People v. Luedemann ( 2006 )


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  •                         Docket No. 100914.
    IN THE
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
    DEREK M. LUEDEMANN, Appellee.
    Opinion filed October 5, 2006.
    CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court,
    with opinion.
    Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Garman, and Karmeier
    concurred in the judgment and opinion.
    Justice Burke took no part in the decision.
    OPINION
    Defendant, Derek M. Luedemann, was charged with driving
    under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11B501(a)(2)
    (West 2002)) and illegal transportation of alcohol (625 ILCS
    5/11B502(a) (West 2002)). In a separate case, defendant was charged
    with unlawful possession of a controlled substance (a
    methylenedioxy amphetamine derivative) (720 ILCS 570/402(c)
    (West 2002)). Defendant moved to quash his arrest and suppress
    evidence in both cases. Additionally, he petitioned to rescind the
    statutory summary suspension of his driver=s license. The basis for
    the motions was that there was no warrant for his arrest and that the
    arresting officer had neither probable cause nor a reasonable
    articulable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity.
    In the DUI case, the circuit court of Kane County granted both the
    motion to suppress and the petition to rescind the statutory summary
    suspension. Defendant then moved in the controlled substances case
    to bar the State from contesting the motion to suppress. The trial
    court granted the motion, ruling that the State was collaterally
    estopped from contesting the motion to suppress. The State filed a
    certificate of impairment and appealed, arguing that the trial court in
    the DUI case erred in granting the motion to suppress and that the
    trial court in the controlled substances case erred when it granted the
    motion to collaterally estop the State from contesting the motion to
    suppress. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed in
    part and vacated in part. 
    357 Ill. App. 3d 411
    . In the DUI case, the
    appellate court affirmed the trial court=s granting of the motion to
    suppress. However, the court also held that the State was not
    collaterally estopped from contesting the motion to suppress in the
    controlled substances case because, at the time the trial court made
    the collateral estoppel ruling, the trial court=s decision in the DUI
    case was on appeal and not yet 
    final. 357 Ill. App. 3d at 426
    . We
    allowed the State=s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
    BACKGROUND
    Officer Eric Pate of the Hampshire police department was the
    sole witness to testify at the hearing on defendant=s petition to rescind
    the statutory summary suspension of his driver=s license, and Officer
    Pate=s testimony was also considered by the trial court in ruling on
    defendant=s motion to suppress in the DUI case. Officer Pate testified
    that he was on patrol in a residential neighborhood on August 17,
    2002, at approximately 2:40 a.m. He was driving west on Julie Street
    when he saw defendant sitting in the driver=s seat of a car parked in
    front of 305 Julie Street. The car was legally parked and facing east.
    Officer Pate noticed that defendant was smoking a cigarette. As
    Officer Pate=s car came closer to defendant=s, he saw defendant reach
    toward the floorboard on the passenger side of the car. Officer Pate=s
    car was approximately 25 to 30 feet away from defendant=s car at this
    time. Defendant then returned to a seated position, and, as Officer
    Pate=s car approached, defendant slumped down approximately six to
    eight inches in his seat.
    -2-
    Officer Pate drove past defendant=s vehicle and parked in the
    center of the street, with his car still facing west. Officer Pate exited
    his vehicle and approached defendant=s car from the rear driver=s side.
    Defendant had his window rolled down, and he was listening to the
    car=s stereo. As Officer Pate approached, defendant turned off the
    car=s engine. Officer Pate had not asked him to do so. When Officer
    Pate was at the rear quarter panel of the vehicle, he noticed the neck
    of a brown glass bottle. The bottle was on the floor in front of the
    passenger seat. Officer Pate could see the top two or three inches of
    the bottle because he was illuminating the vehicle with his flashlight.
    Officer Pate noticed that the bottle was uncapped. Officer Pate asked
    defendant what he was doing there, and he also asked for defendant=s
    identification. Defendant provided his identification and explained
    that he was waiting for his girlfriend to return home. Defendant
    pointed to his girlfriend=s house but said that he did not know the
    address. Officer Pate explained that he had decided to question
    defendant about what he was doing because within the last week
    there had been vehicles damaged and three homes burglarized on
    Julie Street. The burglaries occurred between 5 p.m. and 8 a.m.
    However, the police had no description of the perpetrator or of the
    perpetrator=s vehicle.
    While Officer Pate was speaking to defendant, he noticed that
    defendant=s speech was slurred and that his eyes were bloodshot and
    glassy. Additionally, Officer Pate could smell alcohol on defendant=s
    breath. Because Officer Pate observed signs of intoxication, he
    radioed for another officer to join him. Officer Pate then pulled his
    squad car directly behind defendant=s car and activated his car=s
    videotape system. Officer Harris arrived on the scene, and the two
    officers approached defendant=s vehicle, one on each side. Harris
    found an open Miller Lite bottle on the floor of the passenger side of
    defendant=s vehicle, in the same spot where Officer Pate had
    previously noticed an open bottle. Officer Pate asked defendant to
    step out of the vehicle. Officer Pate then asked defendant if he could
    pat him down for weapons, and defendant agreed. Officer Pate found
    no weapons. He then instructed Officer Harris to remove the bottle
    from the vehicle. Harris said that the bottle was one-third full and
    cool to the touch. Officer Pate could see condensation on the bottle.
    Defendant admitted that he had been drinking, and he agreed to
    perform field sobriety tests. Defendant subsequently failed the
    -3-
    horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the nine-step walk-and-turn test, the
    one-leg stand test, and the finger-to-nose test. Officer Pate then told
    defendant that he believed defendant was under the influence of
    alcohol, and he placed defendant under arrest. Defendant protested
    that he had been parked, and Officer Pate explained to him that he
    had been in physical control of a motor vehicle. After defendant was
    arrested, the officers searched his vehicle and found a substance
    containing a methylenedioxy amphetamine derivative.
    At the close of Officer Pate=s testimony, the circuit court granted
    the petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension. The court
    found that Officer Pate had neither probable cause for an arrest nor a
    reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify a Terry
    stop. The State moved to reconsider, arguing that the court=s ruling
    was erroneous because Officer Pate did not seize defendant until after
    he observed signs of intoxication. The State cited cases holding that
    the police do not violate the fourth amendment merely by
    approaching a person in public and asking him questions. See
    Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 
    466 U.S. 210
    , 216,
    
    80 L. Ed. 2d 247
    , 255, 
    104 S. Ct. 1758
    , 1762 (1984); People v. Love,
    
    199 Ill. 2d 269
    , 278 (2002). Thus, according to the State, Officer Pate
    was entitled to approach defendant and ask him questions, provided
    that he did not make a show of authority sufficient to transform the
    encounter into a seizure. The State argued that no seizure occurred
    until Officer Pate asked defendant to step out of the car and, at that
    time, a Terry stop was warranted because Officer Pate had a
    reasonable suspicion that defendant was intoxicated while in control
    of a motor vehicle. Alternatively, the State argued that, even if
    Officer Pate did seize defendant prior to asking him to step out of the
    vehicle, defendant=s behavior was sufficiently suspicious to justify a
    stop under Terry. The circuit court denied the motion in a written
    order, without comment.
    Relying on the findings it made in granting the petition to rescind
    the statutory summary suspension, the circuit court later granted the
    motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The State moved for
    more detailed findings, arguing that the court=s findings were
    insufficient in that there were no findings of fact or any determination
    as to when the stop occurred. The State also moved to reconsider the
    order quashing arrest and suppressing evidence.
    -4-
    At a hearing on the State=s motions, the circuit court agreed to
    make more detailed findings. The court stated the following for the
    record:
    AAs I review the transcript the first witness to testify was
    Officer Eric Pate of the Hampshire police department. Officer
    Pate=s testimony from Page 6 through Page 11 essentially says
    that he was driving his car and he saw a person sitting in a parked
    car smoking a cigarette, and that he saw him lean forward and
    then ultimately slouched down a little bit. And on that basis he
    made a U turn, pulled in behind him and essentially conducted a
    stop. 1
    The Court finds, for the record, that on that basis Officer Pate,
    using good policeman intuition, stopped the vehicle. But in fact,
    his intuition, while ultimately turned up something, was really
    nothing more than a hunch. And I think as I stated at the time in
    Terry versus Ohio and as that case has been synthesized by the
    Second District, a hunch is not enough.
    So, with regard to a more detailed finding, the court finds that
    Officer Pate=s testimony is pretty straightforward and that he was
    operating, my view of his testimony was he was operating on a
    hunch. Now, that hunch turned out to be something that all
    policemen hope that their hunches turn out to be, but it was
    nothing more than a hunch.@
    Following arguments on the State=s motion to reconsider, the
    court entered a written order denying the motion. That order stated:
    ATHIS CAUSE, coming on for ruling on the state=s motion to
    reconsider the order to quash arrest and suppress arrest [sic]; and
    1
    The circuit court misread the transcript. Officer Pate did not conduct a
    U-turn and pull in behind the defendant at this time. Rather, Officer Pate
    parked in the middle of the street, with his car facing in the opposite
    direction. It was not until after he observed signs of intoxication and radioed
    for backup that he pulled his car in behind defendant=s.
    -5-
    the court having considered the evidence and arguments of
    counsel and having weighed the said evidence; Finds: the
    officer=s testimony regarding burglaries was creditable but not
    sufficient for the court to conclude that the area of the arrest was
    a high crime area. The officer essentially saw a young man sitting
    in a car smoking a cigarette. This conduct is not sufficient to
    warrant the approach and questioning that took place.@
    The State filed a certificate of impairment and appealed pursuant to
    Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)).
    The appellate court affirmed, with one justice dissenting. 357 Ill.
    App. 3d 411. The appellate court first rejected the State=s argument
    that Officer Pate was acting in a community caretaking or public
    safety function when he approached defendant=s vehicle. 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 418-20. Next, the appellate court held that Officer Pate did not
    have reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient
    to justify a Terry stop. Central to the appellate court=s holding was its
    belief that defendant was seized before Officer Pate observed an open
    bottle in defendant=s vehicle. 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 420. The court
    acknowledged that none of the factors set forth in the lead opinion in
    United States v. Mendenhall, 
    446 U.S. 544
    , 
    64 L. Ed. 2d 497
    , 100 S.
    Ct. 1870 (1980), 2 were present in this case. 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 423.
    However, the court held that the absence of Mendenhall factors Asays
    virtually nothing@ (
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 423) and instead found a
    seizure based upon three other factors. First, Officer Pate stopped his
    squad car in the middle of the road. The court believed that, by doing
    so, Officer Pate was demonstrating his authority as a police officer.
    The court noted that private citizens are not allowed to park in the
    middle of the street and that Officer Pate communicated a sense of
    urgency by parking in this manner. 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 421. The court
    believed that Officer Pate should have simply pulled alongside
    2
    The seizure analysis in Justice Stewart=s opinion in Mendenhall was
    joined only by Justice Rehnquist. However, by the time the court decided
    Florida v. Royer, 
    460 U.S. 491
    , 
    75 L. Ed. 2d 229
    , 
    103 S. Ct. 1319
    (1983), it
    was apparent that a majority of the court had endorsed the Mendenhall test.
    See 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure '9.4(a), at 412 (4th ed. 2004); see also,
    e.g., 
    Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215
    , 80 L. Ed. 2d at 
    255, 104 S. Ct. at 1762
    .
    -6-
    defendant=s car and asked him questions because this would have
    communicated Anothing more than a casual encounter on the street.@
    
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 422. Second, Officer Pate was shining a flashlight
    around and into defendant=s car as he approached. 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at
    421. Third, Officer Pate approached from the rear driver=s side
    quarter panel instead of Awalking up to the window as an ordinary
    citizen typically would.@ 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 421. The court concluded
    that the presence of these three factors meant that a reasonable person
    would not have felt free to leave. 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 421. After
    concluding that defendant was seized before Officer Pate observed an
    open bottle in the vehicle, the court considered the propriety of the
    seizure by addressing whether Officer Pate had a reasonable,
    articulable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify a Terry
    stop. The court concluded that defendant=s actions in slouching down
    and reaching toward the floorboard of his car at 2:40 in the morning,
    on a street that had experienced recent burglaries, was insufficient for
    Officer Pate to have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant
    was involved in a crime. 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 424-25. Accordingly, the
    court upheld the suppression of evidence in the DUI case. The court
    also held that the State was not collaterally estopped from contesting
    the suppression motion in the controlled substances case, because the
    the DUI suppression order was on appeal and thus not final when the
    trial court made its collateral estoppel ruling. 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 426.
    Presiding Justice O=Malley dissented. The dissent agreed with the
    majority=s conclusion that Officer Pate was not acting in a community
    caretaking or public safety function when he approached defendant=s
    vehicle. The dissent disagreed, however, with the majority=s
    conclusion that defendant was seized as Officer Pate approached
    defendant=s car on foot. The dissent was sharply critical of the
    majority=s approach, which looked to whether Officer Pate was acting
    like a private citizen or a police officer as he approached defendant=s
    vehicle. The dissent noted that the majority was adopting a rule that
    Apolice must act as little like police as possible, lest a seizure occur@
    (
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 429 (O=Malley, P.J., dissenting)), and argued that
    such an approach was incompatible with controlling precedent from
    the United States Supreme Court and this court. Citing People v.
    Gherna, 
    203 Ill. 2d 165
    , 179 (2003), the dissent stated that an
    individual is not seized for fourth amendment purposes when the
    police merely ask questions of an individual, so long as the officer
    -7-
    does not convey by words or actions that compliance is required. 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 433-34 (O=Malley, P.J., dissenting). More specifically,
    the dissent noted that A >the mere approaching and questioning of a
    person seated in a parked vehicle does not constitute a seizure.= @ 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 434 (O=Malley, P.J., dissenting), quoting People v.
    Murray, 
    137 Ill. 2d 382
    , 391 (1990). The dissent argued that Officer
    Pate=s initial encounter with defendant was no more coercive than the
    encounter in Murray, which this court found not to be a seizure. 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 434 (O=Malley, P.J., dissenting). Further, the dissent
    observed that, in Murray, this court relied on the absence of the
    Mendenhall factors in determining that no seizure had occurred. 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 434 (O=Malley, P.J., dissenting), citing Murray, 
    137 Ill. 2d
    at 390-91.
    Addressing each of the three factors that the majority found
    indicative of a seizure, the dissent concluded that none of them were
    inherently coercive. First, as to the majority=s suggestion that Officer
    Pate should have pulled alongside the defendant=s vehicle instead of
    driving past it and parking in the center of the street, the dissent
    argued that this would have been more coercive because Officer Pate
    would have been blocking defendant=s car in its space. As to the
    majority=s concern that the law does not allow private citizens to park
    in the middle of the street, the dissent argued that the law also does
    not allow private citizens to double park cars in order to carry on
    conversations with occupants of other vehicles. 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at
    431 (O=Malley, P.J., dissenting). Second, the dissent addressed the
    majority=s concern about Officer Pate=s use of a flashlight by citing
    cases holding that the shining of a flashlight into a car is not
    inherently coercive (see People v. Holdman, 
    73 Ill. 2d 213
    , 220
    (1978); People v. Erby, 
    213 Ill. App. 3d 657
    , 662 (1991)). 357 Ill.
    App. 3d at 432 (O=Malley, P.J., dissenting). Third, as to the angle of
    Officer Pate=s approach to the vehicle, the dissenting justice stated
    that he did not understand the majority=s Ageometrical analysis.@ 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 432 (O=Malley, P.J., dissenting). The dissent disputed
    the majority=s assertion that a private citizen would walk right up to
    the window rather than approaching from the rear. The dissent
    contended that the trajectory of a private citizen=s approach to the car
    would be determined from where he began his approach. 357 Ill.
    App. 3d at 432 (O=Malley, P.J., dissenting). The dissent argued that
    officers approach from the rear out of concern for their safety, and
    -8-
    that the majority=s requirement that the police do not use such tactics
    could have Atruly lethal effects.@ 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 432 (O=Malley,
    P.J., dissenting). For all of these reasons, the dissent predicted that
    reversal by this court was inevitable. 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 435
    (O=Malley, P.J., dissenting). We allowed the State=s petition for leave
    to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. Additionally, we granted the Fraternal
    Order of Police of Illinois leave to submit an amicus curiae brief in
    support of the State.
    ANALYSIS
    The State raises two issues. First, the State argues that the
    appellate court erred in determining that defendant was seized before
    Officer Pate observed an open bottle in his vehicle. The State
    contends that the seizure did not occur until after Officer Pate
    observed an open bottle and signs of intoxication. Alternatively, the
    State contends that, even if Officer Pate effectuated a Terry stop prior
    to observing the open bottle, the stop was supported by a reasonable
    suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. The State
    has abandoned its argument that Officer Pate was acting in a
    community caretaking or public safety capacity when he approached
    defendant=s vehicle.
    Standard of Review
    In reviewing a trial court=s ruling on a motion to suppress
    evidence, we apply the two-part standard of review adopted by the
    Supreme Court in Ornelas v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 690
    , 699, 134 L.
    Ed. 2d 911, 920, 
    116 S. Ct. 1657
    , 1663 (1996). Under this standard, a
    trial court=s findings of historical fact should be reviewed only for
    clear error, and a reviewing court must give due weight to any
    inferences drawn from those facts by the fact finder. 
    Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699
    , 134 L. Ed. 2d at 
    920, 116 S. Ct. at 1663
    . In other words,
    we give great deference to the trial court=s factual findings, and we
    will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest
    weight of the evidence. People v. Sorenson, 
    196 Ill. 2d 425
    , 431
    (2001). A reviewing court, however, remains free to undertake its
    own assessment of the facts in relation to the issues and may draw its
    own conclusions when deciding what relief should be granted. People
    v. Pitman, 
    211 Ill. 2d 502
    , 512 (2004). Accordingly, we review de
    -9-
    novo the trial court=s ultimate legal ruling as to whether suppression
    is warranted. 3 
    Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699
    , 134 L. Ed. 2d at 920, 116 S.
    Ct. at 1663; 
    Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d at 512
    ; 
    Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 431
    .
    Timing of the Seizure
    The critical issue in this case is the timing of the seizure. The
    State argues that the seizure did not occur until after Officer Pate
    3
    We briefly note that in People v. Caballes, 
    221 Ill. 2d 282
    , 289 (2006),
    we stated, A >[W]hen a trial court=s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence
    involves factual determinations and credibility assessments,= the ruling will
    not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly erroneous.@ This sentence
    quoted Sorenson=s description of the pre-Sorenson standard of review, but
    only for purposes of describing why we were reviewing the trial court=s
    finding that Athe police dog *** was well trained and sufficiently reliable@
    under the manifest weight of the evidence standardBi.e., because that
    finding was a factual determination to which deference was owed. See
    
    Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d at 289
    . To avoid any future confusion, we clarify that,
    in Caballes, we did not intend to revert to the pre-Sorenson standard of
    review. Indeed, in Caballes, we went on to conclude that A[o]n the record
    before us, we find no basis for concluding that the trial court=s finding of
    reliability was manifestly erroneous@ (emphasis added) (Caballes, 
    221 Ill. 2d
    at 335), by which we meant that the factual determination subject to our
    review was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    -10-
    observed an open bottle in the vehicle and noticed that defendant was
    exhibiting signs of intoxication. These observations obviously gave
    Officer Pate the reasonable suspicion necessary to detain defendant
    and to investigate further. Defendant contends, however, that the
    appellate court correctly determined that the seizure occurred prior to
    Officer Pate=s observation of the open bottle. Defendant argues that
    he was seized for fourth amendment purposes when Officer Pate
    parked his vehicle in the middle of the street and approached
    defendant=s car from the rear, while illuminating the car with a
    flashlight. Thus, according to defendant, we must determine whether
    Officer Pate had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient
    to effectuate a seizure before he observed the open bottle. Defendant
    contends that the lower courts correctly concluded that such
    reasonable suspicion was lacking. We agree with the State that no
    seizure occurred until after Officer Pate had a reasonable suspicion
    that defendant was intoxicated while in control of a motor vehicle and
    thus do not address whether Officer Pate had a reasonable suspicion
    of criminal activity when he first approached defendant=s vehicle.
    The Three Tiers of Police-Citizen Encounters
    It is well settled that not every encounter between the police and a
    private citizen results in a seizure. 
    Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215
    , 80 L.
    Ed. 2d at 
    254, 104 S. Ct. at 1762
    ; People v. White, 
    221 Ill. 2d
    1, 21
    (2006). Courts have divided police-citizen encounters into three tiers:
    (1) arrests, which must be supported by probable cause; (2) brief
    investigative detentions, or ATerry stops,@ which must be supported
    by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity; and (3)
    encounters that involve no coercion or detention and thus do not
    implicate fourth amendment interests. United States v. Black, 
    675 F.2d 129
    , 133 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Berry, 
    670 F.2d 583
    ,
    591 (5th Cir. 1982). Third-tier encounters are also known as
    consensual encounters. 
    Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d at 177
    . Previously, when
    listing the three tiers of police-citizen encounters, this court has often
    used imprecise language. This court has frequently referred to the
    third tier as the Acommunity caretaking function.@ See, e.g., White,
    
    221 Ill. 2d
    at 21; People v. Smith, 
    214 Ill. 2d 338
    , 351-52 (2005);
    People v. Murray, 
    137 Ill. 2d 382
    , 387 (1990). The appellate court,
    both in this case and other cases, has been critical of this court=s use
    -11-
    of the label Acommunity caretaking@ to describe third-tier consensual
    encounters. See 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 418-20; People v. James, 365 Ill.
    App. 3d 847, 851 (2006); People v. Mitchell, 
    355 Ill. App. 3d 1030
    ,
    1033-34 (2005). The use of this label is traceable to Murray, in which
    this court cited Berry for the three tiers, but then added an incorrect
    explanatory sentence. Initially, Murray properly stated that the third
    tier Ainvolves no coercion or detention and therefore does not involve
    a seizure.@ Murray, 
    137 Ill. 2d
    at 387. Murray then incorrectly stated
    that A[t]his tier is commonly known as the community caretaking
    function or public safety function.@ Murray, 
    137 Ill. 2d
    at 387. No
    citation to authority was provided for this assertion.
    In Collins v. State, 
    1993 WY 83
    , 
    854 P.2d 688
    , the Supreme
    Court of Wyoming collected the state and federal cases that have
    recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, the three tiers, and this
    court=s decision in Murray was the only one to refer to the third tier
    as Acommunity caretaking.@ See Collins, 
    1993 WY 83
    , &10 nn.3, 
    4, 854 P.2d at 692
    nn.3, 4 (collecting cases). 4 That courts do not
    generally refer to the third tier as community caretaking makes sense.
    Third-tier encounters are consensual encounters involving no
    coercion or detention. ACommunity caretaking,@ rather than
    describing a tier of police-citizen encounter, refers to a capacity in
    which the police act when they are performing some task unrelated to
    4
    Since Collins was decided, courts in three other statesBNew Mexico,
    North Dakota, and TennesseeBhave referred to the third tier as Acommunity
    caretaking.@ In State v. Ryon, 
    137 N.M. 174
    , 183, 
    108 P.3d 1032
    , 1041
    (2005), the Supreme Court of New Mexico acknowledged its mistake and
    overruled those cases that had used community caretaking as a label to
    describe voluntary or consensual encounters. North Dakota began using the
    label in State v. Halfman, 
    518 N.W.2d 729
    , 730 (N.D. 1994). The three
    cases it cited for this proposition were Murray, United States v. Hernandez,
    
    854 F.2d 295
    (8th Cir. 1988), and Thompson v. State, 
    303 Ark. 407
    , 
    797 S.W.2d 450
    (1990). Neither Hernandez nor Thompson refer to the third tier
    as community caretaking, so it appears that North Dakota=s use of the label
    has its origins in this court=s decision in Murray. Tennessee began using the
    label in State v. Hawkins, 
    969 S.W.2d 936
    , 939 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
    Like this court in Murray, the Tennessee court cited the Fifth Circuit=s
    decision in Berry for this proposition, and Berry contains no such statement.
    -12-
    the investigation of crime. See D. Livingston, Police, Community
    Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 261,
    261-63, 272 (1998) (noting that A[p]olice spend relatively less time
    than is commonly thought investigating violations of the criminal
    law@ and spend a good deal of time performing such functions as
    responding to heart attack victims, helping children find their parents,
    helping inebriates find their way home, responding to calls about
    missing person or sick neighbors, mediating noise disputes,
    responding to calls about stray or injured animals, investigating
    premises left open at night, taking lost property into their possession,
    and removing abandoned property). Courts use the term Acommunity
    caretaking@ to uphold searches or seizures as reasonable under the
    fourth amendment when police are performing some function other
    than investigating the violation of a criminal statute. When a search is
    involved, courts use the term Acommunity caretaking@ to describe an
    exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., United States v.
    Coccia, 
    446 F.3d 233
    , 238 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Johnson,
    
    410 F.3d 137
    , 143-44 (4th Cir. 2005).
    The community caretaking exception was first set forth by the
    Supreme Court in Cady v. Dombrowski, 
    413 U.S. 433
    , 
    37 L. Ed. 2d 706
    , 
    93 S. Ct. 2523
    (1973). In that case, a Chicago police officer who
    had been drinking was involved in an automobile accident in
    Wisconsin. The Wisconsin officers who responded to the scene were
    under the impression that Chicago police officers were required to
    carry their service revolvers with them at all times. Before the car
    was towed from the scene, the Wisconsin officers looked in the glove
    box and the front-seat area to see if they could locate the revolver. No
    revolver was found in those areas, and the automobile was towed to a
    garage. One of the officers later went to the garage and searched the
    passenger compartment and trunk. The officer testified that
    attempting to retrieve a weapon in these situations was standard
    police procedure. The purpose of this procedure was to prevent the
    public from Athe possibility that a revolver would fall into untrained
    or perhaps malicious hands.@ 
    Cady, 413 U.S. at 443
    , 37 L. Ed. 2d at
    
    716, 93 S. Ct. at 2529
    . The officer did not find the revolver, but he
    did find various bloody items, and the question was whether they
    could later be used in a murder prosecution against the Chicago
    officer. The Supreme Court upheld the search as reasonable under the
    fourth amendment. The Court explained that A[l]ocal police officers,
    -13-
    unlike federal officers, frequently investigate vehicle accidents in
    which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for
    want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking
    functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or
    acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.@
    
    Cady, 413 U.S. at 441
    , 37 L. Ed. 2d at 
    714-15, 93 S. Ct. at 2528
    . The
    search was reasonable because it was undertaken to protect the safety
    of the general public. 
    Cady, 413 U.S. at 447
    , 37 L. Ed. 2d at 
    718, 93 S. Ct. at 2531
    . The Court also noted that at the time the Wisconsin
    officer searched the car, he was unaware that a murder had been
    committed. 
    Cady, 413 U.S. at 447
    , 37 L. Ed. 2d at 
    718, 93 S. Ct. at 2531
    .
    An example of a seizure upheld under the community caretaking
    exception is found in State v. Chisholm, 
    39 Wash. App. 864
    , 
    696 P.2d 41
    (1985). In that case, a police officer in an unmarked car noticed a
    pickup truck that had a hat on top of it. He tried unsuccessfully to get
    the driver=s attention, and then radioed ahead to an officer in a
    marked vehicle. The second officer stopped the defendant=s vehicle to
    tell him about the hat, and, upon approaching, noticed an open can of
    beer in plain view. The court upheld the stop under the community
    caretaking exception, noting that Aan individual=s interest in
    proceeding about his business unfettered by police interference must
    be balanced against the public=s interest in having police officers
    perform services in addition to the traditional enforcement of penal
    and regulatory laws.@ 
    Chisholm, 39 Wash. App. at 867
    , 696 P.2d at
    43.
    The courts in these cases upheld the searches or seizures as
    reasonable because the police were acting in a community caretaking
    or public safety function. The analysis had nothing to do with the
    encounters being consensual. Because the officer in Chisholm
    stopped the defendant=s vehicle, the encounter could not be said to
    have involved no detention. The defendant in Cady did not consent to
    the search of his vehicle. Indeed, if Acommunity caretaking@ was just
    another name for consensual encounters, there would have been no
    need for the Supreme Court to formulate the exception in the first
    place. To be sure, a police officer acting in a community caretaking
    function can engage in a consensual encounter. For instance, if a
    police officer stops to aid a person whose vehicle has broken down
    on the side of the highway and then notices an open bottle of alcohol
    -14-
    in the car, the officer would be both acting in his community
    caretaking function and engaging in a consensual encounter.
    However, because the act of stopping to assist a stranded motorist
    would not have been a seizure in the first place, a court would have
    no need to invoke the community caretaking exception.
    It is clear, then, that the Acommunity caretaking@ doctrine is
    analytically distinct from consensual encounters and is invoked to
    validate a search or seizure as reasonable under the fourth
    amendment. It is not relevant to determining whether police conduct
    amounted to a seizure in the first place. Those cases such as White,
    Smith, and Murray, that refer to the third tier of police-citizen
    encounters as Acommunity caretaking,@ should no longer be followed
    for that point. Similarly, cases such as People v. Gonzalez, 
    204 Ill. 2d 220
    , 224 (2003), that state that Acommunity caretaking@ is a label to
    describe consensual encounters should no longer be followed on that
    specific point.
    This court=s error in describing the third tier is not without
    consequence. If the third tier of police-citizen encounters is referred
    to as Acommunity caretaking,@ that would suggest that if the police
    lack a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, they may
    not approach a citizen unless they are acting in a community
    caretaking function. This is obviously not the case, as the law clearly
    provides that a police officer does not violate the fourth amendment
    merely by approaching a person in public to ask questions if the
    person is willing to listen. United States v. Drayton, 
    536 U.S. 194
    ,
    200, 
    153 L. Ed. 2d 242
    , 251, 
    122 S. Ct. 2105
    , 2110 (2002); People v.
    Love, 
    199 Ill. 2d 269
    , 278 (2002). There has never been a
    requirement that the police must be acting in a community caretaking
    function to prevent the encounter from turning into a seizure. Indeed,
    the Supreme Court has stated expressly that the police have the right
    to approach citizens and ask potentially incriminating questions. See
    Florida v. Bostick, 
    501 U.S. 429
    , 439, 
    115 L. Ed. 2d 389
    , 401, 111 S.
    Ct. 2382, 2388 (1991) (AThe dissent reserves its strongest criticism
    for the proposition that police officers can approach individuals as to
    whom they have no reasonable suspicion and ask them potentially
    incriminating questions. But this proposition is by no means novel; it
    has been endorsed by the Court any number of times. Terry, Royer,
    Rodriguez, and Delgado are just a few examples@); see also, e.g.,
    United States v. Winston, 
    892 F.2d 112
    , 117 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (lawful
    -15-
    for police officer to approach the defendant and ask questions
    regardless of whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the
    defendant was involved in a crime); People v. Melton, 
    910 P.2d 672
    ,
    677 (Colo. 1996) (A[t]he subjective suspicions of the police do not
    distinguish a consensual encounter from an investigatory stop. In
    fact, in most cases regarding consensual encounters the police
    approach individuals because they have suspicions about them@).
    The Encounter Between Officer Pate and Defendant
    Having properly set forth the three tiers of police-citizen
    encounters, we next consider the nature of the encounter when
    Officer Pate approached defendant=s vehicle. Defendant contends that
    Officer Pate seized him for fourth amendment purposes before
    observing the open bottle and signs of intoxication, while the State
    maintains that the encounter remained a third-tier consensual
    encounter prior to Officer Pate=s observations.
    For purposes of the fourth amendment, an individual is Aseized@
    when an officer A >by means of physical force or show of authority,
    has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.= A 
    Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434
    , 115 L. Ed. 2d at 
    398, 111 S. Ct. at 2386
    , quoting Terry v.
    Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 19 n.16, 
    20 L. Ed. 2d 889
    , 905 n.16, 
    88 S. Ct. 1868
    ,
    1879 n.16 (1968). Initially, we note that the appellate court framed
    the seizure standard incorrectly. Citing Mendenhall, the appellate
    court stated that a Aseizure occurs when a reasonable person would
    not feel free to leave under the circumstances.@ 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at
    421. Although Afree to leave@ is the correct test for certain situations,
    it was not applicable here. In 
    Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435
    , 115 L. Ed. 2d
    at 
    399, 111 S. Ct. at 2386
    , the Supreme Court explained that the Afree
    to leave@ language makes sense when the person is walking down a
    street or through an airport lobby. However, in situations in which the
    person=s freedom of movement is restrained by some factor
    independent of police conduct the Afree to leave@ test is inapplicable
    and Athe appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would
    feel free to decline the officers= requests or otherwise terminate the
    encounter.@ 
    Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436
    , 115 L. Ed. 2d at 
    400, 111 S. Ct. at 2387
    . In Bostick, the Supreme Court applied this test to persons
    seated on a bus.
    -16-
    The question of which test applies to a person seated in a parked
    vehicle was settled by this court in Gherna. In that case, this court
    applied Bostick rather than Mendenhall. See 
    Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d at 178
    . Thus, the appropriate test is whether a reasonable person in
    defendant=s position would have believed he was free to decline
    Officer Pate=s requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.
    Moreover, the test presupposes a reasonable innocent person. 
    Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438
    , 115 L. Ed. 2d at 
    400, 111 S. Ct. at 2388
    . The
    analysis requires an objective evaluation of the police conduct in
    question and does not hinge upon the subjective perception of the
    person involved. White, 
    221 Ill. 2d
    at 21-22. It is well settled that a
    seizure does not occur simply because a law enforcement officer
    approaches an individual and puts questions to that person if he or
    she is willing to listen. 
    Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d at 178
    ; 
    Drayton, 536 U.S. at 200
    , 153 L. Ed. 2d at 
    251, 122 S. Ct. at 2110
    . In Bostick, the
    Supreme Court explained that the police may do more than merely
    ask questions without turning the encounter into a seizure:
    AWe have stated that even when officers have no basis for
    suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask
    questions of that individual [citations] ; ask to examine the
    individual=s identification [citations]; and request consent to
    search his or her luggage [citations]Bas long as the police do
    not convey a message that compliance with their requests is
    required.@ 
    Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434
    -35, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 398-
    
    99, 111 S. Ct. at 2386
    .
    The central flaw in the appellate court=s opinion was its failure to
    consider and discuss the large body of case law addressing whether
    police approaches to parked vehicles amounted to seizures. The
    appellate court freed itself from the moorings of precedent by
    asserting that each of these cases is Asui generis in that no two factual
    situations are identical@ and that, while precedent may provide some
    insight, Acommon sense@ must be a court=s main guide. 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 421. The court=s failure to consider the applicable case law
    resulted in the court=s finding a seizure based on factors that courts
    had not previously found to be coercive, and the necessary
    consequence of the appellate court=s opinion would be to make a
    seizure of every approach of a police officer to a parked vehicle at
    night.
    -17-
    Although it is true that the facts of no two cases are ever exactly
    the same, that does not mean that a court is free simply to ignore an
    entire body of relevant case law and the principles and guidelines
    articulated therein. Nowhere in the appellate court majority opinion is
    there even an acknowledgment of the general rule that the police may
    approach and question a person seated in a parked vehicle without
    that encounter being labeled a seizure. As Professor LaFave has
    noted, Aif an officer merely walks up to a person standing or sitting in
    a public place (or, indeed, who is seated in a vehicle located in a
    public place) and puts a question to him, this alone does not
    constitute a seizure.@ 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure '9.4(a), at 419-
    21 (4th ed. 2004). The Aseated in a vehicle@ clause of the above
    passage is supported by a lengthy list of citations to the many state
    and federal decisions that have recognized this rule. See 4 W.
    LaFave, Search & Seizure '9.4(a), at 419-20, 420 n.49 (collecting
    cases). In Murray, this court held that the mere approaching and
    questioning of a person seated in a parked vehicle does not constitute
    a seizure and listed many decisions from other jurisdictions that had
    reached the same conclusion. Murray, 
    137 Ill. 2d
    at 391-93. Thus,
    any analysis of such a situation must begin with the recognition that
    the police may approach a person seated in a parked vehicle and ask
    questions of that person without that encounter being labeled a
    seizure. 5 The encounter becomes a seizure only if the officer, through
    5
    This rule in and of itself defeats the trial court=s rationale for granting
    the motion to suppress. In the trial court, defendant argued that Officer Pate
    Ahad no right at that time to approach [defendant] and engage him in
    conversation under the circumstances.@ The trial court adopted this position
    in its written order, stating that Officer Pate had not observed conduct
    sufficient to warrant the approach and questioning that took place. In later
    explaining its ruling from the bench, the trial court stated, A[t]here was no
    basis to approach.@
    -18-
    physical force or a show of authority, restrains the liberty of the
    vehicle=s occupant. See 
    Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434
    , 115 L. Ed. 2d at
    
    398, 111 S. Ct. at 2386
        In 
    Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554
    , 
    64 L. Ed. 2d
    at 
    509, 100 S. Ct. at 1877
    , the lead opinion listed four factors that may be indicative of a
    seizure: (1) the threatening presence of several officers; (2) the
    display of a weapon by an officer; (3) some physical touching of the
    person of the citizen; and (4) the use of language or tone of voice
    indicating that compliance with the officer=s request might be
    compelled. This court adopted these factors in Murray. See Murray,
    
    137 Ill. 2d
    at 390. The record clearly shows that none of these factors
    were present here. The appellate court did not consider this relevant
    because it concluded that A[w]hile the presence of such factors may
    be highly indicative of the occurrence of a seizure, their absence says
    virtually nothing.@ (Emphasis added.) 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 423.
    Immediately preceding this passage, however, the appellate court
    cited those pages in Murray (
    137 Ill. 2d
    at 390-91) in which we find
    the exact opposite rule. In Murray, this court listed the four
    Mendenhall factors and then quoted Mendenhall for the proposition
    that A >[i]n the absence of some such evidence, otherwise inoffensive
    contact between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a
    matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person.= @ (Emphasis
    added.) Murray, 
    137 Ill. 2d
    at 390-91, quoting 
    Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555
    , 
    64 L. Ed. 2d
    at 
    509-10, 100 S. Ct. at 1877
    . After stating this
    rule, this court reviewed each of the Mendenhall factors, found that
    they were absent, and thus concluded that no seizure had occurred.
    Murray, 
    137 Ill. 2d
    at 390-91; see also 
    Smith, 214 Ill. 2d at 353-54
    (relying on absence of Mendenhall factors to conclude that no seizure
    had occurred). Indeed, Mendenhall itself used an analysis based on
    the absence of Mendenhall factors. The lead opinion listed the four
    factors, noted their absence, and then concluded that no seizure had
    occurred. 
    Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554
    -55, 
    64 L. Ed. 2d
    at 
    509-10, 100 S. Ct. at 1877
    . From the very minute the Mendenhall factors
    were created, courts have used their absence to determine that
    seizures had not occurred.
    Even in the absence of cases such as Mendenhall, Murray, and
    Smith, it would seem self-evident that the absence of Mendenhall
    factors, while not necessarily conclusive, is highly instructive. If
    those factors are absent, that means that only one or two officers
    -19-
    approached the defendant, they displayed no weapons, they did not
    touch the defendant, and they did not use any language or tone of
    voice indicating that compliance with their requests was compelled.
    Obviously, a seizure is much less likely to be found when officers
    approach a person in such an inoffensive manner.
    The appellate court believed that, because Mendenhall stated that
    courts should look to the totality of the circumstances in determining
    whether a seizure had occurred, the court must conduct a Apractical,
    realistic@ inquiry to determine if a reasonable person would have felt
    free to leave and that the court should not focus on rigid, technical
    rules such as the Mendenhall factors.6 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 421-24. The
    problem with this view is that, immediately after Mendenhall said
    that a person is seized if Ain view of all of the circumstances
    surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
    that he was not free to leave@ (
    Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554
    , 
    64 L. Ed. 2d
    at 
    509, 100 S. Ct. at 1877
    ), it elaborated on how courts are to
    make that determination. The lead opinion listed several factors that
    are generally indicative of a seizure, said that in the absence of some
    such evidence otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of the
    public and the police is not a seizure, and then concluded that no
    seizure had occurred because those factors were not present.
    
    Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554
    -55, 
    64 L. Ed. 2d
    at 
    509-10, 100 S. Ct. at 1877
    . This court expressly adopted those factors in Murray. The Ain
    view of all the circumstances@ language must be read in concert with,
    not in opposition to, the factors. See, e.g., 
    Smith, 214 Ill. 2d at 352
    -
    53. The factors illustrate what type of police conduct would give a
    reasonable person an objective reason to believe that he or she was
    not free to leave or was not free to decline an officer=s requests.
    Moreover, we disagree with the appellate court=s characterization
    of Mendenhall as requiring a Apractical, realistic inquiry@ of whether
    a reasonable person in the defendant=s situation would feel free to
    6
    It is not entirely clear how the appellate court determined that Ain view
    of all the circumstances@ is synonymous with Apractical, realistic inquiry.@
    The Supreme Court=s requirement that courts consider all the circumstances
    means simply that courts must assess the coercive effect of police conduct
    taken as a whole. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 
    486 U.S. 567
    , 573, 100 L.
    Ed. 2d 565, 572, 
    108 S. Ct. 1975
    , 1979 (1988).
    -20-
    leave. This is not a description that one often sees applied to the
    Mendenhall standard. Indeed, the first person identified under the
    Mendenhall standard as someone who would feel free to walk away
    was a woman approached in an airport by federal agents who
    identified themselves as such and asked to see her ticket and
    identification. Justice Stewart=s opinion did not consider practically
    and realistically whether people in airports feel free to walk away
    from federal agents who ask to see their tickets and identification, but
    rather looked objectively at the police conduct under recognized
    factors to determine if they had curtailed the defendant=s liberty
    through physical force or a show of authority. Moreover, the Court
    focused on what, objectively, the police conduct would cause a
    reasonable person to believe: A[N]othing in the record suggests that
    the respondent had any objective reason to believe that she was not
    free to end the conversation in the concourse and proceed on her way
    ***.@ 
    Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555
    , 
    64 L. Ed. 2d
    at 
    510, 100 S. Ct. at 1878
    . Professor LaFave has explained that the Mendenhall test is not
    to be given a literal reading:
    A[I]f [the free to walk away language] is taken to mean that a
    pedestrian whose movements have been interrupted and who
    is questioned is likely to feel free to depart without
    responding, it is a highly questionable conclusion. As noted
    in Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod: >Implicit in the
    introduction of the [officer] and the initial questioning is a
    show of authority to which the average person encountered
    will feel obliged to stop and respond. Few will feel that they
    can walk away or refuse to answer.= This, it is submitted, is an
    accurate characterization of the great majority of situations in
    which an officer approaches a pedestrian and seeks an
    explanation for his activities or even identification. Thus, if
    the ultimate issue is perceived as being whether the suspect
    >would feel free to walk away,= then virtually all
    police-citizen encounters must in fact be deemed to involve a
    Fourth Amendment seizure. The Mendenhall-Royer standard
    should not be given such a literal reading as to produce such a
    result.@ 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure '9.4(a), at 423-24
    (4th ed. 2004).
    We thus do not agree with the appellate court=s conclusion that the
    absence of Mendenhall factors Asays virtually nothing@ and that a
    -21-
    seizure is determined solely by a Apractical, realistic@ inquiry into
    whether a reasonable person in defendant=s position would have felt
    free to leave (or, as is appropriate here, whether a reasonable person
    would have felt free to decline the officer=s requests or otherwise
    terminate the encounter). Rather, the Supreme Court requires an
    objective evaluation of police conduct, based upon recognized
    standards, and an objective evaluation of what that conduct would
    cause a reasonable person to believe. This makes perfect sense
    because Aany test intended to determine what street encounters are
    not seizures must be expressed in terms that can be understood and
    applied by the officer.@ See 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure '9.4(a),
    at 414 (4th ed. 2004).
    Although it is not true that the absence of Mendenhall factors
    Asays virtually nothing,@ it is true that those factors are not exhaustive
    and that a seizure can be found on the basis of other coercive police
    behavior that is similar to the Mendenhall factors. Courts have
    developed additional rules applicable to police approaches of
    occupants of parked vehicles. Professor LaFave has summarized
    these cases as follows:
    AAs noted earlier, the mere approach and questioning of
    [persons seated within parked vehicles] does not constitute a
    seizure. The result is not otherwise when the officer utilizes
    some generally accepted means of gaining the attention of the
    vehicle occupant or encouraging him to eliminate any barrier
    to conversation. The officer may tap on the window and
    perhaps even open the door if the occupant is asleep. A
    request that the suspect open the door or roll down the
    window would seem equally permissible, but the same would
    not be true of an order that he do so. Likewise, the encounter
    becomes a seizure if the officer orders the suspect to >freeze=
    or to get out of the car.@ 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure
    '9.4(a), at 433 (4th ed. 2004).
    By contrast, factors that courts have found indicative of a seizure of a
    parked vehicle are Aboxing the car in, approaching it on all sides by
    many officers, pointing a gun at the suspect and ordering him to place
    his hands on the steering wheel, or use of flashing lights as a show of
    authority.@ 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure '9.4(a), at 434-35 (4th ed.
    2004). Because the appellate court failed to discuss these factors, it is
    -22-
    unclear whether they were aware of them. We find it relevant that
    Officer Pate=s encounter with defendant involved none of this
    conduct.
    The appellate court did identify three new factors that it believed
    were indicative of a seizure, but we disagree with the court=s
    conclusion that these factors are coercive. The first factor cited by the
    appellate court was Officer Pate=s stopping of his vehicle in the
    middle of the roadway. The appellate court concluded that, by doing
    so, Officer Pate was demonstrating his authority as a police officer
    because private citizens may not stop their cars in the middle of the
    street and Ablock traffic.@ 7 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 421. The court cited
    section 11B1304 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11B1304
    (West 2002)). The court further concluded that Officer Pate=s
    stopping of his vehicle in this manner demonstrated a sense of
    urgency. According to the appellate court, what Officer Pate should
    have done instead would have been to pull up alongside defendant=s
    vehicle and talk to him because that would have communicated
    Anothing more than a casual encounter on the street.@ 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 422.
    There are several problems with the appellate court=s analysis.
    First, the court cited no authority for the proposition that a police
    officer=s parking of his vehicle in a manner not allowed for private
    citizens is inherently coercive. We find it more relevant that Officer
    Pate did nothing to signal that compliance was expected, such as
    turning on his overhead flashing lights as a show of authority. He did
    not even pull his car in behind defendant=s vehicle until after he had
    noticed signs of intoxication. Although the appellate court believed
    that Officer Pate was demonstrating a sense of urgency and
    displaying his authority as a police officer, another equally likely
    explanation for Officer Pate=s behavior was that he did not expect to
    be at the scene very long. This inference is supported by the fact that
    7
    Because Officer Pate was parked on a residential street, in a small town,
    at 2:40 a.m., the appellate court=s concern that he was Ablocking traffic@ was
    overstated.
    -23-
    Officer Pate pulled his vehicle in behind defendant=s vehicle after he
    noticed signs of intoxication and radioed for assistance. Once it was
    apparent that he would be at the scene for a while, he moved his car
    out of the middle of the street. Second, even if the appellate court was
    correct that a police officer commits a show of authority by parking
    in a manner not allowed for private citizens, its proposed cure would
    not have fixed the problem. If Officer Pate would have pulled up
    alongside the defendant=s vehicle as the appellate court wanted him to
    do, that also would have been an action that the law does not allow
    private citizens to engage in. See 625 ILCS 5/11B1303(a)(1) (West
    2004) (A[e]xcept when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic,
    or in compliance with law or the directions of a police officer or
    official traffic-control device, no person shall: 1. Stop, stand or park a
    vehicle: a. On the roadway side of any vehicle stopped or parked at
    the edge or curb of a street@). Third, if Officer Pate would have pulled
    alongside defendant=s vehicle, he would have been blocking
    defendant in his parking space, and this is a factor often used by
    courts to determine that a seizure of a person in a parked vehicle has
    occurred. In Gherna, one of the factors that this court relied on in
    determining that the defendant was seized was that two officers on
    bicycles positioned themselves alongside the driver=s door and the
    passenger=s door: Athe positioning of the officers and their bicycles
    prevented defendant from either exiting the vehicle or driving the
    vehicle away from the scene.@ 
    Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d at 180
    ; see also
    United States v. Kerr, 
    817 F.2d 1384
    (9th Cir. 1987) (finding seizure
    where police blocked car in a one-lane driveway); People v. Beverly,
    
    364 Ill. App. 3d 361
    , 370 (2006) (finding seizure where police officer
    parked perpendicularly behind defendant=s vehicle, blocking it in its
    parking spot); Commonwealth v. King, 
    389 Mass. 233
    , 241, 
    449 N.E.2d 1217
    , 1223 (1983) (officer committed seizure when he
    positioned his cruiser in such a way as to block defendant=s vehicle in
    its parking space); State v. Roberts, 
    293 Mont. 476
    , 483, 
    977 P.2d 974
    , 979 (1999) (seizure where officer parked his car in such a way
    as to block defendant in his driveway); Commonwealth v. Greber,
    
    478 Pa. 63
    , 67, 
    385 A.2d 1313
    , 1316 (1978) (seizure where officer
    parked his squad car in front of a parked car in such a way as to block
    it in a parking lot); cf. United States v. Encarnacion-Galvez, 
    964 F.2d 402
    , 410 (5th Cir. 1992) (border patrol agents approached two
    persons in a parked vehicle and asked for identification; court found
    -24-
    no seizure, in part because the Aagents did not park their vehicle in
    such a way that would block Encarnacion-Galvez=s path if he chose
    to drive or walk away@). We noted earlier the importance in seizure
    analysis of setting forth guidelines that can be understood and applied
    by the officer. It is surely not reasonable, after the courts have for
    years found that blocking cars in their parking spots is coercive, to
    hold that Officer Pate seized defendant because he failed to block
    defendant in his parking space. See 
    Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574
    , 100
    L. Ed. 2d at 
    572, 108 S. Ct. at 1979-80
    (noting that seizure standard
    Acalls for consistent application from one police encounter to the
    next@ so that the police may Adetermine in advance whether the
    conduct contemplated will implicate the Fourth Amendment@). In
    sum, we find nothing inherently coercive in the way Officer Pate
    parked his vehicle.
    The second factor relied upon by the appellate court was that
    Officer Pate shined a flashlight on defendant=s car as he approached.
    According to the appellate court, shining a flashlight is intrusive and
    is analogous to the Mendenhall factor of using language or tone of
    voice indicating that compliance is compelled. 8 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at
    422. Once again, precedent leads to the opposite result. It is well
    settled that the use of a flashlight to illuminate a vehicle located on a
    public way is not a fourth amendment search. Texas v. Brown, 
    460 U.S. 730
    , 739-40, 
    75 L. Ed. 2d 502
    , 512, 
    103 S. Ct. 1535
    , 1542
    (1983) (AIt is likewise beyond dispute that Maples= action in shining
    his flashlight to illuminate the interior of Brown=s car trenched upon
    no right secured to the latter by the Fourth Amendment@); see also 1
    W. LaFave, Search & Seizure '2.2(b), at 461-62 (4th ed. 2004)
    (explaining rule and stating that Athe reason typically given is that the
    owner or operator of an automobile parked or being operated on a
    public thoroughfare does not have a justified expectation that such a
    common device as a flashlight would not be used during the
    nighttime to see what would be visible without such illumination
    during daylight hours@). Whether the use of a flashlight constitutes a
    fourth amendment seizure depends on whether the officer engaged in
    8
    This is the only one of the three factors that the appellate court
    analogized to one of the Mendenhall factors.
    -25-
    other coercive behavior. In People v. Holdman, 
    73 Ill. 2d 213
    , 220
    (1978), this court held that shining a light on a vehicle was not a
    Astop@ when there was no coercion or threat of coercion. See also
    People v. Erby, 
    213 Ill. App. 3d 657
    , 662 (1991) (shining a light on a
    parked vehicle not a stop absent coercion or threat of coercion). By
    contrast, in People v. Bunch, 
    207 Ill. 2d 7
    , 19 (2003), this court found
    that the defendant was seized when, after a police officer ordered him
    to exit a vehicle in which he had been a passenger, the officer had
    him stand next to the handcuffed and arrested driver, stood one foot
    away from him, shined a flashlight in his face, and said, AWhat=s your
    name? Where you coming from?@ Courts in other jurisdictions have
    also generally found that the use of a flashlight or a spotlight, without
    other coercive behavior, is insufficient to transform a consensual
    encounter into a seizure. See, e.g., State v. Stuart, 
    168 Ariz. 83
    , 86,
    
    811 P.2d 335
    , 338 (App. 1990) (shining spotlight on vehicle not a
    seizure); People v. Perez, 
    211 Cal. App. 3d 1492
    , 1496, 260 Cal.
    Rptr. 172, 174 (1989) (shining high beams and spotlights on vehicle
    not a detention; A[w]hile the use of high beams and spotlights might
    cause a reasonable person to feel himself the object of official
    scrutiny, such directed scrutiny does not amount to a detention@);
    People v. Cascio, 
    932 P.2d 1381
    , 1388 (Colo. 1997) (officers= use of
    flashlights and a spotlight was a practical necessity because it was
    getting dark; no seizure because lights were not used in an
    intimidating manner); State v. Baker, 
    141 Idaho 163
    , 167, 
    107 P.3d 1214
    , 1218 (2004) (using spotlight to illuminate the defendant=s car
    was not a seizure); Campbell v. State, 
    841 N.E.2d 624
    , 630 (Ind. App.
    2006) (shining of spotlight on defendant, who was standing next to a
    parked car, not a seizure); Commonwealth v. Eckert, 
    431 Mass. 591
    ,
    595, 
    728 N.E.2d 312
    , 316 (2000) (Aby walking up to the defendant=s
    parked vehicle at the rest area, shining his flashlight inside and asking
    whether the defendant was >all set,= Trooper Shugrue did not engage
    in any conduct that requires constitutional justification@); State v.
    Clayton, 
    309 Mont. 215
    , 221, 
    45 P.3d 30
    , 35 (2002) (shining of
    spotlight on defendant=s vehicle not a seizure); State v. Justesen, 
    2002 UT App 165
    , &15, 
    47 P.3d 936
    , 939 (officer=s use of take-down lights
    served to illuminate the area and was not a show of authority); State
    v. Young, 
    135 Wash. 2d 498
    , 513-14, 
    957 P.2d 681
    , 688-89 (1998)
    (use of spotlight not a seizure). When the use of a light is
    accompanied by coercive behavior, such as blocking a car in its
    -26-
    parking space, the courts will be more likely to find a seizure. See,
    e.g., United States v. Packer, 
    15 F.3d 654
    , 657 (7th Cir. 1994)
    (seizure found when officers= vehicles were in front of and behind
    defendant=s vehicle and had their take-down lights shining, and one
    officer approached with a flashlight shining and asked the vehicle=s
    occupants to put their hands in the air); Commonwealth v.
    Mulholland, 2002 PA Super. 59, &11, 
    794 A.2d 398
    , 401-02 (seizure
    found when police officer shined a spotlight on the defendant=s
    vehicle and parked his cruiser in such a way that the defendant could
    not exit the parking lot).
    Here, Officer Pate=s use of the flashlight was not accompanied by
    other coercive behavior. As we noted above, he parked his car past
    defendant=s vehicle so as not to block it in its space and did not
    activate his overhead flashing lights. He merely shined his flashlight
    on the car as he walked toward it. We view this behavior not as
    coercive, but as merely incident to a police officer=s performance of
    his job after dark. In Baker, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that a
    police officer=s use of a light at night allows him to gain more
    information about the situation he is confronting, which can
    significantly enhance officer safety. 
    Baker, 141 Idaho at 167
    , 107
    P.3d at 1218. If we adopted the appellate court=s view that the use of
    a flashlight is inherently coercive and analogous to a tone of voice
    indicating that compliance is compelled, that would make a seizure of
    any nighttime encounter in which an officer uses a flashlight or
    spotlight. This would leave the officer with a dilemma that we are not
    prepared to require: A >an officer is not constitutionally required to
    choose between a consensual encounter in the dark or turning on a
    spotlight and thereby effectuating a detention that may not be
    supported by reasonable suspicion.= @ 
    Baker, 141 Idaho at 167
    , 107
    P.3d at 1218.
    The final allegedly coercive factor cited by the appellate court
    was that Officer Pate approached defendant=s vehicle from the rear
    driver=s side, instead of merely walking straight up to the window Aas
    an ordinary citizen typically would.@ 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 421.
    According to the appellate court, Officer Pate=s angle of approach
    conveyed the following message to defendant: A >I am interested in
    you and I will speak to you right now.= @ 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 421. The
    appellate court majority agreed with the dissenting justice=s assertion
    that officers approach vehicles from the rear out of a concern for their
    -27-
    own safety. The appellate court concluded, however, that officer
    safety does not Aimmunize from constitutional scrutiny all actions
    taken in its name,@ and that Officer Pate=s angle of approach showed
    that he was treating defendant as a dangerous subject. 
    357 Ill. App. 3d
    at 422-23.
    As with the other two factors, the appellate court failed to cite any
    authority in support of its position. Defense counsel conceded at oral
    argument that he could cite no authority, other than the appellate
    court=s 2-1 decision, for the proposition that a police officer
    effectuates a seizure by approaching a vehicle from the rear instead of
    from the side. We see nothing inherently coercive in Officer Pate=s
    angle of approach, and we agree with the dissenting justice=s
    observation that a private citizen=s angle of approach to a vehicle
    would depend upon where he began his approach. In its amicus brief,
    the Fraternal Order of Police confirms that law enforcement officers
    are trained to approach automobiles from the rear driver=s side
    because this method of approach provides the officer with the most
    protection. We disagree with the appellate court=s conclusion that a
    police officer acts in a coercive manner simply because he
    approaches in a manner designed to enhance his own safety.
    Moreover, it is not true that Officer Pate=s approach necessarily
    meant that he viewed defendant as a dangerous suspect. It seems
    obvious that officers are trained to approach all vehicles in this
    manner because they have no way of knowing when they will
    encounter a dangerous person. As with its position on the use of a
    flashlight, the appellate court would leave a police officer with a bad
    choice. Either he must stroll up to the side of the vehicle with no
    concern for his own safety, or he must approach from the rear driver=s
    side and risk effectuating a detention that is not supported by a
    sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
    Assuming that the police will always take their own safety into
    account, the appellate court=s position would mean that every
    approach of a police officer to a vehicle will constitute a seizure. This
    is exactly the kind of result that Justice Stewart warned against in
    Mendenhall:
    AMoreover, characterizing every street encounter between
    a citizen and the police as a >seizure,= while not enhancing any
    interest secured by the Fourth Amendment, would impose
    wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of
    -28-
    legitimate law enforcement practices. The Court has on other
    occasions referred to the acknowledged need for police
    questioning as a tool in the effective enforcement of the
    criminal laws.@ Mendenhall, 466 U.S. at 
    554, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509
    , 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
    In sum, it is clear that Officer Pate did not effectuate a seizure of
    defendant before observing an open bottle and signs of defendant=s
    intoxication. Rather, precedent shows that Officer Pate acted exactly
    as a well-trained police officer should when he wishes to question a
    person seated in a parked vehicle without effectuating a seizure. He
    drove past defendant=s vehicle so as not to block it in its space. He
    did not turn on his overhead flashing lights to signal that defendant=s
    compliance was expected. He did not use coercive language or a
    coercive tone of voice, he did not touch defendant, and he did not
    display his weapon. He approached from the rear driver=s side, as he
    was trained to do, and he used a flashlight because it was nighttime.
    Objectively viewed, nothing Officer Pate did would communicate to
    a reasonable person, innocent of any wrongdoing, that he was not free
    to decline to answer Officer Pate=s questions or otherwise go about
    his business. We reject the position of the appellate court that if an
    officer patrolling in the middle of the night sees something about a
    vehicle that appears out of the ordinary, he must walk casually up to
    the side window in the dark, with no concern for his own safety and
    no illumination, or be held to have committed a seizure. The
    touchstone of the fourth amendment is reasonableness (United States
    v. Knights, 
    534 U.S. 112
    , 118, 
    151 L. Ed. 2d 497
    , 505, 
    122 S. Ct. 587
    ,
    591 (2001)), and the consequences that would follow from the
    appellate court=s opinion are not reasonable.
    CONCLUSION
    Because no seizure occurred until after Officer Pate had a
    reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant was intoxicated while
    in control of a motor vehicle, the circuit court erred in granting the
    motion to suppress. We therefore reverse the judgments of the
    appellate court and the circuit court and remand the cause to the
    circuit court for further proceedings.
    Appellate court judgment reversed;
    -29-
    circuit court judgment reversed;
    cause remanded.
    JUSTICE BURKE took no part in the consideration or decision of
    this case.
    -30-