People v. Lacy ( 2013 )

2013 IL 113216
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 113216)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
ELIJAH S. LACY, Appellee.
Opinion filed July 11, 2013.
JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Thomas, and
Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Garman dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Theis.
OPINION
¶1 Section 103-5(c) of the Illinois speedy-trial statute (725 ILCS
5/103-5(c) (West 2010)) authorizes a circuit court to continue a
criminal case for “not more than an additional 60 days” to allow the
State to obtain “evidence material to the case” if the State has
exercised “due diligence” to obtain the evidence and “there are
reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may be obtained at
a later day.” In this case, the circuit court granted the State two
separate continuances prior to trial under section 103-5(c) because
two of the State’s witnesses were, for different reasons and at
different times, temporarily unavailable. The two continuances, when
added together, totaled more than 60 days.
¶2 Following a substitution of judge, the defendant moved for
dismissal of the charges against him, arguing that section 103-5(c)
limited the State to not more than 60 days’ continuance in total, and
that when this limitation was taken into account, the statutory speedy-
trial period had expired. The circuit court agreed with defendant,
granted his motion and dismissed the charges against him. The
appellate court affirmed. 2011 IL App (5th) 100347. For the reasons
that follow, we reverse the judgments of the lower courts and remand
this cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 The defendant, Elijah S. Lacy, was arrested on February 8, 2009,
and subsequently charged in the circuit court of Jackson County with
first degree murder and home invasion. After defendant was granted
several continuances, a trial date was set for February 1, 2010.
Defendant remained in custody throughout the proceedings.
¶5 On January 25, 2010, the State filed a motion to continue pursuant
to section 103-5(c) of the speedy-trial statute (725 ILCS 5/103-5(c)
(West 2010)). In this motion, the State explained that Rebecca Pope,
the only eyewitness to the events that gave rise to the charges against
defendant, would be unable to travel from her home in Missouri to
attend the scheduled trial because she was in the midst of a high-risk
pregnancy and travel restrictions had been placed on her by her
doctor. The motion included documentation from Pope’s doctor and
stated that Pope’s due date was March 1, 2010. The circuit court
granted the State’s motion over defendant’s objection and set a new
trial date of April 26, 2010.
¶6 On April 19, 2010, the State filed a “pretrial motion regarding
witness availability,” which asserted that the crime scene technician,
Officer Dale Reamy of the Carbondale police department, was
unavailable to testify at the scheduled trial because he had been
deployed by the army reserve to Afghanistan. The motion requested
the agreement of defendant to allow Lt. Paul Echols, who was present
at the crime scene when evidence was collected, to testify in Reamy’s
stead. The motion also stated that, in the absence of defendant’s
agreement, the State would be forced to seek a continuance of the
trial date until Reamy returned from overseas.
¶7 On April 23, 2010, defendant filed his own motion to continue,
arguing in part that the continuance was necessary so Reamy would
be available for cross-examination. The circuit court granted
defendant’s motion and rescheduled the trial for June 21, 2010.
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¶8 On June 14, 2010, defendant filed a motion stating that he would
not agree to the State’s request that Echols be allowed to testify in
place of Reamy. Consequently, the State filed a second motion
requesting an extension of the speedy-trial period under section 103-
5(c). In this motion, the State asserted that Reamy would be
unavailable to attend the trial on the scheduled date because he would
still be serving in Afghanistan. The motion further stated that Reamy
would be back in the area on July 15, 2010, and would be able to
testify at that time. Over defendant’s objection, the circuit court
granted the State’s motion and rescheduled the trial for July 19, 2010.
Including the continuance allowed with respect to Rebecca Pope, the
two continuances granted the State under section 103-5(c) totaled
more than 60 days.
¶9 On July 9, 2010, a different trial judge was assigned to
defendant’s case. On July 15, 2010, defendant filed a motion to
dismiss on the basis that the statutory speedy-trial period had expired.
In his motion, defendant argued that section 103-5(c) allows a total
of only 60 days’ continuance, regardless of the circumstances
confronted by the State. The motion further alleged that the general,
120-day speedy-trial period provided under section 103-5(a) of the
speedy-trial statute (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2010)), plus the
additional 60 days of continuance allowed under section 103-5(c) (a
total of 180 days), had elapsed on June 26, 2010. Thus, defendant’s
motion contended that the statutory speedy-trial period had expired,
and the case against him should be dismissed.
¶ 10 On July 19, 2010, following a hearing, the circuit court
“reluctantly” granted defendant’s motion. The circuit court held:
“[T]he State can request multiple continuances per 103-5(c) upon
proper proof of due diligence. This was done. This Court does not
believe that the total of these continuances may exceed 60 days. This
Court believes the total maximum time for defendant to be tried is
180 days.” The circuit court determined that July 19, 2010, was the
203rd day of defendant’s pretrial custody that was attributable to the
State, or 23 days past the maximum permitted, in the view of the
court, under the speedy-trial statute. Accordingly, the circuit court
dismissed the charges and ordered defendant released from custody.
¶ 11 The State appealed, arguing that section 103-5(c) of the speedy-
trial statute does not limit it to a total of 60 days’ continuance. The
appellate court rejected this contention, concluding that under the
statute, a defendant must be brought to trial no later than 180 days
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after he is taken into custody. 2011 IL App (5th) 100347. We granted
the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26,
2010).
¶ 12 ANALYSIS
¶ 13 At issue in this case is whether the State is limited to a total of 60
days’ continuance under section 103-5(c) of the speedy-trial statute
(725 ILCS 5/103-5(c) (West 2010)). The parties acknowledge that
this precise issue has not been addressed in any prior case law and,
thus, is one of first impression. Because the issue presented raises a
question of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. Mattis v.
State Universities Retirement System, 212 Ill. 2d 58, 76 (2004).
¶ 14 Section 103-5(c) of the speedy-trial statute provides:
“If the court determines that the State has exercised without
success due diligence to obtain evidence material to the case
and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such
evidence may be obtained at a later day the court may
continue the cause on application of the State for not more
than an additional 60 days. If the court determines that the
State has exercised without success due diligence to obtain
results of DNA testing that is material to the case and that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that such results may
be obtained at a later day, the court may continue the cause on
application of the State for not more than an additional 120
days.” 725 ILCS 5/103-5(c) (West 2010).
¶ 15 As he did in the courts below, defendant maintains that, because
section 103-5(c) states that the cause may be continued “for not more
than an additional 60 days,” the State may not, under any
circumstances, be granted more than 60 days in total to obtain
material evidence. The State counters by arguing that the plain
language of section 103-5(c) “sets no limits on the number of times”
a continuance may be granted and, therefore, the statute allows the
State to obtain multiple continuances of not more than 60 days each
upon a showing of due diligence, materiality of the evidence, and
reasonable grounds to believe the evidence may be obtained at a later
date. In our view, neither of these arguments hits the mark.
¶ 16 Section 103-5(c) provides that where the State has exercised due
diligence to obtain material evidence and “there are reasonable
grounds to believe that such evidence may be obtained at a later day”
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(emphasis added) (725 ILCS 5/103-5(c) (West 2010)), the State may
be granted up to 60 days to obtain that evidence. From this language
it is clear that the 60-day time period is tied to the specific evidence
for which the continuance is being sought. So, for example, in this
case, when the circuit court granted the State a continuance to obtain
the testimony of Rebecca Pope, the continuance was granted with
respect to that evidence alone. Officer Reamy’s testimony was
different evidence and when that testimony became unavailable, the
State was entitled under section 103-5(c) to seek a separate
continuance to obtain “such evidence.”
¶ 17 In arguing that the State may receive no more than a total of 60
days’ continuance, defendant is, in effect, saying that the phrase “such
evidence” refers to all material evidence for which the State may seek
continuances, regardless of when or why those continuances are
sought. This is a strained reading of the statute. The more natural
reading is that the phrase “such evidence” refers to that evidence for
which the State is seeking a continuance and, therefore, the State in
this case was entitled to seek one continuance of not more than 60
days to obtain the testimony of Rebecca Pope, and a separate
continuance of not more than 60 days to obtain the testimony of
Officer Reamy. Indeed, in our view, had the General Assembly
intended the meaning argued by defendant, i.e., that the maximum
time period under section 103-5(c) is 60 days in total, it could have
easily said so. It did not.
¶ 18 At the same time, the State’s contention that section 103-5(c)
“sets no limits on the number of times” a continuance may be granted
is also incorrect. Where the conditions of section 103-5(c) are
satisfied, the State may seek separate continuances in order to obtain
different items of material evidence, but the statute plainly indicates
that the State is only entitled to one continuance of not more than 60
days for each item. Thus, contrary to the State’s assertion, section
103-5(c) does not permit an unlimited number of continuances.
¶ 19 Further, there are significant restraints placed on the use of the
continuances under section 103-5(c). Before granting a continuance,
the circuit court must find, in the exercise of its discretion, that the
evidence for which the continuance is sought is material to the case,
that the State has exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence, and
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence will
be available at a later date. These requirements prevent the State from
using the statute to create unnecessary delay. For example, if the State
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is aware, at the outset, that two different witnesses are unavailable,
due diligence requires that the unavailability of both witnesses be
disclosed to the circuit court at that time. The State cannot move for
a continuance to obtain the testimony of one witness, exhaust that
continuance, and then move for a continuance for the second witness.
In this way, the statute prevents the State from unnecessarily
prolonging the proceedings but allows the State additional time to
obtain material evidence when, as in this case, a second witness
unexpectedly becomes unavailable.
¶ 20 Defendant also contends that reading section 103-5(c) as allowing
for more than a total of 60 days’ continuance would be “inconsistent
with the purpose of the speedy trial statute,” which is to implement
the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the federal and state
constitutions. The constitutional speedy-trial provisions do not
contain a specific time limit within which a defendant must be tried.
See U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. Rather,
to determine whether a constitutional speedy-trial violation has
occurred, four factors are considered as part of a balancing analysis:
(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the
defendant’s assertion of the speedy-trial right, and (4) prejudice to the
defendant caused by the delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530
(1972); People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 46-48 (2001). Illinois’
speedy-trial statute implements the constitutional right to a speedy
trial by setting forth a definite time limit within which a defendant
must be brought to trial. People v. Sandoval, 236 Ill. 2d 57, 67
(2010); Crane, 195 Ill. 2d at 47-48. According to defendant, only a
limit of 60 days’ continuance in total under section 103-5(c) would
be sufficiently definite to serve this purpose. We disagree.
¶ 21 Under the constitutional speedy-trial analysis, the State’s inability
to obtain material evidence after exercising due diligence, and in
particular the inability to obtain the testimony of a material witness,
is considered a presumptively valid reason for delay. Barker, 407
U.S. at 531; see generally Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation,
Illness or Incapacity of Judge, Prosecuting Officer, or Prosecution
Witness as Justifying Delay in Bringing Accused Speedily to
Trial—State Cases, 78 A.L.R. 3d 297, § 5 (1977). Recognizing this
fact, many speedy-trial statutes place no limit on the amount of time
allowed when the government is diligently seeking material evidence.
See, e.g., Alaska R. Crim. P. 45(d)(3)(a) (2012); Ark. R. Crim. P. R.
28.3(d)(1) (2013); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(l)(3) (2013); Haw. R. Penal
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P. 48(c)(4)(i) (2013); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(c)(i) (2012); N.Y.
Crim. Proc. Law § 30.30(4)(g) (McKinney 2013); see also, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)(A) (2006) (excluding period of delay when an
essential witness is unavailable); Mass. R. Crim. P. 36(b)(2)(B)
(2013) (same). However, as we have explained, section 103-5(c)
places an explicit limit on the length of the permitted continuance,
tying the extension of time to the evidence being sought and
providing for one, and only one, continuance of not more than 60
days to obtain an item of material evidence. This is a sufficiently
defined period of time to serve the purpose of implementing the
constitutional right to a speedy trial.
¶ 22 In the case at bar, the State was entitled to seek one continuance
of not more than 60 days under section 103-5(c) to obtain the
testimony of Rebecca Pope. The State was also entitled to seek a
second continuance of not more than 60 days to obtain the testimony
of Officer Reamy, since that testimony constituted different evidence.
Further, defendant does not contend that the circuit court abused its
discretion when it initially found that the State acted with due
diligence in attempting to secure the testimony of the two witnesses,
that their testimony was material, and that there were reasonable
grounds to believe that their testimony would be obtained at a later
day. Accordingly, the circuit court erred when it subsequently held
that the speedy-trial statute was violated.
¶ 23 CONCLUSION
¶ 24 For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the circuit and
appellate courts are reversed. The cause is remanded to the circuit
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 25 Judgments reversed.
¶ 26 Cause remanded.
¶ 27 JUSTICE GARMAN, dissenting:
¶ 28 The majority holds that section 103-5(c) allows the trial court to
grant the State one 60-day continuance to obtain each piece of
evidence or each witness that is unavailable during the speedy-trial
period. Because I believe the majority’s interpretation of the statute
is incorrect, I respectfully dissent.
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¶ 29 Defendants have the right to a speedy trial under the United States
and Illinois constitutions (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, § 8). As the majority notes, under the constitutional
analysis, whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been
violated depends on four factors: (1) the length of the delay in the
trial, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the
speedy-trial right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant caused by the
delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Illinois’ speedy-
trial act implements the constitutional right to a speedy trial and this
court has recognized that the act is to be liberally construed. People
v. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419, 427 (1994). Although the statute
implements a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, the
constitutional right and the right conferred by the statute are not
precisely equivalent. A defendant need not show prejudice under the
statutory right and all that is required is that the defendant has not
been brought to trial within the statutory period and that the defendant
has not caused or contributed to the delay. When a statutory speedy-
trial violation is alleged, the statute operates to prevent the
constitutional issue from arising except in cases involving prolonged
delay or novel issues. Id. at 426-27.
¶ 30 The majority relies on the plain language of section 103-5(c) in
concluding that the phrase “such evidence” refers to the evidence for
which the State is seeking a continuance. Thus, according to the
majority, the State was entitled to one 60-day continuance to obtain
Rebecca Pope’s testimony and one 60-day continuance to obtain
Officer Reamy’s testimony. Supra ¶ 17. In my view, the majority
focuses on the wrong language. The question before this court is
whether the phrase “not more than an additional 60 days” permits the
State more than one continuance of 60 days past the expiration of the
speedy-trial period under the statute. The majority’s emphasis on the
phrase “such evidence” is misplaced. When the State seeks a
continuance to obtain material evidence, the continuance, if granted,
would obviously refer to that evidence. Thus, the phrase “such
evidence” lacks the significance the majority ascribes to it. Rather,
the key phrase is “not more than an additional 60 days.”
¶ 31 The majority rightly rejects the State’s argument that “additional”
means that it may obtain multiple continuances of not more than 60
days each. However, the majority errs in holding that the State may
obtain one 60-day continuance for each piece of evidence and each
witness. What the majority withholds with one hand, it bestows with
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the other. Under the majority’s holding, the State may not obtain an
unlimited number of 60-day continuances for each separate witness
or separate item of evidence. However, the majority would allow the
State to obtain a potentially unlimited number of continuances, as
long as each continuance does not exceed 60 days for each witness or
item of evidence. In a complex case with many witnesses and much
evidence, the State may be able to obtain continuances that would
take the case long past the 120-day speedy-trial period. Such a result
may encourage a defendant to invoke his constitutional right to a
speedy trial, something the legislature sought to avoid in limiting the
State’s ability to obtain continuances under section 103-5(c).
¶ 32 I would find the language “no more than an additional 60 days”
in section 103-5(c) to be ambiguous. While I would reject the State’s
construction of that language, I do not find that construction to be
inherently unreasonable. Where the language of a statute is
ambiguous, we may consider the purposes of the statute. Reda v.
Advocate Health Care, 199 Ill. 2d 47, 55 (2002). As noted above,
section 103-5(c) implements a defendant’s constitutional right to a
speedy trial and this court has recognized that the statute is to be
liberally construed. When a statutory speedy-trial violation is alleged,
the statute operates to prevent the constitutional issue from arising
except in cases involving prolonged delay or novel issues. Staten, 159
Ill. 2d at 426-27. This court has noted that the balancing analysis in
the constitutional speedy-trial right is inherent in our speedy-trial
statute and that this balancing is the prerogative of the General
Assembly. People v. Sandoval, 236 Ill. 2d 57, 67 (2010). Since, under
the majority’s analysis, especially in complex cases, the State can
have potentially unlimited 60-day continuances for as many witnesses
and items of evidence it cannot obtain within the speedy-trial period,
defendants may be forced to invoke their constitutional speedy-trial
rights. This is contrary to the purpose of the statute. Had the
legislature wished to provide not more than one 60-day continuance
for each witness and each item of evidence, it could easily have used
language in the statute to make that clear. It did not and that omission
is telling.
¶ 33 The majority’s reliance on statutes of our sister states to support
its holding is misplaced. Not only do none of the cited statutes place
any time limits on continuances granted at the State’s request, a
review of these statutes reveals that they are considerably more liberal
than our statute with respect to the reasons the State may be granted
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continuances. For example, most of the statutes cited by the majority
except from the speedy-trial period delay caused by continuances
granted the State in cases where the prosecutor requires additional
time to prepare the State’s case due to the complexity of the case or
due to other exceptional circumstances. These exceptions are in
addition to continuances sought for the unavailability of witnesses or
material evidence. See Alaska R. Crim. P. 45(d)(3)(b) (2012); Ark.
R. Crim. P. R. 28.3(d)(2) (2013); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(l)(2) (2013);
Haw. R. Penal P. 48(c)(4)(ii) (2013); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-
1207(4)(c)(ii) (2012); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 30.30(4)(g)(ii)
(McKinney 2013).
¶ 34 In contrast, section 103-5(c) of our speedy-trial statute is much
more restrictive. The open-ended continuances allowed under the
cited statutes require a balancing analysis similar to that required
under the constitutional speedy-trial right. Our legislature has sought
to avoid that possibility by providing for continuances totaling no
more than 60 days beyond the speedy-trial period. The majority’s
holding undermines that intent.
¶ 35 I note that the State was not without options in this case. When it
became clear that Reamy’s presence at trial could not be secured
within the maximum allowable time, the State could have asked the
trial court to lower defendant’s bond or release him on his own
recognizance. The State could have sought a plea bargain with
defendant. It could have gone to trial without Reamy’s testimony.
Instead, the State sought a continuance that would have caused
defendant’s trial to take place beyond the 180-day maximum speedy-
trial period. The trial and appellate courts rightly concluded that this
was not permissible under the statute. The majority errs in reversing
those decisions.
¶ 36 JUSTICE THEIS joins in this dissent.
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