State v. Hawkins ( 2024 )


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  •                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
    Docket No. 50659
    STATE OF IDAHO,                                 )
    )    Filed: July 16, 2024
    Plaintiff-Respondent,                    )
    )    Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
    v.                                              )
    )    THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
    FARON RAYMOND HAWKINS,                          )    OPINION AND SHALL NOT
    )    BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
    Defendant-Appellant.                     )
    )
    Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
    County. Hon. Derrick J. O’Neill, District Judge.
    Orders denying I.C.R. 35 motions for correction of illegal sentences, affirmed;
    order denying motion for appointment of counsel, affirmed.
    Faron Raymond Hawkins, Boise, pro se appellant.
    Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney
    General, Boise, for respondent.
    ________________________________________________
    LORELLO, Judge
    Faron Raymond Hawkins appeals from the district court’s orders denying his I.C.R. 35
    motions for correction of illegal sentences and the district court’s order denying his motion for the
    appointment of counsel. We affirm.
    I.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    In 2008, a jury found Hawkins guilty of two counts of robbery. I.C. § 18-6501. The district
    court sentenced Hawkins to concurrent, unified terms of life imprisonment, with minimum periods
    of confinement of thirty years. Hawkins appealed, arguing the district court erred by not sua sponte
    ordering a competency evaluation. State v. Hawkins, 
    148 Idaho 774
    , 777, 
    229 P.3d 379
    , 382 (Ct.
    App. 2009). This Court vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case. On remand,
    the district court found Hawkins was competent both at the time of the competency proceedings
    1
    and at the time of his January 2008 trial. However, the district court concluded it was required to
    conduct a new trial based on the Court of Appeals’ ruling that it was not possible to make a
    retroactive competency determination. The State filed a permissive appeal, which was granted.
    On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that neither the law of the case doctrine nor I.A.R. 38
    prohibited the district court from making a retroactive competency determination but declined to
    rule on whether a retroactive competency determination violated Hawkins’ due process rights.
    State v. Hawkins, 
    155 Idaho 69
    , 75, 
    305 P.3d 513
    , 519 (2013).
    On remand, Hawkins elected to proceed pro se. The district court informed Hawkins of
    his right to counsel and conducted an extensive inquiry before permitting him to proceed. Hawkins
    then filed numerous pro se motions. Ultimately, the district court found Hawkins was competent
    to proceed to trial in 2008 and reimposed his judgment of conviction and sentences. Hawkins
    appealed, arguing that the retroactive competency determination violated his due process rights.
    State v. Hawkins, 
    159 Idaho 507
    , 512, 
    363 P.3d 348
    , 353 (2015). Hawkins also argued that the
    district court erred in permitting him to represent himself. The Idaho Supreme Court held that
    Hawkins’ due process rights were not violated and affirmed his judgment of conviction and
    concurrent life sentences. 
    Id. at 512-17
    , 
    363 P.3d at 353-58
    . It also determined that the district
    court did not err in determining Hawkins was competent to proceed to trial nor in permitting him
    to represent himself. 
    Id. at 515-16
    , 
    363 P.3d at 356-57
    .
    In 2016, Hawkins filed two I.C.R. 35 motions for correction of illegal sentences, which the
    district court denied. This Court affirmed in an unpublished opinion. State v. Hawkins, Docket
    No. 49974 (Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2018).
    In 2023, Hawkins filed numerous pro se motions, including a Rule 35 motion for correction
    of illegal sentences, alleging Rule 35 “is broader than what the courts have been allowing”; he was
    incompetent at his trial; and other trial, pretrial, and sentencing errors. The district court denied
    Hawkins’ motions, concluding that any relief sought was untimely and unmeritorious. Hawkins
    filed a notice of appeal and another Rule 35 motion for correction of his sentences, which was
    identical to the previously filed motion but added additional claims of ineffective assistance of
    counsel and other alleged trial errors. Hawkins also sought the appointment of counsel. The
    district court denied Hawkins’ Rule 35 motion and his motion for the appointment of counsel after
    which Hawkins filed another notice of appeal.
    2
    II.
    ANALYSIS
    A.     Rule 35
    Hawkins asserts that his convictions and sentences are illegal and should be vacated.
    Pursuant to Rule 35(a), the district court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. In an appeal
    from the denial of a motion under Rule 35(a) to correct an illegal sentence, the question of whether
    the sentence imposed is illegal is a question of law freely reviewable by the appellate court. State
    v. Josephson, 
    124 Idaho 286
    , 287, 
    858 P.2d 825
    , 826 (Ct. App. 1993).
    In State v. Clements, 
    148 Idaho 82
    , 86, 
    218 P.3d 1143
    , 1147 (2009), the Idaho Supreme
    Court held that the term “illegal sentence” under Rule 35(a) is narrowly interpreted as a sentence
    that is illegal from the face of the record, i.e., does not involve significant questions of fact or
    require an evidentiary hearing. Rule 35 is a narrow rule, and because an illegal sentence may be
    corrected at any time, the authority conferred by Rule 35 should be limited to uphold the finality
    of judgments. State v. Farwell, 
    144 Idaho 732
    , 735, 
    170 P.3d 397
    , 400 (2007). Rule 35(a) is not
    a vehicle designed to reexamine the facts underlying the case to determine whether a sentence is
    illegal; rather, the rule only applies to a narrow category of cases in which the sentence imposes a
    penalty that is simply not authorized by law or where new evidence tends to show that the original
    sentence is excessive. Clements, 
    148 Idaho at 86
    , 
    218 P.3d at 1147
    .
    Hawkins’ arguments that he was incompetent at his trial, that there were other errors
    associated with his trial and sentencing, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel are
    collateral attacks on his conviction that are beyond the scope of Rule 35(a). Because Hawkins’
    claims are not the proper subject of a Rule 35(a) motion, he has failed to show the district court
    abused its discretion by denying either of his Rule 35(a) motions.1
    B.     Appointment of Counsel
    In conjunction with the second Rule 35(a) motion that Hawkins filed in the underlying
    case, Hawkins also moved for the appointment of counsel, which the district court denied.
    1
    To the extent Hawkins relies on I.C.R. 35(b), which governs sentences imposed in an
    illegal manner and requests for leniency, any such motion would be untimely. See I.C.R. 35(b)
    (requiring motions filed pursuant to I.C.R. 35(b) to be filed within 120 days of the entry of
    judgment).
    3
    Hawkins argues that the district court erred in denying his request for appointed counsel without
    first determining whether Hawkins is competent. On appeal, Hawkins has cited no authority to
    support the proposition that the district court had the obligation to assess his competency before
    deciding whether to appoint counsel to represent him on yet another Rule 35 motion that is beyond
    the scope of the rule. A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking.
    State v. Zichko, 
    129 Idaho 259
    , 263, 
    923 P.2d 966
    , 970 (1996). Although a defendant has an
    absolute right to retained counsel in a Rule 35 proceeding, appointed counsel at this stage may be
    denied if the trial court finds that the motion is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with
    adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous
    proceeding. State v. Wade, 
    125 Idaho 522
    , 523, 
    873 P.2d 167
    , 168 (Ct. App. 1994). Moreover,
    the district court correctly concluded that Hawkins was not entitled to the appointment of counsel
    to pursue “frivolous continuations of his prior motions, all of which have been rejected.”
    III.
    CONCLUSION
    Hawkins has failed to show that the district court erred in denying his Rule 35(a) motions
    or his motion for the appointment of counsel. Therefore, the district court’s orders denying
    Hawkins’ Rule 35(a) motions and the order denying Hawkins’ motion for appointment of counsel
    are affirmed.
    Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 50659

Filed Date: 7/16/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/16/2024