IDHW v. Jane Doe ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 50905
In the Matter of Jane Doe I, A Child )
Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. )
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF ) Filed: October 30, 2023
HEALTH & WELFARE, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
Petitioner-Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
JANE DOE (2023-27), )
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Bannock County. Hon. Anson L. Call, II, Magistrate.
Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.
David R. Martinez, Chief Bannock County Public Defender; Jessalyn R. Hopkin,
Deputy Public Defender, Pocatello, for appellant.
Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Jason R. Chandler, Deputy Attorney
General, Pocatello, for respondent.
________________________________________________
LORELLO, Chief Judge
Jane Doe (2023-27) appeals from the judgment terminating her parental rights. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Doe is the mother of the minor child in this action who was born in 2021. The child tested
positive for methamphetamine at the time of her birth. When the Idaho Department of Health and
Welfare and law enforcement went to follow up on the child, Doe was arrested on a warrant.
Temporary custody of the child was awarded to the Department. The magistrate court approved a
1
case plan and conducted several review hearings while the child was in the Department’s custody.
In June 2022, the Department filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents.
Following a hearing, the magistrate court denied the petition because it concluded that the
testimony from the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)1 expert was not “sufficiently reliable”
because the expert “did not demonstrate sufficient familiarity with the facts of this case to be able
to testify to whether the child’s continued custody by the parents” would likely “result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child.”
The Department filed a second petition to terminate parental rights in March 2023.
Following the second termination trial, the magistrate court terminated Doe’s parental rights,
concluding that clear and convincing evidence showed that Doe abandoned and neglected the
child; the Department made active efforts to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs
directed toward reunification as required by ICWA; and termination is in the child’s best interests.2
Doe appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater
quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143
Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood
to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe
1
Doe is a member of the Eastern Shoshone Tribe; the child’s father and the child are
members of the Shoshone Bannock Tribe.
2
The magistrate court also terminated the father’s parental rights. The decision to terminate
the father’s parental rights is not at issue in this appeal.
2
v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the trial court’s decision must
be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
Whether a trial court correctly applied the requirements of ICWA to the facts of a case is a
question of law subject to free review on appeal. Doe v. Doe, 127 Idaho 452, 456, 902 P.2d 477,
481 (1995).
III.
ANALYSIS
Doe challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the magistrate court’s findings
that Doe abandoned and neglected the child and that termination is in the child’s best interests.
Doe also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the magistrate court’s finding that
the Department made active efforts under the ICWA. The Department responds that substantial
and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s termination decision. We affirm the
magistrate court’s judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights.
A. Statutory Basis for Termination
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her
child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341,
343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the
Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family
life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due
process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383,
386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a
parent-child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental
liberty interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may
terminate a parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing
evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep’t of
Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386,
146 P.3d at 652.
Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the
parent-child relationship when it is in the child’s best interests and any one of the following five
3
factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between
the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities
for a prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or
(e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each
statutory ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117.
The magistrate court found by clear and convincing evidence that the Department had
established statutory grounds for termination through abandonment and neglect. Doe challenges
the magistrate court’s finding for each of these grounds.3
1. Abandonment
The magistrate court found that Doe abandoned the child. Pursuant to I.C. § 16-2002(5),
abandonment occurs when the parent has willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship
including, but not limited to, reasonable support or regular personal contact. The word “or” is a
disjunctive particle used to express an alternative and, thus, the willful failure to maintain a normal
parental relationship can be based upon either the failure to pay reasonable support, or the failure
to have regular personal contact, or some other failure. Doe I v. Doe II, 148 Idaho 713, 715, 228
P.3d 980, 982 (2010).
When a parent fails to maintain a normal parental relationship without just cause for a
period of one year, prima facie evidence of abandonment exists. I.C. § 16-2002(5). There is no
universal standard for what constitutes a normal parental relationship and whether such a
relationship exists depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Doe I v. Doe II, 150 Idaho
46, 50, 244 P.3d 190, 194 (2010). The petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to demonstrate
that the parent lacks a normal parental relationship with the child and that there is no just cause for
the failure to maintain such a relationship. Id. If the petitioner is able to meet this burden, the
parent then has the burden of production to present evidence of just cause. Id. If the magistrate
3
We note that there are no citations to the record in the argument section of Doe’s brief.
This does not comply with I.A.R. 35(a)(6) which requires citations to the record in the argument
section of the brief. Accordingly, the factual assertions in Doe’s argument section lack supporting
citations to the record. This Court will not search the record on appeal for error. Idaho Dep’t of
Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 103, 113, 244 P.3d 247, 257 (Ct. App. 2010). We also note
the respondent’s brief suffers from the same deficiency; I.A.R. 35(b)(6) requires the respondent’s
argument section to cite to the parts of the transcript and record relied upon.
4
court finds that just cause has not been established, the petitioning party has met its burden of
persuasion. Id.The magistrate court found Doe abandoned the child by willfully failing to maintain a
normal parent-child relationship with the child, without just cause, for a period of more than one
year. The magistrate court further found: (1) the child had been in the legal custody of the
Department for more than twenty months; (2) Doe had periods of consistency in visitation but had
not had a visit with the child for several months; (3) Doe was again incarcerated, following a period
of release, due to a failure to comply with her probation conditions; (4) Doe, while released from
custody, had the ability to establish and maintain a relationship with the child but failed to do so;
(5) Doe had been unable to maintain stable employment and only had periods of limited
employment; (6) Doe did not obtain stable housing; and (7) Doe did not complete a parenting class
or any treatment programs. Substantial and competent evidence in the record supports these
findings.
Doe argues that the magistrate court erred when it failed to consider Doe’s “efforts
regardless of her incarceration.” Doe’s argument focuses on the periods of incarceration, which
Doe concedes “made having regular visits, continuing treatment, and communicating with the
Department difficult,” while arguing that the conduct was not willful. Further, Doe argues that a
finding of abandonment cannot rely solely on a parent’s incarceration and that not having custody
of a child for over a year is not evidence of abandonment. However, the magistrate court’s finding
of abandonment was not based only upon Doe’s periods of incarceration. Rather, the magistrate
court discussed the requirements and expectations of Doe while out of custody, the attempts made
by the Department in assisting Doe, and the lack of compliance in forming and maintaining a
normal parental relationship. In essence, Doe’s assertions are an attempt to have this Court
reweigh evidence. It is well established that appellate courts in Idaho do not reweigh evidence.
Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117. Further, Doe’s argument does not address State v. the
overall lack of compliance with the case plan, lack of attendance at visits, and the lack of support
provided to the child while Doe was in the community. For instance, the record reflects that, while
out of custody, Doe regularly missed a significant portion of the scheduled visits with the child
even though the Department provided transportation. Doe testified that missing those visits made
5
it hard to maintain a relationship with the child. Doe has failed to show that the magistrate court
erred in finding she abandoned the child.
2. Neglect
The magistrate court also found that Doe neglected the child by failing to provide proper
parental care and control, subsistence, and medical care and control necessary for the child’s
well-being and by failing to complete her case plan. We will address each finding in turn.
Idaho Code Section 16-2002(3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in
I.C. § 16-1602(31). Section 16-1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when
the child is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control
necessary for his or her well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents, guardian,
or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to provide them. With respect to neglect, the magistrate
court specifically found that Doe: (1) had not provided housing, subsistence, medical care, or any
basic necessity for the child; (2) had not attended a visit with the child for several months; and
(3) had again been incarcerated after having been released on probation. Substantial and
competent evidence in the record supports these findings.
Doe testified during the termination hearing that she had ingested illegal substances during
pregnancy, that the child was born prematurely, and that the child tested positive for illegal
substances at birth. Shortly thereafter, Doe was arrested and unable to provide parental care for
the child, at which point the child was brought into the care of the Department. Subsequently, Doe
was released on probation several times. However, Doe committed new offenses and violated the
terms and conditions of her probation, resulting in periods of incarceration. Doe was incarcerated
at the time of the termination hearing. Doe also testified to being inconsistent with visitation and
that the lack of visitation made it hard to keep a relationship with the child and develop parenting
skills. Additionally, Doe testified she relapsed on illicit substances while out in the community,
failed to maintain stable employment, and lost her previous housing. Doe also testified that she
did not have the supplies necessary to provide care for the child at that time of the termination
trial.
Doe contends the magistrate court’s findings “lack particularity” and that, “contrary” to the
magistrate court’s opinion, she “did have housing when she was not incarcerated.” Doe also argues
the magistrate court “failed to recognize” that her lack of visitation was “due to incarceration, not
6
refusal.” Doe asserts the removal of the child “was not based on the lack of housing or
mistreatment of the child” and that, although Doe did not have the supplies to care for the child at
the time of the termination trial, “there was no testimony” that Doe “was unable to provide those
things.” According to Doe, the magistrate court’s decision was “inconsistent with the evidence
provided at trial” and there was not substantial and competent evidence to find that she neglected
the child because she provided “housing, subsistence, medical care or basic necessities” for the
child “at different points throughout the case.” That Doe may have made some effort over the
course of the child protection case does not demonstrate that the magistrate court’s findings are
not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Moreover, Doe’s contrary arguments are
conclusory and unsupported by citations to the record or any reference to evidence undermining
the magistrate court’s findings. Conclusory allegations and assertions of fact, without citation to
the record below, are not sufficient to support an argument on appeal. I.A.R. 35(a)(6); Nicholson
v. Bennett, 166 Idaho 720, 727, 462 P.3d 1184, 1191 (Ct. App. 2020).
Neglect also exists where the parent has failed to comply with the court’s orders or the case
plan in a Child Protective Act case and the Department has had temporary or legal custody of the
child for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and reunification has not been accomplished
by the last day of the fifteenth month in which the child has been in the temporary or legal custody
of the Department.4 I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b). The magistrate court found Doe neglected the child as
defined in I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b). Substantial and competent evidence in the record supports these
findings.
Following Doe’s arrest and the child being declared in imminent danger, a case plan was
developed that required Doe to: (1) demonstrate financial stability and the ability to care for the
child through obtaining employment; (2) obtain stable housing for herself and the child;
(3) participate in a parenting class; (4) seek necessary medical and developmental services for the
child; and (5) participate in substance abuse treatment and engage in drug testing.
The magistrate court found that Doe was unable to maintain stable employment and had
only worked for limited periods. At the termination trial in May 2023, Doe testified she was
4
Doe does not contest the magistrate court’s finding that the Department had temporary or
legal custody of the child for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months preceding the
termination and that reunification had not occurred.
7
unemployed and indicated that the last time she had a job was in January 2023, at which time she
had a job for “about two weeks.” Doe further testified that, prior to those two weeks in January
2023, she had been employed from “September to October” 2021 at one place of employment and
had done harvest from “August to September” 2021.
The magistrate court also found Doe had been unable to maintain stable housing--Doe’s
housing arrangements were never approved or vetted by the Department and they only lasted for
short periods of time. Doe testified that, from August 2021 to April 2022, she stayed at her
grandmother’s house intermittently while also spending some periods of time incarcerated. Doe
remained incarcerated from April 2022 to October 2022, at which time she was released and lived
in a hotel. Doe lived at the hotel until February 2023, but that housing arrangement was no longer
available at the time of the termination trial.
The magistrate court found that Doe had not completed a parenting class or any of her other
treatment programs. Doe testified that, although the Department provided transportation
assistance, she failed to complete treatment and had since been discharged. Doe further testified
that, despite two referrals for parenting classes, she had not completed either. Doe continued to
use illicit substances throughout the case and was incarcerated on several occasions.
Doe argues that she “did comply with her case plan at times,” while acknowledging she
“did not complete every goal of the case plan.” Doe provides no legal authority to support her
position that, under I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b), occasional compliance without completion of a case plan
prevents a finding of neglect. This Court generally does not address issues not supported by cogent
argument and citation to legal authority, even in a case terminating parental rights. See Idaho
Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2015-15), 158 Idaho 764, 768-69, 351 P.3d 1222, 1226-27
(2015) (declining to consider parent’s argument “that he ‘substantially complied’ with the case
plan” because the parent failed to provide legal authority).
Doe has failed to show the magistrate court’s neglect findings are erroneous.
C. Best Interests of Child
Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next
determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship.
Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When
determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the
8
parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the
unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the
child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s
efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Doe
(2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare
v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best interests
of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Idaho Dep’t
of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012).
The magistrate court found that termination is in the child’s best interests because: (1) the
child is thriving in her current placement; (2) Doe failed to create a stable home environment for
the child; (3) the child needs stability in her life, which the foster placement has provided; (4) the
child had been able to develop connections with her tribal community through the foster
placement, which would be maintained by the foster placement; and (5) Doe was incarcerated
again and not in a position to support the child despite having ample opportunity to do so.
Substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s determination that terminating
Doe’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.
Doe contends that, although she “needs more time to stabilize,” it would not be in the
child’s best interest to “extinguish a loving relationship.” Doe claims there was “ample testimony”
that there exists a “significant and beneficial bond” between her and the child but does not provide
a citation to the record for such testimony. This Court will not search the record on appeal for
error. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe I, 150 Idaho 103, 113, 244 P.3d 247, 257 (Ct. App.
2010). Further, Doe does not present any argument or legal authority to support her position. Doe
has failed to demonstrate the magistrate court erred in concluding that termination is in the child’s
best interests.
D. Indian Child Welfare Act--Active Efforts
The ICWA sets forth procedural requirements and substantive standards that must be
applied by the state court in termination of parental rights proceedings which involve an “Indian
child” as defined by 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). Where an Indian child is the subject of a termination
proceeding, the party seeking to terminate parental rights must “satisfy the court that active efforts
have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the
9
breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts proved unsuccessful.”5 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d);
see also Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2014-23), 157 Idaho 920, 923, 342 P.3d 632,
635 (2015). A parent’s incarceration significantly affects the scope of the active efforts that the
Department must make to satisfy the ICWA. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2011-23),
152 Idaho 797, 807, 275 P.3d 23, 33 (Ct. App. 2012). The trial court’s finding of active remedial
efforts must be supported by substantial and competent evidence. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare
v. Doe (2011-20), 152 Idaho 797, 802, 275 P.3d 23, 28 (Ct. App. 2012).
According to the ICWA:
Active effort means affirmative, active, thorough, and timely efforts
intended primarily to maintain or reunite an Indian child with his or her family.
Where an agency is involved in the child-custody proceeding, active efforts must
involve assisting the parent or parents or Indian custodian through the steps of a
case plan and with accessing or developing the resources necessary to satisfy the
case plan. To the maximum extent possible, active efforts should be provided in a
manner consistent with the prevailing social and cultural conditions and way of life
of the Indian child’s Tribe and should be conducted in partnership with the Indian
child and the Indian child’s parents, extended family members, Indian custodians,
and Tribe.
25 C.F.R. § 23.2. “Active efforts are to be tailored to the facts and circumstances of the case.” Id.Examples of active efforts include: (1) conducting a comprehensive assessment of the
circumstances of the Indian child’s family, with a focus on reunification; (2) identifying
appropriate services and helping the parent(s) to overcome barriers, including actively assisting
the parent(s) in obtaining services; (3) identifying, notifying, and inviting representatives from the
child’s Tribe to participate in providing support and services, permanency planning, and resolution
of placement; (4) searching for the child’s extended family members and consulting with those
individuals to provide family structure and support for the child and parent(s); (5) offering and
employing all available and culturally appropriate family preservation strategies, and facilitating
use of remedial and rehabilitative services available through the child’s Tribe; (6) taking steps to
5
It appears that, unlike a challenge to the Department’s reasonable efforts (which must be
raised on appeal from the child protection case), the active efforts finding in ICWA cases must be
made as part of the termination decision and is, therefore, reviewable on appeal from the judgment
terminating parental rights. See In re Doe, 157 Idaho 920, 923, 342 P.3d 632, 635 (2015) (noting
ICWA requires an active effort finding in a termination proceeding and reviewing that finding on
appeal from the judgment terminating parental rights).
10
keep siblings together whenever possible; (7) consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the
child, supporting regular visits between the child and the parent(s) or Indian custodian(s) in the
most natural setting possible, including trial home visits; (8) identifying community resources
including housing, financial, transportation, mental health, substance abuse, and peer support, and
actively assist the parent(s) or, when appropriate, the child’s family, in accessing and utilizing the
resources; (9) monitoring progress and participation in services; (10) considering alternative ways
to address the parent’s needs and, where appropriate, the family, if optimum services are
unavailable or do not exist; and (11) providing post-reunification services and monitoring.
25 C.F.R. § 23.2(1)-(11).
The magistrate court found the Department “made active efforts throughout the child
protective case to avoid the breakup of the Indian family.” The magistrate court further found
“[t]hese efforts included providing transportation”; facilitating and encouraging visitation;
attempting to “secure parenting classes” through “multiple referrals”; and working with Doe to
“identify appropriate substance abuse treatment,” which included tribal resources. More
specifically, the magistrate court found the Department sent two different referrals for parenting
classes and approved parenting classes provided by the Tribe and a parenting option through Doe’s
probation program. The Department also provided lists of substance abuse treatment providers
and offered assistance obtaining assessments, including through tribal resources. In addition, the
ICWA expert testified that the Department made active and continuous efforts throughout the case.
Substantial and competent evidence in the record supports the magistrate court’s finding regarding
active efforts.
Doe argues the magistrate court “exaggerated” the Department’s efforts and contends the
Department’s efforts were “merely” passive. According to Doe, referrals to parenting classes and
providing a list of substance abuse treatment providers are passive efforts and do not satisfy the
active efforts required by the ICWA. In a similar vein, Doe argues that the Department’s efforts
in her case were no different than the Department’s efforts in a “regular” non-ICWA case and,
therefore, the efforts were not active. That the Department may make similar efforts in a
non-ICWA case does not mean the efforts are passive. Doe has cited no authority for such a
proposition, and we reject the notion that reasonable efforts in a non-ICWA case cannot also be
characterized as active efforts, particularly as defined by federal regulation. We also reject Doe’s
11
argument that the magistrate court’s findings are “exaggerated” or that the magistrate court erred
in finding the Department engaged in active efforts in this case. The Idaho Supreme Court’s
opinion in Doe (2014-23), 157 Idaho 920, 342 P.3d 632, is instructive.
In Doe (2014-23), the Supreme Court also addressed a claim that the Department did not
engage in active efforts as required by the ICWA. In rejecting the claim in that case, the Supreme
Court stated:
There is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate
court’s finding that DHW made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family.
The State arranged for weekly supervised visits with [the child] that would give the
parents the opportunity for feedback with regard to the challenges they faced in
caring for him, but Doe discontinued participation in the visitation sessions. [The
child] was enrolled in a form of individual counseling specifically designed to
strengthen his relationship with his parents and Doe was encouraged to participate,
but attended only a handful of times. [The child] was scheduled for regular medical
and therapeutic appointments for the purpose of understanding and addressing his
developmental delays, but Doe never attended more than a few. DHW arranged
for Doe to take parenting classes, but she dropped out and did not return. Finally,
DHW arranged for Doe to participate in multiple drug and alcohol treatment
programs and, though Doe completed one such program, she eventually dropped
out of another and resumed her regular abuse of alcohol.
Doe (2014-23), 157 Idaho at 925, 342 P.3d at 637.
Similar to Doe (2014-23), and as found by the magistrate court in this case, the Department
referred Doe for services, approved tribal resources, made transportation available, and offered
Doe assistance, but she did not take full advantage of the opportunities made available to her.
Doe’s failure to do so does not equate to a lack of active efforts by the Department. See id.; see
also Doe v. Roe, 127 Idaho at 458-59, 902 P.2d at 483-84 (concluding Department made active
efforts but father refused to engage in services offered). As Doe acknowledges, her “incarceration
surely frustrate[d] the amount of efforts the Department [could] give.” Although Doe was not
incarcerated throughout the entirety of the case, she did not complete her case plan or engage in
the services offered while out of custody. Substantial and competent evidence supports the
magistrate court’s finding that the Department satisfied the ICWA’s active efforts requirement.
12
IV.
CONCLUSION
The magistrate court’s findings that Doe abandoned and neglected the child, that the
Department made active efforts under the ICWA, and that termination is in the child’s best interests
are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Doe has failed to show error in the
magistrate court’s decision to terminate her parental rights. Accordingly, the judgment terminating
Doe’s parental rights is affirmed.
Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.
13