State v. Pulizzi ( 2024 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 49710
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
Boise, October 2024 Term
)
v. )
Opinion Filed: November 29, 2024
)
MICHAEL ANTHONY PULIZZI, )
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
_______________________________________ )
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Twin Falls County. Benjamin J. Cluff, District Judge.
The district court’s judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant. Kimberly
A. Coster argued.
Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. John C.
McKinney argued.
_____________________
BRODY, Justice.
Michael Anthony Pulizzi appeals his judgment of conviction for felony possession of
methamphetamine, Idaho Code section 37-2732(c)(1), and destruction, alteration or concealment
of evidence, Idaho Code section 18-2603. Pulizzi argues the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of several unlawful searches and seizures of trash
he placed out for collection. According to Pulizzi, Twin Falls City’s waste collection ordinances
created an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his trash and, therefore, the warrantless
searches and seizures of his trash violated his rights under Article I, section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution. For the reasons below, we affirm Pulizzi’s judgment of conviction.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Over a period of roughly five months, detectives from the Twin Falls County Sheriff’s
Office conducted seven warrantless trash pulls from a garbage bin placed on the sidewalk outside
the curtilage of Pulizzi’s apartment. The bags were taken to another location, where their contents
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were examined by various detectives. The detectives discovered drug paraphernalia in these bags
and, based on this evidence, obtained and executed a search warrant on Pulizzi’s apartment. During
the search, the detectives found methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia throughout
Pulizzi’s residence. When questioned, Pulizzi also admitted to law enforcement he had attempted
to flush a pipe and “baggies” down the toilet. The State subsequently charged Pulizzi with
possession of a controlled substance, Idaho Code section 37-2732(c)(1); concealment and/or
destruction of evidence, Idaho Code section 18-2603; possession of drug paraphernalia, Idaho
Code section 37-2734A; and possession of a controlled substance, Idaho Code section 37-
2732(c)(3). The State also alleged that Pulizzi was a persistent violator under Idaho Code section
19-2514 based on his two previous felony convictions for aiding and abetting burglary and
possession of a controlled substance.
Pulizzi filed a motion to suppress, arguing he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the garbage he placed out for collection and, thus, the warrantless searches and seizures of the
garbage violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article I, section 17, of the Idaho Constitution. Pulizzi acknowledged that the Supreme Court of
the United States had rejected a similar argument in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988),
and that this Court had rejected similar arguments in State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 46, 920 P.3d 5(2001), and State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 885, 26 P.3d 1222 (2001), where we held that Article I,
section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, did not afford greater privacy protections than the Fourth
Amendment to such items. However, Pulizzi argued that his privacy interest was objectively
reasonable because it was predicated on the Twin Falls City waste collection ordinance (“WCO”),
which is contained in Chapter 3, Title 7 of the Twin Falls City Code. According to Pulizzi, the
WCO created a reasonable expectation of privacy in his curbside garbage because it: (1) mandates
residential participation in the city’s waste collection program, and (2) prohibits anyone, other than
authorized trash collectors, from collecting garbage for monetary gain.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, a detective with Twin Falls County Sheriff’s
Office testified to the trash pull operation, the evidence obtained from the trash pulls, and the
subsequent search of Pulizzi’s residence. The detective further testified that he received no
monetary gain from searching through Pulizzi’s garbage. Pulizzi did not testify during the hearing.
The district court denied Pulizzi’s motion to suppress. It determined Pulizzi failed to
“provide[] . . . any reasonable basis upon which this [c]ourt could simply ignore the decades-old
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controlling precedent of both the United States Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme Court.” In
addressing the WCO, the district court concluded the ordinance did not create a reasonable
expectation of privacy because (1) it did not require residents to participate in the trash collection
program, as residents had other lawful methods to discard their trash; (2) the prohibition against
collecting garbage for “monetary gain” had no application to police officers performing trash pulls;
and (3) the purpose of the ordinance was to “to promote the health and safety of City residents and
to prevent the spread of disease[,]” rather than “to restrict law enforcement officers from
performing their lawful duty.” Thereafter, Pulizzi pled guilty to possession of a controlled
substance and concealment and/or destruction of evidence pursuant to a conditional plea
agreement, preserving his right to appeal from the order denying his motion to suppress.
Pulizzi timely appealed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“When this Court reviews a trial court’s order granting or denying a motion to suppress
evidence, the standard of review is bifurcated.” State v. Sutterfield, 168 Idaho 558, 561, 484 P.3d
839, 842 (2021) (citing State v. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 671, 450 P.3d 315, 319 (2019)). “Unless
clearly erroneous, this Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact.” Id. (citing Gonzales, 165
Idaho at 671, 450 P.3d at 319). “This Court will, however, freely review the trial court’s
‘application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Bodenbach,
165 Idaho 577, 589, 448 P.3d 1005, 1017 (2019)).
“Interpretation of an ordinance or statute is a question of law over which this Court
exercises free review.” Rouwenhorst v. Gem County., 168 Idaho 657, 662, 485 P.3d 153, 158
(2021) (quoting Lane Ranch P’ship v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 89, 175 P.3d 776, 778
(2007)).
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Pulizzi argues the district court erred when it determined the WCO did not
create an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the district court misinterpreted
the WCO. Pulizzi further argues this Court should reconsider its holdings in State v. Donato, 135
Idaho 469, 20 P.3d 5 (2001), and State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 885, 26 P.3d 1222 (2001), and instead
conclude that the protections in Article I, section 17, of the Idaho Constitution extend to a citizen’s
trash when it is placed out for collection pursuant to a mandatory trash collection ordinance.
However, Pulizzi has not pursued his claim that the WCO gave rise to a protected privacy right
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under the Fourth Amendment. In response, the State argues that the district court correctly
determined the WCO did not create an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. We decline
to reconsider our holdings in Donato and McCall and affirm the district court’s order denying
Pulizzi’s motion to suppress.
Both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 17 protect “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects” against unreasonable searches and seizures.
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. art. I, § 17. “Like the Fourth Amendment, the purpose of
[Article I, section] 17 is to protect Idaho citizens’ reasonable expectation of privacy against
arbitrary governmental intrusion.” State v. Albertson, 165 Idaho 126, 129, 443 P.3d 140, 143
(2019) (quoting State v. Christensen, 131 Idaho 143, 146, 953 P.2d 583, 586 (1998)). Despite the
similarity of language and purpose, “the protections afforded by these two constitutional
provisions are not always coextensive.” State v. Pool, 172 Idaho 47, 51, 529 P.3d 712, 716 (2023).
Indeed, “[s]tate [c]ourts are at liberty to find within the provisions of their constitutions greater
protection than is afforded under the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court.” Donato, 135 Idaho at 471, 20 P.3d at 7 (quoting State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5,
11 n.6, 696 P.2d 856, 862 n.6 (1985)); see, e.g., State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462, 943 P.2d 52 (1997)
(holding that Article I, section 17 provides broader protection for curtilage than that provided under
the Fourth Amendment); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992) (rejecting a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule under Article I, section 17); State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho
746, 760 P.2d 1162 (1988) (holding that the installation of a pen register device constitutes a
warrantless search under Article I, section 17, which was otherwise lawful under the Fourth
Amendment); State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 519, 272 P.3d 483, 491 (2012) (reaffirming Idaho’s
separate exclusionary rule and refusing to adopt the good-faith exception that arises under the
Fourth Amendment).
“Although the United States Supreme Court establishes no more than the floor of
constitutional protection, this Court has found there is ‘merit in having the same rule of law
applicable within the borders of our state, whether an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment or
its counterpart—Article I, [section] 17 of the Idaho Constitution—is involved. Such consistency
makes sense to the police and the public.’ ” Donato, 135 Idaho at 471, 20 P.3d at 7 (quoting State
v. Charpentier, 131 Idaho 649, 653, 962 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1998)). Thus, as a general matter, “the
federal framework is appropriate for analysis of state constitutional questions unless the state
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constitution, the unique nature of the state, or Idaho precedent clearly indicates that a different
analysis applies.” CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund, 154 Idaho 379, 383, 299 P.3d 186,
190 (2013).
In California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held the
Fourth Amendment does not “prohibit[] the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for
collection outside the curtilage of a home.” Id. at 37. Like Pulizzi, the defendants in Greenwood
were convicted of drug charges stemming from evidence taken from their garbage cans. Id. at 37–
38. The Supreme Court explained that, while the defendants may have a subjective expectation of
privacy in their curbside garbage, “[a]n expectation of privacy does not give rise to Fourth
Amendment protection . . . unless society is prepared to accept that expectation as objectively
reasonable.” Id. at 39–40. The Supreme Court concluded society would not accept such
expectations as objectively reasonable because the defendants had exposed their garbage to the
public, in a readily accessible area, with the purpose of conveying the garbage to a third party:
[W]e conclude that [defendants] exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to
defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment protection. It is common knowledge that
plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to
animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. Moreover,
[defendants] placed their refuse at the curb for the express purpose of conveying it
to a third party, the trash collector, who might himself have sorted through
[defendants]’ trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do so. Accordingly,
having deposited their garbage “in an area particularly suited for public inspection
and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of
having strangers take it,” [defendants] could have had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the inculpatory items that they discarded.
Id. at 40–41 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
In the following years, state courts confronted the question of whether particular
warrantless searches and seizures of one’s garbage offended parallel provisions in state
constitutions. See generally Kimberly J. Winbush, Searches and Seizures: Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy in Contents of Garbage or Trash Receptacle, 62 A.L.R.5th 1 (1998). In State v. Donato,
we addressed the issue of whether Article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides greater
protection to privacy rights than those afforded by the Fourth Amendment in the context of
warrantless searches and seizures of curbside garbage. Id. at 471–74, 20 P.3d at 7–10. In our
analysis, we reviewed various Idaho cases where Article I, section 17 was interpreted to provide
greater protection against warrantless searches. Id. at 472, 20 P.3d at 8. However, we determined
that none of the factors in those cases—“uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-
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standing jurisprudence”—supported a divergence from the United States Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 472, 20 P.3d at 8. In so doing, we explored and
approved the Supreme Court’s analysis of this issue in Greenwood:
[T]he rule enunciated in Greenwood is the proper interpretation of the protections
provided by Article I, [section] 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Donato has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in items deposited in a public area, conveyed to
a third-party for collection, and “readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers,
snoops, and other members of the public.”
Id. at 474, 20 P.3d at 10 (citing Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40). On the same day this Court issued its
opinion in Donato, we also issued our opinion in State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 885, 26 P.3d 1222(2001). The McCall opinion addressed a similar challenge to a warrantless search and seizure of
curbside garbage, which was disposed of on the same grounds as Donato. Id. at 887, 26 P.3d at
1224.
“Stare decisis requires that this Court follows controlling precedent unless that precedent
is manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or overruling that precedent is
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” State v.
Brown, 170 Idaho 439, 443, 511 P.3d 859, 863 (2022) (quoting State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4–5,
343 P.3d 30, 33–34 (2015)). Those circumstances are not present here. Pulizzi has not
demonstrated that the precedent established by Donato and McCall is manifestly wrong, unjust or
unwise, or that overruling these precedents “is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of
law and remedy continued injustice.” Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, our interpretation of the
protections of Article I, section 17 is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the protections of the Fourth Amendment. “There continues to be merit in having
the same rule of law applicable within the borders of our state, whether an interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment or its counterpart—Article I, [section] 17 of the Idaho Constitution—is
involved[]” as “[s]uch consistency make sense to the police and the public.” State v. Watts, 142
Idaho 230, 233, 127 P.3d 133, 136 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Charpentier,
131 Idaho at 653, 962 P.2d at 1037). Accordingly, there is no basis to revisit Donato and McCall.
Pulizzi argues that our holdings in Donato and McCall are not dispositive because they did
not address whether a city’s waste collection ordinance created a reasonable expectation of privacy
in trash that is put out for collection in accordance with the ordinance’s provisions. According to
Pulizzi, the WCO creates this expectation because it: (1) requires the City’s residents to place their
trash out for collection in a publicly accessible space; (2) restricts who can collect garbage to
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authorized contractors, and, therefore, prohibits law enforcement from collecting trash that is
placed out for collection in accordance with the WCO; and (3) limits what the licensed and
approved collector must do with that trash once it is collected. Pulizzi further argues our holdings
in Donato and McCall “permit local authorities to command that citizens dispose of their personal
effects in a manner that reveals all of the personal, private information that is contained in their
trash to the police.” Pulizzi therefore argues that these holdings should be modified in light of his
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his trash. Pulizzi’s interpretation of the WCO is
strained for several reasons.
“The objective in interpreting a statute or ordinance is to derive the intent of the legislative
body that adopted it.” Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County., 145 Idaho 121, 131,
176 P.3d 126, 136 (2007) (citing Payette River Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Valley
Cnty, 132 Idaho 551, 554, 976 P.2d 477, 480 (1999), overruled on other grounds by City of Osburn
v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 908, 277 P.3d 353, 355 (2012)). “Where the language is unambiguous,
the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion
for a court to consider rules of statutory construction.” Id. (citation omitted). “Language of a
particular section need not be viewed in a vacuum. And all sections of applicable statutes must be
construed together so as to determine the legislature’s intent.” Id. (quoting Friends of Farm to
Market, v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 197, 46 P.3d 9, 14 (2002)). In this case, neither party has
argued—nor do we conclude—that the language of the WCO is ambiguous. Therefore, we need
not consider rules of statutory construction when interpreting the WCO.
The WCO, as set forth in chapter 3, title 7 of the Twin Falls City Code, establishes a
garbage collection scheme under the supervision of the Twin Falls City Council. Section 7-3-1
sets forth the WCO’s purpose of promoting the general health, welfare, and safety of the people in
the city:
This Chapter is declared to be an ordinance to promote the general health, welfare
and safety of the people in the City; and is enacted for the promotion and protection
of the public health and safety; and to prevent nuisances, the spread of disease and
fire hazards. It is the purpose of this Chapter to aid the people in keeping the City
clean, safe, sanitary and free from petty annoyances and nuisances.
Section 7-3-8 grants the City Council authority “to provide for the collection of garbage and
rubbish as a city function or by contract with one or more independent collectors,” and also states
that: “[n]o person or firm shall engage in the collection of garbage or rubbish for monetary gain
unless authorized and licensed by the council . . . .” Section 7-3-10 instructs independent collectors
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on equipment requirements, collection windows, and the drop off location for the garbage that is
collected within the city. Relevant to this appeal, section 7-3-10 states: (1) “[t]he garbage portion
of each conveyance . . . shall be . . . provided with tightfitting covers to remain closed at all times
except during the actual depositing of garbage into or out of the conveyance[;]” and (2) “[a]ll
garbage collected within the [C]ity . . . shall be deposited at the transfer station at 2186 Orchard
Drive East, Twin Falls, Idaho.”
The WCO also sets requirements and restrictions for storing garbage and placing it out for
collection. Sections 7-3-3 and 7-3-4 require that all garbage and rubbish be placed in containers,
and, under section 7-3-6, these containers must be placed in front of premises for collection (or in
alley ways in certain circumstances). Absent special permission from the City Council, “[n]o user
of a premise within the City shall be exempt from the collection and disposal service provided by
the City or by individual collectors and licensees[.]” Twin Falls City Code § 7-3-12.
The district court determined that the WCO “does not require any resident to participate in
the City’s garbage collection program” and that residents were “free to discard of their trash in any
other lawful manner[,]” such as contracting with other licensed garbage collectors, “hiring
document shredding companies, burning their garbage (where lawful or otherwise obtaining a
permit), or personally transporting their garbage to the county transfer station.” The district court
further concluded the ordinance “clearly does not apply to law enforcement officers” because its
purpose is “to promote the health and safety of City residents and to prevent the spread of
disease[,]” rather than to “restrict law enforcement officers from performing their lawful duty.”
Moreover, the district court concluded section 7-3-8’s prohibition against unauthorized collection
of garbage for “monetary gain” had no application to law enforcement performing trash pulls
because they were not the garbage collection entities section 7-3-8 addressed, and they were not
collecting Pulizzi’s garbage for any type of monetary gain.
Pulizzi argues the district erred by misinterpreting the WCO because participation in the
“City’s collection trash collection program was mandatory” under section 7-3-12, and “placing his
trash out for collection in a public place likewise was mandatory” under sections 7-3-3, 7-3-4, and
7-3-6. We disagree. The WCO does not require residents to dispose of their personal effects,
including evidence of illegal drug use, into the garbage receptacles that are accessible to the public
and law enforcement. As the district court noted, residents have other lawful means to discard their
trash, such as burning their garbage after obtaining a permit or personally transporting their
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garbage to the county transfer station. Furthermore, while section 7-3-12 states that residents are
not exempt from participating in “the collection and disposal service provided by the City or by
individual collectors and licensees,” nothing in the WCO prohibits residents from creating an
alternative garbage collection and disposal arrangement with a contractor that protects their private
information.
Pulizzi argues the district court erred when it determined that the WCO did not prohibit
law enforcement from conducting the trash pulls. Specifically, Pulizzi argues that section 7-3-8
prohibited law enforcement officers from searching his trash because they “were being paid to
periodically collect Mr. Pulizzi’s garbage,” and thus “the detective’s collection of [his] trash was
for ‘monetary gain’ under the plain language of City Code [section] 7-3-8.” This argument is also
unavailing.
First, it is clear that law enforcement officers are not those “person[s] or firm[s]” that are
prohibited from collecting garbage for monetary gain as contemplated under section 7-3-8. Instead,
this provision is directed at independent contractors who were not “authorized and licensed” by
the Twin Falls City Counsel to collect garbage within city limits. This reading is supported by: (1)
the prior sentence in section 7-3-8, which establishes the City Council’s authority to provide for
the collection of garbage “as a city function or by contract with one or more independent
collectors[;]” (2) the language conditioning this prohibition, (i.e. “for monetary gain” and “unless
authorized and licensed by the council . . .”), and (3) the provision stating, “said council may
establish the geographic limits for such collection.” These provisions—along with the ordinance’s
stated purpose of “promot[ing] the general health, welfare and safety”—clearly establish that the
intent of section 7-3-8 was to create a unified garbage collection scheme under City Council’s
supervision, rather than prohibiting suspicious detectives (or nosey neighbors) from rummaging
through curbside garbage.
Second, we reject Pulizzi’s argument that this prohibition applied to law enforcement
because they were being paid a salary while conducting the trash pulls. As the State notes, the
detective testified that he “would have been paid regardless of whether [he] pulled Mr. Pulizzi’s
trash or not[;]”and the district court found that “[n]one of the law enforcement officers involved
in any of the trash pulls received any monetary gain from picking up and sifting through
Defendant’s trash.”
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Next, Pulizzi cites the Iowa Supreme Court’s plurality decision State v. Wright, 961
N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 2021), for the proposition that he “did not abandon his privacy interest in his
trash, because the City Code restricted the manner in which Twin Falls residents were permitted
to dispose of waste.” In that case, the Iowa Supreme Court held that a police officer violated a
provision of the Iowa Constitution when he removed trash from a garbage can that had been put
out for collection. Id. at 420. In the portions of the opinion that had the support of a majority, the
court determined (1) the defendant had not abandoned his curbside garbage because an ordinance
prohibited “any person” other than an authorized waste collector from taking or collecting solid
waste that had been placed out for collection, id. at 415–16 (citation omitted); (2) the officer
committed a trespass when conducting the garbage pull because he violated this ordinance; id. at
416–17; and (3) that the officer also violated the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy
based on the ordinance, id. at 418–19.
Pulizzi’s reliance on Wright is misplaced for several reasons. First, unlike the ordinance in
Wright, the WCO does not prohibit “any person” from taking garbage that is placed out for
collection. Instead, section 7-3-8 only prohibits “person[s] or firm[s]” from collecting garbage “for
monetary gain unless authorized and licensed by the council . . . .” As discussed above, this
prohibition applies to independent garbage collectors. However, it does not apply to law
enforcement. Furthermore, even if we interpreted this provision to broadly prohibit any person
from taking garbage that is placed out for collection, this would not prevent nosy neighbors,
curious kids, scavengers, or unpaid snoops from accessing this garbage, provided that they do not
do so for “monetary gain.”
Second, as the South Dakota Supreme Court explained, an objective expectation of privacy
is not created simply because an ordinance aimed at maintaining society’s interest in sanitation
dictates how trash is to be collected:
While city ordinances may, in some cases, be reflective of societal expectations of
privacy, they do not manifest such an expectation simply because they dictate how
persons are to place their trash for collection or how the trash is to be collected.
Nothing in these ordinances suggests that Rapid City enacted them to protect a
citizen’s interest in garbage privacy. These ordinances were obviously enacted
solely to maintain society’s interest in sanitation.
State v. Stevens, 734 N.W.2d 344, 347–48 (S.D. 2007) (footnote omitted). Nothing in the WCO
indicates that it was intended to promote society’s privacy interest in the content of their curbside
garbage. As the district court and the State emphasized, the WCO’s express purpose is to “promote
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the general health, welfare and safety” of its residents by “aid[ing] the people in keeping the City
clean, safe, sanitary and free from petty annoyances and nuisances.”
Lastly, the Wright court specifically rejected the Supreme Court’s conclusion in
Greenwood that “an expectation of privacy in garbage bags left outside the curtilage of a home
was not objectively reasonable” based on the “common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left
on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops,
and other members of the public.” Wright, 961 N.W.2d at 418 (quoting Greenwood, 486 U.S. 39–
40). Rather, the Wright court concluded that under the Iowa state constitution, “[w]hen a citizen
places garbage out for collection in a closed garbage bag, the contents of the bag are private, as a
factual matter.” Id. at 418. In contrast, this Court has explicitly concluded that the rule enunciated
in Greenwood is the proper interpretation of the protections provided by Article I, section 17 of
the Idaho Constitution. State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 474, 20 P.3d 5, 10 (2001).
In sum, the plain language of the WCO does not support Pulizzi’s argument that his
expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable because the WCO was not intended to promote
society’s privacy interest in curbside garbage, and it does not interfere with the public’s access—
or law enforcement’s access—to curbside garbage in any noteworthy way. Accordingly, Pulizzi
“has no reasonable expectation of privacy in items deposited in a public area, conveyed to a third-
party for collection, and ‘readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other
members of the public.’ ” Id. (quoting Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40). Because this conclusion is
dispositive of Pulizzi’s challenge to the district court’s order, we do not address the State’s
alternative argument challenging Pulizzi’s standing to dispute the search of his garbage.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm Pulizzi’s judgment of conviction.
Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices MOELLER, ZAHN and MEYER CONCUR.
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