State v. Goullette ( 2024 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 50538-2023
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Boise, November 2023 Term
)
v. ) Opinion filed: June 6, 2024
)
PETER FRANKLIN GOULLETTE, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Bonner County. Barbara A. Buchanan, District Judge.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant. Andrea
Reynolds argued.
Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Justin Porter
argued.
ZAHN, Justice.
This case arises from Peter Franklin Goullette’s conviction for felony vehicular
manslaughter. Goullette entered a guilty plea while maintaining his innocence, pursuant to North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). Goulette appeals from his judgment of conviction,
primarily arguing that the district court abused its discretion when it accepted his guilty plea
because it failed to inquire into the factual basis of his guilty plea. For the reasons discussed below,
we hold that the district court did not err in accepting Goullette’s Alford plea because the record
as a whole demonstrates that Goullette entered a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea. We also
hold that the district court did not err by failing to revisit the validity of Goullette’s plea at
sentencing because the district court was not presented with evidence raising an obvious doubt as
to Goullette’s guilt.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
One day in June 2016, Goullette was driving south on McGee Road with his child in the
backseat. Goullette’s girlfriend followed behind him in a different vehicle. A neighbor testified
that Goullette and his girlfriend were driving their vehicles southbound on McGee Road at high
rates of speed. Meanwhile, Zualita Updike and Kathy Stelzer were walking on McGee Road with
their backs to oncoming traffic in the southbound lane.
Lori Stone was driving northbound on McGee Road. Stone saw Updike and Stelzer
walking south on McGee Road in the southbound lane. As she drove north on McGee Road, Stone
testified that she saw Goullette rapidly traveling south on McGee Road. As Goullette approached
Stone, she witnessed Goullette’s vehicle cross over the center line and testified that Goullette was
not looking at the roadway.
Shortly thereafter, Goullette struck Updike and Stelzer from behind, killing Stelzer and
severely injuring Updike. Goullette admitted to officers that he heard his four-year-old son
unbuckle his seatbelt in the backseat and that he had turned around and was attempting to buckle
his son back in when he struck the victims.
McGee Road is a largely straight road with a speed limit of twenty-five miles per hour.
Law enforcement prepared incident and accident reconstruction reports, although these reports are
not in the record. The appellate record indicates that the incident and accident reconstruction
reports concluded that Goullette was traveling at approximately forty-three miles per hour just
before the collision and approximately thirty-five miles per hour at the estimated point of impact.
The State filed a criminal complaint charging Goullette with vehicular manslaughter and
reckless driving. After a preliminary hearing, Goullette was bound over to the district court. The
State then filed an Information alleging two counts: (1) vehicular manslaughter pursuant to Idaho
Code sections 49-1401(1) and 18-4006(3)(a) for striking and killing Stelzer, and (2) reckless
driving pursuant to Idaho Code section 49-1401(1) for striking and injuring Updike.
At his arraignment, Goullette entered pleas of not guilty to both charges. Several months
later, Goullette entered a change of plea. Prior to formally entering the plea, he filled out and signed
a “Guilty Plea Advisory and Form,” indicating that he intended to plead guilty to both counts
pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25(1970). “An Alford plea is a plea where a criminal defendant pleads guilty on the basis that
sufficient evidence exists with which the prosecution could establish its case, but the defendant
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maintains innocence.” State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 217 n.1, 322 P.3d 296, 299 n.1 (2014).
Goullette also signed an “Acknowledgement of Alford Plea,” in which his initials appear next to
a statement acknowledging that the district court must find “[t]hat there exists a strong factual
basis to support the guilty plea[.]”
At his change of plea hearing, the district court asked Goullette if he agreed that there was
a strong factual basis to support his guilty plea and Goullette responded affirmatively:
Q. [District Court] And you’re entering what’s called an Alford plea. An
Alford plea, by doing this you’re agreeing that there’s a strong factual basis to
support a guilty plea.
And you’re asking the Court to enter the plea for you so that you can take
advantage of the offer that the [S]tate has made in all of your pending cases, is that
true?
A. [Goullette] Yes, ma’am.
Q. And you understand that when you’re sentenced, even though you
haven’t said you’re absolutely guilty and entered the guilty plea, you’ll be
sentenced by me as if you pled guilty?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. Do you want to go forward today and enter what is called an Alford plea
to the charge of vehicular manslaughter?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. And also to the charge of reckless driving?
A. Yes, ma’am.
The district court did not ask any further questions or state any conclusions on the record regarding
the factual basis supporting Goullette’s pleas. The district court proceeded to accept Goullette’s
pleas, finding that they were “knowingly and voluntarily made with a full understanding of the
potential consequences.”
Nearly two months later, Goullette appeared for sentencing. Prior to sentencing Goullette
filed an expert report by William Skelton, an engineer with experience in accident reconstruction,
for the district court’s consideration at sentencing. In the report, Skelton concluded (1) that the
large braking skid marks near the area of impact were not caused by Goullette’s vehicle because
it was equipped with an anti-lock brake system; (2) that Goullette’s vehicle’s height and scuff
marks on the road indicated that it was “quite probable” that the victims became entangled and
were carried by Goullette’s vehicle; (3) that, if the victims were carried, law enforcement’s reliance
on the distance between the point of impact and the final resting spot of one of the victim’s bodies
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would be inaccurate for purposes of calculating Goullette’s speed for the accident reconstruction
report; (4) that Goullette’s approximate speed at the estimated point of impact was 26.5 miles per
hour; (5) that Goullette did not have enough time to avoid hitting the victims; and (6) that the
victims were not in compliance with Idaho law because they were walking on the wrong side of
the road.
At Goullette’s sentencing hearing, Goullette’s attorney stated that “we don’t agree that this
is gross negligence” and discussed several mitigating factors, including that the Skelton Report
disputed the State’s version of events. The district court stated that it had reviewed some
documents in the record, including the Skelton Report. The district court discussed the sentencing
factors set forth in Idaho Code section 19-2521 and sentenced Goullette to a fixed ten-year
sentence. Goullette’s attorney did not file a notice of appeal or a motion for reduction of sentence
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 and later withdrew as counsel.
About one year later, Goullette filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, arguing,
among other things, that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney
did not file a direct appeal contrary to Goullette’s request. See Goullette v. State, No. 47576, 2021
WL 807882, at *1 (Idaho Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2021) (unpublished). The district court denied
Goullette’s petition, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for the district court to
consider Goullette’s petition for post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
See generally id.On remand, the district court granted Goullette’s petition for post-conviction relief. The
district court vacated Goullette’s original judgment of conviction and ordered that an amended
judgment be entered to provide Goullette with an opportunity to directly appeal his conviction.
Goullette timely appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion because it failed to
inquire into the factual basis of his guilty plea (1) when it was first entered and (2) at his sentencing
hearing. See State v. Goullette, No. 48904, 2022 WL 16730052 (Idaho Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2022)
(unpublished). The Idaho Court of Appeals rejected Goullette’s arguments and affirmed his
judgment of conviction. See id. Goullette then filed a petition for review, which this Court granted.
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether the district court erred in accepting Goulette’s Alford plea.
2. Whether the district court erred by failing to revisit the validity of Goullette’s plea at
sentencing given the information contained in the Skelton Report.
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III. ANALYSIS
Goullette’s appeal raises two issues. First, Goullette argues that the district court erred in
accepting his Alford plea without first inquiring further into the factual basis of his plea and making
an express finding that a strong factual basis supported his plea. Second, Goullette argues that the
district court erred at the sentencing hearing by failing to inquire further about the factual basis
supporting his plea because the Skelton Report raised an obvious doubt about his guilt.
Goullette’s arguments require us to examine Alford and our prior decisions interpreting it
to determine whether the district court erred. For the reasons discussed below, to the extent our
prior decisions have suggested that a trial court’s obligation under Alford is only to determine that
a strong factual basis exists for the plea, we now clarify those decisions. We conclude that Alford
requires only that a trial court determine that a guilty plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
prior to accepting it. While determining that a strong factual basis exists may establish that a guilty
plea is knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made despite protestations of factual innocence,
it is not the only means of doing so. Applying this standard to Goullette’s plea, we conclude that
the record as a whole demonstrates that his plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently. We also find no error in the district court’s failure at the sentencing hearing to
reassess the validity of Goullette’s plea after he filed an expert report that suggested he was not
guilty of vehicular manslaughter.
A. The district court did not err in accepting Goullette’s Alford plea.
Goullette first argues that the district court erred in accepting his plea because the district
court failed to independently verify that a strong factual basis supported his Alford plea. The State,
as a preliminary matter, argues that Goullette invited any error by the district court.
1. Goullette did not invite the purported error that he raises on appeal.
“The invited error doctrine precludes a criminal defendant from ‘consciously’ inviting
district court action and then successfully claiming those actions are erroneous on appeal.” State
v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 420, 348 P.3d 1, 35 (2015) (citing State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836,
837, 673 P.2d 436, 437 (1983)). Thus, “[t]he doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from
asserting an error when [the party’s] own conduct induces the commission of the error.” Beebe v.
N. Idaho Day Surgery, LLC, 171 Idaho 779, 789, 526 P.3d 650, 660 (2023) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted). “The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who caused or
played an important role in prompting a trial court to [take a certain action] from later challenging
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that [action] on appeal.” Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 834, 243 P.3d 642, 650 (2010)
(alterations in original) (citation omitted). “[A] failure to object is not enough to invoke the invited
error doctrine[.]” State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 485, 399 P.3d 804, 812 (2017); see also State
v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 477, 272 P.3d 417, 449 (2012) (“[W]e hold that Adamcik is not
precluded by the invited error doctrine from raising this issue on appeal, as he did not encourage
the district court to offer the specific malice instructions given, but merely failed to object.”).
The State argues that Goullette invited the district court’s alleged error because he agreed
under oath that a sufficient factual basis supported his plea. The State contends that, at the very
least, Goullette acquiesced in the alleged error by failing to object when the district court accepted
his plea without conducting further inquiry into the factual basis for his plea. We disagree.
We are not persuaded that Goullette’s agreement that there was a strong factual basis
supporting his guilty plea played an important role in the district court’s purported error. As we
discuss below, the purpose of probing into the factual basis supporting an Alford plea is to
determine whether the defendant’s plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970). Applying the invited error doctrine when a defendant merely
agrees that a strong factual basis exists would effectively eliminate Alford’s requirement that the
trial court determine that a defendant’s guilty plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent despite
his protestations of innocence. In short, Goullette’s agreement that a sufficient factual basis existed
for his guilty plea did not obviate the trial court’s obligation to determine that Goullette’s plea was
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
2. Alford requires a trial court to determine whether a defendant’s guilty plea, made despite
protestations of innocence, is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
Goullette’s appeal hinges on the legal standards governing a district court’s decision to
accept an Alford plea. Following oral argument, we ordered the parties to submit supplemental
briefing on whether the record in this case demonstrates that Goullette’s plea was knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent. In addition to briefing that issue, the State argues in its supplemental
brief that Goullette waived the issue of whether Goullette’s plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently entered because Goullette failed to raise this issue in his opening brief. We disagree.
“We will not consider an issue not ‘supported by argument and authority in the opening
brief.’” State v. Tower, 170 Idaho 272, 276–77, 510 P.3d 625, 629–30 (2022) (quoting Bach v.
Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010)). Thus, arguments not raised in a party’s
opening brief are waived. State v. Kimbley, 173 Idaho 149, 157, 539 P.3d 969, 977 (2023).
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Goullette argues in his opening brief that the district court abused its discretion in accepting
his Alford plea because the district court acted inconsistently with applicable legal standards. In
doing so, Goullette squarely put at issue the legal standards applicable to the district court’s
decision to accept his Alford plea, including what Alford itself requires. Goullette has said enough
to preserve the issue for appellate review.
Turning to the applicable legal standards, “[b]efore a trial court accepts a plea of guilty in
a felony case, the record must show that the plea has been made knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily[.]” State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 297–98, 787 P.2d 281, 283–84 (1990) (footnote
and citation omitted). “[T]he validity of a plea is to be determined by considering all the relevant
circumstances surrounding the plea as contained in the record.” Id. (citation omitted). Whether a
plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent generally involves inquiry into three areas:
(1) whether the defendant’s plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood the
nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to
refrain from incriminating himself; and (3) whether the defendant understood the
consequences of pleading guilty.
State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34, 557 P.2d 626, 628 (1976); see also I.C.R. 11(c).
However, when a guilty plea is combined with a protestation of innocence, this Court has
imposed an additional requirement. Relying on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), this Court stated that, “[a]s long as there is a strong
factual basis for the plea, and the defendant understands the charges against him, a voluntary plea
of guilty may be accepted by the court despite a continuing claim by the defendant that he is
innocent.” Sparrow v. State, 102 Idaho 60, 61–62, 625 P.2d 414, 415–16 (1981) (citing Alford,
400 U.S. 25) (remaining citations omitted).
In Alford, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a court can constitutionally
accept a guilty plea accompanied by a claim of innocence. See 400 U.S. at 32. Alford had been
indicted for first-degree murder. Id. at 26. Despite maintaining his innocence, Alford claimed that
he agreed to plead guilty to second-degree murder to avoid the death penalty. Id. at 27. Before
accepting Alford’s plea, the district court heard testimony from several witnesses that summarized
the prosecution’s case. Id. at 28–29. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated Alford’s plea
after concluding it was principally motivated by his desire to avoid the death penalty and was,
therefore, involuntarily entered. Id. at 30.
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The Supreme Court initially indicated that the Fourth Circuit failed to apply the proper
legal standard, which “was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent
choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” Id. at 31. While
acknowledging the inherent tension between claims of innocence and guilty pleas, the Supreme
Court recognized that a defendant “may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to
the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in
the acts constituting the crime.” Id. at 37. This was true in Alford’s case. See id. at 37–39.
The Supreme Court recognized that, although Alford claimed he was innocent, the state
had a “strong” case of first-degree murder, evidence of which the state presented before the trial
court accepted Alford’s plea. Id. at 28–29, 37–38. The Supreme Court stated that “[w]hen
[Alford’s] plea is viewed in light of the evidence against him, which substantially negated his
claim of innocence and which further provided a means by which the judge could test whether the
plea was being intelligently entered, its validity cannot be seriously questioned.” Id. at 37–38
(footnote and internal citation omitted). Given Alford’s clear desire to enter the plea and the factual
basis supporting it, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not commit constitutional
error by accepting Alford’s guilty plea. Id. at 37–38.
We have considered the holding from Alford on several occasions. In State v. Birrueta, we
distinguished Alford because we ultimately concluded that Birrueta had not entered his plea
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 98 Idaho 631, 570 P.2d 868 (1977). Our decision
vacating the defendant’s judgment of conviction did not turn on our application of Alford, but
instead turned on the absence of evidence in the record demonstrating that the defendant
understood the elements of the charge and the defenses available to him. See id.As mentioned above, in Sparrow, we cited Alford for the proposition that, “[a]s long as
there is a strong factual basis for the plea, and the defendant understands the charges against him,
a voluntary plea of guilty may be accepted by the court despite a continuing claim by the defendant
that he is innocent.” Sparrow, 102 Idaho at 61, 625 P.2d at 415 (citing Alford, 400 U.S. 25)
(remaining citations omitted). However, similar to our decision in Birrueta, our holding in
Sparrow did not rely on our application of Alford, but instead on whether the defendant was
adequately informed of the intent element of the crime prior to pleading guilty. Id. We concluded
that he was and affirmed his judgment of conviction. Id. at 61, 625 P.2d at 415. We also recognized
that there was a strong factual basis for the plea because the prosecutor recited the factual basis
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supporting the charges against the defendant at his plea hearing, and the defendant’s counsel
agreed with the facts as stated. Id. at 61–62, 625 P.2d at 415–16.
In State v. Coffin, we stated that the district court was not “obliged” to establish that a
strong factual basis existed at the defendant’s plea hearing because the defendant had not
maintained he was innocent at the time he entered his guilty plea. 104 Idaho 543, 546–47, 661
P.2d 328, 331–32 (1983). At his sentencing hearing, however, the defendant suggested that he was
innocent. Id. at 547, 661 P.2d at 332. The district court provided the defendant with the opportunity
to withdraw his plea, advised the defendant to consult with counsel, and recessed until the
following day. Id. at 547–48, 661 P.2d at 332–33. The following day, the defendant reaffirmed his
desire to plead guilty. Id. at 547, 661 P.2d at 332. We concluded that the defendant voluntarily and
intelligently pleaded guilty after he was provided the opportunity to consult with counsel and
withdraw his plea, and that he made a reasoned decision to continue with his guilty plea. Id. at
547–48, 661 P.2d at 332–33.
More recently, in Schoger v. State, we stated that Alford stood for the proposition that “such
a plea is constitutionally permissible so long as the charge is supported by a strong factual basis.”
148 Idaho 622, 628, 226 P.3d 1269, 1275 (2010). We held that Idaho trial courts possess “wide
discretion in determining whether a strong factual basis exists for the plea.” Id. We concluded that
the district court properly recognized it had to make a discretionary determination concerning
whether a strong factual basis existed to support the plea, that it asked questions pertinent to
making that determination, and that it had reasonable reservations concerning whether a sufficient
factual basis existed to support the charge. Id. As a result, we affirmed the district court’s decision
rejecting the plea because it correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion and reasonably acted
within the bounds of that discretion. Id. at 628–29, 226 P.3d at 1275–76.
Goullette argues that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea because it failed to
make a sufficient inquiry concerning whether a strong factual basis supported the two charges and
instead simply relied on Goullette’s short “yes, ma’am” response to the district court’s question
whether he believed a strong factual basis existed to support his guilty plea. Goullette contends
that this Court’s holdings and Alford require that the district court do more. However, a close
reading of Alford indicates that it only requires the trial court to determine whether the guilty plea
is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The existence of a strong factual basis to support
the charge is but one way of satisfying that inquiry.
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Although the holding in Alford relies heavily on the trial court’s receipt of evidence
establishing a strong factual basis for the charge, nowhere does the Supreme Court state that a
strong factual basis is a constitutional necessity. The Fourth Circuit had held that Alford’s plea
was involuntary because his principal motivation was fear of the death penalty. Alford, 400 U.S.
at 30. The Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing State v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968),
a Supreme Court decision on which the Fourth Circuit “heavily relied,” and noted that Jackson did
not establish a new test for determining the validity of guilty pleas. The Supreme Court stated,
“[t]he standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” Alford, 400 U.S. at 31. In light of
this, the Supreme Court stated that the fact that Alford would not have pleaded guilty except to
limit the possible penalty did not necessarily demonstrate that the guilty plea “was not the product
of a free and rational choice,” especially where Alford was represented by competent counsel who
advised that the plea would be to Alford’s advantage. Id.The Supreme Court next recognized that state and federal courts were divided on “whether
a guilty plea can be accepted when it is accompanied by protestations of innocence and hence
contains only a waiver of trial but no admission of guilt.” Id. at 33. The Supreme Court recognized
that a defendant may have other valid reasons to plead guilty, despite his factual innocence:
Some courts, giving expression to the principle that ‘(o)ur law only authorizes a
conviction where guilt is shown,’ require that trial judges reject such pleas. But
others have concluded that they should not ‘force any defense on a defendant in a
criminal case,’ particularly when advancement of the defense might ‘end in
disaster . . . .’ They have argued that, since ‘guilt, or the degree of guilt, is at times
uncertain and elusive,’ ‘(a)n accused, though believing in or entertaining doubts
respecting his innocence, might reasonably conclude a jury would be convinced of
his guilt and that he would fare better in the sentence by pleading guilty . . . .’ As
one state court observed nearly a century ago, ‘(r)easons other than the fact that he
is guilty may induce a defendant to so plead, . . . (and) (h)e must be permitted to
judge for himself in this respect.’
Id. at 33–34 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court acknowledged
that “[t]his Court has not confronted this precise issue, but prior decisions do yield relevant
principles.” Id. at 34.
The Supreme Court then discussed several decisions that it believed were relevant to
assessing the validity of Alford’s guilty plea. In one decision, the Supreme Court recognized it had
implied that there would be no constitutional error in accepting a guilty plea despite the existence
of evidence supporting a valid defense. Id. at 34–35 (discussing Lynch v. Overhulser, 369 U.S.
10705 (1962)). It also considered its decisions holding that a trial court has power to impose a prison
sentence after accepting a plea of nolo contendere. Id. at 35–36 (discussing, among other cases,
Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926)). A defendant who makes a plea of nolo contendere
does not expressly admit his guilt, but nonetheless waives his right to a trial and authorizes the
court to treat him as if he were guilty. Id. at 36. After considering these cases, the Supreme Court
determined that the principle implicit in the nolo contendere cases is that the U.S. Constitution
does not bar the imposition of a prison sentence upon a defendant who is unwilling to admit guilt,
but who, faced with grim alternatives, is willing to waive his trial and accept the sentence. Id. at
36–37.
Turning to Alford’s guilty plea, the Supreme Court held that the fact that Alford pleaded
guilty instead of nolo contendere was “of no constitutional significance with respect to the issue
now before us[.]” Id. at 37. The Supreme Court stated that an express admission of guilt is not a
constitutional prerequisite to the imposition of a criminal penalty: “[a]n individual accused of [a]
crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison
sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the
crime.” Id. With regard to Alford’s plea specifically, the Supreme Court concluded that it could
not “perceive any material difference between a plea refusing to admit commission of the criminal
act and a plea containing a protestation of innocence when, as in the instant case, a defendant
intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the
judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt.” Id.
The Supreme Court discussed the strong evidence of actual guilt in the context of assessing
whether Alford’s plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently: “When [Alford’s] plea
is viewed in light of the evidence against him, which substantially negated his claim of innocence
and which further provided a means by which the judge could test whether the plea was being
intelligently entered, its validity cannot be seriously questioned.” Id. at 37–38 (footnote omitted)
(internal citation omitted). The Supreme Court did not only consider the strong evidence
supporting the charge, however. It also considered Alford’s clearly expressed desire to enter the
plea despite his professed belief in his innocence. Id. After considering both of those factors, the
Supreme Court held that the trial court did not commit constitutional error in accepting the plea.
Id. at 38. The Supreme Court ended its opinion by observing that “[t]he prohibitions against
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involuntary or unintelligent pleas should not be relaxed, but neither should an exercise in arid logic
render those constitutional guarantees counterproductive[.]” Id. at 39.
A close reading of the Alford decision reveals that the Supreme Court was primarily
concerned with ensuring a guilty plea is knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. While
it relied in part on the strong factual basis supporting the charge against Alford, that was not the
only basis for its decision holding there was no error in accepting the plea. It also relied on Alford’s
express statements that he wished to avoid the death penalty. At no point did the Supreme Court
state that an Alford plea could only be accepted if there was a strong factual basis to support the
charge. Further, in its concluding statements, the Supreme Court noted that the constitutional
prohibition against “involuntary or unintelligent” pleas should not be relaxed. We are unable to
ascertain any constitutional principles announced in Alford that limit our trial courts to only
accepting Alford pleas when a “strong factual basis” exists to support the charge. Instead, our trial
courts may constitutionally accept an Alford plea after determining the defendant made a knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent decision to plead guilty despite his protestations of innocence.
We are not alone in our analysis of Alford’s holding. Appellate courts in the federal system
and at least one of our sister states have similarly concluded that Alford does not mandate that a
guilty plea made despite protestations of innocence can only be accepted when the trial court
determines that a “strong factual basis” for the plea exists. See Roddy v. Black, 516 F.2d 1380,
1385 (6th Cir. 1975) (“Alford held that there is no constitutional bar to accepting a guilty plea in
the face of an assertion of innocence, so long as a defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and
understandingly consents to be sentenced on a charge. This being the rule, there is no constitutional
requirement that a trial judge inquire into the factual basis of a plea.”); Wallace v. Turner, 695
F.2d 545, 548 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Only when a defendant proclaims his innocence while pleading
guilty have federal courts required a judicial finding of some factual basis for the plea as an
essential part of the constitutionally required finding that the plea was voluntary. Even in these
cases, the purpose of placing the facts on the record is not to establish guilt as a basis for a judgment
of conviction. Rather it is to aid in the constitutionally required determination that the defendant
entered the plea intelligently and voluntarily.” (internal citations omitted)); Higgason v. Clark, 984
F.2d 203, 207 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Alford tells us that strong evidence on the record can show that a
plea is voluntary; it does not hold that only strong evidence on the record permits a finding of
voluntariness. And it certainly does not imply that the factual-basis requirement of Fed.R.Crim.P.
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11(f) and its state-law counterparts comes from the Constitution.”); Medina v. People, 535 P.3d
82, 90 (Colo. 2023) (“[Whether] a guilty plea is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent necessarily
depends on the circumstances of each case. While a defendant’s choice to plead guilty may be
influenced by the factual basis for the charge, it may equally be influenced by other considerations.
For instance, by pleading guilty to [a charge, the defendant is] able to achieve the global disposition
of several other criminal cases for which he had no defense.”), cert. denied sub nom. Medina v.
Colorado, No. 23-618, 2024 WL 1607756 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2024) (mem.).
Our decision today should not be read to suggest that the ordinary plea colloquy used when
accepting a guilty plea automatically establishes that an Alford plea was knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently made. The validity of a guilty plea “is to be determined by considering all the
relevant circumstances surrounding the plea as contained in the record.” State v. Carrasco, 117
Idaho 295, 297–98, 787 P.2d 281, 283–84 (1990) (citation omitted). An assertion of innocence is
certainly a relevant circumstance when assessing whether a defendant entered a knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent plea and the record should, therefore, reveal why pleading guilty was “a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant”
despite the defendant’s assertion of innocence. Alford, 400 U.S. at 31.
Our decision today simply holds that, while the factual basis supporting a defendant’s
Alford plea is one way to evaluate whether the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, it is
not the exclusive means of doing so. See id. at 31–39. To the extent that our decisions in prior
cases, including Sparrow and Schoger, suggest that our trial courts may not accept an Alford plea
without first concluding that a strong factual basis exists to support the plea, those portions of our
prior decisions are abrogated. A trial court’s decision whether to accept an Alford plea is a
discretionary one and we leave it to our trial courts to make that decision after having considered
“all the relevant circumstances surrounding the plea as contained in the record.” Carrasco, 117
Idaho at 297–98, 787 P.2d at 283–84 (citation omitted).
Having clarified the standards applicable to accepting Alford pleas, we now turn to the
specific circumstances of Goullette’s guilty plea.
3. The record as a whole demonstrates that Goullette’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent.
The parties focus their arguments on the district court’s colloquy with Goullette at his
change of plea hearing and whether there was a sufficient factual basis to support Goullette’s guilty
plea. Goullette argues that the district court erred by failing to independently inquire into the
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evidence supporting the charges against him prior to finding that a strong factual basis supported
his guilty plea. The State argues that we should affirm the district court because the information
ascertained by the district court at Goullette’s change of plea hearing established that a strong
factual basis supported his plea. However, if we conclude that the evidence adduced at the change
of plea hearing was insufficient, the State argues that we should review other documents in the
record to independently evaluate the strength of the State’s case against Goullette.
At Goullette’s change of plea hearing, the only mention of a “factual basis” in the district
court’s plea colloquy was when the district court explained to Goullette that, by entering an Alford
plea, he was agreeing that there is a strong factual basis to support his plea. The district court then
coupled this explanation with a question to Goullette concerning whether he wanted to enter the
plea to take advantage of an offer that the State made to resolve other pending criminal cases
against him:
Q. [District Court] And you’re entering what’s called an Alford plea. An
Alford plea, by doing this you’re agreeing that there’s a strong factual basis to
support a guilty plea.
And you’re asking the [c]ourt to enter the plea for you so that you can take
advantage of the offer that the [S]tate has made in all of your pending cases, is that
true?
A. [Goullette] Yes, ma’am.
Shortly thereafter, the district court indicated that it would accept Goullette’s guilty pleas and
“enter them pursuant to the North Carolina versus Alford decision, find that they are knowingly
and voluntarily made with a full understanding of the potential consequences.”
“For a guilty plea to be valid, the entire record must demonstrate that the plea was entered
into in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 527, 164
P.3d 798, 807 (2007) (citation omitted). This requires us to conduct a de novo review of the record
to determine whether it demonstrates that Goullette’s plea was voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently made. We begin our analysis by reviewing Goullette’s signed guilty plea advisory
form and the district court’s colloquy with Goullette at the change of plea hearing.
On the same day as the change of plea hearing, Goullette signed a guilty plea advisory form
and a form entitled “Acknowledgement of Alford Plea.” Both forms were filed with the district
court at the time of the change of plea hearing. In the guilty plea advisory form, Goullette indicated
he had no difficulty understanding what he was doing by filling out the form and that there was no
reason why he could not make a reasoned and informed decision in the case. He acknowledged
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that by pleading guilty he was waiving certain constitutional rights, including giving up legal and
factual defenses that he may have and giving up his right to force the State to prove him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. He indicated that he had sufficient time to discuss the case with his
attorney, had been given adequate time to fill out the form, and had adequate access to his
attorney’s assistance in filling out the form. He acknowledged that he understood that no one could
force him to plead guilty and that he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation. He affirmed
that the answers throughout the form were his own, that he was entering the guilty plea freely and
voluntarily, that he was not admitting to all of the elements of the crime to which he was pleading
guilty, and that he understood the consequences of entering a guilty plea.
In signing the guilty plea advisory form, Goullette also affirmed that his plea was the result
of a plea agreement. On the advisory form, Goullette initialed the following description of the plea
agreement: “The Defendant shall plead guilty to Count I and Count II of the Information via an
Alford Plea . . . [and] [t]he Defendant and the State are free to argue.” However, while a plea
agreement is attached to the advisory form, the agreement raises several concerns regarding
whether Goullette’s plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
First, Goullette answered “no” to the question, “[i]f a written plea agreement was done,
have you read this plea agreement?” Yet Goullette had signed the plea agreement attached to the
guilty plea advisory form. Second, the title of the written plea agreement attached to the guilty plea
advisory form does not include the district court case number for the case before us on appeal.
Rather, it only includes the case numbers for three other cases. The record suggests that the plea
agreement resolved the three other cases and also the one presently before us. But the plea
agreement’s only reference to the case currently before us is a statement that the State will
recommend that the sentences imposed in the other cases will run consecutively to the sentences
imposed in this case. Third, Goullette’s signature on the written plea agreement appears
immediately below a statement that Goullette acknowledged he was waiving his right to appeal
his conviction and sentence. However, on the guilty plea advisory form in this case, Goullette
indicated that he did not waive his right to appeal his conviction or his sentence. The district court
did not question Goullette concerning any of these discrepancies during its plea colloquy.
However, we also note that Goullette has not raised these discrepancies on appeal, nor has he
argued that they establish that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.
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Prior to the change of plea hearing, Goullette also signed a form entitled
“Acknowledgement of Alford Plea.” In that form, he affirmed that, in order for the district court
to accept his plea, he understood the district court would have to make certain findings before
accepting the plea, including that a strong factual basis existed to support the plea and that the plea
was made voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly. Goullette also affirmed that he understood
that the district court would not accept the plea unless the court determined that the guilty plea was
a voluntary and an intelligent choice among the alternatives available to him. He acknowledged
that, even though he was not admitting he committed all the elements of the offenses to which he
pleaded guilty, the district court would, upon entry of his guilty plea, make a finding that he was
guilty.
At the change of plea hearing, the district court questioned Goullette under oath concerning
the plea. The district court confirmed with Goullette that he would be entering an Alford plea to
both counts and that there was no agreement concerning the sentence he would receive. The State
indicated that it would be seeking the maximum sentence and Goullette’s attorney stated that there
was an agreement that Goullette’s sentence in the case would run concurrently with the sentences
in his other cases. The district court advised Goullette of the maximum penalties associated with
each charge. In response to questioning from the district court, Goullette confirmed that he
understood the maximum penalties, that the State would be seeking a sentence of ten years, that
Goullette was free to argue for any sentence, and that the district court would determine what
sentence to impose.
During the plea colloquy, Goullette confirmed that the State had agreed to dismiss some
other cases and he would be entering pleas in other cases. He also affirmed that no one had done
anything to force him to enter into the plea agreement. The district court explained to Goullette
that, by entering an Alford plea, Goullette agreed there was a strong factual basis to support the
guilty plea. The district court then asked Goullette if he was asking the district court to accept his
Alford plea so he could take advantage of the State’s offer that related to all of his pending cases.
Goullette responded affirmatively. The district court then advised Goullette that, even though he
was entering an Alford plea, the district court would sentence him as if he had pleaded guilty.
Goullette stated he understood. The district court then found that Goullette’s guilty pleas to both
charges were made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently and accepted both pleas.
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The foregoing is the sum total of the evidence expressly elicited at the change of plea
hearing relating to whether Goullette made his guilty pleas knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently. The State did not present any evidence at the change of plea hearing concerning the
underlying facts of the case, and the district court did not discuss specific facts supporting the
charges against Goullette.
The State argues that the court minutes of Goullette’s probable cause and preliminary
hearings establish that a strong factual basis existed to support the charges. However, the
transcripts of these hearings are not in the record. Although the court minutes give an overview of
the witness testimony and evidence the State presented, court minutes are not sworn testimony and
do not provide the same detail as transcripts. Neither party argues on appeal, however, that the
court minutes of these hearings are inaccurate. Therefore, we will assess the factual basis
supporting Goullette’s Alford plea by reviewing the court minutes from his probable cause and
preliminary hearings.
The court minutes from Goullette’s probable cause hearing are brief. The prosecutor
summarized the State’s case against Goullette but did not present any witnesses. According to the
court minutes, the prosecutor stated that Goullette was travelling southbound on McGee Road at a
high rate of speed while the victims were walking with their backs to oncoming traffic in the
southbound lane. A witness statement indicated that Goullette was distracted and not looking at
the road when she drove past his vehicle in the northbound lane. The prosecutor stated that
investigators determined Goullette was travelling at approximately forty-three miles per hour just
before the collision and approximately thirty-five miles per hour at the estimated point of impact.
The magistrate judge concluded that there was probable cause to charge Goullette with vehicular
manslaughter and reckless driving.
The court minutes from Goullette’s preliminary hearing are more detailed and indicate that
five witnesses testified at the hearing. The surviving victim, Updike, testified first and explained
that she and the deceased victim, Stelzer, went for a walk on McGee Road during their lunch break.
At some point on their return trip, the victims crossed over into the southbound lane to avoid a car
travelling in the northbound lane. Updike testified that sometime thereafter she and Stelzer were
struck from behind by Goullette. She remembered violently spinning around after she was hit and
then landing on the ground, followed by Goullette running over to her.
17
The second witness, a resident living on McGee Road, testified that she saw Goullette
travelling down McGee Road at a high rate of speed.
The third witness, Stone, was traveling northbound on McGee Road at the time of the
accident. Stone testified that she saw Updike and Stelzer walking south on McGee Road in the
southbound lane. She also saw Goullette rapidly driving south on McGee Road further north. As
she passed Goullette, Stone witnessed Goullette’s vehicle cross over the center line and testified
that Goullette was not looking at the roadway.
The fourth witness, Officer Werger, arrived on scene after the collision. He testified that it
was a clear day and there were no obstructions on McGee Road. Werger also testified to several
statements Goullette made after the collision. Goullette admitted that he hit the victims and that he
had previously seen the victims walking when he was traveling northbound on McGee Road.
Werger also testified that Goullette admitted he was distracted shortly before the collision because
he was looking at his child in the backseat and, when he turned back around, the victims were right
in front of his vehicle.
The fifth and final witness was the State’s expert accident reconstructionist, Officer Ashby.
Ashby concluded that Goullette was traveling at approximately forty-three miles per hour when
he began braking eighty to ninety feet before the collision. Ashby concluded that Goullette was
traveling approximately thirty-five miles per hour at the point of impact. Ashby testified that he
used evidence gathered from the scene, such as the braking skid mark, evidence on the roadway,
and Goullette’s vehicle, to calculate Goullette’s approximate speed and the estimated point of
impact. Ashby testified that he calculated Goullette’s speed at thirty-five miles per hour at the
point of impact. The speed limit on that portion of the roadway was twenty-five miles per hour.
Goullette contends that the expert report he filed prior to sentencing undercuts the evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing. The report was prepared by William Skelton, an engineer
with experience in accident reconstruction. The Skelton Report alleged that Ashby’s accident
reconstruction was flawed and opined that Goullette’s speed at the point of impact was 26.5 miles
per hour rather than 35 miles per hour. Skelton’s report also opined that Goullette did not have
sufficient reaction time to avoid hitting the victims and that the victims were in violation of Idaho
law at the time of impact because they were walking on the wrong side of the road. While the
Skelton Report contests certain aspects of the State’s case, it does not contest the eyewitness
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testimony provided by the other witnesses at the preliminary hearing, nor does it contest
Goullette’s admissions to law enforcement at the scene shortly after the collision.
In assessing whether Goullette’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, we
also consider the record as a whole. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 527–28, 164 P.3d 798, 807–
08 (2007). After reviewing the entire record before us, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence
to establish that Goullette’s guilty plea to vehicular manslaughter was made knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently despite his protestations of innocence. The court minutes of the
preliminary hearing reflect a strong factual basis to support the charge. Goullette admitted to law
enforcement that he hit the women; that he had seen them walking along the roadway before the
accident; and that immediately before he hit the women, he was not looking at the road but instead
was turned around looking at his son who was in the backseat of the car. Other witnesses testified
to seeing Goullette shortly before the accident speeding down the road, crossing the center line of
the roadway, and not looking at the road. At the change of plea hearing, Goullette advised the
district court that he was pleading guilty to take advantage of a deal from the State that would
resolve his other pending criminal charges. On the guilty plea advisory form, Goullette affirmed
that he had sufficient time to consult with his attorney, that he understood he was waiving his right
to force the State to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that he was aware of the
consequences of his plea. Goullette then confirmed at his change of plea hearing that he read and
understood the guilty plea advisory form. Further, while we have noted apparent discrepancies
between the plea agreement attached to the guilty plea advisory form and the answers that
Goullette provided on the advisory form, Goullette has not argued those discrepancies on appeal.
We conclude that the confusion arising from those discrepancies does not override the other
evidence in the record indicating that Goullette made the guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently. We therefore affirm the district court’s decision to accept Goullette’s Alford plea in
this case.
However, this case presents a close call. Our decision should not be read as an endorsement
of the district court’s process in accepting Goullette’s Alford plea. Although we review the entire
record to determine whether a plea is entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, the most
effective way to create a record that demonstrates a plea is entered knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently is through the plea colloquy with the defendant. While the court minutes, guilty plea
advisory form, and acknowledgement of Alford plea form tipped the balance in favor of finding
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that Goullette’s guilty plea was constitutionally sufficient in this case, the best practice for
accepting an Alford plea would be to ensure the plea colloquy reveals why pleading guilty “was a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant”
despite the defendant’s assertion of innocence. Alford, 400 U.S. at 31.
B. The district court did not err when it failed to reassess the constitutionality of Goullette’s
Alford plea at the sentencing hearing.
Goullette argues that the district court was obligated to re-inquire into the factual basis of
his plea at sentencing because the Skelton Report and his attorney’s statements at sentencing raised
obvious doubt as to his guilt, which triggered the district court’s duty to inquire into the factual
basis supporting his plea. Goullette contends the district court erred because it did not conduct this
inquiry.
The State argues that the Skelton Report and Goullette’s attorney’s statements at
sentencing did not raise an obvious doubt as to Goullette’s guilt, so the district court was under no
obligation to inquire into the factual basis for Goullette’s plea. The State also argues that Goullette
failed to preserve this argument because he did not argue at sentencing that there was obvious
doubt as to his guilt.
1. Goullette preserved his argument that the Skelton Report raised an obvious doubt as to his
guilt requiring the district court to revisit the validity of his plea at sentencing.
“Issues not raised below will not be considered by this [C]ourt on appeal, and the parties
will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.” State v. Foeller,
168 Idaho 884, 891, 489 P.3d 795, 802 (2021) (citation omitted). Accordingly, “both the issue and
the party’s position on the issue must be raised before the trial court for it to be properly preserved
for appeal.” State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019). However, “[t]his
Court has acknowledged that arguments may ‘evolve’ on appeal.” Foeller, 168 Idaho at 891, 489
P.3d at 802 (citation omitted). “In fact, we fully expect counsel to refocus and sharpen their
arguments when they bring an appeal to this Court.” Id.
Goullette preserved this issue for appeal. Goullette consistently maintained the position
below that he did not act with gross negligence, including at his sentencing hearing. Goullette’s
attorney even referenced the Skelton Report to support his opinion that Goullette was not grossly
negligent. It is true that Goullette did not specifically argue that the Skelton Report raised an
obvious doubt as to his guilt. However, Goullette consistently argued below that he did not act
with gross negligence, and he submitted evidence in advance of his sentencing hearing to support
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that position. This was sufficient to preserve the issue of whether the Skelton Report raised an
obvious doubt as to Goullette’s guilt requiring the district court to revisit the validity of Goullette’s
plea.
2. The Skelton Report did not raise obvious doubt as to Goullette’s guilt.
A trial court should revisit the validity of a plea or allow the defendant to plead anew if
presented with evidence raising obvious doubt as to guilt after the plea is entered but before
sentencing. See State v. Coffin, 104 Idaho 543, 545 n.2, 661 P.2d 328, 330 n.2. The district court
did not err by failing to revisit the validity of Goullette’s plea at sentencing because the Skelton
Report and Goullette’s attorney’s statements at sentencing did not raise obvious doubt as to
Goullette’s guilt.
As previously discussed, the Skelton Report contains several conclusions that dispute
some, but not all, of the State’s evidence. Skelton presented an alternative theory that questioned
law enforcement’s reliance on the distance between the point of impact and the final resting spot
of one of the victim’s bodies, which Skelton concluded was inaccurate for purposes of calculating
Goullette’s speed. Skelton opined that Goullette’s approximate speed at the estimated point of
impact was 26.5 miles per hour. Skelton also concluded that Goullette did not have enough time
to avoid the victims and that the victims were not in compliance with Idaho law because they were
walking on the wrong side of the road.
Although the Skelton Report contests some of the State’s evidence, it does not contest the
eyewitness testimony provided by witnesses at Goullette’s preliminary hearing that Goullette was
driving very fast shortly before the collision. The Skelton Report also does not contest the evidence
that Goullette was not looking at the road while he was driving, including Stone’s observations
and Goullette’s own admissions to law enforcement. Goullette further admitted to law enforcement
that he saw the victims as he passed them traveling northbound on McGee Road, which the Skelton
Report does not refute. Accordingly, while the Skelton Report may have supported an argument
at trial that Goullette did not act with gross negligence, it falls short of raising obvious doubt as to
that element and, therefore, does not raise obvious doubt as to Goullette’s guilt.
Goullette’s attorney’s statements also do not raise obvious doubt as to his guilt for the same
reasons. As previously discussed, Goullette’s attorney argued at the sentencing hearing that
Goullette was not grossly negligent. However, that argument was based on the Skelton Report’s
conclusions. Because the Skelton Report does not raise obvious doubt as to Goullette’s guilt, it
21
follows that Goullette’s attorney’s opinion based on that report also does not raise obvious doubt.
Accordingly, the district court did not err by failing to revisit the validity of Goullette’s plea at
sentencing.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm Goullette’s judgment of conviction.
Chief Justice BEVAN, Justices BRODY and MOELLER, and Pro Tem Justice
SCHROEDER CONCUR.
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