People v. Guzman , 2015 IL 118749 ( 2015 )

Illinois Official Reports
Supreme Court
People v. Guzman, 2015 IL 118749
Caption in Supreme THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JORGE
Court: A. GUZMAN, Appellant.
Docket No. 118749
Filed November 19, 2015
Decision Under Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District; heard in that
Review court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County; the Hon.
Richard Schoenstedt, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Appellate court judgment affirmed.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Peter A. Carusona,
Appeal Deputy Defender, and Andrew J. Boyd, Assistant Appellate Defender,
of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellant.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Carolyn E. Shapiro,
Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Lindsay Beyer Payne,
Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
Justices JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Karmeier,
Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In People v. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507 (2009), this court examined the impact of the
failure to give a statutory admonishment on the potential immigration consequences of
entering a guilty plea. We concluded that the admonishment was directory, not mandatory,
and categorized the potential immigration consequences of the plea as collateral, not direct.
Therefore, the failure to admonish did not affect the voluntariness of the plea, and defendants
wishing to withdraw their pleas on that basis were required to demonstrate prejudice or a
denial of justice. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 519, 521-22. In this case, defendant argues that our
decision in Delvillar must be overturned based on the United States Supreme Court’s later
decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). We disagree and affirm the denial of
defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 In October 2008, seven firearms were stolen from a home in Will County. The following
day, the local sheriff received a report of suspicious activity in Joliet and later found
defendant and two other men in a garage, with five firearms from the burglary in plain sight.
Defendant was indicted in the circuit court of Will County on a single count of aggravated
possession of stolen firearms, a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 5/16-16.1(a)(1), (c)(1) (West
2008)), for possession of between two and five firearms with knowledge that they were
stolen. Defendant was previously adjudicated delinquent for aggravated unlawful use of a
weapon in 2003 and received probation. He faced a possible sentence of 4 to 15 years in
prison on the 2008 firearm charge. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(4) (West 2008).
¶4 In February 2009, while represented by criminal defense counsel, defendant entered a
fully negotiated guilty plea to the firearm charge. During the plea hearing, the trial court
asked defendant whether he was a United States citizen, and, after initially stating he was,
defendant quickly clarified that he was a permanent legal resident. The court did not
admonish defendant about the potential impact of pleading guilty on his immigration status
prior to accepting the plea pursuant to section 113-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963 (725 ILCS 5/113-8 (West 2008)). Defendant was given the minimum sentence of four
years in prison and two years of mandatory supervised release, with a recommendation for
impact incarceration.
¶5 Defendant filed a written motion to withdraw his plea in March 2009 and argued during
the subsequent hearings that he did not enter the plea knowingly and intelligently because he
was not admonished pursuant to section 113-8. The trial court directed the parties to supply
additional research, and, at a subsequent hearing, defense counsel noted that this court had
heard oral arguments a month earlier in a similar case, Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507. Based on
that representation, the trial court asked the parties whether they wished to wait for further
guidance from this court or proceed to an immediate ruling. Defendant requested an
immediate ruling, and the trial court denied his motion to withdraw the plea. Defendant then
filed a direct appeal of the trial court’s ruling.
¶6 During the pendency of defendant’s direct appeal, he filed a postconviction petition that
was denied by the trial court at the second stage because no evidence showed he would have
gone to trial if he had been properly admonished. Defendant appealed the postconviction
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ruling. He then sought leave to file an amended postconviction petition adding the claim that
he would not have entered the plea if he had been informed of the potential immigration
consequences. At the hearing on the amended postconviction petition, defense counsel stated
that defendant was to be deported, and defendant was granted leave to withdraw his notice of
appeal on the first postconviction petition and file an amended petition. No further
proceedings took place in the circuit court.
¶7 Addressing defendant’s direct appeal, the appellate court reversed his conviction,
concluding that his plea was not knowing and intelligent because defense counsel did not
advise him of the possible immigration consequences. People v. Guzman, 2011 IL App (3d)
090464. The State then filed a petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26,
2010).
¶8 In October 2012, this court granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal but, after
briefing, issued a supervisory order remanding the cause. The supervisory order directed the
appellate court to consider whether the absence of a statutory admonishment by the trial court
about the potential immigration consequences of the guilty plea (725 ILCS 5/113-8 (West
2008)) permitted defendant to withdraw his plea in light of the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Padilla, 559 U.S. 356. People v. Guzman, No. 113730 (Ill. Mar. 28,
2012).
¶9 On remand, the appellate court withdrew its original opinion, consolidated defendant’s
direct appeal with his appeal from the denial of his postconviction petition, and requested
supplemental briefing. The appellate court subsequently reversed the denial of defendant’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea in his direct appeal, remanding that cause for further
proceedings, and dismissed defendant’s postconviction appeal. 2014 IL App (3d) 090464.
¶ 10 After allowing the State’s petition for rehearing, however, the appellate court withdrew
its original opinion, with the majority issuing a revised opinion affirming the denial of
defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea and reversing the denial of his postconviction
petition, remanding for additional postconviction proceedings. 2014 IL App (3d) 090464.
Relying on Delvillar, the majority held in the direct appeal that the immigration
consequences of a guilty plea were collateral consequences that did not affect the
voluntariness of the plea. 2014 IL App (3d) 090464, ¶ 22 (citing Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at
521-22). Justice Holdridge dissented in part, asserting that the plea was constitutionally
involuntary under Padilla because the trial court did not give the proper admonishment. He
also cited the reasoning in People v. Peque, 3 N.E.3d 617 (N.Y. 2013). 2014 IL App (3d)
090464, ¶ 73 (Holdridge, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part).
¶ 11 Defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal addressing only the appellate court’s
decision on direct appeal to affirm the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This
court allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015).
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 Defendant asks this court to overrule its prior decision in Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507, in
light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla. He argues that, under Padilla,
the absence of a statutory admonishment about the possible immigration consequences of a
guilty plea (725 ILCS 5/113-8 (West 2008)) renders the plea unconstitutionally involuntary.
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Because the issue presents a question of law, we review it de novo. In re Detention of
Hardin, 238 Ill. 2d 33, 39 (2010).
¶ 14 Section 113-8 of the Code states:
“§ 113–8. Advisement concerning status as an alien.
Before the acceptance of a plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill, or nolo
contendere to a misdemeanor or felony offense, the court shall give the following
advisement to the defendant in open court:
‘If you are not a citizen of the United States, you are hereby advised that
conviction of the offense for which you have been charged may have the
consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial
of naturalization under the laws of the United States.’ ” 725 ILCS 5/113-8 (West
2008).
¶ 15 This court previously considered whether a defendant could withdraw his guilty plea
based on the trial court’s failure to give a section 113-8 admonishment in Delvillar. After
acknowledging that the admonishment “is mandatory in the sense that the circuit court does
not have discretion in giving” it, we explained that the critical question was whether section
113-8 is mandatory or directory. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 516. In making that determination,
we noted that section 113-8 did not include any negative language if the admonition is not
given, such as barring the acceptance of the plea, and that the right being protected was “not
necessarily *** harmed in the absence of the admonishment.” Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 517,
519. We concluded that section 113-8 was directory and the failure to comply with it was
simply one factor to be considered in ruling on a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty
plea. The ruling ultimately “rest[ed] in the sound discretion of the circuit court.” Delvillar,
235 Ill. 2d at 519. Because the right to withdraw a plea is not automatic, a defendant’s
request for relief must demonstrate “a manifest injustice” under the unique facts of the case.
Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 520.
¶ 16 When inadequate admonishments are given, the question of whether due process was
violated arises, and the answer turns on whether the plea was made voluntarily and
intelligently. In resolving that question, the court examines only the direct consequences of
the plea, not the collateral consequences. This court defined “[d]irect consequences” as
“those consequences affecting the defendant’s sentence and other punishment that the circuit
court may impose,” and “[c]ollateral consequences” as those “effects upon the defendant that
the circuit court has no authority to impose.” Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 520.
¶ 17 Because state courts do not control the immigration decisions of governmental agencies,
we concluded that any possible immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea are
collateral. “As such, the failure to admonish a defendant of potential immigration
consequences does not affect the voluntariness of the plea” or violate due process. Delvillar,
235 Ill. 2d at 520-21.
¶ 18 Nonetheless, we noted that a plea may still be withdrawn in the absence of a
constitutional violation if “real justice has been denied or if the defendant has been
prejudiced by the inadequate admonishment,” with the defendant bearing the burden of
making the requisite showing. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 522. In Delvillar, the defendant had
both erroneously informed the trial judge he was a United States citizen and failed to
demonstrate prejudice in either his motion to withdraw the plea or his supporting argument.
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Because the defendant failed to meet his burden of showing prejudice or a denial of real
justice, we reversed the appellate court judgment in his favor and reinstated the trial court’s
denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 522-24.
¶ 19 The following year the United States Supreme Court decided Padilla, cited by defendant
in the instant case. Defendant contends that the reasoning in Padilla requires us to overrule
our decision in Delvillar. In Padilla, the defendant was a noncitizen charged with a drug
crime that “made his deportation virtually mandatory.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359. Here,
defendant argues his firearms conviction places him in a similarly precarious position. Unlike
this case, however, the defendant in Padilla filed a postconviction petition alleging a sixth
amendment violation based on the failure of his defense counsel to provide effective
assistance by advising him of the possibility that he could be deported if he pled guilty. The
Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the denial of the defendant’s postconviction petition,
finding that immigration consequences were merely collateral. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359-60
(citing Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Ky. 2008)).
¶ 20 Citing significant changes in immigration law making deportation a near certainty for
many noncitizens convicted of drug or firearms crimes, the Supreme Court found
“[d]eportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to
the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral
consequence.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366. The Court “conclude[d] that advice regarding
deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel” and, consequently, the standards for effective assistance of counsel expressed in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), were applicable. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366.
¶ 21 Although acknowledging that Padilla did not declare immigration consequences to be
direct, defendant argues that they also cannot be considered collateral, contrary to our
conclusion in Delvillar. In light of Padilla, defendant contends that the failure to give the
section 113-8 admonishment renders any subsequent plea unconstitutionally involuntary.
Because a valid plea must be knowing and intelligent (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242
(1969)), defendant contends that Padilla mandates the conclusion that, in the absence of a
section 113-8 admonition, his due process rights were violated and his plea was not knowing
and voluntary.
¶ 22 Defendant admits that even after Padilla our appellate court has consistently continued to
view immigration consequences as merely collateral (see 2014 IL App (3d) 090464, ¶ 66
(Holdridge, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part) (collecting cases)), but he
maintains those cases were wrongly decided. Citing Justice Holdridge’s partial dissent in the
appellate decision in this case, defendant claims that if deportation cannot be deemed a
collateral consequence of a criminal conviction as a matter of law, logically, “this conclusion
must be true for all purposes.” (Emphasis in original.) 2014 IL App (3d) 090464, ¶ 66
(Holdridge, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part). In further support of his
position, defendant cites the rationale in Peque, 3 N.E.3d at 633-35, decided by New York’s
highest court. We reject that analysis.
¶ 23 Padilla involved a sixth amendment challenge alleging the defendant’s trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance. In contrast, both Delvillar and the instant case involve fifth
amendment due process claims. As we explained in People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102,
¶ 97, the analytical standards for evaluating challenges rooted in due process and other
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constitutional provisions vary widely. Consequently, “[a] ruling on a specific flavor of
constitutional claim may not justify a similar ruling brought pursuant to another
constitutional provision. [Citation.] In other words, a constitutional challenge raised under
one theory cannot be supported by decisional law based purely on another provision. United
States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997).” Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 97.
¶ 24 In addition, the Supreme Court’s concise statement in Padilla “that advice regarding
deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel” expresses an intent to restrict its conclusion to that constitutional predicate. Padilla,
559 U.S. at 366. Perhaps most tellingly, the Supreme Court recognized as much in Chaidez v.
United States, decided three years after Padilla, when it stated while further explaining its
decision in Padilla that “no decision of our own committed us to ‘appl[y] a distinction
between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope’ of the right to counsel.
[Citation.] And however apt that distinction might be in other contexts, it should not exempt
from Sixth Amendment scrutiny a lawyer’s advice (or non-advice) about a plea’s deportation
risk.” (Emphasis added.) Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1110
(2013) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365). The Court again emphasized the sixth amendment
context of Padilla by expressly stating that “[e]ven in Padilla [the Court] did not eschew the
direct-collateral divide across the board.” Chaidez, 568 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1112.
Accordingly, we reject as overly broad defendant’s reading that Padilla created a new rule
barring deportation from being considered a collateral consequence for any purpose.
¶ 25 Moreover, even defendant concedes, as he must, that Padilla did not announce a rule
declaring immigration consequences, including the virtual certainty of deportation, to be the
direct consequences of a criminal conviction—even within the limited context of the sixth
amendment. In Illinois, the established rule is that trial courts must admonish defendants of
only the direct consequences of a guilty plea. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 520. We explained in
People v. Williams that a knowing and intelligent plea is premised on the defendant’s full
awareness of only the direct consequences flowing from it, adopting the standard set forth by
the Supreme Court in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). People v. Williams,
188 Ill. 2d 365, 371 (1999). Consequently, a plea may be knowing and intelligent even if the
defendant is unaware of its nondirect consequences (Williams, 188 Ill. 2d at 371) such as
deportation (Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 521). Thus, even if, as defendant claims, Padilla is
applicable in the context of a fifth amendment due process challenge, it does not mandate a
holding that the failure to give section 113-8 admonishments entitles defendants to withdraw
their guilty pleas.
¶ 26 As long as the potential immigration consequences faced by the defendant are not
deemed to be direct, that is, “affecting the defendant’s sentence and other punishment that the
circuit court may impose,” our longstanding precedents do not bar the acceptance of a guilty
plea in the absence of a section 113-8 admonishment. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 520. “Even in
light of Padilla, we cannot say that deportation is a consequence that relates to the sentences
imposed on the basis of that plea.” People v. Carrera, 239 Ill. 2d 241, 256 (2010). Since
Padilla, we have also rejected the claim that the distinction between direct and collateral
consequences no longer applies in cases involving fifth amendment challenges. People v.
Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶¶ 34-66. Consequently, we conclude that Padilla does not compel
the reversal of our prior holding in Delvillar.
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¶ 27 Our decision puts us in the company of the vast majority of courts nationwide that have
rejected similar Padilla claims. Although not controlling in this court, the post-Padilla
decisions of the federal courts of appeal and all but one high state court that have considered
the issue are in agreement that trial courts are not constitutionally required to provide
admonishments about immigration consequences before accepting defendants’ guilty pleas.
See United States v. Carrillo-Estrada, 564 F. App’x 385, 387 (10th Cir. 2014); United States
v. Rodriguez-Penton, 547 F. App’x 738, 739-40 (6th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases and
explaining that the sixth amendment imposes a higher burden on counsel to inform clients of
the consequences of entering a guilty plea than the fifth amendment imposes on courts);
United States v. Delgado-Ramos, 635 F.3d 1237, 1240-41 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(explaining that Padilla “sheds no light on the obligations” the trial court has under the fifth
amendment); see also United States v. De La Cruz-Trejo, 518 F. App’x 286, 286-87 (5th Cir.
2013) (per curiam) (declining to decide whether Padilla overturned circuit court precedent
but holding that, at a minimum, trial courts do not commit plain error by failing to
admonish); United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2012) (recognizing in the context
of civil commitments that Padilla did not undermine distinction between direct and collateral
consequences in fifth amendment cases); United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 381-82 &
n.3 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding both that Padilla did not change the fifth amendment framework
and that trial courts are not required to provide admonishments on the loss of federal
benefits). See Smith v. State, 697 S.E.2d 177, 183-84 (Ga. 2010) (explaining that the
direct/collateral dichotomy still applies to fifth amendment, but not sixth amendment, and
that defense counsel’s burden is greater than the trial court’s duty); State v. Ortiz, 44 A.3d
425, 429-31 (N.H. 2012); Stiger v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Ky. 2012); State v.
Davis, 9 N.E.3d 1031, 1040 (Ohio 2014) (finding the issue forfeited but noting that
“Padilla’s holding concerns what an attorney must advise a defendant before the defendant
enters a plea of guilty [and not] what a trial court must advise a defendant before accepting a
jury waiver”).
¶ 28 Even the single outlying decision cited by defendant, issued by New York’s highest court
in Peque, rejected the automatic withdrawal of pleas entered without admonishments
addressing potential immigration consequences. Peque, 3 N.E.3d at 622, 638. Contrary to
defendant’s claim in the instant appeal that a due process violation is presumptively
prejudicial, the majority in Peque required defendants to make a showing of prejudice before
being able to withdraw their guilty pleas. In this case, defendant would find no relief if held
to that standard.
¶ 29 Under defendant’s approach, any plea entered in the absence of a section 113-8
admonishment would be deemed invalid and subject to withdrawal without any need for a
showing of prejudice or denial of real justice. Without a need to demonstrate prejudice, an
improperly admonished defendant would presumably be entitled to withdraw a plea even if
fully informed by defense counsel about the possible immigration consequences before
entering the plea. The potential windfall to defendants who have suffered no prejudice or
injustice without the lack of the statutory admonishment could be far-reaching. As the
Supreme Court warned in Padilla, because pleas constitute “nearly 95% of all criminal
convictions,” courts “must be especially careful about recognizing new grounds for attacking
the validity of guilty pleas.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372.
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¶ 30 This court acknowledged a similar need for caution in Delvillar, placing the burden of
establishing prejudice or the denial of “real justice” on defendants who wish to withdraw
their pleas in the absence of proper immigration admonishments. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 522.
Even Padilla required defendants to establish a reasonable probability that they would not
have pled guilty if they had been properly admonished. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366, 374-75. We
do not find defendant’s suggested approach sufficiently persuasive to overcome the
fundamental principle of stare decisis and overturn our decision in Delvillar.
¶ 31 Shifting his focus, defendant next broadly asserts that if the failure to provide section
113-8 admonishments has no adverse consequences, trial courts will have little incentive to
admonish even noncitizen defendants, who often face a serious risk of deportation.
Accordingly, he asks that we construe the admonishment in section 113-8 to be mandatory as
a matter of sound judicial policy. The State counters that defendant’s approach would give
defense counsel a strong incentive to remain silent if a trial court fails to give the section
113-8 admonishment because the defendant would later be entitled to withdraw the plea
without any showing of prejudice or injustice. In refuting the State’s contention, defendant
notes that defense counsel must act in accordance with the professional duty of candor and
may, at least arguably, violate Rule 3.3 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct of 2010
by tacitly ignoring the trial court’s error (see Ill. R. Prof. Conduct (2010) R. 3.3 (eff. Jan. 1,
2010) (requiring attorneys to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the judicial
process)).
¶ 32 Trial judges are under a similar duty to perform all the duties of their office in accordance
with Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Ill. S. Ct. R. 63 (eff. July 1, 2013)). We
conclude it is unlikely that trial judges will knowingly fail to give section 113-8
admonishments to noncitizen defendants in the absence of a stronger incentive to comply
with the law. We also decline to presume that trial judges will interpret our decision in this
case as condoning the routine omission of admonishments enacted by our legislature. While
our trial courts undoubtedly have a statutory obligation to admonish noncitizen defendants
properly, nothing in Padilla advances that obligation to the level of a constitutional mandate.
¶ 33 Noncitizen defendants need not be disheartened by our decision today, however, because
our trial courts do not bear the sole burden of ensuring that defendants are properly
admonished about the potential immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea. As
Padilla made clear, to be constitutionally effective criminal defense counsel must “advise a
noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration
consequences.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369. Defense counsel is generally in a superior position
to the trial court to make determinations about their clients’ citizenship and provide
appropriate advice about potential immigration consequences. Libretti v. United States, 516
U.S. 29, 50-51 (1995). As in Padilla, noncitizen defendants who do not receive that advice
from criminal defense counsel may be entitled to relief based on counsel’s ineffective
assistance if they can make the requisite showing of prejudice. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374.
¶ 34 Defendants who did not receive section 113-8 admonishments may also be entitled to
withdraw their pleas if they have been denied “real justice” or have suffered prejudice.
Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 522. Before this court, however, defendant has not raised that
argument or provided any evidence supporting a claim that he would not have pled guilty if
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he had been properly admonished.
¶ 35 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 36 For the reasons stated, we decline to overrule our decision in Delvillar in light of the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Padilla and defendant’s arguments. We affirm the appellate
court’s judgment upholding the denial on direct appeal of defendant’s motion to withdraw
the guilty plea.
¶ 37 Appellate court judgment affirmed.
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