State v. Axyn Taggart Prow ( 2014 )


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  •                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
    Docket No. 41267
    STATE OF IDAHO,                                 )     2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 524
    )
    Plaintiff-Respondent,                    )     Filed: May 23, 2014
    )
    v.                                              )     Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
    )
    AXYN TAGGART PROW,                              )     THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
    )     OPINION AND SHALL NOT
    Defendant-Appellant.                     )     BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
    )
    Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
    Elmore County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge.
    Order revoking probation and requiring execution of unified five-year sentence
    with two-year determinate term for delivery of a controlled substance, affirmed.
    Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Ben P. McGreevy, Deputy
    Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
    Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy
    Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
    ________________________________________________
    Before GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge; GRATTON, Judge;
    and MELANSON, Judge
    PER CURIAM
    Axyn Taggart Prow pled guilty to delivery of a controlled substance. Idaho Code § 37-
    2732(a)(1)(B). The district court entered a withheld judgment, placed Prow on probation for a
    period of five years and ordered him to serve sixty days in jail as a condition of his probation.
    Subsequently, Prow was found to have violated several terms of the probation. The district court
    consequently revoked Prow’s withheld judgment and probation and imposed a unified sentence
    of five years with two years determinate, and retained jurisdiction. Following the period of
    retained jurisdiction, the district court reinstated Prow’s probation for a period of five years.
    Several months later, Prow admitted to violating several terms of his probation and the district
    court revoked his probation and ordered execution of the original sentence.         Prow orally
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    presented an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion which the district court denied. Prow appeals,
    asserting that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and executing his
    original sentence without reduction.
    It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and
    conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 
    122 Idaho 324
    , 325, 
    834 P.2d 326
    , 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 
    115 Idaho 1053
    , 1054, 
    772 P.2d 260
    , 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 
    114 Idaho 554
    , 558, 
    758 P.2d 713
    , 717 (Ct. App.
    1988). In determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation
    is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v.
    Upton, 
    127 Idaho 274
    , 275, 
    899 P.2d 984
    , 985 (Ct. App. 1995); 
    Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325
    , 834
    P.2d at 327; 
    Hass, 114 Idaho at 558
    , 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation
    has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the
    court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. 
    Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325
    , 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 
    116 Idaho 976
    , 977, 
    783 P.2d 315
    , 316 (Ct. App. 1989).
    The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. State v. Urrabazo, 
    150 Idaho 158
    ,
    162, 
    244 P.3d 1244
    , 1248 (2010). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal
    only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. 
    Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325
    , 834
    P.2d at 327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the
    conduct underlying the trial court’s decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 
    153 Idaho 618
    , 621, 
    288 P.3d 835
    , 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
    record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly
    made part of the record on appeal. 
    Id. Sentencing is
    also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review
    and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well
    established and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 
    121 Idaho 114
    , 117-18, 
    822 P.2d 1011
    , 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 
    106 Idaho 447
    , 449-51, 
    680 P.2d 869
    , 871-
    73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 
    103 Idaho 565
    , 568, 
    650 P.2d 707
    , 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
    When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v.
    Oliver, 
    144 Idaho 722
    , 726, 
    170 P.3d 387
    , 391 (2007).
    When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of
    probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original
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    judgment. State v. Hanington, 
    148 Idaho 26
    , 29, 
    218 P.3d 5
    , 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our
    review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring
    between the original sentencing and the revocation of the probation. 
    Id. Thus, this
    Court will
    consider the elements of the record before the trial court that are properly made part of the record
    on appeal and are relevant to the defendant’s contention that the trial court should have reduced
    the sentence sua sponte upon revocation of probation. 
    Morgan, 153 Idaho at 621
    , 288 P.3d at
    838.
    Applying the foregoing standards, and assuming Prow can challenge the district court’s
    failure to sua sponte reduce his sentence, we cannot say that the district court abused its
    discretion either in revoking probation or in ordering execution of Prow’s original sentence
    without modification. Therefore, the order revoking probation and directing execution of Prow’s
    previously suspended sentence is affirmed.
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