State v. Bennett Robert Scales ( 2014 )


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  •                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
    Docket No. 41289
    STATE OF IDAHO,                                   )     2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 730
    )
    Plaintiff-Respondent,                      )     Filed: September 18, 2014
    )
    v.                                                )     Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
    )
    BENNETT ROBERT SCALES,                            )     THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
    )     OPINION AND SHALL NOT
    Defendant-Appellant.                       )     BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
    )
    Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
    County. Hon. Deborah A. Bail, District Judge.
    Judgment of conviction for felony domestic violence, affirmed.
    Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Brian R. Dickson, Deputy
    Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
    Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Daphne J. Huang, Deputy
    Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
    ________________________________________________
    GRATTON, Judge
    Bennett Robert Scales appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon a jury
    finding him guilty of felony domestic violence, Idaho Code §§ 18-903 and 18-918(2).
    Specifically, he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for a continuance. We affirm.
    I.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Scales and his girlfriend were engaged in a heated argument during which Scales hit his
    girlfriend in the nose with an open palm, breaking her nose in multiple places. The State charged
    Scales with felony domestic violence.       Scales pled not guilty to the charge and the case
    proceeded to trial before a jury.
    At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, defense counsel indicated that Scales intended to
    take the stand and testify in his own defense. However, Scales requested that he delay his
    testimony until the following day. Construing this request as a motion to continue, the district
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    court offered Scales a recess to confer with counsel. Upon returning from that recess, Scales
    asserted that he felt like he was being rushed into testifying and that a continuance would allow
    him to be more relaxed. Recognizing that testifying is stressful, but noting that it was the time
    set for trial and the jury was present, the district court denied Scales’ motion. After the court
    denied his request to postpone his testimony, Scales chose not to testify.
    The jury found Scales guilty of felony domestic violence. The trial court imposed a
    unified ten-year sentence with a two-year determinate term. Scales timely appeals.
    II.
    ANALYSIS
    The decision to grant a motion for a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the
    trial court. State v. Ransom, 
    124 Idaho 703
    , 706, 
    864 P.2d 149
    , 152 (1993). When a trial court’s
    discretionary decision in a criminal case is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a
    multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as
    one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
    consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether
    the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 
    115 Idaho 598
    ,
    600, 
    768 P.2d 1331
    , 1333 (1989). Generally, it has been held that unless an appellant shows that
    his or her substantial rights have been prejudiced by reason of a denial of his or her motion for
    continuance, appellate courts can only conclude that there was no abuse of discretion. State v.
    Cagle, 
    126 Idaho 794
    , 797, 
    891 P.2d 1054
    , 1057 (Ct. App. 1995).
    “Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials.” 
    Id. The burden
    of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the place and time for trial “counsels
    against continuances except for compelling reasons.” 
    Id. In deciding
    whether the denial of a
    continuance was so arbitrary as to violate due process, the reviewing court looks to the
    circumstances of each case, “particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the
    request [was] denied.” State v. Carman, 
    116 Idaho 190
    , 198, 
    774 P.2d 900
    , 908 (1989) (quoting
    Ungar v. Sarafite, 
    376 U.S. 575
    , 589 (1964)). On appeal, Scales argues that the denial of his
    requested recess deprived him of his right to effective assistance of counsel and of his right to
    2
    due process. 1 Scales also argues that his request was reasonable given that the parties and the
    court understood that the trial could extend into a second day.
    The State argues Scales had five months from the time he was charged until his trial
    commenced to confer with counsel and decide whether or not to testify at trial and thus his mid-
    trial request was not justified. Although it is not presented in the record how much time Scales
    actually spent with his counsel, he did not argue unfair surprise at trial when he requested
    additional time. Rather, by his own statement to the court, Scales had initially decided and was
    prepared to testify, but ultimately chose not to.
    Scales has failed to demonstrate that his substantial rights were prejudiced by the denial
    of his motion for a continuance. At trial, when he made his request for a continuance, he sought
    to delay testifying until the following day. In response to this request, the trial judge suggested a
    five-minute recess to allow Scales to consult with is attorney. Following the short recess, Scales
    maintained his position, asserting he was “being pushed a little too quickly” to testify and “[he]
    would be a little bit more relaxed” if he were permitted to testify at a later time. The court
    denied the motion, acknowledging that Scales was feeling emotional, but also noting that “trials
    are stressful” and “it’s not unusual for people to feel . . . a little stressed out at this situation.”
    The court further reasoned, “The jury is here. The jury is present. This is the day set for trial, so
    we need to proceed.” The court also attempted to ease Scales’ emotions by suggesting he drink
    some water and repeatedly encouraged him to take all the time he needed when testifying,
    ultimately finding there would be no benefit in delaying his testimony until the following day.
    However, Scales chose not to testify.
    Every criminal defendant has to make the final decision at trial as to whether or not to
    testify in his or her defense. This case is no different. In our view, the record shows that in
    response to the reasons Scales presented to the trial judge for his request, the judge exhibited
    empathy for the stress Scales was feeling from the trial and patience for him to present his
    testimony to the jury. In the end, Scales did not suggest to the court that he had a need to consult
    with counsel regarding trial testimony. After the break, he simply said he wished to be more
    1
    Not only were these arguments not presented to the trial judge at the time Scales made his
    request, but they are contrary to his argument presented at trial that he would be more relaxed if
    he were allowed to postpone testifying. Therefore, we need not entertain these arguments. See
    State v. Carman, 
    116 Idaho 190
    , 198, 
    774 P.2d 900
    , 908 (1989).
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    relaxed. On this record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
    Scales’ motion for a continuance. It was within the trial court’s discretion to determine that the
    inherent stress that accompanies trials was not a compelling reason to continue, and therefore to
    proceed with trial on the day scheduled and not postpone into a second day of trial. The trial
    court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
    III.
    CONCLUSION
    The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Scales’ motion for a continuance.
    Accordingly, Scales’ conviction is affirmed.
    Judge LANSING and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.
    4