded that Wurdemann had not established that “the basis for reversing or vacating
the conviction was not legal error unrelated to his factual innocence.” I.C. § 6-3502(2)(g).
Wurdemann timely appealed.
This case asks us to, first, interpret the meaning of the double negative phrase “not legal
error unrelated to his factual innocence” used in the Idaho Wrongful Conviction Act and, second,
determine whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the State. For the
reasons explained below, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
John David Wurdemann was charged for his alleged participation in the June 2000 attack
on a woman in Canyon County. This Court, quoting an earlier Idaho Court of Appeals decision,
noted the factual details of the attack:
The crimes that gave rise to this prosecution occurred in the early morning hours of
June 15, 2000, when four people in another vehicle forced [a woman] to stop her
car on Interstate 84 in Canyon County, demanded money and drugs from her,
commandeered her vehicle, and drove her to a dark field along a country road.
There, the foursome took [the woman’s] money, credit cards, and belongings,
stabbed her repeatedly, slit her throat, hit her in the head with a baseball bat, slashed
her shoulder, set her car on fire, and left her to die.
Wurdemann v. State, 161 Idaho 713, 716 n.2, 390 P.3d 439, 442 n.2 (2017) [hereinafter
Wurdemann 2017] (quoting State v. Wurdemann, No. 30438 (Idaho Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2006)
(unpublished)).
After Wurdemann was convicted of seven felonies in connection with the attack, he
appealed his convictions. Id. Wurdemann’s 2006 direct appeal, which was heard by the Idaho
Court of Appeals, was denied, as well as his 2011 petition for post-conviction relief, which was
denied by the district court. Wurdemann 2017, 161 Idaho at 715–16, 390 P.3d at 441–42.
Thereafter, Wurdemann appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. “In July
2012, while his post-conviction appeal was pending, Wurdemann filed an Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) Motion, Relief from a Judgment or Order.” Id. at 716, 390 P.3d at 442. The Rule
60(b) motion challenged the judgment entered in his 2011 petition for post-conviction relief case.
The district court granted Wurdemann’s Rule 60(b) motion and held an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether Wurdemann was denied effective assistance of counsel. “Following the
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evidentiary hearing, the district court ruled that Wurdemann was denied his right to the effective
assistance of counsel and vacated his convictions.” Id. The State appealed.
Wurdemann’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was based on an allegation that his
trial attorneys failed to challenge a police lineup because of inadequate preparation and ignorance
of the law. Key to Wurdemann’s arrest and later convictions was an identification made by a
witness during the police lineup. As this Court noted in Wurdemann 2017, the district court granted
Wurdemann’s 2011 post-conviction petition, because it concluded that the lineup resulting in his
arrest was based on “identification procedures used by the police” that “were [] improperly
suggestive.” Wurdemann 2017, 161 Idaho at 718, 390 P.3d at 444. In our opinion affirming the
district court’s decision, we described the manner in which the lineup was conducted:
In her description of the attacker, [the victim] described her attacker as being “Very,
very tall and thin.... His hair was very greasy. It was long, dark. He looked like a
Hispanic, native-American man and he was very tall. He was thin.... [A]nd his face
was very—it looked like it had a really bad rash on it. It was really messed up. His
face was really messed up.” In addition, [the victim] testified that her attacker spoke
in English, and she indicated that her attacker did not have facial hair.
The video lineup in which [the victim] identified Wurdemann consisted of
six men. Wurdemann was placed in the center. He was noticeably the tallest
participant. And he was one of only three participants who had long hair. Of the
other two participants who had long hair, both were much shorter than Wurdemann;
one did not speak English, and the other had significant facial hair. Thus,
Wurdemann was the only participant in the lineup who could be fairly described as
being tall, thin, Hispanic or Native American, with long dark hair, no facial hair,
and able to speak English. As described at the evidentiary hearing by Dr. Reisberg,
an expert in witness identification, the video lineup was “among the worst video
lineups” he had ever seen “[a]nd so if one looks at this lineup and simply says, who
is there, who is [a] plausible choice, given the fact that he’s been described over
and over as tall and having long straight hair, your attention is immediately drawn
to [Wurdemann].”
In short, Wurdemann was the only participant who met [the victim’s]
description of her attacker. Such a lineup is the epitome of an improperly suggestive
lineup.
Wurdemann 2017, 161 Idaho at 718–19, 390 P.3d at 444–45 (citation omitted) (first, third, and
seventh alterations added). Accordingly, this Court affirmed the grant of post-conviction relief
“[b]ecause the reliability of the identification [did] not outweigh the suggestiveness of the video
lineup in which Wurdemann was identified as [the victim’s] attacker, and because the decision not
to challenge the lineup was based on inadequate preparation and ignorance of the relevant law
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. . . .” Id. at 723, 390 P.3d at 449. Since the issuance of our decision in 2017, the State has not
retried Wurdemann.
In 2021, the Idaho Wrongful Conviction Act was adopted and became law. See Idaho
Wrongful Conviction Act, 2021 Idaho Sess. Laws 38 (S.B. 1027) (codified as I.C. §§ 6-3501-
3505). The Act provides a statutory right to compensation for claimants who have been “convicted
and subsequently imprisoned for one (1) or more crimes that such person did not commit.” I.C. §
6-3502(1). In order to prevail on a claim under the Act, a claimant must establish each of the
following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
(a) The claimant was convicted of a felony in this state and subsequently
imprisoned;
(b) The claimant did not commit the crime for which he was convicted;
(c) The claimant did not commit the acts that were the basis of the conviction;
(d) The claimant did not aid, abet, or act as an accomplice or accessory to either
the acts or to a person who committed the acts that were the basis for the conviction;
(e) The claimant did not commit an included offense of the crime for which he was
imprisoned;
(f) The claimant establishes that his conviction was reversed or vacated and either:
(i) The claimant was not retried and the charges were dismissed; or
(ii) The claimant was retried and was found not guilty; and
(g) The claimant establishes that the basis for reversing or vacating the conviction
was not legal error unrelated to his factual innocence.
I.C. § 6-3502(2) (emphasis added). Additionally, the Act provides that “if the [S]tate shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that a claimant pled guilty with the specific intent to protect another
party from prosecution for the underlying conviction that forms the basis for the claim[,]” then the
claimant shall not prevail. I.C. § 6-3502(3).
Shortly after the Act took effect, Wurdemann filed a petition in Canyon County district
court seeking monetary compensation and a certificate of innocence, as provided in the Act. The
State opposed the petition and, in its answer, demanded a jury trial. The State later moved for
summary judgment, arguing that Wurdemann could not establish two of the statutory
requirements. The district court agreed, addressing only Idaho Code section 6-3502(2)(g), and
concluded that there was not a genuine dispute of material fact and that, as a matter of law,
Wurdemann had not established “the basis for reversing or vacating the conviction was not legal
error unrelated to his factual innocence.” I.C. § 6-3502(2)(g). Having concluded that Wurdemann
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failed to establish a requisite element of his claim, the district court granted the State’s motion for
summary judgment. Wurdemann timely appealed to this Court.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo and employs the same standard
of review used by the trial court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Hanks v. City of
Boise, 173 Idaho 128, 540 P.3d 299, 302 (2023), reh’g denied (Jan. 4, 2024) (citing United
Heritage Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Zech, 170 Idaho 764, 770, 516 P.3d 1035, 1041 (2022)).
Accordingly, “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ”
Summerfield v. St. Luke’s McCall, Ltd., 169 Idaho 221, 228, 494 P.3d 769, 776 (2021) (quoting
I.R.C.P. 56(a)). When this Court reviews a discretionary decision of the district court, this Court
considers four elements: “Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).
Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law which are reviewed by this Court de
novo. Smith v. Kount, Inc., 169 Idaho 460, 463, 497 P.3d 534, 537 (2021) (first citing Hayes v.
City of Plummer, 159 Idaho 168, 170, 357 P.3d 1276, 1278 (2015); and then citing State v. Schulz,
151 Idaho 863, 865, 264 P.3d 970, 972 (2011)). “When faced with a mixed question of fact and
law, the Court will defer to the district court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence,
but will exercise free review over the application of the relevant law to those facts.” Savage v.
State, 170 Idaho 367, 371, 511 P.3d 249, 253 (2022) (citing Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617,
262 P.3d 255, 260 (2011)).
III. ANALYSIS
This case presents a seemingly straightforward question on appeal: What must a claimant
establish under Idaho Code section 6-3502(2)(g) to successfully bring a statutory claim for
wrongful conviction? However, answering that question is challenging based on the unfortunate
use of a double negative in the Idaho Wrongful Conviction Act, which requires that the claimant
must establish, among other requirements, “that the basis for reversing or vacating the conviction
was not legal error unrelated to his factual innocence.” I.C. § 6-3502(2)(g) (emphasis added).
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“The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative body that
adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute.” Reclaim
Idaho v. Denney, 169 Idaho 406, 427, 497 P.3d 160, 181 (2021) (quoting In Re Doe, 168 Idaho
511, 516, 484 P.3d 195, 200 (2021)). “If the statutory language is unambiguous, we need not
engage in statutory construction and are free to apply the statute’s plain meaning.” Callies v.
O’Neal, 147 Idaho 841, 847, 216 P.3d 130, 136 (2009). When necessary to interpret a phrase, “we
must look to the grammatical construction of the statute as the legislature intended the statute to
be construed according to generally accepted principles of English grammar.” State v.
Collinsworth, 96 Idaho 910, 914, 539 P.2d 263, 267 (1975).
For obvious reasons, it is inadvisable to use a double negative in crafting a legal standard
in a statute, for it may suggest the opposite of what was intended. As used in the context of the
Act, such a double negative is known grammatically as a “litotes,” which is a linguistic device
where the contrary is denied. It is often used ironically to express understatement. See Litotes,
Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/litotes (last
visited August 16, 2024) (A litotes is an “understatement in which an affirmative is expressed by
the negative of the contrary (as in ‘not a bad singer’ or ‘not unhappy’).”). For example, during oral
argument a judge might describe an attorney’s argument as “not unpersuasive.” While this might
mean that the judge thought the argument had some persuasive value, it is not necessarily an
indication that the judge was persuaded by the argument.
In his noted work, Garner’s Modern American Usage, Bryan Garner has cautioned:
“Double negatives such as not untimely are often needlessly used in place of more straightforward
wordings such as timely . . . . This type of litotes (the negation of an opposite) often makes language
convoluted.” Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Modern American Usage 563 (3d ed. 2009) (emphasis in
original). 1 While the use of litotes in literature 2, speeches 3, or even as an expression of common
1
George Orwell wryly observed that “[o]ne can cure oneself of the not un-formation by memorizing this sentence: A
not unblack dog was chasing a not unsmall rabbit across a not ungreen field.” William Safire, Our Language;
Redundadundadundant, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (July 6, 1986) (quoting George Orwell, Politics and the English
Language, in IN FRONT OF YOUR NOSE 127, 138 (1st ed., 1968).
2
See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 1, sc. 2 (King Claudius describing young Prince Fortinbras as one
who “hath not failed to pester us with message”); JANE AUSTIN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 27 (Penguin Classics 2014)
(1813) (describing the enigmatic Mr. Darcy as “not unwilling to receive” Elizabeth’s hand, had she not drawn it back);
HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 19 (HarperCollins 1999) (1960) (Scout recounting that she “could not
remember not being able to read hymns.”).
3
George Washington, Farewell Address, Sept. 19, 1796 (humbly noting that he was “[n]ot unconscious in the outset
of the inferiority of my qualifications, …”).
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courtesy (as in “I hear you’re not a bad golfer, Judge”) is well-taken, the employment of this
linguistic device in the Act has complicated our efforts to interpret the statute. Here, applying a
plain language interpretation and ordinary grammar principles to the wording of the Act, and
assuming no ironic understatement was intended, we hold that the legislature’s use of the phrase
“not legal error unrelated to his factual innocence” plainly means “legal error related to his factual
innocence.”
The interpretation of the statutory clause at issue is further complicated by combining the
litotic double-negative with the term “legal error,” a phrase without a universally applicable
definition. While the Act contains some definitions, “legal error” is not among the terms it defines.
While the term might appear to be a well-known term of art, it can mean different things in different
contexts. In fact, the exact phrase “legal error” is not defined in Black’s Law Dictionary.
“Legal error” typically takes on two different forms. It can be broadly understood as akin
to a mistake of law, typically made by trial counsel, which is defined as a “mistake about the legal
effect of a known fact or situation.” Mistake, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). It can
also be more narrowly used to denote a mistake of law committed by a court or tribunal. See Error,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). This Court has employed the term in both ways in
different contexts. Compare Shubert v. Ada Cnty., 166 Idaho 458, 472, 461 P.3d 740, 754 (2020)
(“Represented criminal defendants are not, however, presumed to have recognized legal errors in
their court documents.”), and Thornton v. Pandrea, 161 Idaho 301, 317, 385 P.3d 856, 872 (2016)
(“Mr. Thornton has offered no reasoning or argument supporting his contention that the sanctions
were based on counsel’s legal error.”), with State v. Doe (2021-38), 172 Idaho 292, 532 P.3d 396,
400 (2023) (“However, when a defendant assigns legal error to a trial court’s conclusions of law
. . . the issue may be considered on appeal even though the defendant did not raise it below.”), and
Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Ada Cnty., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 226, 229–30, 192
P.3d 1050, 1053–54 (2008) (“This is because the Board conceded that its conclusion that an
undocumented alien may never be a resident for purposes of this state’s indigency statutes was
legal error.”).
Importantly, the parties agree on which definition of legal error applies to the Act.
Wurdemann concedes that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleged here is the type of
legal error referenced in this statute. Thus, the parties are in accord that ineffective assistance of
counsel is within the plain meaning of “legal error,” as used in the Act. We agree and conclude
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that ineffective assistance of counsel fits within the plain meaning of “legal error” for the purposes
of Idaho Code section 6-3502(g). However, the parties dispute whether the legal error that forms
the basis for reversing the convictions in this case—the failure of Wurdemann’s trial attorneys to
challenge inculpatory evidence due to its being improperly suggestive—amounts to a finding of
factual innocence. We conclude that it does not.
In interpreting the statutory provision at issue in this appeal, the district court narrowly
construed the statute and concluded that Idaho Code section 6-3502(2)(g) “contemplates [that] a
qualifying conviction needs to be overturned based on new evidence or new science, showing
innocence.” We disagree that the basis of the conviction must be confined to “new evidence or
new science.” Nothing in Idaho Code section 6-3502(2)(g) suggests such. However, we generally
agree with the district court to the extent that it held that the basis of the reversal must be predicated
on a “showing [of] innocence.”
Idaho Code section 6-3502(2)(g) contemplates redressing a “wrongful” conviction that is
reversed based on factual innocence, not on an evidentiary ruling that upends a guilty verdict.
While the exclusion of erroneously admitted inculpatory evidence (such as the constitutionally
flawed lineup identification) meant that the jury’s guilty verdict could not be sustained as a matter
of law, it does not establish factual innocence. It is the existence of exculpatory evidence, such as
newly discovered DNA evidence or improperly excluded alibi evidence, that establishes factual
innocence. Thus, we conclude that to satisfy the requirements of Idaho Code section 6-3502(2)(g),
a claimant must establish that the basis for reversal was a showing of factual innocence.
Here, Wurdemann was convicted of seven felony counts related to a vicious attack on a
woman in 2000. Wurdemann 2017, 161 Idaho at 715, 390 P.3d at 441. This Court affirmed the
district court’s grant of post-conviction relief “[b]ecause the reliability of the identification [did]
not outweigh the suggestiveness of the video lineup in which Wurdemann was identified as [the
victim’s] attacker, and because the decision not to challenge the lineup was based on inadequate
preparation and ignorance of the relevant law. . . .” Id. at 723, 390 P.3d at 449. Ultimately, the
district court concluded that Wurdemann was entitled to a new trial because he was denied the
right to effective assistance of counsel due to his trial attorney’s failure to challenge the lineup
evidence admitted at his trial. We affirmed the district court, agreeing that had the lineup evidence
been properly challenged by his attorneys at trial, it should have been excluded. “When a claimant
alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to file a motion, a ‘critical
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inquiry is whether the motion, if filed, should have been granted. . . .’ ” Id. at 717, 390 P.3d at 443(quoting State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 385, 313 P.3d 1, 41 (2013)).
While the improper admission of the lineup evidence resulted in a reversal of his
convictions, this does not establish Wurdemann’s factual innocence. To put it simply,
Wurdemann’s convictions were ultimately overturned based on the deficient performance of his
trial attorneys and the resultant prejudice to his right to a fair trial—not because evidence showed
Wurdemann was actually innocent. Id. at 723, 390 P.3d at 449. Therefore, we conclude that the
basis for the reversal was legal error unrelated to factual innocence. Because Wurdemann cannot
satisfy this element of his claim, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the
State.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Chief Justice BEVAN, Justices BRODY, MEYER, and Justice Pro Tem EMORY CONCUR.
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