State v. Desirae Amanda Tracy ( 2014 )


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  •                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
    Docket No. 40739
    STATE OF IDAHO,                                 )     2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 538
    )
    Plaintiff-Respondent,                    )     Filed: May 30, 2014
    )
    v.                                              )     Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
    )
    DESIRAE AMANDA TRACY,                           )     THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
    )     OPINION AND SHALL NOT
    Defendant-Appellant.                     )     BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
    )
    Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
    County. Hon. Patrick H. Owen, District Judge.
    Withheld judgment for possession of a controlled substance, affirmed.
    Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP; Deborah Whipple, Boise, for appellant.
    Deborah Whipple argued.
    Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy
    Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. John C. McKinney argued.
    ________________________________________________
    GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge
    Desirae Amanda Tracy appeals from the withheld judgment entered upon her conditional
    guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance (marijuana). Tracy argues that the district
    court erred by denying her motion to suppress. Specifically, Tracy contends that the district
    court erred by finding that an exigent circumstance justified the warrantless entry into Tracy’s
    apartment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    I.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURE
    A 911 dispatcher received a morning telephone call that reported a possible domestic
    disturbance at an apartment in Boise. The caller reported hearing loud noises and crying and
    thought that a female was being thrown inside the apartment occupied by Tracy, her husband,
    and children. Tracy’s husband had left the apartment, according to the 911 caller. In addition,
    the 911 caller mentioned prior domestic disturbances between the Tracys. Two Boise Police
    1
    Department officers were dispatched to the apartment and, en route, one of the officers spoke to
    the 911 caller, a neighbor of Tracy. When the officers arrived at the apartment, one of the
    officers knocked on the front door. Tracy answered, and the officers saw one child (the older
    child) in the apartment from their vantage point outside the front door. After explaining the
    reason they were there, the officers were informed by Tracy that her husband was gone and that
    she had a second child (the younger child) upstairs. The officers asked to come in the apartment,
    but Tracy refused and volunteered to bring the younger child to the officers. One officer, who
    testified as to her experience with both child abuse cases and domestic disturbance cases,
    recalled that she was concerned at that point and “thought it was highly likely that the male
    subject . . . was most likely upstairs.” Tracy proceeded upstairs and returned with the younger
    child.
    When Tracy returned with the younger child, the officers saw that the child had red
    marks and indentations over his face, arms, and stomach. After one of the officers asked Tracy
    what was wrong with the younger child, Tracy responded that the child had been sleeping.
    According to one officer, she was not satisfied with Tracy’s response about the younger child
    and so she told Tracy that she wanted to come in the apartment “to make sure that there was
    nobody hurt inside the residence, and basically be able to verify that no one else was injured
    inside.” The officers then entered the apartment; one officer stayed with Tracy downstairs while
    the other officer proceeded upstairs. While looking in one of the rooms upstairs, the officer saw
    a marijuana-grow operation in plain view, but did not find any other persons. Tracy was charged
    by an amended information with manufacturing a controlled substance (marijuana); felony
    possession of a controlled substance (marijuana); and possession of drug paraphernalia. Tracy’s
    husband was charged with the same crimes and the cases were consolidated. The husband filed a
    motion to suppress the evidence, and Tracy joined in that motion. After a hearing, the district
    court denied Tracy’s motion to suppress, finding an exigent circumstance existed to justify the
    warrantless entry into the apartment. Tracy then entered a conditional plea of guilty to felony
    possession of a controlled substance, reserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to
    suppress. 1 Tracy appeals.
    1
    The manufacturing a controlled substance charge and the possession of drug
    paraphernalia charge were dismissed as part of the conditional plea agreement.
    2
    II.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a
    motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
    substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
    as found. State v. Atkinson, 
    128 Idaho 559
    , 561, 
    916 P.2d 1284
    , 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
    suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
    weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
    
    127 Idaho 102
    , 106, 
    897 P.2d 993
    , 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 
    132 Idaho 786
    , 789, 
    979 P.2d 659
    , 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
    III.
    ANALYSIS
    Tracy argues that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress. Specifically,
    Tracy contends that the district court erred by finding that an exigent circumstance justified the
    warrantless entry into Tracy’s apartment.
    The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the
    Idaho Constitution each forbid unreasonable searches and seizures. 2 State v. Hansen, 
    151 Idaho 342
    , 346, 
    256 P.3d 750
    , 754 (2011). “But when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is
    first among equals. At the Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands ‘the right of a man to retreat into his
    own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’” Florida v. Jardines,
    569 U.S. ___, ___, 
    133 S. Ct. 1409
    , 1414 (2013) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 
    365 U.S. 505
    , 511 (1961)); accord State v. Reynolds, 
    146 Idaho 466
    , 469, 
    197 P.3d 327
    , 330 (Ct. App.
    2008).     Accordingly, an officer’s warrantless entry into a residence is presumptively
    unreasonable. 
    Reynolds, 146 Idaho at 469-470
    , 197 P.3d at 330-31. The presumption may be
    overcome under a limited, well-recognized exception, such as the exigent circumstances
    exception. Payton v. New York, 
    445 U.S. 573
    , 589-90 (1980). Once inside a residence, “law
    enforcement officers may seize evidence in plain view, provided that they have not violated the
    2
    Although Tracy contends that both constitutions were violated, she provides no cogent
    reason why article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution should be applied differently than the
    Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution in this case. Therefore, the Court will rely
    on judicial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in its analysis of Tracy’s claims. See State v.
    Schaffer, 
    133 Idaho 126
    , 130, 
    982 P.2d 961
    , 965 (Ct. App. 1999).
    3
    Fourth Amendment in arriving at the spot from which the observation of the evidence is made.”
    Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. ____, ____, 
    131 S. Ct. 1849
    , 1858 (2011) (citing Horton v.
    California, 
    496 U.S. 128
    , 136-40 (1990)).
    The exigent circumstances exception “applies when ‘the exigencies of the situation’
    make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively
    reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’” King, 563 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (alteration
    in original) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 
    437 U.S. 385
    , 394 (1978)). Thus, warrantless searches
    may be performed by state agents “when there is compelling need for official action and no time
    to secure a warrant.” State v. Araiza, 
    147 Idaho 371
    , 374, 
    209 P.3d 668
    , 671 (Ct. App. 2009).
    The United States Supreme Court has recognized a number of exigent circumstances. Missouri
    v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, ___, 
    133 S. Ct. 1552
    , 1558 (2013).                 Among these is “law
    enforcement’s need to provide emergency assistance to an occupant of a home.” 
    Id. (citing Michigan
    v. Fisher, 
    558 U.S. 45
    , 47-48 (2009) (per curiam)); 
    Araiza, 147 Idaho at 375
    , 209 P.3d
    at 672. We examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether an exigency existed
    such that a law enforcement officer was justified in acting without a warrant. McNeely, 569 U.S.
    at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1559; see also State v. Pearson-Anderson, 
    136 Idaho 847
    , 850, 
    41 P.3d 275
    ,
    278 (Ct. App. 2001) (“In addressing Pearson-Anderson’s argument, we must determine whether
    the officer’s entry was reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances.”).
    Tracy argues that there was not an exigent circumstance that permitted the officers to
    enter the apartment without a warrant. Tracy notes that when police arrived at the apartment,
    there was no yelling, no sounds, nor evidence of a fight. Additionally, Tracy contends that she
    came to the door and was uninjured. As for the children, Tracy maintains that there was no
    suspicion that the older child had any injuries. As for the younger child who had red marks,
    Tracy asserts she gave a reasonable and true explanation for the red marks. The State argues that
    the police were allowed to enter the apartment to ascertain the well-being of any persons inside.
    The district court found that an exigent circumstance existed, based on the totality of the
    circumstances. It determined that reasons existed for concern, even though Tracy attempted to
    assure the officers that there was no need for police concern. The district court also found that
    the officers had observed what appeared to be recent injuries to the younger child.
    Applicable to this case is the exigent circumstance that permits a law enforcement officer
    to enter a residence “to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an
    4
    occupant from imminent injury.” 
    Araiza, 147 Idaho at 375
    , 209 P.3d at 672 (citing Brigham City
    v. Stuart, 
    547 U.S. 398
    , 403 (2006)). We must look at the facts objectively to determine if the
    police officers had a reasonable belief that someone was in imminent danger or injured in the
    apartment, based on the facts known to the officers and reasonable inferences from the facts. 
    Id. at 374-75,
    209 P.3d at 671-72. In this case, when the officers decided to enter the apartment they
    knew they had responded to a domestic disturbance call made by a neighbor and the officers
    knew of prior incidents involving Tracy at the apartment. The officers did not hear any sounds
    of a disturbance upon approaching the apartment and they only saw Tracy and the older child
    after knocking on the door and during the initial discussion with Tracy. Additionally, the
    whereabouts of Tracy’s husband were unknown. Even though the 911 caller had reported that
    the husband had left the residence and Tracy told officers that the husband had left, there was a
    back door to the apartment that one of the officers saw from their vantage point looking through
    the apartment.
    Although the officers did not see any injuries to Tracy or the older child, after Tracy
    brought the younger child down to the officers, they saw red marks over the younger child’s
    face, arms, and stomach, along with indentations. This prompted the officers to ask Tracy what
    was wrong with the child, and her response was that the child had been sleeping and that the
    marks would disappear. 3 The officer who testified at the suppression hearing testified as to her
    experience with both child abuse cases and domestic disturbance cases, and also noted that in her
    experience, children could be injured during domestic violence. She further testified that upon
    seeing the younger child, she became concerned that the child was injured and that the child was
    involved in the altercation between Tracy and her husband. 4
    We have addressed the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement in
    domestic disturbance cases. In Reynolds, three officers were dispatched at night to investigate a
    telephoned report that Mrs. Reynolds was being held against her will by Mr. Reynolds. The
    officers arrived simultaneously and saw Mr. Reynolds standing just outside of the front door,
    which was ajar. Two of the officers approached Mr. Reynolds and began to question him about
    3
    Both officers testified that the appearance of the child concerned them. One officer said
    she did not feel that the child would look as it did just from waking up from a nap.
    4
    If the child was injured and the mother was not seeking or admitting to the need for help,
    a reasonable inference may be that she was afraid of or protecting someone.
    5
    the reported altercation.   In the meantime, a third officer entered the home through the
    partially-opened front door. He did not hear any noises coming from the house, nor did he first
    knock, announce his presence, or call for Mrs. Reynolds. The State argued that the third
    officer’s entry into the home was permissible due to an exigent circumstance. We concluded
    otherwise. 
    Reynolds, 146 Idaho at 471
    , 197 P.3d at 332. With Mr. Reynolds outside, we noted
    that “it was apparent that if there was a woman in the house, she was under no immediate risk of
    harm from [Mr.] Reynolds while he was outside being questioned by an officer.” 
    Id. However, if
    the third officer “had first knocked or called out to occupants and received no response, the
    telephoned report of a woman being held against her will could have justified a warrantless entry
    to ensure that there was no one in the house who was physically restrained or too frightened to
    respond to the officers.” 
    Id. The only
    evidence the officer had in Reynolds when the officer
    entered the house was an unsubstantiated phone call. In contrast, the officers in this case, before
    entering the apartment, saw the younger child with red marks over its face, stomach, and arms.
    It was not unreasonable for the officers to have inferred that child was injured, based on the
    marks and the fact that the officers were responding to a report of a domestic disturbance.
    In State v. Wiedenheft, 
    136 Idaho 14
    , 
    27 P.3d 873
    (Ct. App. 2001), we upheld the
    officers’ entry into Wiedenheft’s residence based on the totality of the circumstances. Police
    officers were dispatched to Wiedenheft’s residence in the early morning hours following a 911
    call reporting a possible domestic violence altercation. When officers arrived, the house was
    dark and there were no noises coming from the home. The officers knocked on the door. An
    interior light came on and then went off again. Wiedenheft looked out the window and then
    closed the shade. The officers knocked again and Wiedenheft answered the door. One officer
    identified himself and explained to Wiedenheft that they were there to investigate the report of a
    battery. At this time, the officers noticed that Wiedenheft had a red swollen area in the middle of
    her forehead and appeared to have been recently injured. Wiedenheft also appeared to be
    shaking slightly, had an unsteady voice, and was visibly upset. After the officers requested to
    gain entry to the home, Wiedenheft refused, and an officer placed his foot in the door. We
    concluded that an exigency existed and justified the officers’ warrantless entry into Wiedenheft’s
    residence, based on the totality of the circumstances. 
    Id. at 17,
    27 P.3d at 876. Although
    upholding the warrantless entry, we cautioned “that a prompt and limited search of the scene
    6
    should be strictly circumscribed by the exigency, to assist an injured party or deal with the
    perpetrator, and cannot be used to support a general exploratory search.” 
    Id. In this
    case, although Tracy stood in the door and visually appeared uninjured, the
    officers reasonably could have inferred that the younger child had been recently injured, viewing
    the red marks over the younger child’s face, arms, and stomach. The officer’s testimony at the
    suppression hearing, based on her experience with child abuse cases and domestic violence
    cases, noted her concern that the child had been involved in the domestic disturbance because of
    the perceived injury to the child.    Additionally, the whereabouts of Tracy’s husband were
    unknown, even though Tracy and the 911 caller said he had left the apartment. Because the 911
    caller had reported loud noises, including what she thought was a female being thrown inside, it
    was not unreasonable for the officers to have been concerned about the well-being of the
    younger child when Tracy stood at the door visibly uninjured. In Wiedenheft, the circumstances
    of the apparent injury and the domestic disturbance call gave rise to an exigent circumstance that
    permitted law enforcement to enter the home. Here, the domestic disturbance call and apparent
    injury to the child give rise to an exigent circumstance permitting the officers to enter the
    apartment. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we are persuaded that an exigent
    circumstance existed that permitted the officers to make a warrantless entry into the apartment.
    The district court did not err by denying Tracy’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, the withheld
    judgment entered upon Tracy’s conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance
    (marijuana) is affirmed.
    Judge GRATTON CONCURS.
    Judge LANSING CONCURS IN THE RESULT.
    7