State v. Dobson ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 50609
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: July 12, 2024
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
TAYLOR RENEE DOBSON, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Samuel Hoagland, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, affirmed.
Ferguson Durham, PLLC; Craig H. Durham, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
MELANSON, Judge Pro Tem
Taylor Renee Dobson appeals from her judgment of conviction for possession of a
controlled substance. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Boise police officers on patrol after midnight observed a parked vehicle with its lights on
in a hotel parking lot. A records check on the license plate revealed that the registration was
suspended. The vehicle left the hotel parking lot and the officers initiated a traffic stop. One of
the officers spoke with the driver who said he had applied for a “waiver” for his registration. For
the next two and one-half minutes the driver looked for his insurance information as well as
information about his registration on his cell phone. Dobson, who was the passenger in the vehicle,
told the officers that she had just gotten off work at a restaurant at the hotel. The driver said he
was taking her home. One of the officers asked if there were any weapons in the vehicle and the
driver said there was a knife in the backseat. In response to an officer’s questions the driver said
he was on parole for possession of a controlled substance and was in good standing. One officer
then nodded to the other to indicate that he should call for a drug dog. The driver then found his
insurance information on his cell phone and showed it to one of the officers but could not find any
information about his registration. The officers then asked both occupants for identification. The
driver gave his driver’s license and Dobson gave her state ID card to one of the officers. The
driver said his registration was suspended because of a failed emissions test. Four minutes and
twenty seconds into the traffic stop one of the officers returned to the patrol vehicle to write a
citation for the expired registration. Once in the patrol vehicle, the officer turned off the audio on
his body camera and placed it on the dashboard to function as a dash camera because, as he
testified, there have been cases where canine officers did not turn on their body cameras and the
investigation was harmed by that omission. The officer testified that he only deviated from
conducting record checks for both Dobson and the driver and writing a citation for the expired
registration to periodically glance up to make safety checks. He could not recall whether his
records request was placed in a queue.1 He did not recall how long it took to get a response on the
record checks from dispatch but testified that he had not finished writing the citation when the dog
arrived, about seventeen minutes after the traffic stop was initiated. The officer was in his patrol
vehicle for twelve minutes and thirty-five seconds until the dog alerted indicating the presence of
drugs in the vehicle. A search of the vehicle revealed controlled substances and paraphernalia.
Dobson was charged with possession of methamphetamine. She filed a motion to suppress arguing
that the officers unlawfully extended the traffic stop to allow the drug dog to arrive and that the
dog’s alert was not reliable. Her motion to suppress was denied. She then entered a conditional
Alford2 plea to the charge preserving her right to appeal. She now appeals from the district court’s
denial of her motion to suppress arguing that the officers unlawfully extended the traffic stop.
1
The officer testified that sometimes on Friday and Saturday nights and other busy times
record requests from officers are not answered immediately but placed in a queue. The stop
occurred early on a Sunday morning.
2
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
2
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
III.
ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.” The stop of a vehicle by law enforcement constitutes a seizure of
its occupants to which the Fourth Amendment applies. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653
(1979). The seizure of a vehicle’s occupants in order to investigate a traffic violation is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment so long as the seizing officer had reasonable suspicion that a
violation had occurred. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 353 (2015). However, such
a seizure can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time that is reasonable to complete
the original mission for the seizure. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). Therefore, the
seizure becomes unlawful when tasks associated with investigating the traffic infraction are, or
reasonably should have been, completed. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 349.
The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted the holding in Rodriguez to declare that when an
officer abandons the original purpose of the investigation, regardless of duration of time, the
officer no longer has reasonable suspicion supporting the seizure. State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605,
607-08, 389 P.3d 150, 152-53 (2016). When the officer abandons the original purpose of the stop,
the officer has initiated a new seizure for which independent reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment is required. Id. Like a Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) stop, the “tolerable duration
of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context” is measured in reference to the stop’s “mission.”
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Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407. Because waiting for a drug dog to arrive and conducting a drug-dog
sniff are not part of the purpose or “mission” of a traffic stop,3 the drug dog must arrive and the
sniff must be conducted, before the tasks tied to the stop are--or should have been--reasonably
completed. Of course, if the drug dog alerts signaling the presence of a controlled substance,
reasonable suspicion may then exist to extend the stop. State v. Howard, 169 Idaho 379, 383, 496
P.3d 865, 869 (2021). The critical question is whether the dog sniff prolonged or added time to
the overall duration of the traffic stop. State v. Karst, 170 Idaho 219, 227, 509 P.3d 1148, 1156
(2022). Even a de minimis detour or deviation from the purpose of the stop violates the Fourth
Amendment. Id. (holding delay of nineteen seconds constitutionally impermissible).
Dobson argues that the officers unlawfully extended the traffic stop to allow time for the
drug dog to arrive. The district court found that the drug-dog sniff occurred and that the drug dog
alerted before the purpose of the traffic stop was complete. The district court further found that
neither the request for the drug dog nor the time spent waiting for the dog to arrive added time to
the stop. Dobson contends that the officer’s testimony about how long it took him to complete the
tasks related to the stop was not credible. Specifically, she focuses on the twelve minutes and
thirty-five seconds after the officer went to his patrol car to write the citation before the dog arrived.
The district court found the officer’s testimony to be credible. The district court recognized that,
at face value, “twelve and a half minutes seems like a long time to write a citation solely for an
expired registration” and that by muting his body camera and using it as a dash camera the officer
effectively prevented the district court from “making an objective and independent evaluation of
his actions” to determine whether he remained committed to the original purpose of the traffic
3
A traffic stop’s mission includes, but is not limited to, addressing the traffic violation that
precipitated the stop, determining whether to issue a traffic citation, and making ordinary inquiries
incident to the stop, such as checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are
outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobiles registration and proof of
insurance. Because traffic stops are fraught with danger to police officers, an officer may take
certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission safely, such as asking
for the driver and passenger to exit the vehicle and conducting a criminal records check.
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356; State v. Hale, 168 Idaho 863, 867, 489 P.3d 450, 454 (2021).
However, investigation into other crimes is outside the scope of the stop’s mission and must be
justified by independent reasonable suspicion if it extends the duration of the stop. Rodriguez, 575
U.S. at 356-57.
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stop.” The district court found that the officer’s explanation for placing his body camera to
function as a dash camera was reasonable but that the officer’s decision to mute his body camera
was “not as reasonable.” The district court also found that the officer did not recall whether his
request for records was placed in a queue or how much of the citation he had completed before the
drug dog alerted. The district court stated that these facts undermine his credibility. On the other
hand, the district court found that the officer testified “consistently and unequivocally that he never
deviated from the purpose of the traffic stop except to look up for officer safety purposes” and that
“twelve and a half minutes is within the estimated amount of time (15 minutes) it takes [the officer]
to ‘complete the entire process’ to write a citation for a suspended registration.” The district court
found that there was “no objective evidence indicating [the officer] deviated from the purpose of
the stop,” and “there was no significant discrepancy between his testimony at the preliminary and
evidentiary hearings,” and that Dobson had presented “no evidence (such as police reports,
dispatch logs, etc.) indicating [the officer] delayed writing the citation while waiting for the drug
sniffing canine to arrive.” The district court concluded: “On balance, the Court finds the facts
weigh slightly more in favor of finding that [the officer’s] testimony was credible and that he did
not deviate from conducting a record check and writing the citation. Thus, the Court concludes
the traffic stop was not unreasonably prolonged to conduct a drug dog sniff.”
This Court will not substitute its view for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of the
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from
the evidence. State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 207, 953 P.2d 645, 647 (Ct. App. 1998). The
district court is the arbiter of conflicting evidence; its determination of the weight, credibility,
inference, and implications thereof will not be supplanted by this Court’s impressions or
conclusions from the written record. State v. Howard, 155 Idaho 666, 673, 315 P.3d 854, 861 (Ct.
App. 2013). The district court carefully weighed the evidence before it and drew reasonable
inferences. Its findings are supported by substantial competent evidence.
For the first time on appeal, Dobson argues that the stop was unlawfully extended because
the officer took Dobson’s identification (along with the driver’s) and ran an allegedly unnecessary
criminal check on her. Dobson asserts that, because she was a passenger in the car and there was
no reasonable suspicion that she had committed a crime, taking her identification to investigate
her record was divorced from the mission of the stop, which was to determine whether the car’s
5
registration was valid and to cite the driver if it was not. Dobson cites Karst, 170 Idaho 219, 509
P.3d 1148, which, as noted infra, prohibits even de minimis unjustified extensions of a traffic stop.
Dobson did not raise this argument in her suppression motion or at the hearing on the motion.
Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal. State v.
Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). Dobson’s own argument on this issue
illustrates why it should not be addressed on appeal. Dobson acknowledges that the Idaho Supreme
Court in State v. Wharton, 170 Idaho 329, 510 P.3d 682 (2022) held that an officer may run a
passenger’s identification through a patrol car’s computer system to check for active warrants
because such a check is a negligibly burdensome precaution for officer safety that does not
unlawfully extend a traffic stop. Dobson argues that the officer in this case “ran a ‘records check’
not just a ‘warrants check,’ presumably meaning a full criminal background check for both
[Dobson and the driver].” However, no record was developed in the district court on this issue
because it was not raised. All that can be gleaned from the transcript of the suppression motion is
that the officer requested a “records check” for Dobson and the driver using the officer’s radio (not
the patrol car’s computer system) while he was in his vehicle before the drug dog alerted. Had the
issue been raised, perhaps the record would include information about the nature of the “records
check” and other facts to support Dobson’s argument. Because the issue was not raised in the
district court, we will not address it on appeal.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Dobson has failed to show error in the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress.
Therefore, Dobson’s judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance is affirmed.
Judge HUSKEY and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.
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