Jane Doe v. John Doe ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 50956
In the Matter of John Doe I, A Child )
Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. )
JANE DOE, ) Filed: October 26, 2023
)
Petitioner-Respondent, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
v. ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
JOHN DOE (2023-30), ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Third Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Canyon County. Hon. Courtnie R. Tucker, Magistrate.
Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.
Aaron Bazzoli, Chief Canyon County Public Defender; Alex W. Brockman,
Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.
Bob Pangburn, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
LORELLO, Chief Judge
John Doe (2023-30) appeals from the judgment terminating his parental rights. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
John Doe (Doe) and Jane Doe (Jane) married in 2016 and had a child, but the relationship
subsequently deteriorated. Nevertheless, Doe was reportedly a nurturing father; he was hands-on
and protective of the child. Doe’s relationship with the child was described as “exceptional.”
However, in July 2017, Doe was arrested following an investigation that revealed he possessed
child pornography. Doe was charged with and found guilty of multiple counts of sexual
exploitation of a child for possessing child pornography and battery with the intent to commit a
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serious felony for an incident involving Doe’s sexual touching of his sister. Doe received a
ten-year prison sentence for possession of child pornography and a consecutive twenty-year
sentence for battery with intent to commit a serious felony. Doe testified that he takes full
responsibility for his actions and voluntarily enrolled in classes offered by the Idaho Department
of Correction. Doe is involved in sex-offender treatment and receives programming for his
underlying offenses. Doe testified that he “never stopped trying” to be the child’s father and hopes
to continue his relationship with the child and remain part of the child’s life. Doe has been
incarcerated since his arrest, and his first opportunity for parole is in October 2027.
Following Doe’s incarceration, Jane continued her relationship with him and facilitated
visitation between Doe and the child, both in person and over the phone. In 2018, however, Jane
began a new relationship and she filed for divorce in 2019. The divorce was contentious as a result
of disputes over property division and custodial rights of the child. While the divorce was pending,
Doe harassed Jane via telephone. The harassment prompted Jane to get both a civil protection
order and a no-contact order against Doe. Jane was ultimately awarded sole legal and physical
custody of the child, and visitation between the child and Doe was left to Jane’s discretion.
In March 2022, Jane remarried. Jane and her husband have a daughter in common and live
with both children and Doe’s mother. Jane is reported to be a good mother and is involved in her
children’s lives. Jane’s husband is self-employed and the “breadwinner” for the family. Jane’s
husband has two theft-related felony convictions, but he reported he is compliant with probation
and was scheduled to be released from probation in June 2023. Jane’s husband described a positive
father-son relationship with the child. Ultimately, Jane’s husband hopes to adopt the child.
In April 2022, Jane filed a petition seeking to terminate Doe’s parental rights. After finding
by clear and convincing evidence that Doe neglected the child; that he is unable to discharge
parental responsibilities, which inability will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period due to
Doe’s incarceration; and that termination is in the child’s best interests, the magistrate court
terminated Doe’s parental rights. Doe appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a
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reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.
Id. The substantial evidence test requires a greater quantum of evidence in cases where the trial
court’s finding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence than in cases where a mere
preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear
and convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be
proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057,
1060 (2006). Further, the trial court’s decision must be supported by objectively supportable
grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
III.
ANALYSIS
Doe challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the magistrate court’s finding
that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interests. Jane responds that clear and
convincing evidence supports the magistrate court’s termination decision. We affirm the
termination of Doe’s parental rights.
A. Statutory Basis for Termination
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her
child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341,
343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the
Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family
life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due
process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383,
386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a
parent-child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental
liberty interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may
terminate a parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing
evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep’t of
Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386,
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146 P.3d at 652. Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination
of the parent-child relationship when it is in the child’s best interests and any one of the following
five factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship
between the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental
responsibilities for a prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of
the child; or (e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of
time. Each statutory ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172
P.3d at 1117.
In this case, the magistrate court terminated Doe’s parental rights because it found that he
neglected the child. Idaho Code Section 16-2002(3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in
I.C. § 16-1602(31). Section 16-1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when
the child is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control
necessary for his or her well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents, guardian,
or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to provide them.
The magistrate court found that Jane demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that
Doe neglected the child by failing to provide proper parental care and control necessary for the
child’s well-being. Specifically, the magistrate court noted that Doe has been incarcerated since
the child was seven months old. The child was six years old at the time of the termination trial.
Because of Doe’s incarceration, he has been unable to provide for any of the child’s basic needs.
The magistrate court found that, over the prior six years, Doe failed to provide shelter, financial
support, sustenance, or supplies to the child. Doe also failed to be involved in the child’s
educational or medical care since Doe’s incarceration. Because of the child’s young age, the
magistrate court found it would be detrimental to the child’s health and well-being to be without a
caregiver to provide food, shelter, support, and care. The magistrate court concluded that Doe’s
omission of parental care toward the child constituted neglect and was grounds to terminate his
parental rights.
The magistrate court also found that Jane demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence
that Doe is unable to discharge his parental responsibilities to the child and that such inability will
continue for a prolonged indeterminate period of time that would be detrimental to the child’s
well-being. Doe has been incarcerated for almost the entirety of the child’s life and will continue
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to be incarcerated until at least 2027. Doe is unable to support the child physically or financially
while he is incarcerated. The magistrate court further found that Doe has been unable to maintain
a relationship with the child through visitation due to both the logistical difficulties and Doe’s own
harassment of Jane. Because it is unclear when, or if, Doe will be in a position to exercise his
parental responsibilities to the child, the magistrate court determined that Doe’s lengthy prison
sentence left the child without the benefit of his parental care and support.
On appeal, Doe has not challenged these findings and, thus, we will not presume they are
erroneous. See Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 164 Idaho 883, 892, 436 P.3d 1232, 1241
(2019). These findings provide substantial and competent evidence for the magistrate court’s
conclusion that Doe neglected the child under I.C. § 16-1602(31)(a). See Idaho Dep’t of Health
& Welfare v. Doe (2017-5), 162 Idaho 400, 404, 397 P.3d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App. 2017) (holding
that the inability to provide care for a child due to incarceration constitutes neglect).
B. Best Interests of the Child
Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next
determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship.
Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When
determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the
parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the
unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the
child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s
efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Doe
(2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare
v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best interests
of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Idaho Dep’t
of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012).
The magistrate court found by clear and convincing evidence that terminating Doe’s
parental rights is in the child’s best interests. Due to his crimes, the magistrate court found that
Doe is not ready or able to be an appropriate parental presence in the child’s life. For the prior six
years, Doe had not provided for the child’s care, and it will be several years before Doe might be
able to discharge his parental responsibilities to the child. The magistrate court also considered
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the lack of a relationship between the child and Doe. The magistrate court found that Doe impeded
any relationship he might have had with the child due to Doe’s poor behavior during his divorce
from Jane. Additionally, the magistrate court found Doe’s crimes troubling. Because of his
crimes, Doe is a convicted sex offender who cannot have contact with minors. The magistrate
court acknowledged the sex-offender treatment Doe receives but determined that it is unknown
what risks are posed by Doe resuming a parental role toward the child, even if Doe were to be
paroled.
Further, the magistrate court found that the child’s needs have been met by Jane and her
husband. The magistrate court held there is a normal parent-child bond between Jane’s husband
and the child. Jane’s husband is engaged and active in the child’s care and upbringing and has
been for the vast majority of the child’s life. The child looks to Jane’s husband as his father and
Jane’s husband plans to adopt the child. The magistrate court found that the child is safe, stable,
happy, and thriving in the care of Jane and her husband. Ultimately, the magistrate court held that,
despite Doe’s expressions of love and affection for the child, Doe remains unable to appropriately
care for the child for an indefinite period of time. The magistrate court concluded it is in the child’s
best interests to terminate Doe’s parental rights and allow Jane’s husband, who has been caring for
the child, to pursue adoption.
On appeal, Doe challenges the magistrate court’s basis for finding that termination of his
parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Specifically, Doe alleges that the magistrate
court erred because it overlooked whether Jane’s husband would be eligible to adopt the child in
light of his own criminal record. Doe argues that, while Idaho does not have a specific law
preventing repeated convicted felons from adopting, it is questionable whether Jane’s husband
would be able to adopt the child. Doe believes Jane’s husband would not satisfy an “adoption
home-inspection home-study” by the Department because he was convicted of two felonies and
was on probation at the time of the termination trial. Doe’s argument is couched in the belief that,
should Jane’s husband be unable to adopt, then there would be no clear and convincing evidence
to show that termination of his parental rights would be in the child’s best interests. However,
Doe failed to support his argument with any authority. This Court generally does not address
issues not supported by cogent argument and citation to legal authority, even in a case terminating
parental rights. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2018-24), 164 Idaho 143, 147, 426 P.3d
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1243, 1247 (2018). Even if this Court were to consider Doe’s argument, it nevertheless fails.
While the magistrate court considered Jane’s husband’s willingness to adopt the child, it relied on
several other factors, outlined above, to find that termination of Doe’s parental rights is in the
child’s best interests. These factors provide substantial and competent evidence to support the
magistrate court’s findings.
Doe attempts to bolster his argument that the magistrate court erred when conducting its
best interests analysis by emphasizing the bond he and the child had prior to his divorce from Jane.
According to Doe, the child reacted positively during the visits facilitated by Jane while Doe was
incarcerated. Doe asserts the breakdown of his relationship with the child began once Jane stopped
facilitating visits, which Doe states he had minimal control over. As noted, the magistrate court
considered the nature of Doe’s relationship with the child. The magistrate court also found that
Doe impeded any relationship he might have had with the child due to his poor behavior during
his divorce from Jane. Doe’s argument on appeal essentially seeks to have this Court reweigh the
evidence presented at trial. This Court’s review, however, is limited to whether substantial and
competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s decision. See, e.g., Doe, 148 Idaho at 245, 220
P.3d at 1064 (noting review is whether substantial and competent evidence supports decision).
This Court will not reweigh the evidence. Doe (2017-5), 162 Idaho at 407, 397 P.3d at 1166. The
magistrate court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence and
support its conclusion, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child
for Doe’s parental rights to be terminated. Doe has failed to show that the magistrate court erred
in finding that terminating his parental rights is in the child’s best interests.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s determination that Doe
neglected the child and that termination of his parental rights is in the best interests of the child.
Doe has failed to show error in the magistrate court’s decision to terminate his parental rights.
Accordingly, the judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed.
Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.
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