Morris v. Middleton Police Department ( 2020 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO CAMERON MORRIS, Case No. 1:20-cv-00121-DCN Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE MIDDLETON POLICE DEPARTMENT and CANYON COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE OR DEPARTMENT, Defendants. The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Cameron Morris’s Complaint as a result of Plaintiff’s status as an inmate and in forma pauperis request. The Court now reviews the Complaint to determine whether it should be summarily dismissed in whole or in part under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Having reviewed the record, and otherwise being fully informed, the Court enters the following Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if Plaintiff intends to proceed. 1. Screening Requirement The Court must review complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity, as well as complaints filed in forma pauperis, to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. The Court must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that states a frivolous or malicious claim, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b). 2. Pleading Standard A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. In other words, although Rule 8 “does not require detailed factual allegations, ... it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed-me accusation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the facts pleaded are “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability,” or if there is an “obvious alternative explanation” that would not result in liability, the complaint has not stated a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 678, 682 (internal quotation marks omitted). 3. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is an inmate currently confined in the Canyon County Jail. It appears that Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, though that is not entirely clear from the Complaint. Plaintiff sues the Middleton Police Department and the Canyon County Sheriff’s Department, alleging that various nondefendant police officers or sheriff’s deputies illegally arrested Plaintiff for violating a no contact order. Compl., Dkt. 3, at 2. Plaintiff claims that the officers did not have probable cause and that Plaintiff did not have notice of the no contact order. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against the Defendants. Id. 4. Discussion Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to proceed with the Complaint. The Court will, however, grant Plaintiff 28 days to amend the Complaint. Any amended complaint should take into consideration the following. A. Section 1983 Claims Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). To be liable under § 1983, “the defendant must possess a purposeful, a knowing, or possibly a reckless state of mind.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015). Negligence is not actionable under § 1983, because a negligent act by a public official is not an abuse of governmental power but merely a “failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986). Governmental officials generally are not liable for damages in their individual capacities under § 1983 unless they personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“[E]ach Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”). Section 1983 does not allow for recovery against an employer or principal simply because an employee or agent committed misconduct. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. However, “[a] defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists ... a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). A plaintiff can establish this causal connection by alleging that a defendant (1) “set[] in motion a series of acts by others”; (2) “knowingly refus[ed] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury”; (3) failed to act or improperly acted in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates”; (4) “acquiesc[ed] in the constitutional deprivation”; or (5) engag[ed] in “conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Id. at 1205–09. To bring a § 1983 claim against a local governmental entity, such as the Middleton Police Department or the Canyon County Sheriff’s Department, a plaintiff must allege that the execution of an official policy or unofficial custom inflicted the injury of which the plaintiff complains, as required by Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Under Monell, the requisite elements of a § 1983 claim against a local governmental entity: (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the entity had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, a municipality or private entity performing a state function “may be held liable under § 1983 when the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority or such an official ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled in part on other grounds by Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). An unwritten policy or custom must be so “persistent and widespread” that it constitutes a “permanent and well settled” practice. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167–168 (1970)). “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff cannot simply restate these standards of law in a complaint. Instead, a plaintiff must provide specific facts supporting the elements of each claim and must allege facts showing a causal link between each defendant and Plaintiff’s injury or damage. Alleging “the mere possibility of misconduct” is not enough. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Plaintiff apparently has an ongoing state criminal case related to the allegations in the Complaint. Therefore, this action is likely subject to dismissal under the abstention doctrine. In Younger v. Harris, the United States Supreme Court has held that is only in the most unusual of circumstances that a federal court should interfere in an ongoing state criminal matter or in a threatened state court prosecution—instead, a federal court must usually abstain from entertaining such an action. 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971). A federal court can hear a civil rights action related to a pending state criminal case only if “the threat to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights … cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution.” Id. In order for a federal court properly to abstain from hearing a case under the Younger doctrine, three factors must be present: (1) there must be an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding must implicate an important state interest; and (3) there must be an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding to raise the constitutional challenge. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). Where abstention is appropriate, a federal court may still entertain an action when “extraordinary circumstances” are present, including where irreparable injury is both “great and immediate,” where the state law is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions,” and where there is a showing of “bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstances that would call for equitable relief.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, 53–54. In this case, if this Court were to interfere in Plaintiffs’ ongoing state criminal case, the principle of comity would not be served. Important state interests are at stake where criminal proceedings are involved, as discussed in Younger. Plaintiff has a remedy in the state court system, and there is no indication that the state courts are not fully capable of adjudicating the constitutional issues raised by Plaintiff. Because the three factors required for a Younger abstention are present, and because no “extraordinary circumstances” exist to allow Plaintiff to proceed on his federal claim at this time, the Court concludes that abstaining from Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims is appropriate. If Plaintiff is a convicted inmate, instead of a pretrial detainee, then his § 1983 claims appear to be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may not proceed with a civil rights claim if a favorable result on that claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s criminal conviction or sentence. Id. at 486–87. That is, if success on a civil rights claim would necessarily call into question the validity of a conviction or sentence, the plaintiff must first establish that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Id. A “claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 487. On the other hand, if “the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed.” Id. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he should set forth how the alleged constitutional violation relates to his current detention or incarceration. B. State Law Claims In addition to § 1983 claims, Plaintiff asserts state law claims under Idaho Code § 18-920(4). Compl. at 2. That statute permits an officer to arrest an individual for violating a no contact order, with probable cause and without a warrant, if the individual had notice of the no contact order. Plaintiff’s state law claims are implausible because § 18-920(4) does not create a private right of action. The Idaho Supreme Court has explained the analysis a court must undertake to determine whether a private cause of action exists: When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action. Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 416, 421 (Idaho 1996) (emphasis omitted) (relying on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A). The court in Yoakum held that there was no private right of action under certain Idaho criminal statutes. The Idaho Supreme Court relied on the following factors: the statutes were intended to protect the general public, the statutes provided for a criminal punishment, and there was no indication (1) that the legislature intended to create a private cause of action, or (2) that providing an additional civil remedy was necessary to assure the effectiveness of the statutes. Id. Similar reasoning exists here with respect to § 18-920(4). As in Yoakum, there is no indication that the Idaho Legislature intended to create a private right of action or that an additional civil is necessary to ensure the statutes’ effectiveness. Because Idaho has not created a private right of action under § 18-920(4), Plaintiff should omit such claims from any amended complaint. 5. Standards for Amended Complaint If Plaintiff chooses to amend the Complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the actions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Kay v. Ehler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). Plaintiff must also allege a sufficient causal connection between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss” or to survive screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Rather, for each cause of action against each defendant, Plaintiff must state the following: (1) the name of the person or entity that caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) facts showing the defendant is a state actor (such as state employment or a state contract) or a private entity performing a state function; (3) the dates on which the conduct of the defendant allegedly took place; (4) the specific conduct or action Plaintiff alleges is unconstitutional; (5) the particular federal constitutional provision (or state law provision) Plaintiff alleges has been violated; (6) facts alleging that the elements of the violation are met; (7) the injury or damages Plaintiff personally suffered; and (8) the particular type of relief Plaintiff is seeking from each defendant. In addition, Plaintiff must show that his claims are not subject to abstention under Younger or barred by Heck. Further, any amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff’s allegations in a single pleading and cannot rely upon, attach, or incorporate by reference other pleadings or documents. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 15.1 (“Any amendment to a pleading, whether filed as a matter of course or upon a motion to amend, must reproduce the entire pleading as amended. The proposed amended pleading must be submitted at the time of filing a motion to amend.”); see also Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[An] amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non- existent.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court erred by entering judgment against a party named in the initial complaint, but not in the amended complaint). Plaintiff must set forth each different factual allegation in a separate numbered paragraph. The amended complaint must be legibly written or typed in its entirety, and it should be clearly designated as the “First Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff’s name and address should be clearly printed at the top left corner of the first page of each document filed with the Court. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must also file a “Motion to Review the Amended Complaint.” If Plaintiff does not amend within 28 days, or if the amendment does not comply with Rule 8, this case may be dismissed without further notice. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (“When a litigant knowingly and repeatedly refuses to conform his pleadings to the requirements of the Federal Rules, it is reasonable to conclude that the litigant simply cannot state a claim.”). ORDER IT IS ORDERED: 1. Plaintiff has 28 days within which to file an amended complaint as described above. If Plaintiff does so, Plaintiff must file (along with the amended complaint) a Motion to Review the Amended Complaint. If Plaintiff does not amend within 28 days, this case may be dismissed without further notice. 2. Plaintiff's request that the Court edit his Complaint (Dkt. 8) is DENIED. 3. Plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel (contained in the Complaint) is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may renew the request for counsel in an amended complaint. Aa DATED: April 22, 2020 ie □ ™. alll - oe i Chic US District Court Judge INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 11