Chaudhary v. Department of Human Services , 2022 IL 127712 ( 2023 )

2023 IL 127712IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 127712)
AYESHA CHAUDHARY, Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed January 20, 2023.
JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Theis and Justices Overstreet, Holder White, and Cunningham
concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justices Rochford and O’Brien took no part in the decision.
OPINION
¶1 In 2019, defendant, the Department of Human Services (Department), initiated
an investigation of plaintiff, Ayesha Chaudhary, a recipient of the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), pursuant to section 12-4.4 of the Illinois
Public Aid Code (305 ILCS 5/12-4.4) (West 2018)) and determined that she
received overpayments in the amount of $21,821. The Department began an
overpayment collection process pursuant to Title 89, section 165.10(a), of the
Illinois Administrative Code (Code) (89 Ill. Adm. Code 165.10(a) (2002)).
Chaudhary challenged the determination by filing an agency appeal, and the
administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the overpayment determination was
valid. Chaudhary sought review by the other defendant, Grace B. Hou, the
Secretary of Human Services (Secretary), who found that there was sufficient
evidence presented by the Department to establish that the overpayment had
occurred. Chaudhary filed a writ of certiorari for administrative review in the
circuit court. The circuit court of Du Page County reversed the Secretary’s final
administrative decision, finding that the evidence did not support the determination
of a SNAP overpayment. Defendants filed an appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017)), and the appellate court affirmed the
judgment of the circuit court. See 2021 IL App (2d) 200364. This court allowed
defendants’ petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule
315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). We also allowed the Shriver Center on Poverty Law, Equip
For Equality, Land of Lincoln Legal Aid, Legal Aid Chicago, and Legal Council
For Health Justice to file an amici curiae brief. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20,
2010). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments of the lower courts.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 A. Underlying SNAP Overpayment Proceedings
¶4 Chaudhary arrived in the United States from Pakistan in 2007 or 2008. She
married Jon Mohammad Ramzan while in Pakistan, and they have three children
together. Ramzan also has a daughter from a different marriage. In 2012,
Chaudhary divorced Ramzan, and in January 2013, she moved to White Oak Lane
in West Chicago, Illinois (White Oak address). Chaudhary received SNAP benefits
for herself and the three children she has with Ramzan. He separately received
benefits for himself and his daughter. Under separate accounts, Chaudhary and
Ramzan received SNAP benefits from May 2015 through December 2017 (the
overpayment period), both listing the White Oak address as their SNAP benefits
mailing address.
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¶5 In December 2017, Ramzan stopped receiving SNAP benefits at the White Oak
address when he changed his mailing address to Morton Road in West Chicago,
Illinois (Morton Road address), which was previously listed as his residence in the
Department’s records. His address change alerted the Department that he and
Chaudhary had each been receiving benefits on their separate accounts at the White
Oak address. The separate payments to Chaudhary’s account (four recipients) and
Ramzan’s account (two recipients), cumulatively, were more than would have been
paid if all six recipients had been on one account.
¶6 The Department initiated an investigation and determined that Ramzan lived at
the White Oak address during the overpayment period from May 2015 through
December 2017. Based on its investigation, the Department concluded that
Chaudhary, as the primary account holder at the White Oak address, had received
overpayments totaling $21,821. The Department then began the overpayment
collection process pursuant to section 165.10 of the Code (89 Ill. Adm. Code
165.10(a) (2002)).
¶7 On August 7, 2019, the Department sent Chaudhary a notice of overpayment.
The notification informed Chaudhary that she had received an overpayment of
$21,821 in SNAP benefits from May 2015 to December 2017. The notification
specified that the overpayment “occurred because you and your husband, Jon
Ramzan, received SNAP benefits on separate cases when you were required to be
on a case together, and you did not report Jon’s income from social security or
Ozark Pizza Company.” The notification apprised Chaudhary that she was
“responsible for repaying the SNAP overpayment.”
¶8 Chaudhary challenged the determination by filing an agency appeal. Chaudhary
claimed that she and Ramzan had been divorced since 2012 and Ramzan never
lived with her at the White Oak address. She also maintained that her SNAP account
had always only included four individuals, herself and her three children.
¶9 B. Agency Appeal
¶ 10 Prior to the administrative hearing, there was a prehearing review of the
Department’s documentary evidence, which was attended by Chaudhary and the
department’s representative, Ernesto Chairez, a financial recoveries coordinator
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and a Department employee of 13 years. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 14.11 (2001) (Pre-
Hearing Meeting); id. § 14.12 (Review of Case Record). At the review, Chaudhary
received from the Department a statement of facts and more than 300 pages of
documents. Chaudhary, in support of her position, submitted a letter stating that
Ramzan did not live with her and a copy of her divorce decree from 2012. After the
prehearing meeting, Chairez forwarded Chaudhary’s submissions to the Bureau of
Collections (BOC), which conducted a further investigation. Chaudhary received
the results of this subsequent investigation on the morning of the administrative
hearing, September 30, 2019.
¶ 11 An administrative law judge (ALJ) heard Chaudhary’s appeal via a telephonic
conference. At the hearing, Chaudhary appeared pro se, and the Department was
represented by Chairez. Initially, the ALJ told Chaudhary that, as the appellant, she
had the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and that “[t]his simply
means that you have to prove why you should win and you have to prove it by 51%
which is more likely than not.” The ALJ further informed Chaudhary that in a case
like this, where there is so much information, the Department customarily presents
its case first.
¶ 12 Chairez testified that Chaudhary was the primary account holder on her SNAP
account and that there were six people in her household during the overpayment
period. He stated that the White Oak address was the only address the Department
had for Ramzan, and there were six residents at that address. According to the BOC,
Ramzan moved out of the White Oak residence as of January 13, 2018.
¶ 13 Chairez then reviewed the Department’s exhibits, which consisted of various
documents, including an approximately 200-page submission from the Integrated
Eligibility System (IES) underpayment/overpayment calculator. That submission
indicated that the overpayment was repeated month to month during the
overpayment period. Chairez also pointed out that the BOC report from August 2,
2019, established unreported income for Ramzan.
¶ 14 Chaudhary clarified that she had been divorced from Ramzan since 2012, and
he had been living elsewhere. After receiving the Department’s notification, she
contacted Ramzan and was informed that he was using the White Oak address for
mailing purposes. She stated that her household was “four all the time,” herself and
her three children, and that she wrote to the Department and informed it of the same.
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¶ 15 Chairez attested that Ramzan had a separate SNAP account where he was the
head of the household that included his daughter from another marriage. Chairez
asserted that the Department’s position was that, because Ramzan used the same
address as Chaudhary, the two separate households should have been one
household with six members.
¶ 16 Chaudhary interposed that Ramzan’s daughter attended school in another
district, which showed that he lived in another town. Chairez again stated that all
of the Department’s documents listed Ramzan as living at the White Oak address.
Chairez then continued his review of the Department’s exhibits documenting
Ramzan’s and Chaudhary’s income.
¶ 17 Chairez next addressed numerous documents that purported to establish that
Ramzan lived with Chaudhary at the White Oak address during the relevant time
period, including (1) SNAP payments sent to Chaudhary and Ramzan on separate
accounts at the address from May 2015 to December 2017, (2) post office
verification of the address as Ramzan’s mailing address as of February 9, 2018,
(3) state records showing both Chaudhary and Ramzan with vehicles registered to
the address in 2018, (4) registration of Ramzan’s corporation, Yasmar, Inc., at the
address with Ramzan and Chaudhary listed as officers filed with the Illinois
Secretary of State for the year 2019, (5) property records listing Ramzan as owner
of the White Oak property in 2004 and 2006, and (6) Social Security records
showing the receipt of benefits for Ramzan’s daughter from a prior marriage, at the
address.
¶ 18 Chairez then focused on an IES summary page registering the Morton Road
address as Ramzan’s residence and the White Oak address as his mailing address.
According to Chairez, this was “weird,” and Chairez asked why he would use the
White Oak address for mailing. Chaudhary replied that Ramzan had had trouble
receiving mail at the Morton Road address.
¶ 19 After Chairez concluded presenting the Department’s evidence, the ALJ
addressed Chaudhary, informing her that now was her chance to ask Chairez any
questions. Chaudhary was also informed that she could present her argument or
choose to say nothing.
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¶ 20 Chaudhary affirmed that she and Ramzan had divorced and she had submitted
her divorce decree establishing that they divorced in 2012. She testified that
Shakeel, a relative of Ramzan’s, told her about the White Oak residence and she
started living at White Oak with her three children in 2013. Chaudhary was not sure
if Ramzan had ever lived there, but he was not living there when she moved in. She
acknowledged that she was listed as the secretary of Ramzan’s company in 2006.
¶ 21 After receiving the overpayment notice, Chaudhary spoke with Ramzan, and he
acknowledged that he used the White Oak address as a mailing address. Chaudhary
stated that she had not been aware of this, explaining that there were other residents
at the address, living on different floors, one of whom would receive and distribute
the mail.
¶ 22 Chaudhary continued testifying that she was in her home country, Pakistan, for
34 years, and she had not lived with Ramzan when she came to the United States.
She had resided in Glendale Heights prior to moving to the White Oak address in
2013. She also stated that she occasionally worked on income taxes five to six
months a year. In closing, Chaudhary asked the Department to reconsider its
position because the overpayment was a significant amount. At the end of the
hearing, Chaudhary requested time to submit additional documents showing that
Ramzan lived elsewhere, and the ALJ held the record open for four days.
¶ 23 Chaudhary supplemented the record with evidence that Ramzan did not live at
the White Oak address during the overpayment period. She presented a letter from
Ramzan, which stated that he had moved out of the White Oak address in 2012 and
had moved with his daughter to the Morton Road address. His letter continued that
his relative, Shakeel, rented the residence to Chaudhary after he moved out.
Ramzan explained that, once he moved to the Morton Road address, he had not
received several documents from the Department and Social Security. After
contacting the Department regarding the missing letters, he was advised that he
could provide a different mailing address than his residence. Ramzan then changed
his mailing address to White Oak.
¶ 24 Ramzan enclosed numerous exhibits listing his residence as Morton Road that
included the following: (1) a state of Illinois driver’s license issued in August 2013,
which expired in June 2017; (2) an internal Department record, showing Ramzan
listed White Oak as a mailing address and Morton Road as his residence address
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with the Department; (3) a residential lease beginning June 1, 2013, and ending
May 31, 2015; (4) a residential lease beginning June 1, 2015, and ending August
31, 2020; (5) a proof-of-residency letter from the Benjamin School District for
August 13, 2013; (6) an approval letter from Benjamin School District for free meal
services for the 2015-16 school year; (7) an automobile insurance card effective
September 3, 2015, through October 19, 2015; (8) a copy of a check from Allstate
Insurance dated December 17, 2016; (9) electricity bills for service dated between
2013 and 2016; and (10) a 2017 medical bill from Northwestern Medicine.
¶ 25 Chaudhary also tendered notarized letters from the other tenants, Nizakat Khan
and Sher Dill Khan. They averred that (1) they resided in the basement at the White
Oak address, (2) they knew Chaudhary, and (3) Chaudhary resided in the upper
level with her three children and nobody else. In addition, she submitted a letter
from Shakeel dated October 2, 2019, acknowledging that he managed the White
Oak address and that Chaudhary had moved in on January 3, 2013. The record was
closed on October 4, 2019, after receipt of Chaudhary’s submissions.
¶ 26 Thereafter, the ALJ rendered the following findings of fact based on a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) Chaudhary had received SNAP benefits from at
least May 2015 with a total of four people in her assistance unit; (2) she received a
notice of overpayment from the Department informing her that she had received a
$21,821 SNAP overpayment, and she was responsible for repaying the same
because (a) she and her husband had received SNAP benefits in separate cases when
they were required to be in a case together and (b) she had not reported his income.
The ALJ upheld the Department’s overpayment determination.
¶ 27 In summary fashion, the ALJ discussed Chaudhary’s testimony without making
a credibility determination. She reiterated that Chaudhary arrived from Pakistan in
2007 or 2008, she and Ramzan have children together but never lived together, and
they were divorced in 2012. Ramzan’s family member helped Chaudhary find her
current residence, where she has lived since 2013, and she did not know that
Ramzan had once lived at the White Oak address or that he was using the address
as his mailing address. There are two men who also live at the address in a separate
living quarter, and one collects and distributes all the mail. Chaudhary was aware
that she was added to Ramzan’s corporation in 2006, and to earn extra money,
during the tax season, she works filing income taxes for individuals. Chaudhary
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sought agency review by the Secretary.
¶ 28 C. Secretary’s Final Administrative Decision
¶ 29 Based on the ALJ’s findings, the Secretary issued her final administrative
decision, determining that the decision to charge Chaudhary with $21,821 in a
SNAP overpayment was proper. The Secretary relied on documents from the
Department’s investigation showing the White Oak address as Ramzan’s address,
including the Secretary of State records listing Ramzan and Chaudhary as officers
of Yasmar, Inc., a post office address verification, and state vehicle registration
records, to find that it was more likely than not that both lived there during the
overpayment period. As a result, the Secretary ruled Ramzan should have been
included on Chaudhary’s account and his income reported.
¶ 30 The Secretary specifically addressed the fact that the notice of overpayment
stated that Chaudhary and her husband received SNAP benefits in separate cases
and Chaudhary had undeclared income from her husband. The Secretary
acknowledged Chaudhary’s divorce decree, but according to the Secretary,
although they may no longer be married under the law, that did not overcome the
evidence that they are members of the same household and that a SNAP
overpayment occurred.
¶ 31 The Secretary then asserted that Chaudhary’s testimony “lacks credibility.” The
Secretary noted that “[i]t is highly implausible” that she did not know that Ramzan
once owned and lived at the White Oak address, “it is unlikely” that others collected
the mail every day and that she was “clueless” or “completely oblivious” to the fact
that Ramzan received his mail there, and her testimony that she and Ramzan never
lived together during their marriage contradicted her written statement that they had
not lived together “since” their divorce.
¶ 32 The Secretary concluded that the Department had provided sufficient
documentation and calculations establishing that Ramzan resided at the White Oak
address and that an overpayment had occurred. The Secretary upheld the
Department’s decision to charge Chaudhary with a $21,821 SNAP overpayment.
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¶ 33 D. Circuit Court Decision
¶ 34 Subsequently, Chaudhary filed a common-law writ of certiorari in the circuit
court seeking review of the Secretary’s final administrative decision. The circuit
court granted the writ and reversed the Secretary’s final administrative decision.
The circuit court found that the Department had the burden of proof regarding
overpayment of SNAP benefits where it is seeking to divest a recipient of
previously granted benefits.
¶ 35 Further, the court found that the Department had not sustained its burden of
proof and the evidence did not establish that Ramzan, Chaudhary’s ex-husband,
resided at the White Oak address. Specifically, the court determined that (1) many
of the documents produced by the Department were from outside of the
overpayment period; (2) Chaudhary and Ramzan had been divorced since 2012,
with the time in issue being between May 2015 and December 2017; and (3) the
affidavits plus all of the other documentation clearly showed that Ramzan used the
White Oak address only as a mailing address and did not reside there.
¶ 36 E. Appellate Court Decision
¶ 37 Defendants filed an appeal of the circuit court’s order. The appellate court
affirmed, holding that the Department carried the burden of proof to establish a
SNAP overpayment. 2021 IL App (2d) 200364, ¶ 47.
¶ 38 The court agreed with the parties that the Code was silent regarding allocation
of the burden of proof in an appeal from a SNAP overpayment determination. Id.The appellate court recognized that the Department first initiated the overpayment
claim, determined the overpayment amount, and then notified Chaudhary of its
determination. Id. ¶ 48. Based on the above circumstances, the appellate court
concluded that Chaudhary’s administrative hearing was not an initiation of a new
action. Id. Rather, her hearing was an appeal of the Department’s overpayment
determination against her, as was her right under the Code. Id. The court observed
that its conclusion was consistent with Eastman v. Department of Public Aid, 178
Ill. App. 3d 993 (1989), which indicated that the burden of proof is with the agency
because the agency must present some reliable evidence establishing an
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overpayment for the administrative decision to stand. 2021 IL App (2d) 200364,
¶ 52 (citing Eastman, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 994).
¶ 39 According to the appellate court, where the statute is silent regarding the burden
of proof, the general rule controls that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. The
court determined that, in this case, the Department is the plaintiff because it initiated
the action against Chaudhary to recover its overpayment. Id. ¶ 55.
¶ 40 In addressing the evidence, the appellate court held that the Department’s
decision to charge Chaudhary with an overpayment and the Secretary’s denial of
her appeal were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 63. The court
observed that the evidence that the Secretary relied on in reaching her decision was
largely from outside the overpayment period. Id. ¶ 65.
¶ 41 The appellate court recognized that “the Secretary gave scarcely any
consideration in her written decision to Chaudhary’s evidence submitted following
the appeal hearing.” Id. ¶ 68. In the court’s view, there was no reason why the
Secretary should not have considered this evidence. Id. The appellate court found
that the failure to discuss the substance of any of Chaudhary’s supplemental
evidence in reaching a final decision was unreasonable. Id. ¶ 71. In addition, the
Department’s “evidence did not show that Ramzan consistently used the White Oak
address, let alone resided there, during the overpayment period.” Id. Accordingly,
the appellate court held that the opposite conclusion, that Ramzan did not reside at
the White Oak address, was clearly evident. Id. The appellate court affirmed the
judgment of the circuit court reversing the Secretary’s final administrative decision.
Id. ¶ 73. Defendants filed a petition for leave to appeal to this court.
¶ 42 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 43 Defendants argue that the lower courts erred in placing the burden of proof on
the Department in this administrative hearing addressing a SNAP overpayment
determination. Defendants acknowledge that the provisions governing the
Department’s SNAP administrative hearings do not specifically place the burden
of proof on either party, but they argue for application of the default rule that the
party who initiates the action carries the burden, and here that is Chaudhary. In
addition, defendants contend that the Code as a whole, specifically its appeal
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process, implicitly places the burden of proof on Chaudhary. Defendants also
contend that the burden should rest with the party who has access to relevant
information and Chaudhary possesses the evidence concerning Ramzan’s
residence. Defendants posit that placing the burden on Chaudhary does not violate
her due process rights because she was afforded a fair hearing before a neutral
tribunal. Defendants argue that the Secretary’s decision was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence because there was evidence in the record to support
the finding that Ramzan lived with Chaudhary at the White Oak address during the
relevant time period. Finally, defendants maintain that the Secretary’s credibility
determination regarding Chaudhary is due substantial deference and should be
upheld.
¶ 44 Chaudhary responds that the lower courts properly found the Department
carries the burden of proof when divesting a recipient of SNAP benefits. Chaudhary
agrees that the statute is silent as to who carries the burden of proof and the default
rule applies. According to Chaudhary, it is the Department that initiated the action
to divest her of a benefit and, therefore, carries the burden of proof. Chaudhary also
argues that the Code and the relevant provisions regarding the appeal process do
not implicitly place the burden on a SNAP benefit recipient. Chaudhary maintains
that the Department is responsible for determining whether an overpayment
occurred and has superior access to relevant public records to make that
determination. Chaudhary argues she was not afforded due process, as she was at a
disadvantage at the hearing because she did not have notice that she bore the burden
of proof and did not receive prior notice that Ramzan’s alleged residence at the
White Oak address was the reason for the overpayment determination. Chaudhary
maintains that the Secretary’s decision was against the manifest weight of the
evidence because it was unsupported by any competent evidence and that the
opposite conclusion was clearly evident—Ramzan did not live at White Oak during
the overpayment period but used it only as a mailing address.
¶ 45 A. Standard of Review
¶ 46 The determination of which party bears the burden of proof in the context of an
administrative proceeding presents a pure question of law that we review de novo.
1350 Lake Shore Associates v. Healey, 223 Ill. 2d 607, 627 (2006). To ascertain
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whether the Code implicitly places the burden of proof on the benefit recipient
requires us to construe the relevant sections of the Code. Statutory construction also
presents a pure question of law that we review de novo. Robinson v. Village of Sauk
Village, 2022 IL 127236, ¶ 17.
¶ 47 The primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to
the intention of the legislature. Id. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent
is the language of the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
Id. A statute is viewed as a whole; therefore words and phrases are construed in
light of other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation. United States v.
Glispie, 2020 IL 125483, ¶ 10. A court may consider the reason for the law, the
problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences
of construing the statute one way or the other. Id.¶ 48 B. Burden of Proof
¶ 49 1. Where the Statute Is Silent, the Default Rule That the
Party Who Initiated the Action Applies in
Administrative Proceedings to Divest a
Recipient’s Benefit
¶ 50 Defendants contend that an agency should not bear the burden of proof where
the statutes or regulations do not assign the burden of proof to either party.
Defendants further contend that their internal process to determine whether an
overpayment has occurred and notification of an overpayment to the recipient is
not a proceeding that initiates an action. Rather, it is the benefit recipient’s request
of an appeal that is the affirmative step that starts the action.
¶ 51 Defendants rely on Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005), for the
proposition that, where the relevant statute does not allocate the burden of proof,
the default rule is that the party who initiates the action carries the burden.
¶ 52 Defendants contend that Schaffer supports their position that SNAP
overpayment collection procedures implicitly place the burden on the recipient of
the benefit, rather than the Department. Defendants point out that in Schaffer the
United States Supreme Court explained that placing the burden of proof on an
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agency assumes that “every [agency action] is invalid until the [agency]
demonstrates that it is not.” Id. at 59. The Court rejected this assumption, reasoning
that “Congress appears to have presumed instead that, if the [agency’s] procedural
requirements are respected, [individuals] will prevail when they have legitimate
grievances.” Id. at 60. Thus, the Court determined that the plaintiffs bore the burden
of persuasion regarding the essential aspects of their claims. Id. at 57.
¶ 53 Defendants maintain that Illinois law follows this default rule, regardless of
whether the party initiating the administrative appeal seeking relief from the
agency’s action either (1) first claimed and was denied a benefit or privilege or
(2) had a government agency revoke or suspend an existing benefit or privilege.
We disagree.
¶ 54 Defendants’ reliance on Schaffer is misplaced. In Schaffer, the Court explained
the difference between the burden of persuasion, i.e., which party loses if the
evidence is closely balanced, and the burden of production, i.e., which party bears
the obligation to come forward with the evidence at different points in the
proceeding. Id. The Court explained that its decision governed the burden of
persuasion. Id. at 56.
¶ 55 The Schaffer Court determined that the case concerned the burden of persuasion
because the ALJ deemed the evidence in “ ‘equipoise.’ ” Id. at 55. The Court
explicitly stated that it would “hold no more than we must to resolve the case at
hand.” Id. at 62. The Court found that the burden of persuasion in an administrative
hearing challenging an individual education program is properly placed upon the
party seeking relief, whether that is the parent on behalf of the disabled child or the
school district. Id. The parties in the case before us are in a different procedural
posture.
¶ 56 In the case at bar, Chaudhary’s application for benefits had been approved, and
she had been receiving SNAP benefits for herself and her three children. The
Department later initiated proceedings to recover alleged overpayments made to
Chaudhary. The Department, through notification of a change in mailing address
for Ramzan, became aware that two recipients were using the same mailing address.
With this information, the Department made the decision to initiate an
investigation, refer the results to its BOC, and send notification of overpayment to
Chaudhary. We find that the Department’s mailing of its notice of overpayment to
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Chaudhary on August 7, 2019, and informing her “You Are Responsible For
Repaying This SNAP Overpayment” is the act by the Department that initiated this
action. We also agree with the appellate court that the posture of this case—
divesting an existing recipient of her benefits and the Department never designating
Chaudhary as the plaintiff—falls within the default rule. 2021 IL App (2d) 200364,
¶ 48.
¶ 57 We next address defendants’ reliance on Arvia v. Madigan, 209 Ill. 2d 520(2004), People v. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d 326 (1988), and Smoke N Stuff v. City of Chicago,
2015 IL App (1st) 140936, for the proposition that the party challenging the
agency’s determinations is the party who bears the burden during the administrative
proceedings. These cases do not support defendants’ position.
¶ 58 In Arvia, this court placed the burden of proof on a driver contesting a license
suspension where the suspension was required by statute and the State provided an
administrative hearing process to challenge the suspension. Arvia, 209 Ill. 2d at
540. This was necessary, as the burden of proof at the administrative hearing was
provided for by the Code. Id. at 542 (citing 92 Ill. Adm. Code 1001.620 (2003)
(zero tolerance petitioner carries the burden of proof)). Thus, the suspension
occurred by operation of law rather than government action. Id.¶ 59 Similarly, in Orth, a driver was contesting the summary suspension of his
driver’s license, and the court placed the burden on the driver. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d at
337. This court addressed the legislative intent of the statute providing recission
only if the motorist took the positive step of making a written request for judicial
hearing in the circuit court. Id. However, again, the summary suspension occurred
by operation of law. Id.¶ 60 Smoke N Stuff involved an administrative appeal to contest a government
entity’s initial action against a business. Smoke N Stuff, 2015 IL App (1st) 140936,
¶ 1. The city suspended a business license due to a tax law violation. Id. The court
in Smoke N Stuff relied on the general rule that, because the business initiated the
administrative appeal, it bore the burden of proof at the hearing to restore its license.
Id. ¶ 15.
¶ 61 The distinguishing factor, as defendants acknowledge, is that the burden was
assigned by local ordinance where the municipal code provided that the notice
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constituted a prima facie case. See id. Thus, the code clearly indicated that the
burden was on the party challenging the allegations in the notice.
¶ 62 In addition, the court in Smoke N Stuff, in applying the general rule, relied on
Marconi v. Chicago Heights Police Pension Board, 225 Ill. 2d 497 (2006) (per
curiam). Marconi involved a plaintiff police officer who took the initial step of
applying for pension disability benefits, was denied them by the Board, and then
appealed the denial. Id. at 500. This court stated specifically in Marconi, “[a]s the
applicant for disability pension benefits, plaintiff had the burden of proof to
establish his entitlement to either *** pension.” Id. at 536.
¶ 63 We observe that there is a distinction between a party who appeals a benefit
denial on application and a party who appeals and challenges an agency’s
determination to divest the party of a benefit the party already receives. Id. Thus,
Arvia, Orth, and Smoke N Stuff do not help us determine the party with the burden
in a case where a party challenges an agency’s determination of an overpayment of
benefits. Accordingly, we find defendants’ reliance on those cases is misplaced.
¶ 64 We, however, find the reasoning in Petrovic v. Department of Employment
Security, 2016 IL 118562, to be instructive in the present case. In Petrovic, an
employee was advised that her employment was terminated because of her
misconduct. Id. ¶ 5. She filed for unemployment, and the employer filed a protest.
Id. ¶ 6. The unemployment claims adjuster denied the benefits. Id. ¶ 7. On appeal
to the board of employment security, the denial was affirmed. Id. ¶ 9. On review by
the circuit court, the decision was overturned. Id. ¶ 10. The Department of
Employment Security, the board of review, and the Director of Employment
Security appealed, and the appellate court reversed the circuit court, reaffirming the
board of review’s denial. Id. ¶ 11.
¶ 65 The Petrovic court addressed which party carried the burden of proving an
employee’s disqualification due to misconduct. Id. ¶ 28. This court observed that
the appellate court has consistently held that the burden of establishing an
employee’s disqualification rests upon the employer who alleges that the employee
was discharged for misconduct. Id. (citing cases). The court explained that, while
it is true that a claimant bears the burden of establishing her initial eligibility for
unemployment insurance benefits, this does not mean that an employee must prove
the absence of a disqualifying event. Id. In the court’s view, there was no reason to
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change the well-established rule that an employer who asserts an employee’s
disqualification for benefits based on misconduct has the burden of proving such
misconduct. Id.
¶ 66 Similarly, Chaudhary, as a SNAP recipient, having been previously approved
and awarded SNAP benefits, was not required to prove the absence of an
overpayment. Rather, the Department, which asserted Chaudhary’s erroneous
receipt of SNAP benefits in excess of her household maximum, initiated the action
by notification and was required to carry the burden of proving such overpayment.
See id..
¶ 67 In support, we also find case law addressing the burden of proof in Social
Security overpayment determinations instructive. Like SNAP benefit recipients,
recipients of federal funds from the Social Security Administration are a vulnerable
populace. In addition, the Social Security Act also does not designate which party
bears the burden of establishing an overpayment and the amount of the
overpayment. 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2018).
¶ 68 In Wilkening v. Barnhart, 139 Fed. App’x 715, 715 (7th Cir. 2005), the Social
Security Administration (Administration) informed Wilkening that the
Administration had overpaid her disability benefits. Wilkening pursued an
administrative appeal, which found evidence of the overpayment. Id. at 717. She
then sought judicial review. Id. The court concluded that the burden of proving the
existence and amount of an overpayment should rest with the Administration. Id.
¶ 69 In McCarthy v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Cannuni v.
Schweiker, 740 F.2d 260, 263 (3d Cir. 1984), and United States v. Smith, 482 F.2d
1120, 1124 (8th Cir. 1973)), the court observed that, although the Social Security
Act does not designate which party bears the burden of establishing the fact and
amount of overpayments, each circuit to consider the issue has held that the
Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) has this burden. The court joined
these circuits and held that the Commissioner bears the burden of proving the fact
and amount of overpayment. Id.¶ 70 As set forth above, we find that where the statute is silent the default rule applies
in administrative proceedings to divest a recipient’s benefit, such that the party
initiating the action carries the burden. Here, the Department initiated the action by
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sending Chaudhary a notification of overpayment and informing her that she was
responsible for repaying the $21,821 SNAP overpayment. Accordingly, we hold
that the Department carries the burden of proof in overpayment proceedings.
¶ 71 2. The Code, Including the Appeal Process, Does Not
Implicitly Vitiate the Department’s Burden of Proof
¶ 72 Defendants contend that the Code, as a whole, implicitly places the burden of
proof on Chaudhary to prove the Department’s determination was incorrect. In
support, defendants primarily rely on the appeal process and its provisions to show
that Chaudhary carries the burden of proof.
¶ 73 Defendants assert that the Code provisions relating to SNAP overpayment
collection procedures are in direct contrast to provisions relating to disqualifying a
recipient from SNAP benefits altogether for an intentional violation. Defendants
point out that, in a determination of intentional violation, the Department must
initiate the administrative proceeding pursuant to section 14.300. 89 Ill. Adm. Code
14.300 (2001). Further, the Code requires the Department to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that an intentional violation occurred. Id. § 14.340.
Defendants argue that it is clear that the legislature placed the burden on the
Department in disqualification hearings but did not show such an intent in the
SNAP overpayment collection process.
¶ 74 However, we find important distinctions in the Code’s reference to a suspected
intentional violation of the program requiring the disqualification of a recipient and
the Department’s overpayment collection process that divests a portion of the
recipient’s benefits. First, regarding a disqualification due to an intentional
violation of the program, section 14.300 provides that the Department may refer
cases of suspected intentional violation for criminal prosecution. Id. § 14.300.
Second, at a disqualification hearing, disqualification will only occur if there is
clear and convincing evidence as determined by the hearing officer that the
household member intentionally violated the program. Id. §§ 14.340, 14.370.
Evidence is clear and convincing if it leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the
trier of fact as to the truth of the proposition in question, and proof by a
preponderance of the evidence means that the trier of fact must believe that it is
more likely than not that the evidence establishes the proposition in question. In re
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Meyers, 616 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 2010). An evidentiary standard that is greater
than the preponderance is required to reduce the risk of an erroneous
disqualification. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 361-62 (2004) (finding that, where the
interests at stake are substantial, a higher burden than a preponderance is required,
and in those cases a clear and convincing standard is imposed).
¶ 75 We note that in the determination of an overpayment and subsequent divestment
of a portion of the benefit there are no possible criminal implications. Further, the
standard of proof, as the ALJ informed Chaudhary, was the preponderance of the
evidence rather than the more exacting standard of clear and convincing evidence
for disqualification. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 14.340, 14.370 (2001).
¶ 76 It is clear that the legislature was aware of the substantial result of a full
disqualification from the program and required the heightened burden prior to
disqualification. Yet we see no intent, either implicitly or explicitly, that the
legislature intended to place the burden of proof in overpayment proceedings on a
vulnerable population such as SNAP recipients. See Glispie, 2020 IL 125483, ¶ 10
(finding that in construing a statute it is proper to consider the reason for the law,
the problem sought to be remedied, the goals to be achieved, and the consequences
of construing the statute one way or another). Accordingly, defendants’ arguments
regarding the relevant provisions of disqualification and divestment of a benefit do
not support their contention.
¶ 77 We now turn to defendants’ assertion that the appeal provisions of the Code
also implicitly provide that Chaudhary, as the one who is appealing the
Department’s determination, carries the burden of proof. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 14.10
(2001). Defendants rely on section 14.22(a), which provides that “[t]he appellant
shall have the opportunity to: (1) [p]resent evidence and witnesses in the appellant’s
behalf” and “(2) [r]efute testimony or other evidence and cross-examine
witnesses.” Id. § 14.22(a). In defendants’ view, the fact that section 14.22(a) gives
the appellant a right to affirmatively present evidence and witnesses and to cross-
examine witnesses implies that the burden of proof rests with the benefit recipient
who is appealing the Department’s overpayment determination. Defendants further
maintain that section 14.60, which provides that the Department may collect an
overpayment with no prove-up if an appeal does not proceed, also implies that the
Department does not bear the initial burden of proof. Id. § 14.60.
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¶ 78 Contrary to defendants’ assertions, the language in sections 14.22(a) and 14.60
does not vitiate the Department’s burden of proof. Rather, sections 14.22(a) and
14.60 define the contours of the appeal process, which is the only opportunity for a
benefit recipient to challenge the Department’s SNAP overpayment determination.
Nothing in the language of the statutes indicates or implies that the appeal process
alleviates the Department’s burden of proof.
¶ 79 In addition, defendants fail to acknowledge that section 165.10 provides
specifically that “[t]he Illinois Department of Human Services (Department)
initiates action to recover overpayments.” (Emphasis added.) 89 Ill. Adm. Code
165.10 (2002). Thus, the plain language of the Code refutes defendants’ contention
that Chaudhary’s appeal initiated the action and implicitly placed the burden on
her. See Robinson, 2022 IL 127236, ¶ 17 (finding that the most reliable indicator
of legislative intent is the language of the statute, which must be given its plain and
ordinary meaning). In fact, this section of the Code, together with the Department’s
own assertion that the burden falls on the party who initiated the action, confirms
the burden rests on the Department.
¶ 80 Further, although focusing on different administrative codes, we find Scott v.
Department of Commerce & Community Affairs, 84 Ill. 2d 42 (1981), to be
instructive. In Scott, this court held that when the appellant is challenging an agency
determination to divest a benefit, the burden of proof belongs to the agency. Id. at
53. The Scott court observed that the Department of Commerce and Community
Affairs (Department of Commerce) misconceived the purpose and intent of the
hearing provided by the Housing Authorities Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 67½, ¶ 4)
and the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 127, ¶ 1010).
Scott, 84 Ill. 2d at 52. The court noted that the Department of Commerce interpreted
the relevant “statutory provisions as requiring only that the Department [of
Commerce] inform the commissioners of the reasons why it proposes their removal;
the commissioners are then entitled to a hearing at which they bear the burden of
establishing the absence of cause for their removal.” Id.¶ 81 The Scott court recognized that the Department of Commerce overlooked
relevant provisions of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, which impose
upon the Department of Commerce a greater obligation in contested cases, under
which the rules of evidence in civil cases would be followed and a party would be
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allowed to conduct cross-examination. Id. at 53. The court determined that implicit
in the right of cross-examination is the requirement that there be witnesses and
testimony presented. Id. The court also determined that the application of the rules
of evidence in civil cases imposes upon the Department of Commerce the
obligation to establish, in the first instance, a prima facie case. Id. The court
explained that Illinois courts have uniformly enforced the rule in administrative
agency cases that the moving party has the burden of proof. Id.¶ 82 Thus, we reject defendants’ contention that the Code, and specifically the
appeal process, implicitly placed the burden of proof on Chaudhary. Similarly, as
in Scott, here, the Code provided for witnesses, testimony, and cross-examination
and that the Department, in the first instance, initiated the action. Accordingly, we
find that the Department carried the burden to present a prima facie case of the
SNAP overpayment determination and maintained that burden throughout the
appeal process. See id.; 89 Ill. Adm. Code 14.23 (2001) (requiring that a hearing be
conducted in a manner best calculated to conform to substantial justice).
¶ 83 3. The Department Is the Entity With
Access to Relevant Information
¶ 84 We next address defendants’ argument that, because Chaudhary had access to
relevant information as to where her ex-husband, Ramzan, lived during the
overpayment period, the burden of proof was properly placed on her by the ALJ.
We disagree.
¶ 85 Defendants contend that Chaudhary was in a better position than the
Department to have information specific to where Ramzan resided. Defendants also
point out that the regulations provided Chaudhary with prehearing protection that
included a meeting with a representative to go over the Department’s evidence to
understand the reasons for its determination. See 89 Ill. Adm. Code 14.11, 14.12
(2001).
¶ 86 We observe, that in the case at bar, the record shows that the notification and
the prehearing meeting only informed Chaudhary that the Department found that
she and her “husband” should have been on the same account for SNAP benefits.
She was not aware that the Department would be relying on evidence regarding her
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and Ramzan’s mailing addresses during the overpayment period. Thus, as far as
this prehearing protection is concerned, it failed Chaudhary.
¶ 87 In addressing who has access to relevant information, we first note that the
Department is responsible for determining that an overpayment has occurred and it
obviously has superior access to the records it used to make this determination. 89
Ill. Adm. Code 165.10 (2002). To make this determination, the Department has a
myriad of public resources that include access to the Illinois Department of
Employment Security, Social Security Administration, United States Department
of Labor, and Internal Revenue Service records. The Department also has internal
provisions that allow the Department to conduct a yearly state income tax match,
where the Department’s records are matched with the Illinois Department of
Revenue records to obtain possible sources of unreported income. 89 Ill. Adm.
Code 117.90 (2013). In addition, the Code provides the Department with the ability
to match its records with new hire information reported by employers to discover
unreported earned income of persons receiving assistance. 89 Ill. Adm. Code
117.91 (2020). On the other hand, benefit recipients have no such access to public
sources of information and, thus, are at an obvious disadvantage.
¶ 88 Second, the Department also has expertise compared to the general SNAP
population, including Chaudhary, who by nature of the program are those with
disabilities; who are elderly; or may have limited education, resources, access to
representation, and English proficiency. See Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities,
Illinois Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (Apr. 25, 2022), https://www.
cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/snap_factsheet_illinois.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NN6F-H6RE]. As noted by the amici curiae, many SNAP recipients who
file an appeal are unrepresented at the hearing. See The Justice Gap: The Unmet
Civil Legal Needs of Low-Income Americans, Legal Services Corp. (Apr. 2022),
https://justicegap.lsc.gov/ [https://perma.cc/ANX6-WDVE]; Lyz Riley Sanders
et al., Colo. Ctr. On Law and Policy, Barriers, Errors, & Due Process Denied, at
16 (Mar. 2022), https://cclponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SNAP-
Administrative-Hearing-Report-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NSL-4WJQ]. SNAP
administrative hearings are formal legal proceedings that occur on record and
involve the submission of evidence, examination and cross-examination of
witnesses, and opening and closing statements. Moreover, they involve the legal
framework of federal and state statutes and regulations and policies that govern the
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administrative hearing process. In these proceedings, the Department is represented
by an appeals coordinator, who has great experience and knowledge of the SNAP
program rules and of Department policy manual provisions. Indeed, here, Chairez,
representing the Department, has the title “Executive I” with over 13 years of
experience, while Chaudhary appeared pro se. This imbalance in representation and
advantage to the Department supports our determination that the Department is the
entity with access to relevant information. See 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 190 (Nov.
2022 Update) (the party with greater expertise and access to relevant information
should bear the evidentiary burdens of production of evidence and persuasion).
¶ 89 Third, as observed by the appellate court, the Department would not have to
expand its prehearing procedures. 2021 IL App (2d) 200364, ¶ 54. Under current
procedures, the Department must first make an overpayment determination before
there can be any appeal. Id. Thus, at the appeal hearing, it need not necessarily do
more than present and authenticate the relevant information and evidence from its
overpayment determination. Id.; see also Petrovic, 2016 IL 118562, ¶ 28 (finding
that placing the burden on the employer, rather than the employee, thus imposes
the burden of proof on the entity who has access to the relevant evidence); Hooper
v. Talbot, 343 Ill. 590, 593 (1931) (determining that it is reasonable and just to
impose the burden of proof on the individual who is in possession of such proof,
rather than requiring the other party to prove a negative).
¶ 90 Accordingly, we find that, as the Department is the party that initiated the action
and the party responsible for determining the overpayment, it is the entity with
access to relevant information. Consequently, we hold that the Department carries
the burden of proof in SNAP overpayment proceedings. See Petrovic, 2016 IL
118562, ¶ 28; Scott, 84 Ill. 2d at 53. Finally, to the extent that Smoke N Stuff, 2015
IL App (1st) 140936, suggests that the burden of proof lies with the recipient
beneficiary, it is now overruled.
¶ 91 We need not address the parties’ due process concerns. Our holding that the
burden of proof was with the Department negates the question of whether
Chaudhary was entitled to notice on that issue. Further, as acknowledged by the
appellate court, allowing Chaudhary time to supplement the record provided her
with the opportunity to respond, thus providing a fair hearing on her administrative
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appeal. 2021 IL App (2d) 200364, ¶ 58.
¶ 92 C. The ALJ’s and the Secretary’s Decisions Were
Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence
¶ 93 We next address defendants’ assertion that the ALJ’s and the Secretary’s
decisions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence because there was
overwhelming evidence in the record to support the finding that Ramzan lived with
Chaudhary at the White Oak address during the overpayment period. Defendants
posit that, at the administrative hearing, Chairez authenticated and explained the
evidence that Ramzan lived at the White Oak address. Defendants contend that the
evidence sufficiently showed how the Department calculated the SNAP
overpayment amount, thus establishing that Chaudhary received an overpayment
and was responsible for repaying $21,821. Defendants further contend that
Chaudhary’s documentary evidence simply conflicted with the Department’s and
that the Secretary properly weighed the conflicts in the Department’s favor. We
disagree.
¶ 94 1. Standard of Review
¶ 95 The reviewing court reviews the decision of the administrative agency. Wade
v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 226 Ill. 2d 485, 504 (2007). The
Secretary, as the head of the Department, reviewed the ALJ’s decision and made
the final decision. See 89 Ill. Adm. Code 14.70(a) (2001) (“[f]ollowing the hearing,
a Final Administrative Decision will be made by the Secretary that either upholds
or does not uphold the appealed action”). The standard of review depends on the
issue presented, whether it be one of law, one of fact, or one of law and fact. City
of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 204-05 (1998).
The Secretary’s decision here turned on a question of fact—whether Ramzan lived
at the White Oak address at the relevant times such that he should have been
included in Chaudhary’s SNAP account—and is reviewed under the manifest
weight of the evidence standard. Kouzoukas v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s
Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 234 Ill. 2d 446, 463 (2009). The Secretary’s
factual findings are prima facie true and correct and will not be disturbed unless
they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. An administrative agency
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decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite
conclusion is clearly evident. Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional
Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88 (1992).
¶ 96 2. The Secretary’s Confirmation of the Department’s
Overpayment Determination Was Not Supported
by the Record
¶ 97 Defendants contend that there was evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s
and the Secretary’s finding that Ramzan lived with Chaudhary at the White Oak
address during the relevant time, from May 2015 through December 2017.
Defendants contend that this determination was established at the administrative
hearing, where Chairez authenticated and explained the evidence and by the records
showing how the Department calculated the overpayment amount. Defendants take
issue with the fact that Chaudhary produced much of her evidence after the
administrative hearing when she had gained the benefit of the Department’s
testimony and evidence and the ALJ’s comments. Furthermore, Chaudhary’s
documentary evidence conflicted with the Department’s, and it was the Secretary’s
prerogative to weigh the posthearing submissions and the conflicts in the evidence
in defendants’ favor. Finally, defendants maintain that, instead of according
deference to the Secretary’s findings, the circuit court improperly reweighed the
evidence and the appellate court repeated that mistake by conducting its own
analysis of the evidence and substituting its judgment for that of the Secretary’s.
¶ 98 Although it is true that the Secretary’s decisions should be afforded
considerable weight, they are not immune from review. The Kouzoukas court noted
that, “ ‘[e]ven under the manifest weight standard applicable in this instance, the
deference we afford the administrative agency’s decision is not boundless.’ ”
Kouzoukas, 234 Ill. 2d at 465 (quoting Wade, 226 Ill. 2d at 507). This court has
observed that, when reviewing an administrative agency’s decision, we may put
aside any findings that are clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.Such is the case here.
¶ 99 Defendants relied on the Department’s evidence allegedly showing Ramzan
resided at the White Oak address, including SNAP payments to that address to
Chaudhary and Ramzan on separate accounts from May 2015 to December 2017,
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post office verification of the address as Ramzan’s mailing address dated in 2018,
state records showing both Chaudhary and Ramzan with vehicles registered there
in 2018, registration of Yasmar, Inc., with Ramzan and Chaudhary as officers filed
with the Illinois Secretary of State in 2019, property records showing that Ramzan
had owned the property in 2004 and 2006, and Social Security records showing the
receipt of benefits for Ramzan’s child from a prior marriage.
¶ 100 In addressing the Department’s evidence, we find that the post office
verification contains no evidence of where Ramzan lived during the overpayment
period. The verification request was a blank form that was sent by the Department
to the United States postmaster, who completed it on February 9, 2018, and returned
it to the Department. The verification specified that Mr. Ramzan currently receives
mail at the White Oak address. It contains no information about where Mr. Ramzan
received mail at any other time.
¶ 101 The vehicle registrations that the Department relied upon are also from outside
the overpayment period, as the registrations for the vehicles are dated February 8,
2018. Further, nothing on the face of the documents indicates the source of the
information. In fact, Chairez testified, “I don’t even know where they get this
information because I’m not familiar with the system that has this stuff.”
¶ 102 The Department also submitted documents related to Ramzan’s company,
Yasmar, Inc., that purported to support a finding that Ramzan resided at the White
Oak address during the overpayment period. First, Chairez testified that he had
received those documents from BOC, but they were not otherwise identified.
Second, the documents were dated 2019 and 2020, outside of the overpayment
period. Third, they were internally inconsistent, as one contained the White Oak
address, another contained an address in Bloomingdale, Illinois, and a third
contained an address in Glendale Heights, Illinois. All that can be gleaned from this
evidence is that, at some point in time, Ramzan and Chaudhary were listed as
officers in the corporation and it was registered at the White Oak address.
¶ 103 The Department introduced documents referred to as property records
apparently showing that Ramzan once owned White Oak. There is nothing in these
documents that is remotely close to the time frame of the overpayment, as the
records are from 10 years prior to the overpayment period. Further, nothing on the
face of the documents indicated their source. Indeed, the ALJ asked “But you’re
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not sure where this document was generated from?” Chairez answered, “That’s
correct. I don’t see the source.” Here, we find that the Department’s evidence was
not sufficiently authenticated and does not support the determination that Ramzan
resided at the White Oak address during the overpayment period.
¶ 104 Next, we observe that the Secretary’s final administrative decision stated that
the “Department submitted income documents and calculations and an abundance
of state/government records to show that Adult A (Ramzan) was residing at
Address A (White Oak) and that an overpayment occurred.” The Secretary did not
acknowledge or address Chaudhary’s subsequent submissions to the ALJ.
¶ 105 Thus, the record supports the conclusion that the ALJ and the Secretary relied
solely on evidence the Department submitted, which was from outside the
overpayment period. The Department maintains that the investigation, including its
search for evidence, naturally took place after the overpayment period ended.
Hence, those records were printed or produced on a date after the overpayment
period but “could still reflect Ramzan’s activity or status during the overpayment
period.”
¶ 106 However, we find that, no matter when it was obtained, the evidence still needs
to show that Ramzan resided at the White Oak address during the overpayment
period. Any inference that might be drawn from evidence outside of the
overpayment period about where Ramzan lived during the overpayment period was
unsupported by the evidence in the record.
¶ 107 To compound these errors, the Secretary ignored the Department’s own
evidence showing that Ramzan did not live with Chaudhary but only used the White
Oak address for mail. A Department summary page for Ramzan’s account lists
Morton Road as his residence and White Oak as his mailing address. In fact, the
Department’s own document established that the Department keeps both a mailing
address and a residential address, even if the same, for all recipients. In addition,
the Department’s evidence included a copy of Ramzan’s driver’s license from the
overpayment period, which listed the Morton Road address.
¶ 108 We note that Chaudhary submitted an abundance of evidence that supported her
argument that Ramzan did not reside at the White Oak address during the
overpayment period. The documents included Ramzan’s statement that he resided
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at the Morton Road address, as well as other evidence listing the Morton Road
address, including a residential lease from 2013-20, a state of Illinois driver’s
license issued to Ramzan on August 14, 2013, with an expiration date of June 19,
2017; an approval letter to Ramzan from the Benjamin School District for free meal
services for his daughter for the 2015-16 school year; copies of envelopes with
United States postal stamps showing delivery to Ramzan in 2017; and electricity
bills addressed to Ramzan in 2013 and 2016.
¶ 109 We reject defendants’ argument that Chaudhary’s evidence was entitled to less
weight because it was submitted after the administrative hearing. The Department’s
overpayment determination notification stated that the reason for the overpayment
was that Chaudhary and Ramzan were married, not whether Ramzan was living at
White Oak. Contrary to its assertion, before the appeal, Chaudhary was not aware
that the issue was anything other than that Ramzan was listed as her “husband” in
the Department’s notification. It is not surprising that Chaudhary’s evidence
revolved around her divorce from Ramzan, thus establishing that they were not
husband and wife, after 2012. As noted by the appellate court, considering the
notification described in error that Ramzan was Chaudhary’s husband, it was proper
for the ALJ to allow Chaudhary to respond to the Department’s evidence and
arguments by supplementing the record after the hearing. 2021 IL App (2d) 200364,
¶ 68. Chairez, representing the Department, did not object.
¶ 110 It is apparent from the record that the Secretary did not consider any of this
evidence, as established by the Secretary’s written decision. Although the
Secretary’s final decision is due considerable deference, the failure to discuss the
substance of Chaudhary’s supplemental evidence was unreasonable, and her
subsequent decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In addition,
we note the competent and corroborated evidence that Ramzan lived at the Morton
Road address. Thus, the appellate court did not reweigh the evidence but, rather,
properly set aside a decision that was unsupported by any competent evidence,
meaning that the opposite conclusion was clearly evident. See Abrahamson, 153
Ill. 2d at 88 (administrative agency decision is against the manifest weight of the
evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident). We find that the
evidence is entirely consistent with both Chaudhary’s and Ramzan’s assertions that
he used the White Oak address only as his mailing address and that he did not reside
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there between May 2015 and December 2017.
¶ 111 3. The Secretary’s Credibility Determination Was
Unreasonable and Not Supported by the Record
¶ 112 Defendants contend that the Secretary’s determination that Chaudhary’s
testimony lacked credibility should be affirmed because it was established by the
record and deserves substantial deference. This contention is without merit, and we
reject the Secretary’s credibility determination.
¶ 113 The Secretary found that Chaudhary’s testimony “lack[ed] credibility,” noting
that “[i]t is highly implausible” that she did not know that Ramzan once owned and
lived at the White Oak address, “it is highly unlikely” that others collected the mail
every day and that she was “clueless” or “completely oblivious” to the fact that
Ramzan got his mail there, and her testimony that she and Ramzan never lived
together during their marriage contradicted her written statement that they had not
lived together “since” their divorce.
¶ 114 Defendants assert that the ALJ, who heard Chaudhary testify, found that she
was not credible and that the Secretary agreed with that finding. But the record
reveals that the ALJ made no credibility finding. Thus, the ALJ did not make a
specific credibility determination for the Secretary to adopt.
¶ 115 Second, the Secretary’s credibility determinations were based upon immaterial
discrepancies, such as whether Ramzan had owned and resided at the White Oak
address prior to 2012, whether Chaudhary and Ramzan had lived together prior to
2012, and whether someone other than Chaudhary collected and disbursed the mail
at the White Oak address. The answer to these questions is not relevant to the
determination of whether Ramzan resided at the White Oak address during the
overpayment period.
¶ 116 Third, Chaudhary’s testimony was consistent in that she asserted from the
beginning that she was not married, that she had a household of four individuals,
and that Ramzan did not live with her but resided elsewhere during the alleged
overpayment period. Moreover, minor discrepancies in a witness’s testimony are
not unusual (In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 438 (2009)) and do not destroy the
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witness’s credibility. See Longanecker v. East Moline School District No. 37, 2020
IL App (3d) 150890, ¶ 45 (finding an inability to recall minor events that took place
nearly six months prior to a hearing did not detract from detailed and credible
testimony about events that occurred that same day).
¶ 117 Again, although the Secretary’s final decision is due considerable deference,
the credibility determination by the Secretary was based on testimony on
nonmaterial issues and was not supported by the record. Accordingly, we find that
the Secretary’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. See
Kouzoukas, 234 Ill. 2d at 465 (when reviewing an administrative agency’s decision,
this court may put aside any findings that are clearly against the manifest weight of
the evidence (citing Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department v. Illinois Human
Rights Comm’n, 233 Ill. 2d 125, 142 (2009))).
¶ 118 D. Defendants’ Challenges to Portions
of the Appellate Court’s Decision
¶ 119 As a final matter, we note that defendants take issue with portions of the
appellate court’s analysis and argue that they were based on improper
considerations. We find it unnecessary to address these challenges. Our task is to
review the judgment of the appellate court, regardless of whether the reasoning it
employed was correct. Vaughn v. City of Carbondale, 2016 IL 119181, ¶ 44 (citing
Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 97 (1995)); In re Rita P.,
2014 IL 115798, ¶ 51. For the reasons set forth above, we find that the appellate
court made the right decision when it affirmed the circuit court’s reversal of the
Secretary’s final administrative decision.
¶ 120 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 121 We are mindful that care should be taken to ensure against an erroneous
deprivation of critical nutritional benefits that jeopardize the health, wellness, and
stability of low-income state residents. Thus, we find that, where the Department
initiates an action to divest a SNAP recipient of benefits and the statute is silent as
to the burden of proof, the default rule applies. Accordingly, we hold that the burden
of proof lies with the Department in overpayment cases and remains with the
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Department throughout the appeal process. We find that the Secretary’s final
administrative decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence because it
was unsupported by competent evidence and the opposite conclusion was clearly
evident—that Ramzan did not live at the White Oak address during the
overpayment period. We also find that the Secretary’s credibility determination was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Consequently, we hold that the
appellate court did not err when it affirmed the circuit court’s judgment reversing
the Secretary’s final administrative decision.
¶ 122 Appellate court judgment affirmed.
¶ 123 Circuit court judgment affirmed.
¶ 124 Department decision reversed.
¶ 125 JUSTICES ROCHFORD and O’BRIEN took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
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