IDHW v. John Doe (2024-14) ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 51694
In the Matter of Jane Doe I, A Child )
Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. )
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF ) Filed: June 28, 2024
HEALTH & WELFARE, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
Petitioner-Respondent, )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
v. ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
JOHN DOE (2024-14), )
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Andrew Ellis, Magistrate.
Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.
Anthony R. Geddes, Chief Ada County Public Defender; Joshua M. Wickard,
Deputy Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Peter A. Mommer, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
TRIBE, Judge
John Doe (2024-14) appeals from the judgment terminating his parental rights. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The minor child in this case was placed in foster care after the child and mother each tested
positive for methamphetamine and barbiturates at the time of the child’s birth on June 22, 2023.
The mother admitted to actively using methamphetamine during the pregnancy.
A petition for hearing under the Child Protective Act was filed on June 23, 2023. A
shelter care hearing was held, and the magistrate court awarded temporary legal custody of the
child to the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (Department). An expedited permanency
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hearing was held, and the magistrate court approved the permanency goal of termination of
parental rights and subsequent adoption. The Department filed a petition for termination of the
parent-child relationship against the mother and identified Doe as the father of the child. A trial
was held on the petition regarding the child’s mother’s parental rights, which concluded in a decree
terminating her parental rights. The Department filed an amended petition adding Doe to the Child
Protective Act case. A trial was held on the amended petition regarding Doe’s parental rights.
Doe appeared via video conference for a portion of the case and provided testimony. The case
manager and guardian ad litem for the child each testified that termination of Doe’s parental rights
is in the best interests of the child.
Doe has been incarcerated since March 2023 on four federal counts of distribution of
methamphetamine. Doe was sentenced to fifty-seven months in federal prison and is scheduled to
be released in late 2027. Doe has never met the child.
The magistrate court issued a written order and found that the state presented clear and
convincing evidence that conditions exist to terminate Doe’s parental rights on the grounds that he
is incarcerated and is likely to remain incarcerated for the early formative years of the child’s life.
Idaho Code § 16-2005(1)(e).1 Further, the magistrate court found that it would be in the child’s
best interests for Doe’s parental rights to be terminated. Doe appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her
child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341,
343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the
Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family
life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due
process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383,
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Idaho Code § 16-2005(1)(e) permits termination of parental rights when it is in the best
interests of the child and the “parent has been incarcerated and is likely to remain incarcerated for
a substantial period of time during the child’s minority.” Doe does not challenge the statutory
basis and, therefore, this finding is not at issue on appeal.
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386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a
parent-child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental
liberty interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may
terminate a parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing
evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep’t of
Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386,
146 P.3d at 652.
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater
quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143
Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood
to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe
v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the trial court’s decision must
be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
III.
ANALYSIS
Doe argues that the magistrate court abused its discretion as it pertains to the second prong
of the standard but fails to cite supporting authority.2 Also, Doe states that the trial court must find
by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the child and follows
that statement with a citation to I.C. § 16-2005(1)(3). It is unclear which section Doe is citing or
2
Doe cites In re Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 108, 320 P.3d 1262, 1267 (2014) following his
statement that termination cases are reviewed for abuse of discretion. However, this case does not
support that proposition but, rather, states that a termination of parental rights will not be disturbed
on appeal so long as there is substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the
findings.
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if he is citing both sections 1 and 3; however, subsection 3 restricts Idaho courts from terminating
the parent-child relationship based on the child’s immunization status, which is not argued here.3
This Court generally does not address issues not supported by cogent argument and citation
to legal authority, even in a case terminating parental rights. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v.
Doe (2018-24), 164 Idaho 143, 147, 426 P.3d 1243, 1247 (2018). The Court, however, may
address certain narrow issues involving due process violations despite the absence of supporting,
cogent argument or citation to legal authority. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2017-32),
163 Idaho 536, 538, 415 P.3d 945, 947 (2018); State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 534, 535-36, 164 P.3d 814,
815-16 (2007). For example, the Idaho Supreme Court has previously addressed due process
errors affecting parents’ fundamental rights, including procedural errors and the application of an
incorrect standard of review. Doe (2017-32), 163 Idaho at 538, 415 P.3d at 947 (addressing
procedural error); Doe, 144 Idaho at 536, 164 P.3d at 816 (addressing application of incorrect
standard).
Doe’s issue on appeal does not fit within that narrow scope of due process violations that
this Court may address despite the absence of supporting, cogent argument or citation to legal
authority; therefore, this Court need not review this appeal for its merits. However, even if we
review the case on its merits, we hold that Doe’s argument still fails.
On appeal, Doe does not challenge the magistrate court’s finding of a statutory basis for
termination. Instead, Doe only challenges the magistrate court’s basis for finding that termination
of his parental rights is in the best interests of the child. In particular, Doe argues that the
magistrate court erred by failing to consider his assertion that he has the potential to be released
from prison early due to good behavior and participation in a drug treatment program. The
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It is necessary to address Doe’s briefing. The content of Doe’s brief suggests that this
appeal stems from the termination of the father’s parental rights. However, the briefing is
inconsistent and addresses the termination of mother’s parental rights in the body and in a heading.
Doe’s first heading in the argument section reads, “The Magistrate erred in finding that termination
of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child.” (Emphasis added). Within
that section, Doe states, “Mother asserts that the trial court abused its discretion under the second
prong of this test when the Magistrate failed to follow the legal standards that applied to its exercise
of discretion.” (Emphasis added). However, the Appellant in this case is the father, John Doe,
and the remainder of the brief refers to his criminal history and testimony at trial, not the mother’s.
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Department argues that the magistrate court did not err because it explicitly considered Doe’s
testimony regarding early release. The magistrate court found that the remaining four years of
Doe’s sentence is a substantial period during the child’s minority. When determining whether
termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the parent’s history with
substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the unemployment of the parent, the
financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the child is placed in protective custody,
the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s efforts to improve his or her
situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Doe (2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho
192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111,
320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best interests of the child to terminate
parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v.
Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 957, 277 P.3d 400, 404 (Ct. App. 2012).
The magistrate court considered several factors when determining what is in the best
interests of the child. The magistrate court found that the child is “a vulnerable infant child that
requires full-time around the clock parenting,” and because of Doe’s “criminal choices and the
resulting consequences,” he has “made himself unavailable to be that parent.” The magistrate
court also considered that when Doe previously regained custody of his now adult son, Doe
resumed using and distributing methamphetamine. The magistrate court also noted that, when the
child in this case was with Doe’s family, the child sustained significant injuries and was placed in
a non-relative foster home where the child is “thriving” and is “a happy, bubbly little [child] who
is crawling, recognizing faces, laughing, babbling and ‘adores’ [the] foster family.” The
magistrate court considered Doe’s declarations that the child’s birth and Doe’s current
incarceration influenced his desire to be stable but found that Doe would “need to demonstrate for
a significant period upon his release that he can maintain in the community before it would be
appropriate for reunification.” Ultimately, the magistrate court decided this waiting period would
extend the child’s time in foster care and uncertainty in the child’s life. Finally, the magistrate
court found that the “actual parent-child connection as created by daily interaction and repeated
demonstration to a child that they can depend on their adult caregiver to meet the child’s emotional
and physical needs” could not be met by Doe.
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Doe argues that the magistrate court ignored relevant evidence by “failing to take into
account in the best interest analysis the significant reduction to [the] federal sentence that is
available to John Doe through participation in federal prison programs.” As support for his
argument, Doe cites Roe, 143 Idaho at 192, 141 P.3d at 1061, where the Idaho Supreme Court held
that a magistrate court erred by ignoring or not discussing relevant evidence. The magistrate court
did not make that error here. In Roe, the father’s parental rights were terminated by the magistrate
court under the statutory grounds of abandonment after the magistrate court found that father had
failed to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child. Id. Specifically, the magistrate
court found that the father did not take advantage of meaningful visitation opportunities and failed
to provide reasonable financial support to the child. Id. at 190-91, 141 P.3d at 1059-60. The Idaho
Supreme Court held that the magistrate court failed to consider that the mother moved with the
child from Phoenix, Arizona--where father lived--to Lewiston, Idaho. Id. at 192, 141 P.3d at 1061.
The father was granted supervised monthly visitation with the child in Idaho (with each visit lasting
between three and six hours) and travel was at the father’s expense. Id. at 190, 141 P.3d at 1059.
Also, the magistrate court did not consider the circumstances surrounding the father’s financial
hardship, including debt and missing work due to injury. Id. at 192, 141 P.3d at 1061. The Idaho
Supreme Court held that “courts cannot ignore relevant, admissible evidence of an issue the
Legislature has deemed relevant to the abandonment inquiry.” Id.This case is distinguishable because, unlike the magistrate court in Roe ignoring relevant
evidence, the magistrate court here discussed the length of Doe’s prison sentence multiple times
and specifically mentioned his testimony about the potential reduction of his sentence. The
magistrate court specifically addressed Doe’s testimony in the finding of facts section of its decree,
which in his opening brief Doe stated, “is adequate in describing the procedural history of the
case.” The magistrate court found:
[Doe] was arrested on four (4) federal counts of Distribution of
Methamphetamine in March 2023. (Exhibit 4.) He has been incarcerated in Idaho
county jails or Federal prisons since that time. On 9/26/23, [Doe] was sentenced to
57 months in the Federal Bureau of Prisons. (Exhibit 5.) [Doe] has served one (1)
year in Federal prison with another 45 months remaining on his sentence. [Doe] is
scheduled to be released in late 2027. [Doe] testified that he is qualified for a drug
treatment program in the federal system called “RDAP” that can result in a
reduction of his sentence. [Doe] also believes that he will be given a further
reduction of his sentence due to good behavior. By his own calculation, [Doe]
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believes he could be released by January 2025. [Doe] provided no proof from any
federal authorities for these calculations so any release date prior to late 2027 is
speculative.
Later in its decision the magistrate court again addressed the issue of Doe’s length of incarceration
when specifically addressing the statutory grounds for termination. The magistrate court stated:
The court finds it is likely that [Doe] will serve the bulk of his remaining sentence,
keeping him in federal custody for another three (3) to four (4) years. This means
[Doe] will miss the first five (5) years of [the child’s] life which is a substantial
period of [the child’s] minority. The court is well aware that the first three (3) years
of a child’s life are critically important in forming the foundation of a child’s
emotional and physical well-being.
Doe’s incarceration was central to the statutory basis for terminating his parental rights and the
best interests of the child who is thriving in a foster care home that provides a safe and stable
environment for the child’s development.
Doe cites In re Doe, 157 Idaho 14, 17, 333 P.3d 125, 128 (2014) to support his assertion
that, when a trial court is deciding the issue of termination, it is improper to consider whether
another person would better discharge the duties of parenthood. However, Doe’s citation omits
necessary context. The Idaho Supreme Court states, that “the parent who has primary physical
custody of the child marries someone who can be an excellent parent is not a ground for denying
the other parent his or her fundamental liberty interest.” Id. at 18, 333 P.3d at 129. Doe’s reliance
on this authority is misplaced because he does not cite anywhere in the record where the magistrate
court considered the married partner of another parent in conjunction with terminating his parental
rights. Although Doe alleges that the magistrate court erred in the same vein by terminating his
parental rights “simply because another could provide for and raise the child,” Doe does not allege
what other person the magistrate court considered to be a better parent when terminating his
parental rights.
The magistrate court’s findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence and
support its determination, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Doe’s parental
rights is in the best interests of the child. As such, Doe has failed to show that the magistrate court
erred in finding that terminating his parental rights is in the child’s best interests.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
Substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s determinations that
termination of Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Doe has, therefore, failed
to show error in the magistrate court’s decision to terminate his parental rights. Accordingly, the
judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge LORELLO, CONCUR.
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