ISP v. Lilton ( 2023 )


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  •                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
    Docket No. 49676
    DIRECTOR, IDAHO STATE POLICE,                  )
    STATE OF IDAHO; and ELMORE                     )   Filed: November 15, 2023
    COUNTY PROSECUTING                             )
    ATTORNEY,                                      )   Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
    )
    Plaintiffs-Respondents,                 )   THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
    )   OPINION AND SHALL NOT
    v.                                             )   BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
    )
    ONE BLACK 2017 MERCEDES-BENZ                   )
    VIN NO. WWUG6DB8HA300117;                      )
    $4,201.00 IN UNITED STATES                     )
    CURRENCY,                                      )
    )
    Defendant Property,                     )
    )
    and                                            )
    )
    JOHN LARRY EDWARDS LILTON,                     )
    )
    Real Party in Interest-Appellant.       )
    )
    Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
    Elmore County. Hon. Jonathan Medema, District Judge. Hon. James Cawthon,
    District Judge.
    Order denying motion to reconsider award of attorney fees, reversed; case
    remanded.
    Idaho Injury Law Group, PLLC; Seth H. Diviney, Boise, for appellant.
    Shondi K. Lott, Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney; Ralph R. Blount, Deputy
    Prosecuting Attorney, Mountain Home, for respondent.
    ________________________________________________
    GRATTON, Judge
    John Larry Edwards Lilton appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion for
    reconsideration of his request for attorney fees. We reverse the district court’s order denying the
    motion for reconsideration and remand for entry of an award of attorney fees.
    1
    I.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A sheriff’s deputy conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle owned and driven by Lilton.
    Deputies seized Lilton’s vehicle and cash pursuant to 
    Idaho Code § 37-2744
    . The Elmore County
    Prosecutor (Prosecutor) filed a complaint seeking to forfeit Lilton’s vehicle and cash. Lilton filed
    an answer alleging the proceedings were not instituted within the statutorily required thirty days
    of the seizure and filed a motion to dismiss arguing the in rem action was barred by the statute of
    limitation. The district court granted Lilton’s motion and ordered his property returned to him on
    December 10, 2020. Lilton filed a motion for entry of judgment on December 20, 2020. The
    district court signed the judgment on January 26, 2021.
    On February 10, 2021, Lilton filed a memorandum of costs pursuant to I.C. § 12-117
    requesting costs and attorney fees for the legal work performed to obtain the judgment. Twenty-
    nine days later, the Prosecutor filed a motion to disallow part or all costs with a supporting
    declaration and memorandum. Lilton filed a motion to strike the Prosecutor’s motion as untimely
    and in opposition to the Prosecutor’s implied motion for enlargement of time. The Prosecutor
    lodged four additional filings, including a motion for relief from judgment,1 to which Lilton
    responded. The district court held hearings on the various motions and objections. The district
    court denied the Prosecutor’s miscellaneous motions and issued an amended judgment which
    awarded Lilton the requested attorney fees and costs incurred for work to obtain the initial
    judgment.
    On June 16, 2021, Lilton filed a supplemental request for attorney fees incurred for
    securing his initial request for attorney fees and defending against the post-judgment motions
    brought by the Prosecutor, asserting that the Prosecutor’s various motions and objections were
    unfounded. The Prosecutor filed a memorandum in support of objection and motion to disallow
    the second request for attorney fees. The district court denied the request for fees and costs. The
    district court reasoned that the fees sought in the supplemental request could have been requested
    in the “prior litigation” and no construction of the procedural rules or statutes relating to attorney
    1
    The Prosecutor asked for relief from the judgment asserting that, contrary to the prior
    finding of untimeliness of the complaint, there was an argument that the complaint was timely
    because the probable cause for the seizure did not arise until after midnight and, thus, the start of
    the timeframe occurred at that time. The district court denied the motion. Consequently, the basis
    for an award of attorney fees remained.
    2
    fees allows for successive awards of attorney fees based on being a prevailing party on a request
    for attorney fees. Lilton filed a motion to reconsider and memorandum in support. The district
    court issued a memorandum decision denying the motion for reconsideration. Lilton timely
    appeals.
    II.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The Idaho appellate courts review a district court’s denial of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-
    117 for an abuse of discretion. Ada County v. Browning, 
    168 Idaho 856
    , 859, 
    489 P.3d 443
    , 446
    (2021). When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
    conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the
    issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently
    with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision
    by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 
    163 Idaho 856
    , 863, 
    421 P.3d 187
    , 194
    (2018).
    The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound
    discretion of the trial court. Campbell v. Reagan, 
    144 Idaho 254
    , 258, 
    159 P.3d 891
    , 895 (2007);
    Carnell v. Barker Mgmt. Inc., 
    137 Idaho 322
    , 329, 
    48 P.3d 651
    , 658 (2002).
    III.
    ANALYSIS
    Lilton contends that the district court: (1) misconstrued the relevant statutes in denying his
    supplemental request for attorney fees; and (2) abused its discretion in denying the supplemental
    request on a basis not argued by either party. The Prosecutor argues that Lilton invited error by
    claiming that the reason he had not earlier filed his supplemental request was because the request
    was not “ripe.” The Prosecutor also argues that the supplemental request for attorney fees was
    untimely.
    A.        The District Court Erred in Its Initial Decision
    In the district court’s initial denial of Lilton’s supplemental request for attorney fees, the
    court held:
    I’m not aware of a construction on the rules, or the Idaho statutes relating
    to attorneys fees, that allow for successive awards of attorneys fees as a prevailing
    party based [on] an award of attorney fees when you are a prevailing party, and I
    think the fees that were involved here are fees that could have been requested in
    3
    that litigation, as they were directly attributable to that litigation, and so for that
    reason, the court will deny the request for attorneys fees.
    There appear to be two concepts in this holding; the statutes and rules do not allow for attorney
    fees to defend a prior award of attorney fees and a motion for relief from a judgment but even if
    permitted, such fees must be requested at the time initial fees are requested.
    1.      Attorney fees incurred after an initial award of fees may be recoverable
    The statutes and rules permit an award of attorney fees incurred in defending a prior award
    of fees and in defending against post-judgment motions; in this case, a request for relief from
    judgment. Attorney fees may be awarded to the prevailing party in an action where the non-
    prevailing entity’s position does not have a reasonable basis in fact or law, I.C. § 12-117. In the
    normal course of events, the judgment determines the prevailing party who is then allowed to seek
    attorney fees incurred to secure that judgment on the merits. Typically, if attorney fees are
    awarded, an amended judgment is filed so that the award can be collected pursuant to a judgment.
    Here, however, after Lilton was awarded attorney fees, the Prosecutor unsuccessfully challenged
    the award, including requesting relief from the judgment itself. 
    Idaho Code § 12-117
     includes
    attorney fees to Lilton, as the prevailing party, for the additional fees he incurred in defending his
    initial award of attorney fees and opposing the request for relief from the judgment. Lilton
    prevailed. The Prosecutor has cited to no rule or attorney fee statute that precludes an award for
    attorney fees necessarily incurred after a favorable decision on the merits.
    2.      The supplemental request for attorney fees need not have been brought earlier
    The district court suggested that the request for fees incurred in defending the judgment
    and initial award of attorney fees could have and must have been brought as a part of the initial
    attorney fees request. First, this is contrary to the district court’s initial holding that attorney fees
    incurred after a decision on the merits are unavailable. Second, post-judgment proceedings and
    the initial award of fees are not separate litigation, as the district court suggests. Finally, the district
    court’s analysis does not take into consideration that attorney fees in this case continued to accrue
    post-judgment until the time of the district court’s decision on Lilton’s supplemental request for
    attorney fees. Given the extent of the Prosecutor’s filings after Lilton’s first fee award, it would
    be impractical for Lilton to file updates to the initial award of attorney fees on a rolling basis. The
    district court asked Lilton why he had not filed the supplemental request earlier, and Lilton
    responded that it was not “ripe” because he was not yet the prevailing party on the post-merits
    decision litigation.
    4
    On appeal, the Prosecutor argues that Lilton’s position that the supplemental attorney fee
    request was not ripe earlier is a concession and the invited error doctrine precludes Lilton’s claim
    of error. The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when that
    party’s conduct induces the commission of the error. State v. Atkinson, 
    124 Idaho 816
    , 819, 
    864 P.2d 654
    , 657 (Ct. App. 1993). Lilton’s position was not a concession that he was eligible for the
    supplemental attorney fees before making that request, but instead was a correct assertion that he
    was not the prevailing party on the post-merits litigation, including the Prosecutor’s motion for
    relief from the judgment, until that phase of litigation concluded in his favor. The district court
    erred in its initial decision.
    B.      The District Court Erred in Deciding the Motion for Reconsideration
    A different district judge decided the motion for reconsideration. The district court did not
    directly address the basis for the holdings on the initial motion. The district court stated, “Of
    course, this court is not being asked to reconsider the court’s earlier award of fees to the car.”
    Instead, the district court determined that: (1) Lilton was not a real party in interest; (2) a judgment
    was not required on the merits, and; (3) the Prosecutor had a good faith basis to claim in law or
    fact that the initial attorney fee request was untimely and, although the Prosecutor did not so argue,
    there was a basis in law for such an argument precluding attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117. We
    disagree.
    1.      The district court erred in holding Lilton is not the real party in interest
    Lilton argues the district court erred by finding Lilton is a person but not a party entitled to
    request attorney fees under the relevant statutes. Lilton asserts he is a real party in interest under
    I.C. § 37-2744(d) and is entitled to claim attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117. The district court
    concluded that, although Lilton is a person, he is not a party entitled to personally request attorney
    fees under I.C. § 12-117. In reaching this conclusion, the district court first considered the nature
    of an in rem action and concluded that only “a vehicle and a pile of federal reserve notes” were
    defendants. The district court also described what it viewed as the summary nature of in rem
    forfeiture actions, concluding that the legislature set the proceedings up to be “quick and dirty”
    and, while the owner could appear, an owner is not allowed to be a “party” to the action. We
    conclude to the contrary that Lilton is a real party in interest under the statutes and case law.
    5
    The district court recognized, but then distinguished, Idaho Department of Law
    Enforcement, By and Through Richard L. Cade v. Kluss, 
    125 Idaho 682
    , 
    873 P.2d 1336
     (1994).
    Kluss is indistinguishable in any meaningful way. The Kluss Court held:
    Admittedly, a civil property forfeiture action under I.C. § 37-2744A is an in
    rem proceeding brought in the name of the state against the property sought to be
    forfeited. However, there is no question from the forfeiture provisions that the
    legislature contemplated it would be the property owner who would be the real party
    in interest. The statute specifically provides that notice of the forfeiture must be sent
    to any persons holding a recorded interest in the property and that the forfeiture
    complaint must be served on all persons having an interest in it. The statute also
    requires that the property be released to the owner if the owner had no knowledge or
    reason to believe the real property was being used for the purposes alleged by the
    DLE, or if it in fact was not being so used. Without question, the owner of the property
    being subjected to a forfeiture proceeding is so inextricably involved in the forfeiture
    that the property owner is such a "person" included within I.C. § 12-117. We,
    therefore, conclude that I.C. § 12-117 applies to drug forfeiture proceedings.
    Kluss, 
    125 Idaho at 684-85
    , 
    873 P.2d at 1338-39
     (emphasis added). The district court noted that
    Kluss would be determinative if this were a real property case under I.C. § 37-2744A, but
    distinguished Kluss because this is a personal property forfeiture case under I.C. § 37-2744(d) with
    a more “truncated” procedure relative to personal property forfeitures.            For purposes of
    determining the real party in interest, the framework for the proceeding is not relevant. The
    Prosecutor does not contend otherwise. Kluss is controlling and Lilton is the real party in interest
    entitled to personally make a claim for attorney fees.
    2.      The district court erred in holding that a judgment is not required
    As to the entry of judgment, the district court held that under I.C. § 37-2744(d) a judgment
    is not appropriate or necessary because this is an action in rem. The district court acknowledged
    that the legislature made reference to the court entering judgment in I.C. § 37-
    2744(d)(3)(D)(IV)(iii) but stated “one cannot view the various orders the legislature has required
    the court to make as judgments as that term is defined in Rule 54.” Related to the erroneous
    holding that Lilton is not a party, the district court held that an in rem action only has one party
    and there is no claim by or against any other party. The district court acknowledged that it should
    enter a judgment in such cases setting forth the relief the only party to the action (the Prosecutor
    or other appropriate state agency) is entitled to receive on the claim which can be nothing, title to
    the conveyance, or a portion of the proceeds. Nonetheless, the district court concluded that no
    6
    judgment was otherwise necessary or needed to be entered in favor of the property named as
    defendants in this case. Since Lilton is a real party in interest, a judgment was appropriate and
    necessary. See Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54; Idaho Appellate Rule 11.
    3.      The district court erred in holding that there was a reasonable basis in law or
    fact for the denial of attorney fees in the first instance and denying the
    supplemental fees on that basis
    Although the district court concluded Lilton was not entitled to attorney fees because he is
    not a party, it alternatively considered the merits of Lilton’s request.          The district court
    acknowledged Lilton argued that the Prosecutor acted without a reasonable basis in opposing the
    first fee request because the Prosecutor’s objection to attorney fees was admittedly untimely; and
    the Prosecutor conceded that an attorney fee award was appropriate so the Prosecutor’s later
    opposition was without a reasonable basis in fact or law. However, the district court held that even
    though the Prosecutor’s objection to attorney fees was untimely, the court could consider the
    arguments made therein, and that because a judgment was not necessary, there was a reasonable,
    albeit unpersuasive, argument that the time to file the initial request for attorney fees ran from the
    court’s order that possession of the car and cash be returned to Lilton, which would make Lilton’s
    attorney fee request untimely.
    The Prosecutor conceded the first award of attorney fees due to the Prosecutor filing an
    untimely response.2     The district court abused its discretion by denying the request for
    reconsideration of the supplemental request for attorney fees based on finding that the Prosecutor
    actually had a good faith basis to have challenged the first award of attorney fees. The first order
    for attorney fees was followed by a request for judgment. Lilton’s request for entry of judgment
    was not a delay tactic and did not violate I.R.C.P. 58. The district court initially did not enter
    judgment. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(4), attorney fees can be sought any time after a jury verdict
    or a decision of the court, but not later than fourteen days after entry of a judgment by any party
    who claims costs. While failure to timely file a memorandum of costs and attorney fees is a waiver,
    the timeliness of a request for attorney fees is based on the entry of a judgment.
    2
    At the hearing conducted May 24, 2021, the district court noted that there was no objection
    to an award of fees and the issue was the fees requested, to which the Prosecutor responded, “I
    don’t see it any other way, Your Honor.” The Prosecutor later asked for reconsideration; however,
    the Prosecutor first conceded Lilton had standing and the district court properly awarded attorney
    fees because the Prosecutor’s objection was untimely. The Prosecutor does not argue the district
    court should have disregarded his concession.
    7
    The district court acknowledged that it was not being asked to reconsider the attorney fees
    initially awarded and that the Prosecutor conceded its initial objection was untimely and, thus,
    there was no basis upon which to challenge the initial award. Nonetheless, the district court
    concluded the Prosecutor could have made an argument reasonably based in law that the initial
    award of attorney fees was untimely. The district court denied Lilton’s request for supplemental
    attorney fees and, in doing so, abused its discretion. The district court stated that this aspect of its
    decision was made assuming error in its holdings that Lilton was not a party and no judgment was
    required. As such, the district court noted that the untimeliness argument would have been
    unpersuasive, but nonetheless concluded it was not without a basis in law or fact.
    The Prosecutor agreed at the May 24, 2021, hearing on post-judgment motions that the
    only issue was the amount of attorney fees to award, acknowledging that Lilton was entitled to
    attorney fees. That concession came after the Prosecutor made the argument in its various post-
    judgment filings that the initial request for attorney fees was untimely and violated Rule 58’s
    prohibition of delaying entry of judgment for the taxation of costs. The Prosecutor did not ask for
    reconsideration or appeal any adverse decision. The district court erred in disregarding the
    Prosecutor’s previous concessions when finding that the Prosecutor had a reasonable legal
    argument to defeat the first award of attorney fees. Lilton is a real party in interest and entitled to
    judgment and the opportunity to seek attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117. The district court erred
    in denying Lilton’s motion for reconsideration.
    IV.
    CONCLUSION
    The district court erred in finding Lilton was not a real party in interest and was not entitled
    to attorney fees.     Consequently, the district court erred by denying Lilton’s motion for
    reconsideration.    As a result, we reverse the district court’s denial of Lilton’s motion for
    reconsideration and remand the case for entry of an award of attorney fees.
    Costs on appeal are awarded to Lilton.
    Chief Judge LORELLO and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 49676

Filed Date: 11/15/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/15/2023