IDHW v. Jane Doe ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 51961
In the Matter of: John Doe I, Jane Doe I, )
and Jane Doe II, Children Under )
Eighteen (18) Years of Age. )
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF )
HEALTH AND WELFARE, ) Filed: November 18, 2024
)
Petitioner-Respondent, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
v. ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
JANE DOE (2024-28), ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the Second Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Nez Perce County. Hon. Victoria Olds, Magistrate Judge.
Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.
Ayla C. Krueger, Fuhs Law Office, PLLC, Lewiston, for appellant.
Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Briana Allen, Deputy Attorney General,
Lewiston, for respondent.
________________________________________________
HUSKEY, Judge
Jane Doe appeals from the magistrate court’s judgment terminating her parental rights to
her children, John Doe I, Jane Doe I and Jane Doe II (Children).1 Doe argues the magistrate court
erred in finding she neglected Children by her conduct or omissions, was unable to discharge her
parental responsibilities, and that it is in the Children’s best interests to terminate Doe’s parental
rights. The magistrate court’s judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed.
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Children’s biological father’s rights were also terminated to John Doe I and Jane Doe I.
He appealed from the judgment terminating her parental rights in Docket No. 51960. The parental
rights of the father of Jane Doe II are not at issue in this case.
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I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Doe is the biological parent of Children. This case began when Doe and Children were
walking along the side of a busy road with no sidewalk. When contacted by law enforcement
officers, Doe explained she was seeking refuge with Children at the local shelter following a
domestic violence incident with John Doe. The Department of Health and Welfare (Department)
filed a petition pursuant to the Idaho Child Protection Act to shelter Children. Following a hearing,
Children remained in shelter care. A case plan was submitted by the Department and adopted by
the magistrate court. Periodic review hearings occurred and ultimately, the Department filed a
petition to terminate Doe’s parental rights. After a hearing, the magistrate court determined that
Doe neglected Children because her conduct or omissions deprived Children of proper parental
care and control and because of Doe’s long-term and ongoing inability to discharge her parental
responsibilities. The magistrate court determined it is in the best interests of Children to terminate
Doe’s parental rights. Doe appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater
quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143
Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood
to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe
v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the magistrate court’s decision
must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
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III.
ANALYSIS
Doe argues the magistrate court erred in finding that: (1) she neglected Children by her
conduct or omissions and because she is unable to discharge her parental responsibilities; (2) she
parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities and such inability will continue for a
prolonged indeterminate period and will be injurious to the health, morals or well-being of the
child; (3) it was impossible for her to complete the case plan; and (4) it is in the best interests of
Children to terminate her parental rights. The Department argues the evidentiary burden was
satisfied as to each argument.
A. Grounds for Termination
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her
child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341,
343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the
Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family
life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due
process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383,
386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a parent-
child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental liberty
interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may terminate a
parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep’t of Health &
Welfare, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at
652.
Idaho Code § 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the parent-
child relationship when it is in the child’s best interests and any one of the following five factors
exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child
and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities for a
prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e) the
parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each statutory
ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117. Upon
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finding a statutory ground for termination, the court must also find that it is in the best interests of
the child to terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 16-2005(1). Both findings must be
established by clear and convincing evidence.
In this case, the magistrate court found alternate statutory bases for which Doe’s parental
rights could be terminated. First, the magistrate court found that Doe neglected Children by failing
to exercise proper parental care and control and second, because Doe demonstrated a long-term,
ongoing inability to discharge parental responsibilities.
1. Neglect
Doe argues the magistrate court erred in finding she neglected Children. The Department
argues the finding of neglect is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Pursuant to I.C.
§ 16-2005(1)(b), neglect is a statutory ground for terminating parental rights. Idaho Code § 16-
2002(3)(a), in part, defines “neglect” as any conduct included in I.C. § 16-1602(31). Section 16-
1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when the child is without proper
parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for his or her
well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents, guardian, or other custodian
or their neglect or refusal to provide them. Section 16-1602(31)(b) provides a child is neglected
when its parents are “unable to discharge their responsibilities to and for the child and, as a result
of such inability, the child lacks the parental care necessary for his health, safety, or well-being.”
Doe first asserts the magistrate court failed to consider Doe’s developmental disability
when concluding Doe neglected Children. Here, any challenges to Doe’s ability to comply with
the case plan had to be raised during the Child Protection Action case and cannot be raised for the
first time in the termination case. In re Doe, 156 Idaho 682, 687, 330 P.3d 1040, 1045 (2014).
Therefore, we decline to address this argument. Second, Doe argues that her developmental
disability is not evidence of neglect. Because the magistrate court did not find Doe neglected
Children based on a developmental disability, we need not address the argument any further.
Regarding whether Doe’s conduct or omissions resulted in Children lacking proper
parental care and control, the magistrate court considered various factors, including: (1) Doe’s
failure to protect Children from John Doe; (2) her child protection history; (3) her unaddressed
substance abuse; (4) failing to follow through with treatment; (5) her past criminal behavior; (6) the
domestic violence in the home; (7) the improvement of Children in foster care; and (8) Doe’s
noncompliance with the case plan. Doe argues the magistrate court did not give adequate
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consideration to her progress because she was making strides towards sobriety, protectiveness, her
mental treatment, and stable housing.
The magistrate court considered all the evidence, including Doe’s marginal progress. Doe
essentially asks this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we decline to do, as this Court does not
reweigh evidence, but defers to the trial court’s unique ability to accurately weigh the evidence
and judge the demeanor of the witnesses. Doe, 148 Idaho at 246, 220 P.3d at 1065.
The magistrate court noted that the primary safety concerns in this case, as with the prior
CPA cases, are illegal substance use, domestic violence, and emotional volatility. Any facts that
are relevant to whether a statutory basis upon which to terminate parental rights exist are properly
analyzed by the magistrate court. Thus, nothing precludes the magistrate court from considering
the above factors to assess whether Children were neglected.
The magistrate court found that the home environment for Children was unstable, and
Father was violent and dangerous. Doe has not learned to prioritize the safety of Children over
her relationship with John Doe. A court’s finding that a parent is unable to protect her children
from the other parent constitutes substantial and competent evidence that the parent neglected her
children. In Interest of Doe Children, 163 Idaho 367, 374, 413 P.3d 767, 774 (2018). The
magistrate court found that Children suffered regular physical and emotional neglect. For
example, despite Doe’s statements that John Doe had engaged in domestic violence at the time
Children were taken into custody, Doe later said that John Doe has never harmed her and does not
recall him abusing her in front of Children. Despite John Doe’s arrest on three counts of felony
rape of a child, based on allegations involving Doe’s oldest daughter, Doe testified she thinks the
allegations are false because she did not ever witness any rape and “[t]here’s no solid proof that
he’s ever raped her.” Mother testified that John Doe is safe around her other children and plans to
allow John Doe to be around Children if they are returned to her. The definition of neglect does
not require the child suffer demonstrable harm before a finding of neglect can be made. In re Doe,
143 Idaho at 347, 144 P.3d at 601.
As to the prior child protection cases, Doe acknowledges that the history of a family can
be considered as evidence of neglect. Doe, 144 Idaho at 843, 172 P.3d at 1118. The magistrate
court found that since 2012, the family has been the subject of twenty-two safety referral reports,
of which thirteen were investigated, resulting in substantiated investigations of neglect by Doe in
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2014, 2018, and in this case. Doe has had two prior CPA cases in Idaho and one CPA case in
Washington, and her parental rights to her oldest child have been terminated in an unrelated case.
The magistrate court could properly consider Doe’s untreated addiction to illegal
substances, as a drug problem that interferes with parenting and supports a determination of
neglect. Int. of Doe I, 166 Idaho 173, 177, 457 P.3d 154, 158 (2020). Doe testified that her
addiction to illegal substances affected her ability to care for Children, as it caused them to miss
school and appointments, and that her thinking and behavior was not normal due to her drug use.
Doe also testified that she was in a drug-induced psychosis at the time she was walking along the
road with Children. The magistrate court found that Doe failed to follow through with treatment.
Failing to follow through with treatment is a factor the magistrate court can properly consider. See
In re Doe, 133 Idaho 826, 830, 992 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Ct. App. 1999). Doe continued to use illegal
substances, Doe did not show proof of medication management and counseling, and one of the
case workers noticed that Doe’s substance abuse affected Doe’s behavior.
A court may also consider a parent’s involvement in criminal activity and the charges
against them, as evidence of neglect. In re Doe, 142 Idaho 174, 179, 125 P.3d 530, 535 (2005).
The magistrate court considered that Doe had been charged with felony drug possession, but the
charges had been dismissed during the pendency of the CPA case. The magistrate court considered
this only to note that despite the charges being dismissed, Doe did not seek treatment but instead
continued to use controlled substances.
The record contains evidence of domestic violence, including the acts that precipitated
Children coming into the Department’s care. Doe exposed Children to this behavior, and during
one instance, John Doe I attempted to intervene on Doe’s behalf, which is evidence of neglect
based on Doe’s conduct demonstrating a lack of proper parental care and control.
In addressing the statutory bases of neglect, the magistrate court analyzed the case plan
tasks that were directly related to and address the same safety threats that applied to the other
statutory bases for terminating Doe’s parental rights: neglect by conduct or omission and by failing
to discharge her parental responsibilities. Doe acknowledges that she did not complete her case
plan but claims this was because visitation was suspended. Doe testified that the Department “took
away my visits, so why should I do what they want me to do when they took away my kids.” The
magistrate court found that Doe only stayed fifteen minutes during the meeting to develop the case
plan and refused to attend the case plan hearing. Despite this, the magistrate court found that Doe
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partially completed some case plan tasks but was not able to articulate knowledge of the
circumstances that would lead her to use illegal substances, did not follow through with addressing
her unhealthy relationship with John Doe, did not maintain healthy relationships free from abuse
and violence, and did not demonstrate an ability to understand the negative effect these behaviors
had on Children.
Doe argues the Department’s actions made it impossible for her to comply with the case
plan. In support, Doe cites Idaho Dept of Health & Welfare v. Jane Doe (In re John Doe), 161
Idaho 596, 389 P.3d 141 (2016). An impossibility defense precludes a finding of neglect pursuant
to I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b), which defines neglect, in part as:
(b) The parent(s) has failed to comply with the court’s orders or the case
plan in a child protective act case and:
(i) The department has had temporary or legal custody of the child
for fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months; and
(ii) Reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the
fifteenth month in which the child has been in the temporary or legal
custody of the department.
Doe fails to articulate which part of the case plan she could not comply with and how that
was attributable to the Department. More importantly, the impossibility defense only applies to
allegations of neglect pursuant to I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b). See Doe, 161 Idaho at 600, 389 P.3d at
145 (holding impossibility may be asserted as defense to claim of neglect founded upon failure to
comply with requirements of case plan). In this case, the Department did not allege, and the
magistrate court did not find, that Doe neglected her children pursuant to I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b), so
the magistrate court did not err in concluding the impossibility defense did not apply.
Consequently, the magistrate court did not err in considering the above factors or in
finding that Doe neglected Children.
2. Discharge of parental responsibilities
To the extent the magistrate court found Doe failed to discharge parental responsibilities
and would be unable to do so for a prolonged period of time2 pursuant to Idaho Code § 16-
2
The Department petitioned to terminate Doe’s parental rights on two different bases:
pursuant to Idaho Code § 16-2005(1)(b) and pursuant to I.C. § 16-2005(1)(d). It is not entirely
clear whether the magistrate court found the inability to discharge parental responsibilities as an
alternate basis of neglect, pursuant to I.C. § 16-2005(1)(b), or whether it was based on I.C. § 16-
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2005(1)(d), substantial and competent evidence supports this finding. Idaho Code § 16-2005(1)(d)
provides an independent basis for terminating parental rights: “The parent is unable to discharge
parental responsibilities and such inability will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period and
will be injurious to the health, morals or well-being of the child.” The magistrate court found that
Doe cannot meet Children’s basic needs, did not address the safety concerns that brought Children
into the Department’s care, cannot set safe and healthy boundaries or demonstrate learned skills
over time, and that despite the Department’s efforts, Doe does not have the necessary insight or
ability to parent responsibly.
Doe does not separately address this ground but regardless, Doe’s arguments regarding her
failure to discharge parental responsibilities fail for the same reasons that her argument regarding
neglect by conduct and omission fails. The same reasons and factual support for the magistrate
court’s finding of neglect by conduct or omission also support the magistrate court’s finding that
Doe was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities for a prolonged period of time, pursuant
to I.C. § 16-2005(1)(d). Consequently, the magistrate court did not err in so finding.
B. Best Interests of the Children
Once statutory grounds for termination have been established, the trial court must next
determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship.
Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When
determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the
parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the
unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the
child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s
efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Doe
(2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare
v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best interests
of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Idaho Dep’t
of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012).
2005(1)(d). To the extent the magistrate court addressed it as an alternate basis of neglect pursuant
to I.C. § 16-1602(31)(b), for the same reasons there is substantial and competent evidence to
support a finding of neglect under I.C. § 16-1602(31)(a), there is substantial and competent
evidence to support a finding of neglect pursuant to I.C. § 16-1602(31)(b).
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The magistrate court found that terminating Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests of
Children because Doe had ongoing law enforcement contacts and criminal charges (although they
were subsequently dismissed), failed to provide any financial support, her situation and ability to
safely parent had deteriorated, which the magistrate court found unsurprising given her untreated
substance abuse and unstable relationship with John Doe. The magistrate court concluded that
Doe had learned nothing from any of the prior CPA cases and refused to take any responsibility
for neglecting Children. One of the Department workers who was involved in this case and the
previous CPA cases, saw a significant deterioration in Doe’s functioning and physical signs of
long-term drug use and noted that Doe is unable to recognize her maltreatment of Children. Doe
could not or did not provide for Children’s most basic educational needs. Children’s attendance
at school was poor and they were significantly underperforming academically: at age eight, John
Doe I did not know all the letters of the alphabet and, at age six, Jane Doe I cannot recognize letters
or know their sounds.
In contrast, Children have made significant progress in foster care. The foster care
placement was the same placement Children had in a prior CPA case. The foster parent in this
case is highly educated and has specialized training in interacting with trauma-exposed children.
The foster parent testified that John Doe I and Jane Doe I were feral when they came to her when
John Doe I was three and Jane Doe I was two. By the time they were returned to their parents’
care, both had established routines and could regulate their behavior. The foster parent testified
that when the two older children returned to her care, at ages eight and six, the Children had
regressed, were again “kind of feral,” and all Children, including Jane Doe II, were behind
academically and physically for their ages. As to all Children, the magistrate court found they
have made progress at school, in the home, in their speech, and in their ability to manage anger.
The magistrate court also noted that Children are happier, healthier, and calmer. Children’s
behavior has improved dramatically, and they have a safe and stable bond with their foster parent.
Thus, the magistrate court did not err in determining that it is in the best interests of Children to
terminate Doe’s parental rights.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s conclusions that Doe
neglected Children, was unable to discharge parental responsibilities, and that termination of Doe’s
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parental rights is in the best interests of Children. The judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights
is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge TRIBE CONCUR.
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