State v. Struckmeyer ( 2024 )


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  •                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
    Docket No. 50819
    STATE OF IDAHO,                                )
    )       Filed: November 20, 2024
    Plaintiff-Respondent,                   )
    )       Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
    v.                                             )
    )       THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
    PAIGE LINDSEY STRUCKMEYER,                     )       OPINION AND SHALL NOT
    )       BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
    Defendant-Appellant.                    )
    )
    Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,
    Kootenai County. Hon. Richard S. Christensen, District Judge.
    Order denying motion to suppress, affirmed; judgment of conviction, affirmed.
    Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kiley A. Heffner, Deputy
    Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
    Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney
    General, Boise, for respondent.
    ________________________________________________
    HUSKEY, Judge
    Paige Lindsey Struckmeyer appeals from her judgment of conviction for felony possession
    of a controlled substance. Struckmeyer argues the district court erred in denying her motion to
    suppress because an officer exceeded the scope of Struckmeyer’s consent in searching her vehicle
    during a warrantless search. The officer’s search was justified under the plain view exception to
    the warrant requirement, a ground not challenged by Struckmeyer on appeal. Additionally, the
    search did not exceed the scope of Struckmeyer’s consent. The order denying Struckmeyer’s
    motion to suppress and her judgment of conviction are affirmed.
    II.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Officer Pierson stopped a vehicle for failing to display a front license plate. Officer Pierson
    approached the vehicle, talked with the driver (Struckmeyer), informed her of the reason for the
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    stop, and asked for her driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. Struckmeyer’s
    mother was a passenger in the vehicle.        While Struckmeyer was looking for her proof of
    registration, Officer Pierson was in radio contact with another officer inquiring whether
    Struckmeyer was someone the police were investigating for possible drug crimes. Officer Pierson
    then returned to her patrol vehicle to run warrant and driver license checks using Struckmeyer’s
    driver’s license and expired vehicle registration. While running Struckmeyer’s information,
    Officer Pierson simultaneously inquired of another officer whether Struckmeyer was being
    investigated for possible drug crimes. Officer Pierson then got out of her patrol car and informed
    Struckmeyer that her driver’s license was suspended and that she could not drive. Officer Pierson
    told Struckmeyer that she would “cut [Struckmeyer] a cite and then I’ll let you be on your way.”
    Officer Pierson then handed the citation book, Struckmeyer’s driver’s license, and her vehicle
    registration to Officer Brown, who had just arrived, and told him to write a citation for driving
    while suspended.
    Officer Pierson then asked Struckmeyer if she had any illegal drugs in her vehicle. Officer
    Pierson asked Struckmeyer if she could search the vehicle.            Although initially reluctant,
    Struckmeyer consented to Officer Pierson searching her vehicle for marijuana. During the search,
    Officer Pierson discovered a cut plastic red straw in Struckmeyer’s purse that she recognized as
    drug paraphernalia. The plastic straw contained a white residue that Officer Pierson suspected to
    be a controlled substance. Officer Pierson also found a prescription drug container bearing neither
    Struckmeyer’s nor her mother’s name and marijuana in Struckmeyer’s purse. Struckmeyer then
    asked to speak with Officer Pierson. Struckmeyer informed Officer Pierson that there was a broken
    methamphetamine pipe in her purse and she did not want Officer Pierson to get cut by it. Officer
    Pierson located the pipe. Shortly thereafter, Officer Brown notified Struckmeyer that he had
    completed the citation and handed Officer Pierson her citation book.
    The State charged Struckmeyer with felony possession of a controlled substance, 
    Idaho Code § 37-2732
    (c)(1), and misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A(1).
    Struckmeyer filed a motion to suppress, arguing that, among other issues, the search was unlawful
    because Officer Pierson exceeded the scope of Struckmeyer’s consent. The district court held a
    hearing, where Officer Pierson, Officer Brown, and Struckmeyer testified. Despite Struckmeyer’s
    consent for the officer to search the car, Struckmeyer testified that she would not have allowed
    Officer Pierson to search her purse. Subsequently, the district court issued its memorandum
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    decision and order on Struckmeyer’s motion to suppress. The district court denied Struckmeyer’s
    motion to suppress, finding relevant to this appeal, that although Struckmeyer did not provide
    broad consent to search her vehicle for any controlled substances, Officer Pierson’s search was
    lawfully within the scope of Struckmeyer’s consent to search for marijuana. Once Officer Pierson
    had consent to search, he could lawfully search the purse and examine both the red plastic straw
    and the pill bottle because either could have contained marijuana. Alternatively, the district court
    found that Officer Pierson’s examination and ultimate seizure of the plastic red straw and
    prescription pill bottle were justified by the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, based
    on Struckmeyer’s consent.
    Pursuant to a plea agreement, Struckmeyer entered a conditional guilty plea to felony
    possession of a controlled substance, reserving her right to appeal from the district court’s denial
    of her motion to suppress. The State dismissed the possession of paraphernalia charge and an
    unrelated case. Struckmeyer appealed.
    II.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
    to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
    substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
    as found. State v. Atkinson, 
    128 Idaho 559
    , 561, 
    916 P.2d 1284
    , 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
    suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
    weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
    
    127 Idaho 102
    , 106, 
    897 P.2d 993
    , 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 
    132 Idaho 786
    , 789, 
    979 P.2d 659
    , 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
    III.
    ANALYSIS
    Struckmeyer argues that mindful of the United States Supreme Court and Idaho precedent,
    the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress because Officer Pierson exceeded the
    scope of Struckmeyer’s consent when she examined the pill bottle and plastic red straw inside her
    purse. The State argues that the district court correctly denied Struckmeyer’s motion to suppress
    because Officer Pierson’s search of the purse and examination of the plastic red straw and pill
    bottle was within the scope of Struckmeyer’s consent that the officer could search for marijuana.
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    The State also argues that the district court denied the motion on an alternate basis--that to the
    extent the reading of the words on the prescription pill bottle and the examination of the plastic
    red straw exceed the scope of consent to search for marijuana, the officer’s actions were justified
    by the plain view exception to the search warrant, and because Struckmeyer does not challenge
    that basis on appeal, the district court’s decision must be affirmed.
    The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches
    and seizures. Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable and therefore, violative of
    the Fourth Amendment. State v. Weaver, 
    127 Idaho 288
    , 290, 
    900 P.2d 196
    , 198 (1995). The
    State may overcome this presumption by demonstrating that a warrantless search either fell within
    a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the
    circumstances. 
    Id.
     One such exception is the plain view doctrine, which permits an officer to
    seize evidence viewed from an area where the officer has a right to be if it is immediately apparent
    to the officer that the items viewed are contraband or evidence of a crime. State v. Claiborne, 
    120 Idaho 581
    , 586, 
    818 P.2d 285
    , 290 (1991).
    Struckmeyer does not challenge the district court’s finding that Officer Pierson’s
    examination and ultimate seizure of the plastic red straw and prescription pill bottle were justified
    by the plain view exception.         Where a lower court’s alternative ground for its relevant
    determination is unchallenged on appeal, the appellate court will not presume error and must
    uphold the lower court on the unchallenged ground. State v. Goodwin, 
    131 Idaho 364
    , 366-67,
    956, P.2d 1311, 1313-14 (Ct. App. 1998). Here, because Struckmeyer does not challenge the
    district court’s finding that the search was justified by the plain view doctrine, we affirm the district
    court’s denial of Struckmeyer’s motion to suppress.
    IV.
    CONCLUSION
    The district court did not err in denying Struckmeyer’s motion to suppress because the
    search was justified under the plain view and consent exceptions to the warrant requirement and
    the search did not exceed the scope of Struckmeyer’s consent. The district court’s order denying
    Struckmeyer’s motion to suppress and her judgment of conviction are affirmed.
    Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge TRIBE CONCUR.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 50819

Filed Date: 11/20/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/20/2024